[sacw] SACW #1 | 20 Sept. 02

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Fri, 20 Sep 2002 00:16:08 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 20 September 2002

__________________________

#1. From New York with presents (M. B. Naqvi)
#2. On Roots Of Communal Violence (Asghar Ali Engineer)
#3. The right to secular education in India (Praful Bidwai)
#4. Hostage to Fascists! (C R Irani)
#5. Demographic Lies and Demonisation (Ram Puniyani)
#6. Amartya Sen blames Modi Govt. for violence

__________________________

#1.

>From New York with presents

By M. B. Naqvi

The UN General Assembly session as usual provided an occasion to=20
leaders of India and Pakistan. As usual they wasted the opportunity.=20
In a way it was Agra all over again, only much worse. True, the=20
Pakistan President's chief purpose, apart from warding off pressures=20
'to do more' in pursuing the al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives inside=20
Pakistan and cooperating with the Iraq campaign, was to complain that=20
India refuses either to de-escalate its troops concentrations or=20
negotiate. The Indian Prime Minister's prime objective was also to=20
lodge a complaint against Musharraf that he is 'not doing more' in=20
pursuance of what he assured Armitage in June. Vajpayee is incensed=20
that Musharraf government has supposedly increased infiltration into=20
Kashmir to frustrate the ongoing elections in the State. He has also=20
threatened that if the international community --- euphemism for=20
American pressure --- cannot force Pakistan to keep its promises,=20
India will use its own "option" whatever that meant.

One=92s perspective generally begins at home and ends at South Asia.=20
Pakistani governments over the years have wanted to internationalise=20
the Kashmir issue, with India opposing. But after the Bush's War on=20
Terrorism, India changed tack and began internationalising the issue.=20
Well, the issue has been internationalised. Both have invited the US=20
to, in effect, mediate. America is now engaged with Kashmir for the=20
long haul. Both may have to rue the day they wanted to=20
internationalise the problem because the Americans may have a long=20
agenda --- from globalisation to eliminating Terror from everywhere,=20
not to say its larger geostrategic aims.

Mr. Musharraf has been toughening his instances, both at home and=20
abroad of late. He has told Vajpayee through the media: 'OK, you keep=20
your soldiers where they are'; 'if you do not talk, that too is OK';=20
and 'if there are to be no communication facilities between Pakistan=20
and India, so be it'. 'I have done what I could; I can do no more',=20
meaning I cannot stop those that may still be carrying on Jihad in=20
Kashmir. What is Indians actual assessment is not certain. Either=20
they do not believe Musharraf or are at their wit's end about what=20
should they do. Musharraf may also be tailoring his utterances to his=20
own electoral needs, may be going to the length of utilising the=20
grave security concerns by renewed brinkmanship along LOC, as current=20
exchanges of posts would seem to suggest. His electoral stakes in Oct=20
10 general election are not less high than for BJP government.

Doubtless, Vajpayee has repeated the threat of war on Pakistan by=20
referring to India's own 'option'. That sort of language cannot be=20
unwelcome to Musharraf who has soon to win the crucial polls that be=20
a matter of life and death for him. Exchange of hot words and even=20
some fracas in Kashmir might distract popular attention from=20
opposition charges. Vajpayee too has to think of not only of Kashmir=20
election but about many others to follow. Tough postures promise=20
votes. But it seems to be just that: talk. And Heavens be praised for=20
it. If a war does break out in earnest, as it yet may, no one will=20
win. One has long thought that if India has not started a war all=20
these nine months --- due to the primary deterrence of nuclear=20
weapons --- it is unlikely to do so now or later. All this was good=20
politicking before the internationalisation of the Kashmir problem.=20
Now, the US is almost an unignorable a party. To that extent, neither=20
India nor Pakistan have as much freedom of action as they had earlier=20
in the year. One way or another, no war can take place without its=20
approval.

What both New Delhi and Islamabad cannot but realise that there is no=20
way out of the cul de sac in which both have landed themselves over=20
Kashmir --- except through a war. And a war, though still possible=20
for want of diplomatic alternative that India has denied itself, can=20
be a catastrophe for India while it will be an utter disaster for=20
Pakistan --- if nuclear weapons are used. It is a subject on which=20
civil society in both India and Pakistan has to think a lot more=20
seriously than has been done.

