[sacw] SACW | 1 July 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire Dispatch | 1 July 2002

[ INTERRUPTION NOTICE: Please note that there will be no SACW=20
dispatches between the period 3 July - 11/12 July 2002 ]

South Asia Citizens Web:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

South Asians Against Nukes:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/NoNukes.html

__________________________

#1. Sri Lanka: Political power over ethnic identity (Ram Manikkalingam)
#2. Possession and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (R=20
Rajaraman, M V Ramana, Zia Mian)
#3. India: NDA's Presidential Missile - Kalam: boon or bane? (Praful Bidwai=
)
#4. India: The siege is from within. A way of life has been seized=20
upon as a means to political power and a religion held hostage.=20
(Soutik Biswas, Sanjay Suri, S. Anand)
#5. India: Petition to Protest Against Ban on Anand Patwardhan's=20
Film, "Ram Ke Naam" by Malappuram District Collector In Kerala
#6. Two reports on Gujarat

__________________________

#1.

Political power over ethnic identity
By Ram Manikkalingam

The civil war in Sri Lanka consists of three distinct conflicts. Most=20
observers focus on the ethnic conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese,=20
or the armed conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the rebel=20
Tamil Tigers. But they pay scant attention to the political power=20
conflict among the three main forces that currently have a stake in=20
political rule in Sri Lanka - the Tamil Tigers, the United National=20
Party (UNP) and the People's Alliance (P.A.). While the Tiger desire=20
for absolute power in the Tamil areas has kept the war going, the=20
competition for political power between the P.A. and the UNP has=20
prevented the war from ending.

Conflict over power among political parties is a vital element of=20
democracy in any country. It prevents the state from becoming an=20
oligarchy or, worse, a tyranny. While the power conflict between the=20
UNP and the P.A. is good for democracy, it is bad for resolving the=20
ethnic conflict. Ending political competition between the two major=20
political parties is not required for them to work together to=20
resolve the civil war. The political competition for power between=20
the two political parties should be channelled so it does not=20
undermine efforts to end the war. By voting for Chandrika Kumaratunga=20
as President and Ranil Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister, the Sri=20
Lankan people have called on the two leaders of the main political=20
parties to do precisely this.

The ethnic conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese is commonly=20
considered the hardest to resolve. Most descriptions of Sri Lanka's=20
ethnic conflict (or for that matter any ethnic conflict) are=20
variations of the hate-and-greed explanation. These descriptions=20
depict Tamils and Sinhalese as either hating each other, because of=20
conflicting nationalisms, or competing with each other for resources=20
because of greed. Where the nationalism comes from - ancient history,=20
myth, or recent acts of violence - is less relevant than that it=20
exists and manifests itself in mutual hostility between Tamils and=20
Sinhalese. Similarly, where greed comes from - individual interests,=20
group solidarity or nationalist passion - is less important than that=20
it ultimately leads ethnic groups to get into conflict.

While this explanation - that Tamils and Sinhalese are enmeshed in a=20
conflict over ethnic identity and material resources - may have had=20
some relevance in the past, it is becoming less and less plausible=20
today. Most Tamils and Sinhalese desire an end to the war. They have=20
come to realise - whether enthusiastically or reluctantly - that a=20
solution to the conflict will require the Central government=20
dominated by the Sinhalese to share political power with other ethnic=20
groups, particularly the Tamils. Whatever the various solutions=20
proffered, they invariably converge on some form of federalism.=20
Except for some Sinhalese and some Tamils, the majority of the people=20
in Sri Lanka are beginning to accept such a solution. Even those who=20
are critical of federalism are less concerned that it will give more=20
rights to Tamils than they deserve, than that it will enable the=20
Tigers to consolidate their power and establish a separate Tamil=20
authoritarian state.

The proposals presented by President Kumaratunga in July 1995 form an=20
important basis for pursuing a political solution. The proposals,=20
presented after the Tigers violated the ceasefire, go beyond a=20
unitary state. They acknowledge the discrimination that the Tamil=20
people faced at the hands of the Sri Lankan State since Independence=20
and seek to redress it through regional autonomy. The point is that=20
there is no mystery about what the outlines of a political solution=20
to the ethnic conflict will look like. While most academic and=20
journalistic observers continue to focus primarily on the ethnic=20
conflict in Sri Lanka, this is probably the least challenging=20
obstacle to peace today.

