[sacw] SACW #1 | 19 June 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire Dispatch #1 | 19 June 2002

South Asia Citizens Web:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

South Asians Against Nukes:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/NoNukes.html

__________________________

#1. Identity Crisis (Hendrik Hertzberg)
#2. Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures Between India and Pakistan
released by the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) + News Rep=
ort
#3. Time To Move Forward On Kashmir (Bharat Bhushan)
#4. Choking On Our Froth - War is a game played by the desperate.=20
(Anita Pratap)
#5. The choice of Kalam (V. Krishna Ananth)
#6. Narmada Bachao Andolan - Press note , Bhopal: 18 June 2002

__________________________

#1.

The New Yorker
Issue of 2002-06-17
COMMENT
IDENTITY CRISIS

Last Monday, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of India, and=20
his host, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan, took an=20
hour out of their busy schedules to participate in a ceremony. Their=20
schedules were busy because they, along with fourteen other=20
Presidents and Prime Ministers, were taking part in something called=20
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in=20
Asia. The purpose of the ceremony was to mark the renaming of=20
Panfilov Street, in Almaty, Kazakhstan's largest city. The old name=20
honored Ivan Panfilov, a Red Army hero. The new name is-wait for=20
it-Mahatma Gandhi Street.

Although the twentieth century's greatest advocate of nonviolence had=20
a pretty good sense of humor (asked once what he thought of Western=20
civilization, he replied that he thought it would be a good idea),=20
this was one joke he might have found a bit forced. And although=20
Mohandas K. Gandhi knew all about paradoxes (he turned a homespun=20
loincloth into a raiment more commanding than any bemedalled=20
uniform), this particular ceremony might have been a little too=20
fraught with paradox even for him. Never mind that the President of=20
Kazakhstan is known for corruption and bullying, two of Gandhi's=20
least favorite vices. The other speaker at the renaming ceremony,=20
Prime Minister Vajpayee, is the leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party,=20
or B.J.P., the political ancestors of which include the=20
Hindu-nationalist fanatics who conspired in Gandhi's assassination,=20
on January 30, 1948. What's more, this nice tribute to a man who=20
lived and died for peace and brotherhood came at a moment when India=20
was mobilizing for war over Kashmir, while India's estranged younger=20
brother, Pakistan, was hinting that its own options, should things=20
get bad enough, would include the use of nuclear weapons. As for=20
Gandhi, he might have preferred to be honored by some actual=20
Confidence-Building Measures, and maybe by some actual Interaction,=20
too. Instead, he got a street sign, while Vajpayee and his Pakistani=20
opposite number, President Pervez Musharraf, managed to spend the=20
better part of two days in the same room without speaking to each=20
other, or even shaking hands.

Gandhi's ideas are largely ignored on the subcontinent nowadays, but=20
he was right about many things, including the two great historical=20
mistakes that are at the root of the current crisis. He was right in=20
his opposition to the partition of the British Raj into India and=20
Pakistan. In 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru and the other leaders of the=20
Indian National Congress reluctantly accepted the division, thinking=20
that the alternative was bloodshed. But the carnage that followed=20
anyway was greater than anyone except Gandhi had imagined, and it has=20
continued sporadically down to the present. (A million died in 1947=20
and 1948, and by 1949 Nehru was bitterly regretting his=20
acquiescence.) The other mistake was the disposition of Kashmir,=20
which, given the brutal logic of partition, ought to have been part=20
of Pakistan. The majority of its population was, and is, Muslim, but=20
its maharaja was Hindu, and the maharaja dithered, and there was=20
fighting, and Kashmir ended up divided but mostly in Indian hands-a=20
partition within the partition, a wound within the wound.