Apart from any progress over mutual ties, or lack of them and which=20
in any case remain deadlocked, Musharraf surpassed himself in New=20
York. Buoyed by the assessment he seems to have made of the US=20
Administration's overall satisfaction with his Army's and=20
government's active cooperation to arrest al-Qaeda fugitives, he told=20
Mr. Bush he can do no more, not even for Iraq. Bush was apparently=20
too overwhelmed by the arrest on September 11 of Ramzi bin al Shaiba=20
from Karachi after a dramatic shoot out to press him further either=20
on Iraq or Kashmir. Bush is scarcely engaged over Kashmir, except as=20
a proforma stance. The latter is obviously intractable. By that very=20
quality of the dispute enhances America's role in South Asia.

Mr. Musharraf was lionised by both American media and government.=20
American think tanks think highly of him. His methodology and timing=20
of what he said were significant. He had gone to America after his=20
tough domestic decisions and statements. Take the latter first. He=20
had told the Americans he had already too much on his plate; Iraq is=20
too far out of his perspective. He also needed no US troops or more=20
Special Forces or its additional sleuths. He had also taken a tougher=20
stance vis-=E0-vis India, as noted. These were hard words that, in the=20
end, did not displease the Americans.

His domestic actions too were tough, indeed. He heeded no criticism=20
of his ridiculous referendum. He went ahead and carried out 27=20
amendments in the Constitution all by himself and in one go. He=20
brought back to life the old nightmare of civilian politicians:=20
Article 58(2)(b). He has also created the Army's pet scheme of a=20
National Security Council, with four Generals sitting on it in=20
addition to the self-appointed President himself. Whether or not he=20
implements the concession he talked about while in America that he=20
might dispense with Article 58(2)(b) if the NSC can have the power to=20
dissolve the electoral system or ask him to do that, that will be a=20
distinction without a difference. No detailed discussion is needed on=20
the system he wants to bring into being: it would be an autocracy of,=20
by and for Mr. Musharraf. All these changes had been made before he=20
left for the American shores.

The point to note is that although the American media have criticised=20
these steps and a few officials of the government have said they=20
disliked the Musharraf-devised system over which he wants to go on=20
presiding for many years to come. But if one were to study all the=20
implications of what Armitage told Pakistani journalists about Mr.=20
Musharraf retaining his uniform despite becoming the elected=20
President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan under a 'democratic'=20
dispensation, the hard kernel --- and the fact of the matter -- will=20
be plain: the US in effect endorses the actions of the President and=20
if the elections are not scandalously rigged --- in addition to what=20
the pre-poll political engineering have done it --- the system would=20
be acceptable to the US administration for all practical purposes.

As for some officials having criticised Musharraf's constitutional=20
amendments, does that mean that they non-cooperate with him after he=20
has gerrymandered the elections in another three weeks time? It is=20
not possible for American officials or media to like this new system;=20
it is not 1950s when third world military=92s modernism could be cited=20
to justify supporting dictators. But, given a democratic-seeming,=20
they would forget their criticisms and proceed with cooperating with=20
a President Musharraf who will have all the dictator's powers.

How does it translate into domestic politics? During his American=20
yatra Mr. Musharraf in an exuberant moment allowed himself to say=20
that that he needed seven years to transform Pakistan into a tolerant=20
and democratic society. Which is a prescription and rationale for=20
remaining in power for two full terms of five years each, under the=20
system he has devised. Since the Americans seem to have, in effect,=20
endorsed his actions, it can be said that the Americans have allotted=20
Mr. Musharraf to the Pakistanis for the next 10 years because he can=20
survive for these 10 years only if the US goes on supporting him. The=20
American goodwill is anyhow vital to survival in this country. The=20
Pakistanis have to grin and bear it. Those foolish people who=20
continue looking up to the US for the preservation of democratic=20
values should now give up day dreaming. Another 10 long years of Army=20
rule in Pakistan! Well what will be will be.