Addressing the ethnic conflict is complicated by the armed conflict=20
between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan State. Although the armed=20
conflict is generally viewed as stemming from the ethnic conflict, it=20
is also distinct in character. States claim a monopoly over the=20
legitimate use of force in a given territory. So any state will=20
repress those who seek to oppose it by force. It matters little to=20
the state that those who oppose it do so on the basis of democracy,=20
ethnicity or regionalism. And when it comes to suppressing an armed=20
rebellion, it matters little whether the state is capitalist or=20
socialist, authoritarian or democratic. All states have acted with=20
varying degrees of violence and repression in stemming armed=20
rebellions. So also have rebel groups opposing states. There are two=20
ways armed conflicts between states and a rebel group can end - when=20
one side defeats another or when both sides concede that they cannot=20
defeat each other. It is not clear if this has happened in Sri Lanka.

The current ceasefire agreement between the government of Sri Lanka=20
and the Tigers is an attempt to resolve the armed conflict. Prime=20
Minister Wickremesinghe and the Tiger leader signed it. The previous=20
P.A.- led government was involved in drawing up key elements of it,=20
such as the list of items to be lifted from the embargo. The Sri=20
Lankan State has conceded that the cost of defeating the Tigers is=20
one that it does not wish to bear. The Tigers have yet to do so. They=20
are either bluffing, that is, they have admitted it among them but do=20
not wish to do so to others. Or they are simply buying time. Whatever=20
the drawbacks to the ceasefire agreement (and there are many), it is=20
still an attempt at resolving the armed conflict between the Tamil=20
Tigers and the Sri Lankan State, without granting either side a=20
decisive military victory.

Addressing the armed conflict is complicated by the political power=20
conflict among the main contenders for political power in Sri Lanka -=20
the ruling UNP led by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, the Opposition=20
P.A. led by President Kumaratunga and the Tamil Tigers led by their=20
leader V. Prabhakaran. There is a distinct power conflict among these=20
three contenders that is derived from competition over the business=20
of rule. The UNP and the P.A. compete over who gets to rule the Sri=20
Lankan State, while the Tigers seek to rule a separate Tamil one.

This competition cannot simply be reduced to varying ideologies of=20
nationalism or competing policies over how to resolve the ethnic=20
conflict or, for that matter, different socio-economic policies.=20
Political parties are built around the express intent of securing=20
political power. They may have different ideological leanings or=20
social bases and therefore wish to carry out different programmes.=20
Still, one of their central goals is to rule, simpliciter, not only=20
ruling in order to do something else. Clearly, all three parties -=20
the UNP, the P.A. and the Tigers - do not contend for power the same=20
way. The P.A. and the UNP do so through more or less democratic=20
means. The Tigers do so through more or less violently=20
anti-democratic means. Yet, an important part of what they all=20
contend for is power.

The position taken by these parties in elections over the past two=20
years helps illustrate the distinction between policy on the ethnic=20
conflict and political alliances to secure power. During the last two=20
parliamentary elections and the most recent presidential elections,=20
the UNP opposed the P.A. government's political proposals for=20
resolving the conflict - saying that it had granted too much autonomy=20
to the Tamils. At the same time, the UNP supported talking to the=20
Tamil Tigers, who were asking for a separate state.

This seemingly contradictory position - opposing Tamil autonomy, but=20
supporting a dialogue with the Tamil extremist Tigers - can be=20
reconciled. The UNP as a political party seeking to run the state was=20
seeking Tiger support to obtain Tamil votes in areas under Tiger=20
domination, while keeping its Sinhala base satisfied. Similarly, the=20
Tigers seeking a separate state were implicitly supporting a=20
political party that sought to dilute measures granting autonomy to=20
Tamil areas. The Tigers expected the UNP to be more conciliatory=20
towards them than the P.A. would be.

The point here is not that the UNP (or Tigers) is opportunistic and=20
the P.A. is not. Nor is it the point that there are no differences of=20
opinion among members of the UNP and the P.A. as a whole about the=20
ethnic conflict.