Like the Israeli-Palestinian dispute in the Middle East, the=20
Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir is one of overlapping rights=20
and wrongs, religious and ethnic hatreds, and existential fears.=20
Pakistan sees itself as defending the principles of=20
self-determination and majority rule; India sees itself as defending=20
a larger idea of democracy, and the principles that terrorism must=20
not be rewarded and borders altered by force. Each fears that the=20
"loss" of Kashmir would be fatal to its very identity-Pakistan's as a=20
Muslim state, India's as a secular one. Despite the alliance of=20
India's present government with Hindu fundamentalism, India's=20
conception of itself-one that Westerners naturally find=20
sympathetic-remains that of a multi-ethnic society held together by a=20
democratic political and social contract. To India, the surrender of=20
Kashmir would invite the collapse of the whole national experiment.=20
Yet Pakistan's dilemma-its need to simultaneously resist, co=F6pt, and=20
appease Islamism-is at least as vexing. What makes the situation=20
especially dangerous, of course, is the nuclear arsenals on both=20
sides. Even though each side is capable of destroying the other as a=20
functioning society (and plunging itself and the rest of the world=20
into unthinkable horror), deterrence cannot be relied upon. The=20
United States and the Soviet Union took pains to avoid direct=20
hostilities between their armed forces; but the 1947, 1965, and 1971=20
wars between India and Pakistan were hot, not cold, and their=20
soldiers are shooting, shelling, and killing each other at this=20
moment along the Line of Control that divides Kashmir. Between the=20
two countries there is a perilous asymmetry. Pakistan is weaker than=20
India in every way-in military power, in economic resources, in=20
political stability, in civic strength. The result is a combustible=20
dynamic of desperation on one side and arrogance on the other. And,=20
as has been widely reported, neither side appears to have anything=20
like a realistic picture of what a nuclear war would be like.

In the Middle East, everyone knows what the solution must be: land=20
for peace. Kashmir offers no such obvious formula. It is possible to=20
envision a future arrangement whereby Kashmir remains, in some=20
confederated sense, part of India but also has both a high degree of=20
autonomy and some kind of formal political association with Pakistan.=20
To get there, however, the world is going to have to accept that=20
Kashmir is-like the Middle East, like the terrorism emergency-one of=20
the handful of problems that demand unrelenting international=20
attention and involvement. As in the Middle East, the world, led by=20
the United States, has to provide cover for the sides to make the=20
compromises they can't make on their own. The crisis (along with its=20
international dignity) has to be elevated to the point where it is=20
understood as singular and unique, so that its solution, whatever=20
that turns out to be, is understood to have as few implications as=20
possible for the self-conception of the countries involved.

The intensity of the crisis seems to have ebbed a little in recent=20
days, and, for the most banal of reasons-the weather-a serious=20
outbreak is unlikely before autumn. Heat and rain should see to that.=20
Meanwhile, Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, and=20
Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, are hastening to the=20
subcontinent, in an effort to persuade the region's generals and=20
statesmen that nuclear war is something about which they simply have=20
no idea. Perhaps Armitage and Rumsfeld, of all unlikely pacifists,=20
can convince them that Gandhi-who, in 1946, called atomic weapons=20
"the supreme tragedy"-knew what he was talking about.
- Hendrik Hertzberg

_____

#2.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION MEASURES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
released by the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) in=20
Delhi on June 18, 2002. Other organisations which have endorsed this=20
text in India are the following: Corpwatch, Saheli for Women, Women's=20
Initiative for Peace in South Asia, Indian Social Action Forum,=20
Popular Education and Action Centre, Focus, Movement Against Nuclear=20
Weapons (Tamil Nadu), Janeethi (Kerala).
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/nrrmMIND2002.html

o o o

[Related News Report]

http://www.hindu.com/stories/2002061907911200.htm
The Hindu
Jun 19, 2002

N-risk reduction measures proposed for India, Pak.

New Delhi June 18. Alarmed by the recent war rhetoric in the=20
subcontinent, Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND), a=20
peace group, today proposed a draft of Nuclear Risk Reduction=20
Measures (NRRMs), asking India and Pakistan to immediately de-alert=20
their weapon systems to save the region from an accidental nuclear=20
conflagration.

The NRRMs proposed by MIND include non-deployment of nuclear weapons,=20
keeping nuclear warheads separated from delivery vehicles and=20
de-assembling bombs by removing the nuclear core.

