[sacw] SACW | 14 August 02

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Wed, 14 Aug 2002 02:55:34 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire | 14 August 2002

__________________________

#1. Pakistan: National stock-taking (M B Naqvi)
#2. Peace Delegation on India Pak Border for normalisation of=20
relations between the two countries.
#3. Pakistan: Interview with Mubarak Ali (Yoginder Sikand)
#4. India: Contradictions of nationality (Gail Omvedt)
#5. Celebrating Independence of India and Pakistan (Montreal, Aug.17)
#6. What Kalam didn't see, didn't hear: notes from Naroda (Tanvir=20
Siddiqui & Shefali Nautiyal)
#7. If cannibalism is indeed dead, why do we still lust for human=20
blood? (Jawed Naqvi)
#8. PBS Lehrer Newshour - Tom Friedman's visit to India and Sri Lanka

__________________________

#1.

The News International (Pakistan)
Wednesday August 14, 2002

National stock-taking

M B Naqvi

The writer is a well-known journalist and freelance columnist

Independence Day introspection over the state of the nation is=20
unavoidable, though it has resulted in mixed feelings in the past.=20
Having the reputation of looking only at negative things and of=20
ignoring the achievements, one wants to be fair demonstratively. What=20
one recommends is more introspection by all aware citizens=20
objectively and dispassionately.

One does not stop where patriotic commentators do: to see only=20
successes and satisfying achievements. Insofar as setting up a new=20
central government with few men and resources is concerned,=20
Pakistanis did it well enough, despite difficult circumstances of the=20
influx of eight million refugees, paucity of finances, large scale=20
disruption, war with India over Kashmir and the perceived need to=20
build a modern Army. Doubtless, a good deal of development of=20
infrastructure and industrialisation has been achieved. These have to=20
be acknowledged. Many take pride in managing to build a Nuclear=20
Deterrent that is claimed to have worked.

These achievements cannot be de-emphasised by reference to ample=20
foreign aid or corruption. The question is about the value of these=20
in the context of other and more important goals that could not be=20
attained. The best course in stock-taking is to be sure about the=20
standard of judgement or criteria for assessing successes and=20
failures. Is there a predetermined destiny that Pakistan was, or is,=20
meant to achieve? Was Pakistan an inevitable requirement of Islam? Is=20
it true that Pakistan, having been created in the name of Islam, has=20
necessarily to be an Islamic state of a certain conception? Or do the=20
freedoms and welfare of the people constitute the criterion to judge=20
the Pakistani experience?

Well, irrespective of what the 1940 resolution or Quaid-i-Azam said=20
-- and the latter said far too many things in different contexts=20
during the seven-year campaign -- one has always opted for people's=20
rights: all the freedoms of the two UN Charters of universal human=20
rights that included rights in the economic and social are the goals=20
to be achieved. That is the criterion. All other nostrums lead=20
nowhere and usually lead to some kind of tyranny, packaged in=20
beautiful verbiage to hide ugly realities. This is the standard for=20
judging achievements and failures of the past 55 years. Let us be=20
rigorously honest.

Looking at conditions in which a vast majority of Pakistanis lives, a=20
preliminary query is: what was the point of seeking independence from=20
the British rule when per capita consumption of food and clothing=20
today is no higher than it was in 1947; law and order today is worse=20
than during the colonial period; trains used to run in time and were=20
operated more efficiently and profitably than now; healthcare for the=20
people, insofar as it was available, was free for everyone and was of=20
better quality before 1947, given that many modern wonders were=20
unknown. Education was not wholly free but was affordable at most=20
levels and was of better quality than what is being imparted today;=20
while corruption has been a sub-continental way of life, higher=20
levels of administration then were not financially corrupt; and above=20
all, there used to be the same rule of law for all that Pakistanis=20
today pine for.

There is a 10 million strong affluent class of consumers, able to buy=20
modern comforts. Literacy rate has superficially gone up to over 45=20
per cent -- but the effective percentage is not more than what the=20
British had left. Institutions of excellence in education and health=20
exist that are rationed by price -- for the rich. Over 35 per cent=20
Pakistanis have no pucca roof over their heads. Who knows the true=20
number of the unemployed? Everybody talks incessantly of poverty=20
alleviation. Can anyone see any incipient signs of poverty levels=20
declining? Before it is reduced its growth has to stop. Has it? What=20
value to attach to all this development?