In fact, historically, the P.A. has tended to be more Sinhala=20
nationalist than the UNP. Rather, it is that apart from all the=20
claims and counter-claims about the conflict based on ethnicity,=20
there is a competition between the political parties over who gets to=20
rule Sri Lanka that is quite distinct from the ethnic conflict.

And this competition adds to the complexity of resolving the civil=20
war. All Sri Lankan governments have sought to, for better or for=20
worse, address the ethnic conflict through regional autonomy and the=20
armed conflict through ceasefires and/or military confrontation.=20
Other than sporadic efforts, they have all paid little if any=20
explicit attention to addressing the political power conflict among=20
the main parties.

The proposal to set up an interim administration under Tiger control=20
in the Northeast of Sri Lanka is an attempt to address the desire for=20
political power of the Tigers. The UNP-led government hopes to entice=20
the Tigers by granting them de facto rule over the Northeast. Human=20
rights groups are concerned that the Tigers will use the interim=20
administration to violate the rights of people living in the=20
Northeast, engage in ethnic cleansing, and prepare for war. Others=20
argue that an overall political settlement needs to be worked out=20
prior to setting up an interim administration. The interim=20
administration will then become a means to a clear political goal,=20
rather than a halfway house that both parties haggle over until=20
conflict breaks out. Whatever the validity of such criticisms (and=20
they are all valid), the UNP-led government's proposal to set up an=20
interim administration constitutes a pragmatic recognition that the=20
political power conflict with the Tigers is distinct from the ethnic=20
conflict with the Tamils.

Even as it is addressing the political power conflict with the=20
Tigers, the UNP-led government, however, is failing to address the=20
conflict over political power with the P.A. The political power=20
conflict between the P.A. and the UNP is harder to resolve (though=20
not bloodier) than that between either one of them and the Tigers.=20
This is because, even in the worst case where the Tigers control the=20
Northeast or even establish a separate state, the P.A. or the UNP can=20
still rule from Colombo. However, if either the P.A. or the UNP=20
controls all political power in Colombo, the other party is=20
automatically excluded. Thus the P.A. and the UNP are more reluctant=20
to share power with each other than with the Tigers, although they=20
are both ideologically closer to each other than each is to the=20
Tigers.

Recent efforts by the UNP to weaken the constitutional authority of=20
President Kumaratunga are an example of this unwillingness to share=20
power at the Centre. The UNP is rushing through amendments to the=20
Constitution that will prevent the President from dissolving=20
Parliament. The President of Sri Lanka wields the power to dissolve=20
Parliament a year after it is elected under the present=20
semi-presidential system. When the President and the Prime Minister=20
are from the same party, this power does not differ significantly=20
from that of the latter under the parliamentary system. However, when=20
they are from different parties, these powers provide a critical=20
source of authority for a President without a parliamentary majority.=20
With the threat of dissolution hanging over the government, a=20
President can cajole the ruling party to act in ways that take the=20
interests of the Opposition are taken into consideration.

The political rationale presented by the UNP for amending the=20
Constitution to limit the President's powers is to prevent her from=20
jeopardising the peace process by dissolving Parliament. But as Sri=20
Lankan political columnist Tissaranee Gunesekere has astutely=20
observed, this amendment is either unnecessary or counterproductive.=20
It is unnecessary if the peace process is working, that is, there is=20
no resumption of war and the negotiations are proceeding steadily. In=20
such circumstances, even if President Kumaratunga were to dissolve=20
Parliament, the UNP is likely to come back to power with a greater=20
majority, not a lesser one. On the other hand, if the peace process=20
collapses, this amendment is not going to protect the UNP from a=20
serious political setback that may even cost them their majority in=20
Parliament.

The efforts to weaken the constitutional authority of the President=20
are counterproductive in yet another way. They jeopardise rather than=20
strengthen the peace process. By aggravating tensions between the=20
P.A. and the UNP further, they reduce any incentive on the part of=20
the P.A. led by the President to support the peace efforts of the=20
Prime Minister. And if these tensions continue after the collapse of=20
the peace process, they will weaken the Centre's capacity to defend=20
itself from a Tiger onslaught.