``We must be clear about the limitations of NRRMs. We can try and=20
make South Asia less unsafe, but we cannot make it nuclear-safe=20
except by making it nuclear-free. NRRMs should only be seen as a=20
transitory measure to complete disarmament,'' MIND founder-member,=20
Achin Vinaik, told a press conference.

Apart from the deliberate use of nuclear weapons by one side or the=20
other, MIND identified four potential risks - miscalculation,=20
unauthorised use, accidents and panic behaviour.

``Cold War history tells us that these risks are considerable,'' said=20
Satyajit Rath, another MIND member. ``For instance between 1977 and=20
1984 alone, there were 20,000 false alarms in the United States and=20
former Soviet Union of which 1,000 were serious enough to put bombers=20
and missiles on full alert... The India-Pakistan situation is much=20
worse.''

Mr. Vinaik said the main limitation of NRRM in the sub-continental=20
milieu is the political context with the high level of mistrust=20
between the two neighbours. ``The best guarantee for such CBMs to be=20
effective is to promote greater trust.''

``There is always a trade-off between the demands of safety and the=20
demands of having an active nuclear deterrent system. Actually=20
security through deterrence is an illusion,'' he said.

MIND suggested that India and Pakistan strive to secure an agreement=20
to reciprocate such safety measures and establish procedures to=20
confirm that each side is doing what it is supposed to do. It also=20
demanded that India repudiate the draft nuclear doctrine, which aims=20
to develop tactical nuclear weapons and replace the 1962 Atomic=20
Energy Act to make the civilian nuclear sector more transparent and=20
accountable to Parliament. - UNI

_____

#3.

The Telegraph (Calcutta)
19 June 2002

TIME TO MOVE FORWARD ON KASHMIR

BY BHARAT BHUSHAN

Upto now India has tried to de-link the international diplomatic=20
pressure on Pakistan on the issue of promoting terrorism in Jammu and=20
Kashmir from the Kashmir issue itself. On Kashmir, India is holding=20
on to its traditional postures.

As a result of the Indian and international diplomatic offensive=20
against Islamabad, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is likely to come=20
down. It may not disappear, but experts believe that the terrorist=20
violence in the state would be 30 to 40 per cent less than the=20
critical level, that is, the level at which people are frightened of=20
participating in political processes or speaking out.

What is India going to do if this happens? It will then have to=20
decide how it wants to resolve the Kashmir problem. It can, of=20
course, begin by holding elections to legislatures. However, no one=20
will be foolish enough to believe that free and fair elections in=20
Jammu and Kashmir would be the permanent solution to the Kashmir=20
issue.

In addressing the Kashmir problem, India must ask itself two=20
questions. Is this the right time to move in for a solution? And if=20
so, is India willing to explore new paradigms which may lead to a=20
solution, which is acceptable not only to India and Pakistan but also=20
to the Kashmiris?

There are those who argue that this is not the right time to discuss=20
Kashmir. They believe that India and Pakistan should put the Kashmir=20
issue in cold storage temporarily and concentrate on improving=20
relations in other areas. Attempt the solvable issues first and=20
create a propitious atmosphere for addressing the vexed issue of=20
Kashmir - or so the argument goes. This is a residual argument which=20
has been proved wrong time and again - most recently during Nawaz=20
Sharif's time, when the warm hug in Lahore actually led to Kargil.

This is, in fact, the right time to address Kashmir with Pakistan.=20
Today, in Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan has a leader who has=20
demonstrated the capacity to make fundamental policy changes and=20
survive. He started Kargil, reversed it and yet emerged stronger. He=20
turned Islamabad's Afghanistan policy on its head, took on the=20
jihadis within his own country and increased his acceptability=20
domestically as well as internationally. By eschewing terrorism as a=20
means of furthering Pakistan's Kashmir policy, he is once again=20
making a major policy reversal and hopefully, he will be successful=20
in this endeavour too.