Pakistani intellectuals, the establishment types, have overworked the=20
adjectives derived from Islam vis-=FD-vis every concept or action. But=20
the reality remains dismal. If Pakistan was Islam's laboratory, well,=20
it has not produced anything worthwhile -- unless Gen Zia's Hudood=20
Ordinances, remaining the previous banking practices or his=20
distortions in colonial defamation and evidence laws are all that=20
Islam has to offer. The truth behind his Islamic provisions was the=20
effort to cheat the people and Mullahs. But the process had begun=20
with the Objectives Resolution in 1949 and went on to Bhutto's=20
declaring Ahmedis non-Muslims. Zia's bogus Islamisation was public=20
policy's nadir. The reality stayed mundane power politics that was=20
secular in nature with an intended pejorative twang.

Above all else, while the throats of most dealers in Islam have=20
remained hoarse by incessant rhetoric, Pakistanis' actual conduct had=20
had its first sorry result in December 1971. Wasn't it a profound=20
failure in nation building? If outsiders call it a failure of Islam=20
to bridge the ethnic divergences of two separated zones why blame=20
them? What other heights have Pakistanis touched since? The net=20
summation to be made is that Islam has no direct relevance to either=20
nation-making or running a state from day-to-day -- but rule of law,=20
democracy, tolerance, rationalism and non-violence, all secular=20
concepts, are vital to all our social purposes.

Talking of democracy, most Pakistanis have to hang their head in=20
shame. Look at those Indians next door who have built an acceptable=20
democratic structure and have run it, communal warts and all.=20
Pakistanis, in contrast, have been lost in wilderness misled by many=20
siren songs and snares -- always seeking a democracy that could work.=20
An inherited democratic structure could be run for no more than six=20
years: thereafter power was first cornered by a coterie of=20
bureaucrats (under the impression that Iskandar Mirza had the Army=20
C-in-C in his pocket) and in another four years the generals seized=20
the state in 1958. They crafted a modern enough ruling establishment=20
that has been a sad success. Power still resides in a college of top=20
generals. Where are the people, Islam and noble ideals?

Those who see only the positive side are dazzled by the wealth of the=20
elites at five star events -- marriages and private parties not to=20
mention their glamorous life styles -- and find that compared to=20
1930s, Pakistan of 1990s is far more developed. Some of the Pakistani=20
rich are rich by world standards. But does that fill the bellies of=20
emaciated children of the bottom 40 per cent of Pakistanis. Are the=20
fruit of human labour, such as are available, widely distributed?=20
Then, much of this prosperity has been achieved at the cost of large=20
external debts, still requiring over $6 billion to service from an=20
export income of $8 billion. Externally Pakistan is vulnerable to=20
pressures from creditors and internally it is creating an explosive=20
situation where all kinds of extremism grow.

Two of the three cited dazzling "achievements" are the Pakistan Army=20
that supposedly enables this country to look India in the eye. Its=20
record is not inspiring. Out of four or five skirmishes it has fought=20
with India, it has won none. Kashmir is not an inch nearer to=20
accession after all this Garagantuan effort. India challenged it to a=20
fight eight months ago over certain demands. Pakistan instead of=20
accepting to fight and humbling India, accepted the key demand of the=20
enemy -- to stop infiltration of Jihadis into Kashmir -- while=20
showing readiness to do a deal about others.

The same applies to the second: the Nuclear Deterrent. It is claimed=20
it has deterred India from invading. May be. But perish the thought=20
that Islamabad's giving in over stopping the Jihad looks as if its=20
Deterrent was not doing enough deterring. Instead of being a=20
deterrent, Pakistan had to change its 30 years old policy on=20
Afghanistan as soon as Powell telephoned. Why? To save Pakistan's=20
Nuclear Deterrent! Despite this "huge" cost it did not adequately=20
deter India. Obviously, somewhere along the line India's Deterrent is=20
also deterring. Well, if Islamabad's Deterrent fails to deter India=20
-- for whom it was meant --- whom will it deter? Maldives or Qatar?=20
What is the point of all this shining dross?

It is claimed that a new 'real' democracy -- that unashamedly=20
recognises the truth about the locus of power -- is to be inaugurated=20
after October 10 poll despite many uncertainties: Gen Musharraf, who=20
is scheduled, with American support, to stay in power until 2007,=20
cannot afford an election that does not yield "positive results". But=20
an election, especially when the whole world wants it to be=20
transparently free, cannot but be anuncertainty-creating event --=20
unless he disregards democratic norms and achieves those "positive=20
results" by skulduggery. This year the outlook is clouded: either the=20
elections need the special skills of the administration or there will=20
be trouble between the new Assemblies and the entrenched power of the=20
President. Clouded did one say? When was it not in this land of the=20
pure?

_____

#2.