There is a great deal of common ground in the approach of the two=20
political parties to addressing the civil war. Both argue that a=20
political solution to the ethnic conflict will require regional=20
autonomy in predominantly Tamil areas. Both parties hope that=20
negotiating with the Tigers through Norwegian facilitation might lead=20
to a reduction in the armed conflict. Still, they emphasise slightly=20
different approaches. The President has argued in favour of a=20
political solution to the ethnic conflict throughout her career as a=20
political activist and leader of the country. She presented the most=20
extensive devolution package ever drafted by a Sri Lankan government.=20
She has consistently acknowledged the grievances of the Tamil people=20
and has sought to mobilise support for political devolution at a=20
moment when it was hardest to do so - in the midst of war. The=20
President, who called for "maximum devolution" to the Tamil people in=20
her policy statement to Parliament at the beginning of the previous=20
peace process, has gone much further than the Prime Minister who=20
calls for "extensive devolution". The President has both the=20
political courage and the charisma to provide leadership to the=20
country in devising a political solution to the ethnic conflict.

Through the ceasefire agreement the Prime Minister has demonstrated=20
that he has the confidence to take a number of risky steps to reduce=20
the armed conflict. While he may never have been associated with=20
previous calls for a negotiated settlement, he has also never=20
obstructed efforts to do so. When President Kumaratunga presented=20
wide-ranging devolution proposals in July 1995, then Opposition=20
leader Wickremasinghe criticised it in Parliament, but he did not=20
oppose it outside. He made an important break with the Sri Lankan=20
tradition of the Opposition always mobilising Sinhala nationalists=20
against any political concessions made to the Tamils by the=20
government. More recently, he supported President Kumaratunga when=20
she initiated indirect talks with the Tiger through Norwegian=20
facilitation. In the past few months he has worked hard to diffuse=20
opposition to the peace process with the Tigers. The Prime Minister=20
has shown that he has the skills and the patience to negotiate an end=20
to the armed conflict with the Tigers.

There is a natural division of political labour between the two main=20
political parties in Sri Lanka that can help the country wend its way=20
towards peace. Sri Lankans can encourage the two parties to compete=20
with each other for power by pursuing two parallel but complementary=20
aspects of a peace process - addressing the armed conflict and the=20
ethnic conflict - rather than obstructing each other's effort to do=20
so. If the political moment is ripe and the proper political=20
incentives are created, this collaboration can be institutionalised=20
in a bipartisan negotiating council as peace negotiations proceed.

The negotiating council can be co-chaired by the President and the=20
Prime Minister, who together can appoint its members. The negotiating=20
council ought to have two subcommittees- one to deal with the armed=20
conflict and the other with the ethnic conflict. The Prime Minister=20
can chair the subcommittee that deals with the armed conflict, an=20
area where he has already made some headway. The President can chair=20
the subcommittee that deals with the ethnic conflict, an area where=20
she has been more forthcoming. The role of this committee will be to=20
advise and guide the negotiating team representing the Sri Lankan=20
government. Ultimately, who has more influence in shaping the peace=20
process will depend on the relative power of the two political=20
parties among the people. While there is no assurance that the=20
negotiating council will ensure that the two political parties=20
co-operate with each other, it can provide an institutional framework=20
that will enable the two major political parties to collaborate=20
better in negotiating an end to the war.

Clearly none of this will guarantee that the peace process will=20
succeed, particularly if the Tigers believe they have more to gain by=20
going to war than working towards peace. Peace processes rarely=20
succeed, even when both parties negotiate in good faith. When one=20
party has consistently demonstrated nothing but bad faith, it is even=20
less likely to do so. To counter the possibility of failure, the best=20
that the President and the Prime Minister can do is make preparations=20
for war together, just as they ought to make preparations for peace=20
together.

If there is unity in peace, there is likely to be unity in war.=20
However, disunity in peace, will invariably lead to disunity in war.