None of the political leaders of Pakistan - not Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,=20
not Benazir Bhutto and not even Nawaz Sharif - has demonstrated this=20
capability. For once there is a leader in Pakistan - albeit a=20
military one - who is taking that society away from religious=20
extremism. The jihadi culture was always a superimposition on the=20
moderate south Asian Islam that most Pakistanis practise. This was=20
partly the fallout of Pakistan's Afghan policy, as also the result of=20
the Inter-Services Intelligence's promoting religious extremist=20
outfits to launch a low-intensity war against India in Kashmir.=20
Musharraf is now attempting to steer Pakistani society away from all=20
this and towards moderation. To do this and yet retain political=20
control requires deft footwork.

Musharraf is also good for India. By changing Islamabad's Kashmir=20
policy of the last one-and-a-half decades, he would eventually lessen=20
the influence of the army on the Pakistani polity. It would also=20
weaken the distorting influence of the ISI in Pakistan domestically.=20
There is, therefore, for the first time, the prospect of a Pakistan=20
which would not be intrinsically inimical to India. India should want=20
to push this process further to help create a Pakistan that does not=20
see itself as an enemy, which does not use its leverage with China=20
against Indian interests and which does not threaten India with=20
nuclear weapons.

For this, India needs to make two fundamental changes in its attitude=20
towards Pakistan. India needs to get rid of the "punish Pakistan"=20
mindset which persists within some sections of the establishment. And=20
it must work towards a satisfactory resolution of the Kashmir issue.=20
Only a Pakistan whose borders with India are secure and stable can be=20
friendly towards it.

The change in mindset is most important. The "punish Pakistan"=20
outlook leads to adventurist ideas ranging from breaking up Pakistan=20
in order to make it landlocked to fomenting an independence movement=20
in its northern areas. Those who dream of a landlocked Pakistan must=20
ask themselves what kind of neighbour would such a Pakistan be? Would=20
it be any more friendly towards India than today's Pakistan? Would=20
India be able to take a massive influx of refugees from Sindh? As for=20
fomenting trouble in Pakistan's northern areas, India must realize=20
that its interest lies in making sure that the northern areas and=20
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir are fully integrated with mainland=20
Pakistan. The sooner this happens, the greater would be the chances=20
of better integrating Jammu and Kashmir with India. If the aim of=20
inflicting punishment on Pakistan is to ultimately get it to discuss=20
the Kashmir issue, then why not begin directly where we hope to end=20
up after such tortuous and devious methods?

It has become increasingly clear over the last 50 years that=20
conventional perspectives on the Kashmir issue have not led anywhere.=20
Neither the paradigm of the instrument of accession being final nor=20
that of a plebiscite, nor even that of converting the line of control=20
into an international border, is going to work. The search for a=20
workable solution, therefore, must begin by jettisoning these=20
paradigms.

If the aim is to work towards a defensive border, then that itself=20
would mean handing over the problem to geographers on both sides.=20
Leave it to the surveyor-generals of the two nations and task them to=20
suggest the give and take required so that both India and Pakistan=20
can have a low-cost, defensible border - one that would, for example,=20
cut down the troop requirements by one-third or more. Which nullah,=20
which gully and which pass should go to whom could be decided on the=20
basis of who has a better defensive position there.

Another way of looking at redefining the border could be to follow=20
the watershed approach - with the direction of the flow of water=20
deciding the border demarcation. In order to give Pakistan the=20
confidence that it will never again be subject to the threat of=20
revocation of the Indus water treaty, it could be given the source of=20
a river - the Kishanganga, for example.

Yet another approach to redefining the border could be to use the=20
linguistic (and, therefore, cultural) identity of the people along=20
it. The areas where people speak Mirpuri, Poonchi, Pahari or Kashmiri=20
could go to the side which has the linguistic majority. The Gujjars=20
who speak Pahari would then go to the side which has their=20
preponderance, the fate of those speaking Poonchi would be decided=20
likewise and so on.