The Hindustan Times
August 14, 2002
Film stars may visit Wagah border on Aug 14
HT Correspondent
(Amritsar, August 13)
Film star Raj Babbar, Sharmila Tagore and director-writer Gulzar are=20
among those who are expected to visit the Wagah border at midnight on=20
August 14.

They will be part of a peace delegation led by Rajya Sabha MP Kuldeep Nayar=
.

The delegation will march up to the border and light candles in a bid=20
to impress upon the governments of India and Pakistan that=20
people-to-people contact is a must for normalisation of relations=20
between the two countries.

This is the sixth year that delegations from India and Pakistan will=20
march up to the Wagah border to light candles on the occasion of the=20
Independence Days of both the countries.

While the respective delegations will reach the border at 5 pm=20
respectively, the Indian delegation will remain till midnight.

The Pakistan delegation, however, will not participate because of=20
restrictions by the Pakistan Government: "This is an open invitation=20
to all peace lovers to participate, march upto the border Mr Nayar=20
told the Hindustan Times.

_____

#3.

Outlookindia.com
Web | Aug 12, 2002=20=20=20=20

INTERVIEW
'Pakistan Is Becoming More Fundamentalist'
Lahore based Pakistani scholar and activist thinks that 'In the=20
beginning the state was fundamentalist but now the wider society has=20
become increasingly fundamentalist'.
YOGINDER SIKAND

Lahore-based Mubarak Ali is a leading Pakistani scholar and activist.=20
He has taught History at the University of Sind, and is presently the=20
editor of the Urdu quarterly Tarikh. He talked to Yoginder Sikand on=20
Islam and militancy in contemporary Pakistan.

What do you feel about the current talk of madrasas emerging as=20
centres of 'terrorism' in Pakistan?

Much of this talk is exaggerated, I must admit. On the whole, the=20
madrasas create narrow-minded, sectarian students but not terrorists.=20
Not all the Afghan Taliban were madrasa-educated. They also included=20
young people educated in modern schools or colleges. They were=20
influenced by the television, radio, newspapers and textbooks. During=20
the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, the Americans motivated=20
madrasa students to engage in armed jihad and prepared for them=20
special textbooks which glorified 'holy war'. Then, when Mulla Omar=20
took power in Afghanistan, he encouraged the madrasa students to come=20
to his help. During this period they were militarily trained and=20
fought for the new regime in Afghanistan.

How can madrasas be suitably reformed?

In Pakistan even the modern educational system is like the madrasas=20
as far as the curriculum is concerned. The only way out is to=20
radically change and reform the curriculum and introduce the teaching=20
of social sciences. Instead of doing this, our government is focusing=20
on the introduction of the natural sciences in the madrasa syllabus=20
and is also providing them computers. I think this is a useless=20
exercise. It is the social sciences that make people to think and=20
helps them open their minds, not the natural sciences.

What are your views on how the Musharraf government has gone about=20
dealing with the madrasas?

The Musharraf government lacks a proper vision as far as education is=20
concerned. Musharraf is trying to please both the Americans as well=20
as the mullahs. He is attempting to register the madrasas, but this=20
is being resisted by the mullahs and he has no courage to defy them.=20
I think that the best way out of the dilemma is to establish=20
faculties of theology at the college and university levels and to=20
abolish the madrasa system altogether.

What are your reflections on the possibilities in Pakistan today of=20
developing new ways of understanding Islam to seriously take into=20
account issues such as democracy, human rights, women's rights,=20
religious pluralism etc.?

As I see it, day by day Pakistan is becoming more fundamentalist. In=20
the beginning the state was fundamentalist but now the wider society=20
has become increasingly fundamentalist. Every mullah is free to issue=20
any fatwa he wants. Rich people in Pakistan prefer to give donations=20
to a madrasa or a mosque rather than to an organization working for=20
social development. Dictatorship and 'feudal democracy' have=20
disappointed the people, and economic hardship and social problems=20
are forcing them to take refuge in religion. There is little hope for=20
a real people's democracy in Pakistan today. The Army is powerful and=20
has increased in size, consuming more and more of the country's=20
resources, leaving little for the people. As the nature of state has=20
changed in accordance with the interests of the ruling classes, there=20
is shocking lack of respect for human rights. State institutions=20
treat people as subjects and not citizens. In such a situation, in a=20
backward society, the interpretation of religion is also backward. In=20
presence of Hudood ordinance, women are denied their rights. The=20
religious minorities are often made victims of the blasphemy law.=20
There is little effort being made to develop new Islamic perspectives=20
on issues of contemporary concern.

What are your views on the current relations between Muslims and the=20
West, and on the emergence of Islamist radicalism?