That Pakistan is back to 1955's One Unit for all practical purposes=20
is plain. What the earlier One Unit did, the second one will do it=20
some more. The social and economic policies of Mr. Musharraf can be=20
inferred from his conduct during the last three years. The economy=20
will produce the results it has so far produced, only more so. That=20
provincial harmony will be shattered some more and provincial=20
prejudices will be aggravated goes without saying. The march of=20
poverty, on present indications, shall continue perhaps with=20
acceleration in pace. The nuclear and conventional arms races,=20
insofar as at all feasible, shall continue.

That the Indians would also be reaping similar harvests, though=20
perhaps on a smaller scale, is no consolation. But the die has been=20
cast. The Americans promise of remaining engaged over Kashmir will=20
manifest itself in India talking with a regime that will say and do=20
what Musharraf wills. The continued standoff in South Asia will=20
result in a race between Islamabad and New Delhi to win over American=20
favours. Americans high priority schemes will receive unstinted=20
cooperation from both bickering countries. Power politics by the true=20
great powers will march on while people of this region will have to=20
bear additional burdens and grin.

_____

#2.

(Secular Perspective, Sept. 16-30, 2002)

ON ROOTS OF COMMUNAL VIOLENCE
Asghar Ali Engineer

Communal violence has been increasingly taking place in India for=20
last several decades. There has hardly been any respite throughout=20
period of independence. To understand the phenomenon of communal=20
violence and its roots in our society is highly necessary to find=20
solution if any. Many rationalists reduce it to religion and for them=20
religion is the main culprit. Such reductionism would not help. It is=20
not only oversimplifying an issue it also means ignoring the=20
complexity of a social phenomenon.

Religion, at best, is one factor, among many. Religion, it should=20
also be noted, is an instrumental rather than fundamental cause.=20
Religion is used as a powerful instrument to achieve political,=20
economic and social purposes for its powerful mobilizatory power.=20
Religion has powerful emotional appeal and hence it is easy to=20
exploit clouding real interests. What appears to be clash of=20
religions is, really clash of interests.

Even partition was not result of clash between Hinduism and Islam as=20
popularly thought. Jinnah was quite indifferent to religion and=20
religious practices. He was a constitutionalist and was fighting for=20
constitutional arrangements for the Muslim power elite. Had it been=20
resolved satisfactorily our country would not have been partitioned.=20
The theory invoked by communal forces that since Muslims were not=20
loyal to the country they saw it partitioned, can hold no water.

Jinnah represented interests not of all Indian Muslims but only of=20
elite Muslims. He had no concern for low class, low caste Muslims and=20
overwhelming majority of Indian Muslims belonged to, and belong even=20
today, to this category. The interests of poor Muslims left Jinnah=20
quite cold. When the noted poet Dr. Iqbal wrote to Jinnah about acute=20
poverty among the Muslims of Punjab and to do something about it to=20
make Muslim League popular among them, Jinnah quietly dropped him=20
from presidentship of the Punjab Muslim League. Muslim League was=20
party of Muslim power elite.

In understanding the roots of communalism one must understand that=20
communalism neither represents religion nor patriotism, it represents=20
interests. Secondly, it should also be understood that no religious=20
community is homogenous as communalists make it out to be; every=20
religious community is divided along several lies =96 caste, class,=20
culture and language. These are the fault lies of any religious=20
communities. Muslim League, as pointed out above, did not represent=20
the entire Muslim community nor Hindu communalists represent=20
interests of all Hindus. The Hindu community is irreconcilably=20
divided along caste lies apart from class and linguistic-cultural=20
lines.

In any case Hindus are much more stratified (though Muslims too are)=20
than any other community in India and no single formation like the=20
Sangh Parivar or Muslim League (in pre-partition days) can represent=20
entire community. However, since who knows this better than communal=20
forces that they employ religious rhetoric much more aggressively to=20
compensate for lack of political unity in the community.

The Muslim League tried to arouse religious passions to fanatical=20
pitch as Muslims in pre-partition days were far from united. The low=20
caste and lower class Muslims as well as Muslims from regions like=20
North West province and South (particularly Tamil and Malayalam=20
speaking Muslims) were opposed or indifferent to Muslim League and=20
supported Indian National Congress or even left parties. The Muslim=20
League used aggressive religious rhetoric precisely to make up for=20
this lack of unity.