The point is that there could be many ways of redefining a defensible=20
and stable border. India and Pakistan need to explore them to solve=20
this vexed problem instead of getting trapped in frozen positions.=20
The time is ripe for doing so. Even if the rest of the world is kept=20
out of any mediation, it would be waiting to encourage a fair=20
resolution of the issue.

_____

#4.

Outlook Magazine (New Delhi) | Jun 17, 2002

IMPRESSIONS
Choking On Our Froth
War is a game played by the desperate. The world is with us now. We=20
must press our advantage, move further from the brink.
ANITA PRATAP

Those who doubted the power of coercive diplomacy ought to be=20
silenced by now. Over the past week, we saw the major world powers=20
unequivocally endorse India's stand that Pakistan must match deeds=20
with words to stop terrorist infiltration. The world placed the onus=20
on Pakistan to take the first step to defuse the crisis. In moving=20
closer to achieve our national goal of ending cross-border terrorism,=20
in pressuring Pakistan and in rallying international opinion in our=20
favour, coercive diplomacy has delivered. War couldn't have achieved=20
any of this and that alone should persuade our war-mongers to pause=20
and reflect.
But just the threat of war has hurt us. Bracketed with Pakistan,=20
India too is now seen as a dangerous, unstable part of the world=20
where medieval mindsets coexist with nuclear weapons. A volatile=20
Molotov cocktail of a region where politicians, bureaucrats, military=20
experts and even ordinary civilians talk loosely of N-war and mutual=20
destruction. It's not just an unquantifiable thing like our image=20
that has been damaged. A very quantifiable thing, such as our=20
economy, will reel under the impact of two things-the consequences=20
arising out of the evacuation of foreigners and the six-month-long=20
high alert military mobilisation on the border. The middle class,=20
which jingoistically supported war-mongering, will wind up picking up=20
the tab when they soon face joblessness, deteriorating incomes, high=20
taxes and prices.
If just the prospect of war can do so much damage, how much more will=20
be the havoc caused by an actual war? That too, a war that can't=20
guarantee an end to terrorism, notwithstanding the chest-thumping=20
rhetoric. We should desist from waging war not because we are afraid,=20
but because we must be guided by wisdom, reason and realism. The=20
bottomline is, if war breaks out, we have much more to lose than=20
Pakistan. War is a gamble played by the reckless and the desperate,=20
people with nothing much to lose anyway. Likewise, India stands to=20
gain much more than Pakistan if normalcy returns quickly to our=20
region. Here too, the world will back India. Coercive diplomacy has=20
brought us tangible gains and the focus now should be to harness=20
these gains, press our advantage and move even further away from the=20
brink. That does not mean lowering our guard or pulling back the=20
troops just yet. It entails easing tensions with a few diplomatic=20
gestures and getting out of this immature kutti syndrome. Reopening=20
communication channels doesn't mean foreclosing the war option. But=20
it'll prevent further escalation and ventilate the poisoned air.
Pro-war sentiments run strong in Delhi, other metros and a few=20
American cities where our worthy NRIs advocate war and hate through=20
the Net from the safety of their faraway homes. But is there a=20
national consensus for war, even after people are informed it could=20
turn nuclear, leaving 12 million dead and an economy shattered beyond=20
repair for the next 30 years? Even at the risk of inviting hate mail=20
bombardments, I've consistently urged against war. Surprisingly, my=20
last column didn't elicit the volume and intensity of hate mail I=20
expected. I can only conclude our xenophobic pen-pushers suddenly ran=20
scared-were probably too busy leaving India or taking their money=20
out. I will probably reactivate them with this comment!
At moments like this, it's important to remember who a journalist is=20
accountable to. The common misconception, even among some scribes, is=20
that we are accountable to our readers and viewers.
We are not. If we were, then we could be playing the dangerous role=20
Sandesh and Gujarat Samachari did in Gujarat in inciting riots, as=20
clearly established by the Editors' Guild fact-finding team. The two=20
papers fed the Hindu mob frenzy, disguising propaganda as=20
information. They gave the readers what they wanted to hear and read,=20
including incendiary disinformation.In doing so, they aggravated the=20
conflict, serving neither the cause of journalism nor their country.
Journalists are accountable to ideals like truth, justice, equality,=20
democracy and humanism. This was enshrined as far back as '83 in a=20
UNESCO declaration on the international principles of journalistic=20
ethics. Principle viii states: "A true journalist stands for the=20
universal values of humanism, above all peace, democracy, human=20
rights, social progress and national liberation, while respecting the=20
distinctive character, value and dignity of each culture. Thus the=20
journalist participates actively in the social transformation towards=20
democratic betterment of society and contributes through dialogue to=20
a climate of confidence in international relations conducive to peace=20
and justice..."
Principle IX states: "The ethical commitment to the universal values=20
of humanism calls for the journalist to abstain from any=20
justification for, or incitement to, wars of aggression and the arms=20
race, especially in N-weapons, and all other forms of violence,=20
hatred or discrimination."
I quote this UNESCO declaration in such detail only to highlight that=20
some in the media are unmindful of their responsibilities. It's=20
dangerous the way pamphleteers promoting a political agenda=20
masquerade as journalists these days, even in mainstream media. The=20
blurring of lines between what is right and wrong, between church and=20
state, between motives and values, between what is acceptable and=20
unacceptable have systematically eroded all the pillars of our=20
democracy, including the fourth estate.
The media must present all viewpoints in a society including those=20
supporting war-the only caveat being that all views be sheathed in=20
decency, facts and logic. But when they advocate war themselves,=20
journalists violate an international covenant. In times of national=20
stress and danger, the media must strike a note of balance, maturity,=20
reason and caution. They cannot, must not, pander to emotions. If=20
their aim is to win brownie points with the people, they should have=20
become politicians, not journalists.
(The author can be contacted at post@a...)