There are several complex reasons for the emergence of Islamist=20
radicalism and anti-West feelings among large sections of the Muslim=20
community. What has happened, and is still happening, to the Muslims=20
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Palestine and Kashmir etc. has convinced=20
people that there is a conspiracy against the Muslims by the=20
Christians, Jews and the Hindus. And so, growing numbers of Muslims=20
feel that the way out is to adopt the path of 'holy war', turning=20
their backs on dialogue. Widespread poverty and economic backwardness=20
is another reason, leading to the feeling of extreme helplessness=20
among many Muslims. Acts of violence provide them some 'satisfaction'=20
that they can terrify even their powerful 'enemies'.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yoginder Sikand is currently engaged in a post-doctoral research=20
project on Islam and Inter-faith relations at the University of London

_____

#4.

The Hindu
Aug 14, 2002
Opinion - Leader Page Articles=20=20=20

Contradictions of nationality
By Gail Omvedt

What gives hope is the ongoing ferment among Dalits themselves:=20
organising here to fight oppression, taking their fight to world=20
arenas, looking for allies, building the future in an ongoing search=20
for equality and freedom.

IN THE mid-19th century the great Maharashtrian liberal reformist=20
intellectual, M. G. Ranade, wrote a book titled "The Rise of the=20
Maratha Power". In it he argued that the moral and emotional=20
foundations for the national upsurge spearheaded by Shivaji were=20
provided by the "sants and poets" - from the innumerable sants of the=20
bhakti cult, coming from all castes and communities, to Ramdas, the=20
presumed guru of Shivaji. The book was in English; Ranade clearly was=20
trying to make a point to the Indian elite of his time that=20
religion-based social reform could provide a foundation for the=20
national movement. It proved influential, not only in Ranade's time=20
but even today, when scholars such as C.A. Bayley have taken Ranade's=20
argument for a pre-colonial, culturally-provided "patriotism of the=20
homelands" as being paradigmatic for the "Origins of Nationality in=20
South Asia". The Maratha sense of homeland or swadeshi formed over=20
centuries by bhakti and politico-religious movements is, to him, only=20
the clearest case of many such developing patriotisms in India.

However, while the elements of proto-nationality were clearly there,=20
both Ranade and contemporary scholars miss the contradictions=20
involved.

In the Maharashtrian case, for example, the differences between the=20
sants of the Varkari movement and Ramdas were profound. Tukaram and=20
others did promote a deeply based social equality and vested their=20
longings in a community of devotees - but they were heavily=20
apolitical, Tukaram refusing with a sense of horror of corrupting=20
involvement to be drawn into a meeting with the young Shivaji.=20
Ramdas, in contrast, who promoted "Maharashtra dharma" and was deeply=20
political, was also socially orthodox. While there is no direct=20
evidence that he was in fact the guru of Shivaji, and while Shivaji=20
himself sought to curb feudal power and build a welfare-oriented=20
state, the fact that the dynamic ruler of shudra origin sought=20
coronation as a Kshatriya only gave legitimacy to the varnashrama=20
framework.

The contradictions involved exploded after Shivaji as the state was=20
taken over by the Brahmanic Peshwa regime, remembered by Dalits=20
especially as one of the most oppressive in India, a regime where=20
they were forced to wear brass vessels around their necks to collect=20
their polluting spit. And the retribution of contradictions came when=20
the Dalits, no longer able to find military or social mobility under=20
the Peshwas, flooded into the British armies which conquered the=20
hated Peshwai.

Such contradictions continued during the colonial period. They were=20
implied not only in the "social versus political reform" dilemma=20
which was announced for so long, but in the processes of the British=20
rule itself.

The British opened up education and other institutions, yet the=20
limitations of funds hampered the spread of education so much as to=20
make it practically useless for Dalits. Their courts introduced in=20
part a modern legal framework, but at the same time took the advice=20
of orthodox pandits and mullahs to implement customary social laws.=20
Finally, the British Army which the Dalits had served so faithfully=20
and which was open in the 18th and early 19th centuries stopped=20
recruitment of Dalits and even many OBCs in the 1890s as the theory=20
of "martial races" began to dictate that only Jats, Rajputs, Marathas=20
and the like were truly fit material to be soldiers. It was for this=20
reason that Ambedkar declared that the colonial power would never=20
abolish inequalitarian customs and only in an independent India,=20
however great the dangers from a high-caste elite, could the Dalits=20
find liberation. Even then, the contradictions of the nationalist=20
response - reformism in tension with the affirmation of a "Hindu"=20
tradition that for so many was equivalent to national identity -=20
hampered the ability to create the moral equalitarian foundations of=20
nationality.