The Sangh Parivar transcended even pre-partition Muslim League in=20
unabashedly exploiting Hindu religious rhetoric to promote its own=20
political interests and to make up for total lack of unity among the=20
Hindus. Since the caste consciousness is very deep among the Hindus=20
and now every caste is pressing for its political interests, the task=20
of leaders of the Sangh Parivar became even more challenging any=20
time. And hence they are compelled to use much more aggressive=20
rhetoric and also much more organised violence against the other=20
community to try to forge unity among Hindus fragmented along so many=20
lines.

Greater the fragmentation higher the tendency to attack other=20
community to create illusion of unity. High pitched rhetoric and=20
maximum degree of communal violence reaching proportions of carnage=20
help 'unite' disparate groups of Hindus though this 'unity' itself is=20
extremely fragile and temporary.

It is also important to note that the real carriers of communal virus=20
are those belonging to educated middle classes. And most of these=20
middle class people happen to be not so enthusiastic about religion=20
and religious orthodoxy. The carriers of Muslim communalism were=20
educated Muslim middle classes of colonial India. These middle=20
classes become, through their education, more conscious of their=20
caste and communal identities and then they articulate these=20
identities in caste and communal idiom. Their whole political=20
discourse veers round caste and communal issues.

It is in this sense that communalism is product of modern British=20
colonial period, and not of medieval period as made out by the=20
communal forces. It is not only the British colonialists who divided=20
Indians to rule over them, the Indian elite too was equally divisive=20
in its own interests. It got easily divided, as basically its=20
interests were divisive.

The Sangh Parivar (The Hindu Mahasabha in the colonial period)=20
created illusion of patriotism by employing rhetoric of 'Bharat=20
Mata', 'Akhand Bharat' and so on but it was no less divisive of the=20
country as Muslim League politics itself. Both Savarkar as well as=20
Jinnah employed similar communal discourse and both talked of Hindu=20
nationalism and Muslim nationalism. Savarkar also maintained that=20
Hindus and Muslims are two separate nations as Jinnah did. Only=20
difference is that majority communalism leads to hidden inner=20
division and minority communalism to visible external division. But=20
minority communalism also does not lead to external visible division=20
in all cases; it can lead to such division only if it is concentrated=20
in some areas; but not if it is dispersed.

In independent India majority communalism slowly and gradually became=20
much more aggressive and ultimately almost subdued the minority=20
communalism. Jawaharlal Nehru maintained even during pre-partition=20
period (when minority communalism was comparatively more aggressive)=20
that majority communalism is aggressive and reactionary and minority=20
communalism is defensive and borne out of feeling of insecurity.

The majority communalism showed its aggressiveness in=20
post-independence India first in Jabalpur riots of 1962. Nehru never=20
thought in post-independence India such aggressive communal violence=20
can break out. He was greatly shocked. However, Nehru and Maulana=20
Azad were great pillars of secularism and did everything to protect=20
and even promote it.

The subsequent generation of Congresspersons hardly had such=20
commitment to secular ideology and secular politics. They were more=20
interested in power than ideology. The gradual de-ideologisation of=20
politics further strengthened politics of communalism. The=20
de-ideologised 'pragmatic approach' then began to deteriorate into=20
opportunism and even unabashed use of caste and communal rhetoric by=20
the Congress 'secular' leaders to capture power.

What mattered now was to win elections rather than promote politics=20
of secular and socialist ideology though the rhetoric of socialism=20
and secularism continued. Nehru=92s socialist -secular discourse now=20
became an empty rhetoric. Indira Gandhi continued this discourse but=20
for a short while. For her too power superseded ideology in less than=20
a decade. And, she was much more of a secularist than other leaders=20
of the Congress.

This weakening of secular commitment injected much greater degree of=20
dose of opportunism, if not outright communalism, in Indian politics.=20
The decade of eighties proved to be much dangerous from this point of=20
view. The weakened secular commitment of the Congress and much more=20
aggressive communal rhetoric of the Sangh Parivar brought about=20
greatest spurt if communal violence in the decade of eighties. The=20
Sangh Parivar raised new issues and began to seriously question the=20
very concept of nehruvian secularism as =91psuedo-secularism=92 based on=20
=91appeasement=92 of minorities. Such overtly communal discourse was=20
never employed before as part of secular political discourse.