In the past few years, rhetoric aside, the P.A. and the UNP have come=20
a remarkably long way towards a common position on resolving the two=20
central conflicts that plague Sri Lanka - the ethnic conflict and the=20
armed conflict. The people of Sri Lanka by voting for two political=20
parties to rule them together have called on their leaders to set=20
aside partisan differences that obstruct the peace process. Both=20
parties must come to realise that an end to the civil war will=20
ultimately benefit them both. Because whichever political party wins=20
the competition to rule Sri Lanka, it will still have to deal with=20
the ethnic conflict, on the one hand, and the armed rebellion of the=20
Tigers, on the other.

(The writer is a Fellow of the Open Society Institute and an=20
Assistant Director at the Rockefeller Foundation, based in New York.=20
This article expresses his personal views and not those of either of=20
the institutions).

Daily Mirror (Colombo)
Friday, 28 June 2002

____

#2.

Economic and Political Weekly (Mumbai, India)
June 22, 2002

Possession and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

An Assessment of Some Risks

This paper examines some of operational requirements and the dangers=20
that come with the possibility that in the foreseeable future India=20
and Pakistan may deploy their nuclear arsenals. The authors first=20
describe the analytical basis for the inevitability of accidents in=20
complex high-technology systems. Then they turn to potential failures=20
of nuclear command and control and early warning systems as examples.=20
They go on to discuss the possibility and consequences of accidental=20
explosions involving nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.=20
Finally some measures to reduce these risks are suggested.

R Rajaraman
M V Ramana
Zia Mian

http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=3D2002&leaf=3D06&filename=3D460=
7&filetype=3Dhtml

_____

#3.

The Praful Bidwai=20
Column - June 24

- NDA=92s Presidential Missile

Kalam: boon or bane?

By Praful Bidwai

Is Mr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam an eminent scientist with an exceptional=20
record and worthy vision, a secularist of integrity, who personifies=20
India=92s =93composite culture=94, behind whom the entire nation should=20
unite? Or is he merely the RSS=92 =93poster-boy Muslim=94, a =93Kalam Iyer=
=94=20
(as his colleagues call him), the kind who takes pride in knowing=20
Sanskrit but no Urdu, and who plays the rudra veena and reads the=20
Bhagwad-Gita every day?

The issue has proved divisive enough to split not just the=20
Opposition, but even the People=92s Front, which tried to forge a=20
distinct identity within it. Never before have such heavy charges=20
been traded between politicians over a single individual, including=20
Ms Sonia Gandhi. The Kalam issue demands a dispassionate discussion=20
which goes beyond icons and does not shy away from a good look at our=20
science and technology establishment.

However, two things should be clear. One, the BJP/NDA is making a big=20
hullabaloo about a =93consensus=94 around Mr Kalam. But the =93Missile Man=
=94=20
was not its first choice. Its original favourite until June 8 was=20
Vice-President Krishna Kant. Then, it suddenly switched to=20
Maharashtra governor P.C. Alexander for reasons connected with the=20
BJP-Shiv Sena=92s bid to topple the Congress-NCP state government. This=20
happened against Mr Vajpayee=92s wishes and his =93understanding=94 with Mr=
=20
Chandrababu Naidu. Mr Naidu went into a sulk.

At this point, the BJP=92s internal power dynamics took over. Mr=20
Vajpayee proposed Mr Kalam=92s name to outmanoeuvre his own party=20
colleagues. Thus, it is for cynical reasons that Mr Kalam emerged as=20
NDA candidate. The Opposition played its cards poorly. Rather than=20
hold wide consultations and develop a fallback option in case=20
President Narayanan refused re-nomination, it put all its eggs in one=20
basket. The Congress did not use its 14 chief ministers to evolve a=20
multi-party candidate. And the Left didn=92t apply its mind enough.

Secondly, whatever Mr Kalam=92s other qualifications, he lacks=20
experience in public life, government or Parliament. In our=20
Constitutional scheme, the President=92s is a political office. He/she=20
is not a decorative figure, but is called upon to counsel the Cabinet=20
and exercise discriminating judgment on sensitive matters. True, the=20
President need not have a party background. But s/he cannot be=20
uncoached in politics. Thus, Dr Radhakrishnan was an academic, but=20
had served as ambassador to the USSR. Barring Gyani Zail Singh and=20
V.V. Giri, all our Presidents have been men of learning, typically=20
with high qualifications from world-class universities. But they were=20
also experienced diplomats, administrators or legislators with a deep=20
understanding of the Constitution and the peculiarities of our=20
politics.