Contradictions remain today. The human quake in Gujarat shows the way=20
in which Dalits and Adivasis have become drawn into the net of a=20
ferocious "Hindu" identity at the cost of extreme antagonism to=20
Muslims; the creation of a negative unity only against a demonised=20
"other" will in the end prove to be less than equalitarian for Dalits.

Overall, in India, the processes of development have provided some=20
kinds of social mobility, but only very slow progress - painfully=20
halting decline in poverty, a tentative spread of education. Even=20
temples are only partially opened up; the programme recently=20
undertaken of training Dalits as priests is facing the obstacle of=20
almost no takers among caste Hindus for these low-born pujaris.=20
Atrocities continue; murders and rapes continue; and tensions between=20
Dalits and OBCs in places such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu=20
continue to define the limits of politics.

The contradictions of Indian and linguistic nationalities today lie=20
in the limitation of equalitarian achievements. "Gandhiji, I have no=20
homeland", Ambedkar had proclaimed in his first meeting with the=20
Mahatma. "How can we see it as our homeland where we are treated like=20
cats and dogs, where we cannot get even water to drink?" Over 50=20
years later the famous Dalit poet, Baburao Bagul, advised Dalits to=20
"flee the country" in which they faced only atrocities.

Much progress has been made and the large majority of Dalits today=20
would clearly see themselves as Indians - but there are enough bitter=20
experiences to make this a limited commitment.

The creation of equality, of a society where a son or daughter born=20
in any family can genuinely feel that every path is open - whether to=20
be a scientist, an astronaut, an industrialist, a creative artist -=20
is still to be completed. New steps are undoubtedly being taken.=20
Following the Bhopal declaration of last January, the Madhya Pradesh=20
Government has now declared that 30 per cent of Government contracts=20
will be awarded to Dalit businessmen; the Congress overall has=20
endorsed this policy and Mayawati will certainly be taking up aspects=20
of it in Uttar Pradesh. "Making Dalit millionaires,'' as journalist=20
Chandrabhan Prasad puts it, is now in a sense on the agenda and will=20
aid in the renewal of entrepreneurship in India. Yet, while the=20
Karnataka Chief Minister has reportedly shown interest, nothing has=20
been heard from other Congress-ruled States (notably from the centre=20
of Indian industry in Maharashtra) or from those ruled by the BJP and=20
its allies. And most troubling of all, Indian industrialists are=20
completely silent on the issue of whether they accept the need for=20
diversity, whether they have any programmes or ideas to offer.

What gives hope is the ongoing ferment among Dalits themselves:=20
organising here to fight oppression, taking their fight to world=20
arenas, looking for allies, building the future in an ongoing search=20
for equality and freedom that will resolve the contradictions of=20
nationality in India.

_____

#5.

Celebrating
The end of colonialism in South Asia
Independence of India and Pakistan

Anand Patwardhan's
"War and Peace (Jung aur Aman)"
Plus reflections on 55 years of history

DATE & Time: Saturday August 17, 2002 (4-7 p.m.)

PLACE: 1400 de Maisonneuve West (Between Bishop and Mackay)
(Pavilion McConnel, cinema deSeve, Concordia University)
Guy Metro [ Montreal]
All Welcome -Admission free
Sponsored by:
South Asia Center (CERAS) [ Montreal] & Pakistan Association of Quebec (PA=
Q)
Info: 937-4714, 485-9192 or 521-9049

_____

#6.

Indian Express
Tuesday, August 13, 2002
PAGE 1 ANCHOR

What Kalam didn't see, didn't hear: notes from Naroda
Father of Kausar, pregnant woman who was killed, not among 'select'=20
victims allowed to meet him
Tanvir Siddiqui & Shefali Nautiyal

Ahmedabad, August 12: President A P J Abdul Kalam came here for 5=20
minutes, spent the next 30 with a few victims. That was the news.=20
Here is the noise:

The Evening Before
6.30 pm-9 pm: Barricades up, debris cleared, disinfectant sprinkled=20
outside the public toilet, whitewash, streetlights - all in a single=20
day. ''Woh miyanbhai hai...hamari baat dhyan se sunega (He's a=20
Muslim, he'll lend us his ear),'' says Lalbibi Ismailbhai, whose=20
house was ransacked. Her neighbour Majeed and his family weren't so=20
lucky-they were killed.

Halogen lamps are up, the street is flooded with light, inside it's=20
dark. Houses have no doors, no windows, no roof. ''The shop owner=20
does not give us adequate kerosene,'' complains Bundubhai, who lost=20
his wife and daughter in the riots. His daughter-in-law tries to=20
light a fire with damp wood. Stoves have been distributed but with no=20
kerosene, they are of little use.