_____

#5.

The Hindu
Wednesday, Jun 19, 2002
Opinion - Leader Page Articles

The choice of Kalam

By V. Krishna Ananth

It is sad that those waging at least a symbolic battle against the=20
BJP's majoritarianism did not oppose militarism - another critical=20
aspect of the Sangh Parivar's agenda - and its symbol, A.P.J. Abdul=20
Kalam, for President.

THE POLITICAL establishment, barring the Left parties (whose idea of=20
fighting the threat posed by the right wing by roping in the Congress=20
has taken a beating once again), is now finding ways to prove its=20
patriotism as defined by the communal-fascist coalition headed by the=20
BJP and aided so well by India's own soldier of the social-democratic=20
tradition, George Fernandes. There is no disputing that Mr.=20
Fernandes, who was once seen by Petra Kelly and Olaf Palme as their=20
pointman not just in India but across Asia, has turned out to be the=20
drumbeater of the right wing to the point that he puts even the=20
committed disciples of the Fuehrer and Il Duce (and their variants in=20
India belonging to the Golwalkar tradition) to shame.

This, however, is not new. Mr. Fernandes seemed to have decided=20
against looking back long ago and after he showed up at Pokhran in=20
May 1998 (with clenched fists) there was nothing surprising about his=20
willingness to be counted with those who now want to celebrate a=20
brand of nationalism that is sought to be served by nominating one of=20
the main brains behind India's weaponisation programmes for the post=20
of President. Mr. Fernandes had, after all, showed no compunctions=20
about being seen with the communal-fascists in between these two=20
occasions - May 11, 1998, and June 11, 2002 - and the worst of those=20
instances was when he held a brief for the Gujarat Chief Minister,=20
Narendra Modi.