Mr Kalam lacks such experience or orientation. He is an engineer who=20
became a manager of cloistered defence-related programmes, with=20
little exposure to the broader process of governance. He has an=20
over-simple, untutored and at times unpardonably na=EFve understanding=20
of Constitutional issues, development priorities, and the=20
relationship between military and human security. Even a casual=20
reading of his Wings of Fire and Vision-2020 will confirm this.=20
Naivety marred his first two post-nomination press conferences, at=20
which he evaded inconvenient questions and took a position on=20
avoidance of war with Pakistan through nuclear deterrence, which is=20
at odds with the official view.

Mr Kalam believes India is a =93developed nation. We are among the top=20
five =85 in terms of GDP=85 Our poverty levels are falling, our=20
achievements are being globally recognised today. Yet we lack the=20
self-confidence to see ourselves as a developed nation.=94 But=20
underdevelopment is not just a function of GDP. Even in nominal GDP=20
terms, India is lower than Holland (pop. 15 million). Over half our=20
population lives on less than $2 a day. The per capita=20
income-differential between India and the developed world is roughly=20
1:40, higher than 50 years ago. What should especially shame Indians=20
is not just poverty, but staggering income inequalities. Growth alone=20
cannot address these. Mr Kalam has no understanding of these or of=20
the structural constraints, including hierarchy, caste and=20
illiteracy, which keep India backward.

Similarly, Mr Kalam shows little comprehension of the complex,=20
double-edged character of technology itself. Technology can liberate.=20
But it can destroy too-that=92s what nuclear missiles, biological=20
weapons and mind-control technologies do. Mr Kalam bemoans our=20
=93negativism=94: =93We are the second largest producer of wheat =85 [and=20
rice] in the world =85=94 But he doesn=92t reflect on the fact that we also=
=20
have the second biggest population in the world-and the biggest=20
collection of the hungry, the crippled, the diseased, the deprived =85

Such attitudes do not speak of wisdom. Truth to tell, Mr Kalam=92s=20
thinking is full of poorly constructed, half-baked or undigested=20
ideas. For instance, he advocates such weird things as =93bio-implants=94=20
for =93deficient=94 brains (reminiscent of eugenics?), compulsory=20
sterilisation, using nuclear fission (why?) to power short-haul=20
airplanes, and combining the occult with modern science. He believes=20
India is eminently capable of making anti-ballistic missile shields,=20
when even the US has so far proved unable to master that technology=20
which involves, among other things, reliably detecting launches in=20
distant continents, and then accurately attacking incoming=20
missiles-akin to hitting a bullet travelling at 24,000 km/sec with=20
another travelling at the same velocity!

As Princeton-based physicist M.V. Ramana says, Mr Kalam tends to=20
=93dress up even mediocre work with the Tricolour to pass it off as a=20
great achievement. In his autobiography, he says he=20
reverse-engineered a Russian rocket-assisted take-off system, simply=20
borrowing the crucial motors. Publicly, however, it was passed off as=20
an =91indigenous development=92=94. Here lies the crux. Mr Kalam is not a=20
scientist. He has discovered nothing new about the physical world. He=20
is an engineer who has manipulated aspects of the physical=20
reality-essentially to military ends. His doctorate is honorary, like=20
Ms Jayalalithaa=92s.

The performance of the two institutions closest to him, Indian Space=20
Research Organisation and Defence Research and Development=20
Organisation, has been deeply unsatisfactory. Besides the rather=20
primitive, short-range Prithvi (range, 150-250 km), their most=20
important achievement has been the Space Launch Vehicle rocket. But=20
this used an imported, not Indian, guidance system. The SLV-3 was the=20
base for the original Agni (range, 1,500-2,500 km). But that Agni=20
model went through three tests-one success, one failure, and one=20
=93limited success=94 (i.e. partial failure)before being declared a=20
=93technology demonstrator=94, rather than a prototype that would fly.=20
Since then, there has been a longer-range Agni-II (2,500 to 3,000 km)=20
missile, and a renamed, wholly new, Agni-I (range 700-900 km)=20
unrelated to the original missile. Both were developed largely after=20
Mr Kalam quit the DRDO.