Bangle-seller Akhtar Husain's family of seven watches mother Subaida=20
cook rice and dal on a makeshift oven using wood. She wants to speak=20
to Kalam, they haven't got compensation. ''But they won't let us=20
approach him,'' she says.

Inside the chawl, Social Welfare Department officials tell victims to=20
collect their cheques-compensation for small businesses-in the=20
morning. Collector K Srinivas arrives; Shah Alam camp inmate Sabir=20
Mehboob Shaikh has come here in his wheelchair to speak to Kalam.=20
Srinivas asks an official to look into his case. Pat comes the reply:=20
''I will prepare his papers tonight and we can give him the cheque=20
tomorrow morning.'' Sabir wonders what's happening.

The Night Before
10-10.30: Ilyas needs money for a pillar in his damaged scrap shop.=20
''With the President here, they'll do it,'' says a neighbour. A young=20
Noor Mohammad couldn't care less. ''The President is not a true=20
Muslim,'' he says.

Women start moving to ''safer places'' to sleep, all across the road.=20
Bundubhai, who lost his wife and daughter, is unable to sleep. Asks=20
Abdul Rahimbhai, a fabrication worker: ''What difference will his=20
visit will make, except perhaps for this streetlight?''

The colony turns in for the night but PWD men are still at work:=20
painting black and yellow stripes on the highway roundabout.

The Morning
08 am-12 noon: Noor Mohammad Shaikh - the father of eight-month=20
pregnant Kausar Bano who was killed after her foetus was ripped=20
out-has arrived from Shah Alam camp. He wants to meet the President.=20
Like him, others who don't live here have come, hoping that they get=20
in a word or two.

By 9 am, Govt officials have reached along with the corporation's=20
garbage vehicles. The road is scrubbed clean. The bylanes, where=20
Kalam will not go, are untouched.

Police pour in. A makeshift stage is set up. Naseem Aapa is sifting=20
through the wheat she received from the Collectorate last week. Ask=20
her who's coming. ''Must be some neta,'' she says. ''Only then does=20
the Government do anything here.''

Voluntary organisations start putting up banners. More policemen=20
arrive, most of them gather around a tea stall.

At noon, more police vans arrive, so do senior officials who ask=20
local organisations to bring the ''select riot victims'' for=20
screening - only they will meet Kalam.

Raja Bundebhai, the 9-year-old, who became famous when he spoke to=20
Justice J S Verma of the NHRC, is told he will meet the President.=20
The boy rushes home to take a bath and wear new clothes.

The Countdown
1-4.50 pm:''Where were all these people all these months?'' asks a=20
Munnabibi Ghulam Mohammad. The officials - in safaris and shiny shoes=20
- go from house to house, followed by another team handing out=20
compensation cheques.

''Just because he is coming, they think of distributing cheques. We=20
have made hundreds of rounds in the last five months but had to do=20
without. Now Narendra Modi will say 'see how many cheques we have=20
given'. How will Dr Kalam know?'' asks Mariyum Begum.

Naseem Khaalu, 85, has an early lunch and guided by her nephew, sits=20
near Noorani Masjid. ''Some bada saaheb is coming,'' she says.

Police shoo away bystanders, stray dogs. RAF columns arrive.

At the nearby office of a local organisation, Collectorate officials=20
hand out cheques to widows. Some of them begin crying.

Javed, another orphan who will meet Kalam, sports a new shirt.=20
Truckloads of officials arrive. Mere desh ki dharti blares from the=20
loudspeakers. Traffic is diverted. ''Why didn't so much police come=20
that day?'' asks someone. ''I want to see Kalam's hair,'' says=20
another.

The President
5-5.30 pm: Kalam aaya, goes the crowd whenever a car pulls up. The=20
convoy stops: the President gets down and instead of walking into the=20
lane, walks towards the crowd and waves. TV cameras, police and=20
Government officials all rush towards him. Chief Minister Narendra=20
Modi escorts Kalam, who stops at two houses.

In five minutes, he is out of the Naroda-Patiya lane.

5.15 pm: He walks up the dais where ''selected'' victims are waiting.=20
He listens patiently and asks a few questions. Collector K Srinivas=20
stands by, translating while Modi stands at arm's length. Outside,=20
the crowd shouts Kalam zindabad

5.30 pm: The President has left. ''Gaya. Sab ghar jao (He's gone. Go=20
home now),'' a youth shouts. The selected victims are surrounded by=20
the media, ''No one will come here from tomorrow,'' says a widow.

Noorbhai, the father of the pregnant Kausar Bano who was killed and=20
her stomach slit, leaves. He didn't meet Kalam.

_____

#7.