The more significant aspect in this context is the way in which those=20
parties in the Opposition that do not belong to the Left have behaved=20
in the aftermath of the NDA announcing its nominee for the=20
President's post. In their enthusiasm to be seen as patriots and to=20
establish their own credentials among the articulate middle classes,=20
the secular lot among the political class too are willing to play=20
ball with the communal Right. They, after all, cannot afford to be=20
seen as throwing a spanner in the works of the=20
"nation-building-process" the Sangh Parivar is seriously engaged in.=20
They did so even in May 1998; Mulayam Singh Yadav went to town=20
claiming that Pokhran-II was about to happen when he was Defence=20
Minister while Laloo Prasad Yadav made it clear that there was no=20
space for party politics when it came to the nation's security. They=20
all agreed to define Indian nationalism by the same paradigm as the=20
right wing. This was reflected in the Congress' enthusiasm to=20
establish its love for Dr. Kalam. This, after all, is what one could=20
make out from S. Jaipal Reddy's refrain that Dr. Kalam was put=20
in-charge of India's missile development programme by the Congress.=20
It is another matter that Mr. Reddy was unaware, when he made the=20
statement, about the candidature of the legendary Lakshmi Sahgal; she=20
and her comrades in the Indian National Army were defended (against=20
charges of treason levelled by the colonial Government in 1946) by=20
the luminaries of the Indian National Congress in the INA trials. For=20
those in the Congress unaware of this part of history, Jawaharlal=20
Nehru himself wore the gown (along with Bhulabhai Desai and several=20
others) to defend the INA soldiers.

Sonia Gandhi and others in the Congress will now be voting against=20
someone who was described by Rajiv Gandhi's grandfather as a patriot=20
and a soldier who fought for India's freedom. Here is one more=20
instance of the Congress, in its post-Independence phase, displaying=20
a reluctance to internalise into its agenda the nationalist ethos=20
constructed in the course of the freedom movement and represented by=20
the Indian National Congress.

All these aspects have become relevant now not because Dr. Kalam's=20
candidature is undesirable on the grounds that he is a novice in the=20
political arena. It is another matter that the articulate middle=20
classes, full of contempt for men (and women) belonging to the=20
political class, are now celebrating the choice of someone who is not=20
a politician. The problem here is that Dr. Kalam was chosen by the=20
RSS (proposed by the BJP and endorsed by its allies) because he was=20
the most prominent face within the establishment that carried out=20
Pokhran-II. Dr. Kalam symbolised India's nuclear weaponisation=20
adventure thanks to the visuals in the media after May 11, 1998, and=20
all that accompanied the agenda including the rhetoric about "it's=20
time to teach Pakistan a lesson".

The Sangh Parivar must have found Dr. Kalam eminently qualified for=20
the highest political office in the land for another reason; he has=20
been so enthusiastic about expressing his emotional attachment to the=20
Hindi-Hindu-Hindustani tradition and had endeared himself so much to=20
sants representing the Vedic tradition. In other words, a=20
"nationalist" in the cultural sense of the term who had no problems=20
accepting India as not just his fatherland (pitr bhoomi) but also as=20
his holy land (punya bhoomi). What more could the Sangh Parivar have=20
asked for?

It is for these reasons that the Congress as well as the others in=20
the Opposition such as the Samajwadi Party and the Rashtriya Janata=20
Dal could have established their commitment to resist the right wing=20
in the ideological sense of the term (and not just restrict the=20
battle to Assembly and Parliament elections) by putting up a=20
candidate against the NDA's choice. Here was an opportunity, after=20
the Pokhran adventure, to address the concerns of the majority of the=20
Indian people rather than the middle classes and the brand of=20
patriotism they indulge in their clubs, kitty parties and whenever=20
they get a chance to participate in television discussions apart from=20
the Internet; that India as a nation must do everything to teach=20
Pakistan a lesson (but these men and women do everything to ensure=20
that their own children do not even go anywhere close to joining the=20
armed forces) even if that means "using the nuclear option".

The Congress and others across the political spectrum (including=20
those groups innocent of ideology who have been shuttling between the=20
communal NDA and the different secular formations in the past decade)=20
did nothing to stand up and be counted against the nuclear adventure.=20
Pokhran-II, after all, was one instance when one critical aspect of=20
the Sangh Parivar agenda - militarism - was revealed.

Anyone with some idea about the BJP's ideological moorings will agree=20
that militarism and majoritarianism are the two cardinal points on=20
which the party's ideology rests. And in this sense, the nuclear=20
adventure was as bad as the systematic violence against the minority=20
community in Gujarat.