The result was not any serious debate from the Congress leaders but a=20
feeling began to take roots in the Congress circles that we are=20
getting alienated from majority community in order to court minority=20
votes. Though such a stance was never officially adopted by the=20
Congress, it was never seriously challenged either. The Congress=20
commitment to secularism became so weak during the eighties that it=20
even surrendered before minority leaders to overturn the Supreme=20
Court judgement in the Shah Bano maintenance case by enacting another=20
law for maintenance for Muslim women. Rajiv Gandhi then went to the=20
extent of laying foundation stone for Ramjanmabhoomi Masjid and got=20
completely alienated from the minority community and lost subsequent=20
elections.

Had the Congress maintained its commitment to secularism like Nehru=20
and Azad communalism would not have been emboldened to such an extent=20
and India would not have seen eruption of communal carnage in Gujrat.=20
The Lohite socialists also wavered in their commitment to socialism=20
often making compromises with the Sangh Parivar. It is only the=20
Communists who remained steadfast in their commitment to both=20
socialism and secularism.=A0

(Centre for Study of Society and Secularism
9B, Himalaya Apts., 1st floor, 6th Road, Santacruz (E),
Mumbai:- 400 055, India. E-mail: <mailto:csss@v...>csss@v... )

_____

#3.

The Hindustan Times
September 20, 2002

The right to secular education
Praful Bidwai

Venkaiah Naidu has taunted the opposition to move court against=20
Narendra Modi for his nauseating remarks against the minorities =8B=20
themselves a sordid low in hate-speech. He could only have spoken out=20
of a combination of communal arrogance and supreme confidence that=20
the judiciary won=B9t chastise or punish Modi within a time-span which=20
is socially material, that is, which modifies, or improves, the way=20
we are governed.

It=B9s hard to quarrel with Naidu on this second count. Proof of this=20
comes from instances high and low. Take the refusal eight years ago=20
of the Bombay High Court, and then the Supreme Court to order the=20
government to do its duty and prosecute Bal Thackeray for instigating=20
the 1992-93 communal killings. Thackeray=B9s role wasn=B9t in doubt =8B nor=
=20
denied. The petitioners, including a former Maharashtra chief=20
secretary, cited inflammatory editorials from Saamna which Thackeray=20
edits =8B which he didn=B9t disown =8B calling for the butchery of Muslims=
=20
busti by busti. The senapati still roams free.

Also in the =8Chigh=B9 category are the Supreme Court=B9s 1989 Bhopal=20
settlement, the 1996 =8CHindutva as a way of life=B9 verdict, and the=20
2000=A0Narmada judgment. These did not defend the underprivileged,=20
uphold secular pluralism, or promote the Constitution=B9s social=20
liberation agenda.

In the =8Clow=B9 category is the trial of the Parliament attack accused.=20
This is being conducted through questionable interpretations of=20
illegally tapped phone-intercepts. Contradictorily, the prosecution=20
invokes POTA while pressing charges, but the 19th century Telegraph=20
Act when collecting evidence! Mayawati has aggravated the crisis of=20
the justice-delivery system by refusing to prosecute L.K. Advani and=20
others in the Babri case. The CBI, working directly under the=20
cabinet, must now prosecute its members =8B fairly!

Ordinary citizens will never understand the system=B9s arcane ways, or=20
appreciate why the Babri prosecution cannot even begin after 10 years=20
of procedural wrangle, or why the courts can=B9t take suo motu=20
cognisance of the worst communal pogrom in independent India when=20
they can intervene on CNG for buses.

The latest disappointment is the apex court=B9s verdict in the=20
textbooks petition. The petition accused NCERT of bypassing the=20
Central Advisory Board on Education (CABE) while capriciously=20
formulating the National Curriculum Framework for School=20
Education-2000 (NCF); and of insinuating religion into secular=20
education in violation of the =8Cbasic structure=B9 of the Constitution.