DAWN
13 August 2002

If cannibalism is indeed dead, why do we still lust for human blood?

By Jawed Naqvi
Professor Kailash Nath Kaul, the maternal uncle of Indira Gandhi, was=20
an icon of Lucknow's syncretic culture through the '60s and '70s. He=20
was a botanist by skill and an engaging conversationist by nature who=20
rarely strayed from his chaste if somewhat ornate Urdu whenever he=20
delved on a subject of his choice.
"Cannibalism may be dead but we still continue to speak the language=20
of cannibals, even today," he declared one day flanked by my=20
completely absorbed parents who both had a lot of time for this=20
frequent visitor to our home. Tera qeema banadoongi. Teri haddiya'n=20
gadh doo'ngi. Tera khoon pee jaaoo'nga. Kyo mera bheja kha rahey ho?=20
These are some of the phrases that Prof Kaul cited to illustrate the=20
point about the influence of our cannibalistic past on today's=20
commonly spoken language.
A rough English equivalent would include phrases like, Stop chewing=20
my brains. I'll pound you into mincemeat. Have you for dinner. Oh=20
that crazy bloodsucker. And so on.
In Gujarat, the recent orgy of violence against fellow humans was gut=20
wrenching. The massacre of harmless children and women seemed=20
particularly macabre because those who profess non-violence as a key=20
tenet of their faith had staged them. When they took out the entrails=20
of fellow men in a drunken orgy and prowled for days from dusk to=20
dawn hunting for more, when they raped young girls mercilessly and=20
laughed like maniacs, they were showing us just a little bit of their=20
atavistic side.
There are no cannibals in India today, but there is enough evidence=20
from the discourse, both religious and political, that makes Prof=20
Kaul's analysis look truer today than it did a few years ago. Yes, we=20
had abused and killed fellow humans even earlier. But there was no=20
political culture to overtly and covertly support the lurking bestial=20
instincts as there is today. And if there was such a culture its=20
followers were kept at a safe distance from the levers of state power.
Of course, there are Indians who do not for a moment believe that we=20
are the inheritors of some exclusive doctrine of non-violence as=20
preached by Buddha and Gandhi. Javed Akhtar, the poet and wit, sees=20
all the claim of non-violence as mushy talk. "You need soap where=20
there is filth," he startled his fawning audience in Bihar recently.=20
"You idolize Gandhi and Gautam Buddha for the same reason that you=20
need soap, to scrub out the filth of centuries of innate violence. We=20
have always been a violent lot." But if it didn't happen in the time=20
of Buddha or Gandhi, any exorcism of violence today is certainly not=20
nigh. On the contrary, there is a party in power today that threatens=20
to move heaven and earth to establish the Hindu Dharma in the country=20
by, among other measures, banning the slaughter of cows. But when it=20
comes to protecting defenceless human beings from rampaging mobs,=20
there is not even an honest word of sympathy for fellow humans, leave=20
alone mass action.
Now, we all know that there are several ways of getting people not to=20
slaughter cows, namely by discouraging beef-eating. Any good medical=20
expert would tell you that it is not the healthiest of things to eat=20
red meat. But to advocate such scientific finding as part of an=20
effort to save cows from hungry humans would be to rob the rightwing=20
Hindu campaign of its insidious political edge.
If we look around the Gulf region, in the heartland of Islam, in=20
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, there is no culture of eating=20
beef. There are no cattle there to be eaten in the first place. Lamb=20
primarily, even camel. But hardly any beef. Nor is beef part of any=20
celebrated Mughal or Avadhi dish. This side of the Atlantic,=20
beef-eating has been essentially a European trait, or, if historians=20
agree, a pre-Islamic Indian trait too.
So when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee introduced the ban on cow=20
slaughter for the first time as the objective of the Indian=20
government through the presidential address in parliament in 1996, he=20
was not merely pandering to a key constituency that elected his=20
13-day government, the only purely BJP federal government so far, but=20
he was preparing the grounds for an anti- Muslim hysteria. That=20
hysteria, it was rightly or wrongly thought, would catapult the BJP=20
to power on its own the next time round.
Vajpayee had to seek a vote of confidence from parliament on the 13th=20
day of his first rightwing Hindu administration. That proved to be=20
the government's last day in office. Woefully short of a majority,=20
the BJP decided to quit even before the vote was taken. Two speakers=20
from the opposition, who spoke against the motion, were communist=20
leader Indrajit Gupta and the former Congress- sponsored speaker of=20
the Lok Sabha, G. G. Swell.
What Gupta, a Bhadralok upper caste Hindu from West Bengal, said, and=20
what Swell, an Oxbridge-accented Christian tribesman from India's=20