It is sad that those waging at least a symbolic battle (it is a fact=20
that the battle was never substantive and was restricted to=20
statements in the media and speeches in Parliament) against the BJP's=20
majoritarianism did not oppose militarism - another critical aspect=20
of the Sangh Parivar's agenda - and its symbol, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam,=20
for President.

_____

#6.

Narmada Bachao Andolan
Jail Road, Mandleshwar,
District Khargone, Madhya Pradesh
Telefax :07283-33162
E-mail: nobigdam@s...

Press note
Bhopal: 18 June 2002

Expert Advisors Appointed in GRA to Ensure Rehabilitation of Maan Dam
Oustees:
To Guarantee Complete Rehabilitation by July 31st:
Indefinite Fast and Dharna Withdrawn

Today, on the 29th day, the indefinite fast by Chittaroopa Palit, Ramkuvar,
Vinod Patwa and Mangat Varma was called off, as the government has asked
Mr.Ravindra Sharma, Chairman Grievance Redressal Authority (GRA) of Narmada
Valley Development Authority (NVDA) to look into the rehabilitation of the
oustees of Maan dam, under the special advice of former Commissioner of
SC/ST Commission, Dr.B.D.Sharma and veteran journalist Shri.Prabhas Joshi.
The GRA will ensure that the rehabilitation of the Maan dam oustees is
completed in a time-bound manner, not later than July 31st, 2002.

Thus, people from different villages affected by Maan dam, supported by the
oustees of other dams in the Narmada valley like Maheshwar, Bargi, Veda and
Sardar Sarovar, have returned back home on a note of success. The indefinit=
e
fast of 29 days and the dharna (sit-in) for 35 days witnessed many a hope
and disappointment. One mutually agreeable solution or the other was over
and again turned down by the politician-bureaucratic lobby, for whom the
rightful rehabilitation of the dam oustees will make a 'precedence' of
justice in other dams. Ultimately it was the victory of perseverance and
determination of the people on fast and on dharna.

The fasting activists had to go underground because of the police high
handedness on June 12th. Inspite of intense combing of police, they were
unable to trace them and they continued with fast till the end. At the time
of withdrawal of fast, Ramkuvar, the 22 year old tribal girl from the first
submergence village, Khedi, was at her lowest ebb. She hardly can talk and
her organs are showing signs of damage. Chittaroopa Palit continues to have
pain in the abdomen. Vinod Patwa and Mangat Verma have continuous omitting
and dizziness. Inspite of the danger of permanent damage to their vital
organs, or even life, the satya-agrahis (who are insistent on truth - &
non-violence) stood by their resolve of putting their own lives at stake to
assert the rights of the people and justice.

At the time of calling off the fast, senior activist of Narmada Bachao
Andolan Ms.Medha Patkar and noted writer Ms.Arudhati Roy were present.

Different organisations from Bhopal as well as different parts of the
country and abroad expressed precious support and solidarity with the
ongoing agitation. While many organised programs =F1 like rally, dharna and
fast (supporters in US and UK are still continuing with their relay fast) =
=F1
some have come down to Bhopal and joined the agitation here. We feel oblige=
d
to all of them who have bore the heat of the agitation here and who have
been a part of this, since years, and taken up the agitations in their own
forums. NBA feels confident that with the support and participation of all
like-minded citizens and organisations of India and abroad, we will save th=
e
valley from irreversible damage and destitution.

Narmada Bachao Andolan demands that the water should not be filled till the
committee ensures complete rehabilitation. NBA, while extending all
co-operation to the committee, will face the submergence, in case the water
inundate the houses and fields of hundreds of Maan affected families before
proper rehabilitation, according to the rehabilitation policy.

NBA also reiterates that in other dams like Sardar Sarovar, where over 7000
families are left without rehabilitation, and who are under the threat of
submergence this coming monsoon, people will face the rising waters and wil=
l
challenge the injustice of the State.

Joe Athialy
Alok Agarwal

--=20
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