CABE (established 1920) is the sole body through which the states and=20
the Centre interact on education policy implementation. CABE=B9s=20
approval of the NCF is indispensable to preventing dangerous=20
over-centralisation in a one-billion population country with 33=20
states/territories.

The NCERT-formulated NCF did not receive CABE=B9s approval. (The=20
government never bothered to convene the board.) Nor did NCERT follow=20
elementary norms by holding wide consultations with teachers,=20
educationists and social scientists before writing the NCF. Yet, the=20
court upheld the NCF=B9s validity merely because CABE is not a=20
statutory body. But nor is NCERT (for that matter, the Planning=20
Commission)!

What was at stake was not merely the legal status of institutions,=20
but the right of the child to free, unbiased education based on=20
syllabi critically discussed through the widest exchange of=20
thoughtful views. The NCF represents one specific, narrow ideological=20
viewpoint. It bases itself on =8Cvalue education=B9; derives =8Cvalue=B9 fr=
om=20
the =8Cmajor source=B9 =8B religion; and advances dubious notions such as=20
the child=B9s =8Cspiritual quotient=B9, in addition to discredited ones=20
like the =8Cintelligence quotient=B9. Proof of the NCF=B9s bias lies in the=
=20
ingredients =8B shoddy Hindutva and NCERT=B9s obnoxious syllabi.

The NCF mandates a system which tells children lies and half-truths =8B=20
about Harappa and the post-Bronze Age Vedic period being=20
contemporary, Brahmins never eating beef, Rama and Krishna being=20
historical, not mythological figures, Muslims and Christians being=20
=8Caliens=B9. The syllabi and NCERT-censored textbooks follow the RSS=B9s=20
Vidya Bharati model =8B demolished by distinguished historians. As the=20
Delhi Historians Group says, this promotes Hindu-supremacism in the=20
name of sarva-dharma-samabhava.

Since 1998, Hindutva fanatics like M.M. Joshi have relentlessly=20
pursued one agenda. They tried to thrust Saraswati Vandana down our=20
throats, stuffed NCERT and UGC with RSS loyalists, introduced=20
astrology and karmakanda in universities, and equated crude=20
majoritarianism with nationalism. The Supreme Court has turned a=20
blind eye to this context =8B and to the NCF-syllabi=B9s content. Rather,=20
it has upheld their validity through its own obiter dicta. Examples:

* =B3It appears that religions have come into existence for=20
controlling wild animal instinct (sic) in human beings and for having=20
civilised cultural society. Religion is the foundation for value base=20
survival of human beings=8A=B2
* =B3All the values are derived from ultimate reality =8B supreme=20
power or self-consciousness =8B to which man orients himself.=B2
* =B3How to coexist, not only with human beings but all living=20
beings on the earth, =8A is=8A discussed by Saints=8A all over the world=20
which is reflected in religions.=B2

The judgment repeatedly, arbitrarily, pronounces that all religions=20
are identical in essence. This imposes a false homogeneity upon=20
different faiths. It trivialises the citizen=B9s fundamental right to=20
practise any faith of her/his choice =8B irrespective of the=20
=8Cessentialist=B9 interpretation.

With due respect, the court=B9s judgment is flawed and illogical. It=20
erroneously conflates secularism =8B separation of religion from=20
politics =8B with homogenised faith in religion. Such ideas cannot=20
inculcate pluralist, multicultural, multi-religious notions of=20
Indianness or universal citizenship values.

The Supreme Court should review the verdict =8B as it did on Bhopal case.

_____

#4.

The Statesman
Hostage to Fascists!
Caveat
By C R IRANI
http://www.thestatesman.net/page.news.php3?id=3D2421&type=3DPageone&theme=
=3DA

______

#5.

Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 15:56:31 +0530 (IST)

Demographic Lies and Demonisation

Ram Puniyani

One of the major factors in perpetuation of communal violence is the
doctoring of the mass consciousness. The social common sense is
manufactured in such a way that the targeted community is made to appear
as the culprit. The classic case
of'Victim as Culprit'. And that's how so many myths percolate about the
minorities. Apart from the Historical myths the one's related to
demographics are playing a serious role in the demonisation of Muslims in
particular. In a way what Mr. Modi said is nothing new as far as social
common sense is concerned. Modi's statement during his Gaurav Yatra about
Muslims, "We are five and we will have 25 offspring's.... For this, we
have to teach a lesson to those who are increasing the population at an
alarming rate.", has been resented even by the BJP top brass who at
deeper level believe that what Mr. Modi said is true, it is this
propagation, which has been done by communal outfits actively most of the
time. And also these are the types of propagations, which are actively
spread by the members of the progeny of RSS, the Sangh Parivar. So why
this resentment against Mr. Modi by many a leaders of Sangh Parivar like
Vajpayee and Vaikayya Naidu etc?

Sangh Parivar though deeply believes in this and propagates it, it is
done in a way whereby the electoral wing does not have to resort to this
propaganda making as the RSS, VHP, Bajarang Dal etc.are there to do this
job, to prepare the fertile ground for electoral benefits for the
Hindutva politics. The electoral wing, BJP, has to ensure that it keeps a
neutral face to win over even the 'enemies' (Muslims, Christains and
Communists) of Hindu nation, as defined by M.S. Golwalkar, the major
ideologue of Sangh Parivar. While Mr. Modi out of desperation wants to
ensure the post violence consolidation of Hindu votes, it may have
adverse repercussions on the overall strategy of BJP, so this reprimand
to the emerging Hero of Hindutva politics, Narendra Modi.

As such what are the facts behind the Ham Panch Hamare Pachis, (A
derogarory reference to Muslims' attitude towards family planning etc.-We
are five, one husband-four wives, twenty Children) Does demographic data
support this construct, which comes in handy especially before the riots
to build up the atmosphere. The census surveys by religion totally negate
this firmly held popular belief. Religion is one of the markers used in
these surveys. As per 1971 survey Hindus constituted 82.7% and Muslims
11.2% of the population. The corresponding figures for 1991 census are
Hindus 82.6% and Muslims 11.4%. (Malayalam Manorama, 1992). The marginal
difference in the growth pattern as we will see a bit later has more to
do with socio-economic factors rather than the religious ones. Over all,
this statistics shows a reasonably 'stable' (religion wise) population.
That apart, even if the current differentials persist, it is not only
unlikely, but also impossible for Muslim population to overtake the Hindu
population for the next century or so. On the contrary if the prevailing
growth rates are analysed, it will be clear that between 61-71 and
71-81,Hindu population increase went up from 23.71 to 24.42, while
between the same periods Muslim population increase went down from 30.85
to 30.20. If these rate of growths are frozen at same level hundred years
from 1981,Hindus and Muslims will record a decadal growth rate of 30.71
and 30.55 respectively i.e. growth rates of Hindus will be higher.

Similarly what about four wives to the Muslim male. Is it possible at
all? On first count it is immaterial whether a man is having one or more
wives as the total number of children depends on the number of women,
which does not get influenced by polygamy. If at all, this number of
women has more to do with the prevalence of social practice of female
infanticide and 'bride burnings' in the areas where the practice of
extortion by parents of 'grooms' called dowry is prevalent. Secondly, the
male/female ratio cannot permit the 'luxury' of four wives to the Muslim
males unless three-fourths (75%) of them go without marriage. As per 1981
census the male/female ratio for Muslims was 1.068 and for Hindus 1.072
i.e. for every 1000 Muslim females there are 1068 Muslim males. One has
to conceive of gigantic mental acrobatics, in the light of these
statistics, to believe that all Muslim males can have four wives.

As such a slightly earlier but relevant statistics of polygamy (1961
census report) totally smashes the myth of Muslim polygamy, unless the
social trends have worsened drastically, which obviously have not. As per
this the incidence of polygamy is highest among the Adivasis (15.25)
followed by Buddhists (7.9), Jains (6.72) Hindus (5.80) and lo behold,
followed by Muslims (5.70). Research carried out by Mallika B.Mistry of
Gokhle institute of Pune, concludes "there is no evidence that the
percentage of polygamous marriage (among Muslims) is larger than for
Hindus". A comparison of nuptiality patterns for Hindus and Muslims shows
great similarity, the incidence of polygamy has been declining among both
Hindus and Muslims.
>From the above it will be interesting to draw the religion based
fertility patterns. These patterns differ within Muslim community itself,
they vary from region to region as per the socio-economic and educational
levels of the community concerned. Those in the better socio-economic and
educational ladder have lesser population increase, while those on the
lower rungs of socio-economic educational ladder have higher rate of
population growth. This conforms to regional, urban and rural
distribution as well. Birth rates in Malabar region of Kerala, whose
Muslim population is 40%, is significantly lower than those in Uttar
Pradesh with a Muslim population of 15%. The contrasting case is that of
Kashmir, a Muslim majority state. Here the Fertility rate of Hindus is
almost twice that of Muslims. Here again the birth rate was lower
31.4(per thousand) than in U.P (36.5), MP 36.4, Bihar 34.8 and Rajasthan
33.4.