northeastern district of Shillong, said that day in a way anticipated=20
today's Gujarat and hinted at even a bleaker future ahead for=20
secularism and democracy.
Gupta, while berating what he said was Vajpayee's incorrigible=20
communalism, held him directly responsible for the 1983 Nellie=20
massacre in Assam in which women and children belonging to the local=20
minority community were brutally slaughtered by mobs. Swell, on the=20
other, held forth on the asinine division of India over a patently=20
bovine issue. Interestingly, Swell spoke immediately after Gupta to=20
jointly deliver what then seemed to be a knockout blow to a communal=20
administration.
Said Gupta: " Sir, my friend Shri Vajpayee who is a very, very old=20
friend of mine and I think we are on very good terms with each other.=20
We have seen one face of him here in this debate, during this debate.=20
All the media, the press and everybody have definitely been very much=20
impressed by his sobriety, his calmness, his appeal to everybody, his=20
reasonableness, etc., etc. But I regret to say that Shri Vajpayee on=20
occasions also has a different face. This is the trouble. I would=20
like to remind him that during the Assam elections of 1983, elections=20
which could hardly be called elections because there was so much=20
disturbance, voters could not come and cast their votes, the whole=20
atmosphere was surcharged.
"There were so much fear of disturbances, riots and ethnic clashes=20
and all that. Mr Vajpayee was campaigning in Assam. I have got here a=20
book which describes the fact that when he was addressing roadside=20
election meetings in Assam, in that highly surcharged atmosphere, he=20
had said this and I am quoting:
"'Foreigners have come here; and the government does nothing. What if=20
they had come into Punjab instead, people would have chopped them=20
into pieces and thrown them away.'
"Sir, I submit that in that atmosphere prevailing in Assam at that=20
time, for a responsible leader to make statements like this, that=20
they should be chopped into pieces and thrown away, is something=20
which could be nothing but inflammatory."
What did Swell say? "Mr Vajpayee has been my friend for a number of=20
years, as I have already said. I thought I knew him. Today, I do not=20
know him.
"The irrational thing that he ever did was to have assumed power. I=20
had expected that he would show himself to be a leader of this nation=20
and that as a national leader his government would project a national=20
image. On the other hand he started donning the Hindutva clothes and=20
he started basing his government on what we called, the cow-belt.=20
This is what I could not understand. ...... He has polarized this=20
country. He has divided this country into the cow-belt and non=20
cow-belt.
"This is what is happening in this country. I do not understand his=20
dissimulation. I do not understand why Mr. Vajpayee has taken to=20
dissimulation. The president's address is a string of inanities, a=20
string of good wishes that he wishes to do. He seems to have=20
forgotten all the fundamentals of his party.
"There is only one thing in which he is sincere and that is to have a=20
total ban on cow slaughter. I have said that in the North-East - I=20
come from that section as you come - beef is the cheapest source of=20
protein for the majority of the people.
"If you stop people ...(Interruptions)... They are ashamed of us and=20
we are ashamed of them. ...(Interruptions)... They can never impose=20
their hegemony on the North-East. The Mughal emperors tried to do=20
that by sending the army to Assam and each time they had been turned=20
away from the banks of Brahmaputra. They cannot impose their way of=20
life on the people of North- East."
I have spoken about Prof Kaul in my previous columns and of another=20
profoundly secular Kashmiri Brahmin who lived in Lucknow and was=20
loved by its people, overwhelming so by Muslims. He was Pandit Anand=20
Narain Mulla, sometimes confused with a Mullah. The former chief=20
justice of Uttar Pradesh and a much-admired Urdu poet Mulla once=20
caused pandemonium in the state assembly when the neo-jingoists of=20
the BJP were riled by his couplet:
Khooney Shahid se bhi hai qeemat mein kuchch siwa,
Fankaar ke qalam ki siyahi ki ek boond
(Martyrs are noble beings but a drop of ink from my quill is often=20
more valuable than the blood of these valiant heroes)
Mulla, a pious orthodox Hindu, was once erroneously served a dish of=20
beef-curry during a visit to Lahore in the undivided subcontinent.=20
Found out, the Muslim waiter pleaded he was keeping the dinner for a=20
" Mullah Sahab", meaning an orthodox Muslim. " All right then, leave=20
it here, but don't do it again," came the smiling reprimand from Mr=20
Mulla. That is how it used to be.

_____

#8.

PBS Lehrer Newshour
August 12, 2002

Tom's Journal
Tom Friedman's visit to India and Sri Lanka

Real Audio version of Lehrer interview:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/foreign_correspondence/july-dec02/tom_8-12.h=
tml

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