India=92s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (launched=20
1983) is hardly a success story. Of the five different=20
missile-classes it was meant to develop, only two have become=20
(quasi-)operational. The Trishul, Nag and Akash are nowhere near that=20
status, despite long delays and massive cost-overruns. No Indian Navy=20
or Air Force ship or plane carries a DRDO missile. The army=92s main=20
anti-tank missile, the Milan ATM, is French in origin. All three=20
forces=92 anti-aircraft weapons are of Russian origin.

To be fair, Mr Kalam must be judged by the performance of the DRDO as=20
a whole. He headed it for long years. This record is embarrassingly=20
poor. The DRDO has never completed a major project on time. Its=20
weapons are often of indifferent quality, e.g. the 5.56 mm basic=20
infantry gun. Some of its big-ticket projects, like the AWACS=20
Advanced Airborne Warning Systems or the aircraft carrier, are big=20
disasters. Three of its most expensive projects, the Main Battle=20
Tank, Light Combat Aircraft, and Advanced Technology Vessel (nuclear=20
submarine) have each soaked up Rs 2,000 crores-plus, without=20
delivering results. The Arjun MBT is so heavy that the army prefers=20
Russian T-90 tanks. The LCA doesn=92t even have an Indian engine. And=20
the ATV=92s design isn=92t ready-after 20 years of =93work=94.

The DRDO can annually burn Rs 3,600 crores of public money without=20
producing decent results-at least partly because it is shielded from=20
public scrutiny, including the Comptroller and Auditor General=92s.=20
Such =93power without responsibility=94 has given the military-industrial=20
complex (MIC) a bad name everywhere. In India, jingoism and=20
militarist nationalism have made the MIC a holy cow. In this respect,=20
Mr Kalam represents the seamy, undemocratic side of the Complex. His=20
elevation to India=92s highest office will not only depoliticise and=20
lower its stature. It will put the terrible stamp of militarisation=20
on Rashtrapati Bhawan.

In principle, elevating Mr Kalam to the Presidency is no different=20
from making Dr A.Q. Khan Pakistan=92s president in a warlike situation.=20
Mr Kalam will also serve to whitewash the BJP after the Gujarat=20
carnage. His =93Hindutva-friendly=94 image will marginalise all those=20
Muslims who don=92t follow the Sangh stereotype: i.e. Urdu-speaking=20
meat-eaters who don=92t read the Gita, but who are no less Indian for=20
that. India=92s non-executive President is meant to reflect and defend=20
a pluralist culture. Mr Kalam does not. He, it bears recalling,=20
refused to publicly condemn those culpable for the Gujarat massacre;=20
he only said the events were =93very sad=94. Is that the kind of=20
presidential wisdom and candour we deserve?-end-

_____

#4.

Outlook Magazine | Jul 08, 2002=20=20=20=20
COVER STORY

A Faith Besieged
The siege is from within. A way of life has been seized upon as a=20
means to political power and a religion held hostage.
SOUTIK BISWAS, SANJAY SURI, S. ANAND

http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=3D20020708&fname=3DCover+Story=
&sid=3D1

_____

#5.

A new petition has been submitted by Mukundan C. Menon,=20
mukundancmenon@r... petition title is PROTEST AGAINST=20
BAN ON ANAND PATWARDHAN'S FILM, "RAM KE NAAM" BY MALAPPURAM DISTRICT=20
COLLECTOR IN KERALA.. The petition URL is=20
http://www.PetitionOnline.com/CHRO/petition.html
The petition is directed to The Chief Minister of Kerala,=20
Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala

_____

#6.

Two reports on Gujarat:

1) Violence In Vadodara
by People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) - Vadodara and Vadodara Shanti
Abhiyan
June 26, 2002

Available online at:

http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/pucl/index.htm

2) AT THE RECEIVING END: Women's Experiences of Violence in Vadodara
By: People's Union for Civil Liberties, Vadodara and Vadodara Shanti Abh=
iyan
May 31, 2002 published June 26, 2002

PDF File - 29 pages Available online at:
http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/pucl/receivingend.pdf