We have to realise that the overall rate of population increase in
educationally and socially advanced states like Kerala, Tamilnadu and
Karnataka, is overall lower, both for Muslims and Hindus, compared to the
rest of the country. Also let us have a look at Urban rural divide. More
than on third of the Muslim community is concentrated in the peripheral
and decaying areas of urban economic life. Incidence of urban poverty is
higher among them by 17%(vis--vis Hindus). The number of Muslims living
below poverty line is close to 65%. They are generally living in older
areas of modern cities, which are well known for poor sanitation, lack of
health facilities and basic amenities. On the top of this the repeated
outburst of communal violence against them is 'ghettoising' them with the
result that improvement in their lot is becoming more and more difficult.

Overall one observes that there are multiple factors determining
the rate of population growth, religion being very low on weightage
scale, if at all it counts at all. Socio-economic betterment and
education are the foremost factors helping in the control of population
growth. Feeling of insecurity and poor socio-economic status counter the
efforts to promote family planning, (nee, welfare, which is the term
conveying the goals of this exercise more precisely), and these two
factors transcend the religious factor by number of times. One has to
'complement' the Gobbelsian methods of Hindu right, which have concocted
this offensive slogan, which is far removed from the truth.

And lastly what about the Muslims not taking to family planning? In
Islamic countries like Turkey and Indonesia family planning methods are
quite popular. In Turkey for example 63% of the population in the
reproductive age group uses contraception and in Indonesia the figure is
48%. In India the number of Muslim couples in the child bearing age
practising family planning in 1970 was 9%(Hindus 14%) and in 1980,
22.5%(Hindus 36.1%) (Operation Research Group, Baroda 1981). Thus the
number of additional Muslims taking to family planning is keeping pace
with the number of Hindus doing the same. Like all other social
programmes family planning is also linked with socio-economic status,
level of general social awareness etc. We will be repeatedly encountering
this fact that a large number of Muslims being in the low socio economic
strata share these statistics more with other socially disadvantaged
sections of society.

Narendra Modi's use of abusive and abrasive language to distort the
Demographic facts in a way does not come as a surprise as it has been the
major fodder on whch the communalism has been feeding itself. Whatever be
the far reaching implications of such statements, it is sure the communal
politics will keep resorting to such myths to strengthen itself.

(Writer works fro EKTA, Committee for Communal Amity, Mumbai)

_____

#6.

The Hindu
Saturday, Aug 17, 2002

Amartya Sen blames Modi Govt. for violence

By Our Special Correspondent

Kolkata Aug.16. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen today held the Narendra=20
Modi Government responsible for the communal violence in Gujarat,=20
describing it as ``a monstrous act'' which ``could not be correlated=20
to the poor economic development and lack of education''.

At a news conference, Prof. Sen said, ``what happened in Gujarat is a=20
monstrous act. There was an attempt to incite a section of the=20
population against another with political motivation.''

He criticised the Narendra Modi Government, saying that the communal=20
violence did not happen in any other State. ``The nature of the=20
governance in Gujarat had something to do with it.''

Prof. Sen suggested that communalism could be controlled by changing=20
the school curricula.

``We can help to do so by making the curricula more broad-based.''

He said it was not proper to correlate communal violence with poor=20
economic development and lack of education. ``One of the highest=20
sectarian violence in the twentieth century occurred in Germany, a=20
developed State, and not in any third-world country.''

[...].

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996.
To subscribe send a blank message to:
<act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|