[sacw] SACW #1 | 27 July 02 Pakistan Special

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 27 July 2002

>From South Asia Citizens Web:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

__________________________

#1. The two-nation theory is used as a form of social control by=20
Pakistan's elite. ( Aasim Sajjid Akhtar)
#2. We Owe An Apology To Bangladesh (Hassan Abbas)
#3. Lessons of the Mianwali outrage ( I.A. Rehman)
#4. What is blasphemy? (Ayaz Amir)
#5. Book Review of 'Kartography By Kamila Shamsie' (Salil Tripathi)

__________________________

#1.

Himal (Kathmandu)
July 2002
PERSPECTIVE

Fallacy of the basic idea
The two-nation theory is used as a form of social control by Pakistan's eli=
te.

by Aasim Sajjid Akhtar

The 'Islamic' general

The single most important event in Pakistani his tory is the=20
secession of the eastern wing and the formation of Bangladesh in=20
1971. Yet, the imperative sentiment behind Pakistani nationhood=20
remains the two-nation theory. The interest groups that comprise the=20
Pakistani state are entirely reliant on this theory to justify the=20
security paradigm that underlies decision-making, and allocation of=20
resources. And yet, the single most important event in Pakistani=20
history remains strangely peripheral and misunderstood,=20
misrepresented as it is by the elite. To understand the concept of=20
Pakistanhood that has been propagated over our 55-year history is to=20
understand the political economy of this country.

All state structures that are fundamentally undemocratic rely on=20
means of social control, whether they are coercive or subtle. This=20
social control is usually founded on a basic idea, on a singular=20
ideology that permeates all aspects of life. In Pakistan's case, this=20
ideology in its essence asserts that Muslims are unable to co-exist=20
with Hindus. Created as a home for the Muslims of the Subcontinent,=20
Pakistan today teeters on the brink of political bankruptcy. It is=20
described by a ravaged economy, all-consuming societal ills, and a=20
political culture that resembles a modern-day monarchy.

The assumption that Muslims were inherently a single nation separate=20
from the nation of Hindus, India, was proven false by the events of=20
1971, when it became apparent that the Bengali identity was dearer to=20
those who lived in East Pakistan than the Muslim identity. Today,=20
there still are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan. And, have we=20
forgotten that there are still over a hundred thousand Biharis in=20
refugee camps in Bangladesh that the Pakistani state refuses to=20
accept? Still, the two-nation theory continues to inform Pakistan's=20
polity in a profound way, by providing the energy for its Kashmir=20
preoccupation: Kashmir continues to irk because it is symbolises a=20
failure to fulfil the two-nation dream. The fallacy of the two-nation=20
theory has been proven time and again, its contra-dictions=20
undermining its credibility, but the tragedy for Pakistan is that the=20
theory continues to be employed by the elite to perpetuate a system=20
that has clearly failed to cater to even the basic needs of its=20
citizens. The fact that the majority of Pakistanis still subscribe to=20
this theory underlines how powerful a means of social control it is.

The Pakistani body politic was dysfunctional from the word go. At the=20
time of partition, the Pakistani military was a marginal actor.=20
Neither was the religious clergy a major player in the politics of=20
the new nation; in fact, the Jamaat-e-Islami had been opposed to the=20
break up of India. The Hindu intelligentsia and entrepreneurial class=20
from entire regions, including the Siraiki belt and Sindh, had packed=20
up and crossed the new border to India. At that stage then, it was=20
the landed elite that had emerged as the most influential lobby=20
within the Pakistan movement which held the reins of power. The rest=20
was an unnatural amalgamation of different interest groups aspiring=20
to state power. And from the outset, the Kashmir dispute defined the=20
national psyche.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah is often quoted as having said that religion=20
should not interfere in the affairs of the state. He is said to have=20
asserted on numerous occasions that Pakistan would be a secular=20
state, albeit with a Muslim majority. However, he also made it very=20
clear that Kashmir was Pakistan's "jugular" and the new nation was=20
incomplete without it. Jawaharlal Nehru was similarly uncompromising,=20
promising on the one hand to give Kashmiris the right to decide their=20
own future, and on the other, initiating the militari-sation of the=20
area by sending thousands of troops to fortify its frontiers. At the=20
very outset, the leaders of the freedom movement made the Kashmir=20
issue content-ious, and this has since weighed heavily on the entire=20
region. A mentality that Kashmir must be made part of the country has=20
dominated the public discourse in Pakistan, and as such, has given=20
the military and the religious right an easy excuse to propagate=20
their destructive ideologies. Meanwhile in India, the establishment=20
continues to mandate gross violations of human rights in Kashmir,=20
claiming it is a secular, democratic state at the same time.

The inordinate amounts of money spent on defence, the extraordinary=20
and unnatural rise of the religious right in the last 25 years, and=20
the degeneration of political parties in Pakistan all have something=20
to do with the security paradigm of the state. Essentially, it is the=20
threat perception from a bigger and stronger India (and therefore,=20
the argument goes, the ten times as many Hindus on that side of the=20
border who thirst for Muslim blood) that gives license to the=20
establishment to accord special privileges to itself in the name of=20
protecting Pakistan and its Muslim population. The rise of the=20
religious right (and the proliferation of jehadi elements) and the=20
thwarting of the political process are, then, outcomes of the=20
inordinate power that the military establishment exercises. These=20
trends have been reinforced by the whims of the United States both=20
during the Cold War, and now.

Pakistan reached a critical point when General Zia- ul Haq took over=20
the country in 1977. A year later, the Soviet Union invaded=20
Afghanistan and as the definitive conflict of the Cold War shaped up,=20
Pakistan emerged as western capitalism's point man on the=20
Subcontinent. It is now common knowledge that the US supported the=20
Afghan mujahideen and the many splinter jehadi groups that have since=20
become the US's primary enemy in the "war on terror". Nevertheless,=20
then it was the Islamisation of the country that made it possible for=20
General Zia to pro-pagate the notion of jehad against communist=20
Russia.

This process of Islamisation had actually begun with Zulfikar Ali=20
Bhutto. Having come to power on the slogan of Islamic socialism,=20
Bhutto proceeded to oversee the writing of the 1973 constitution in=20
which Ahmadis were infamously declared non-Muslims. In 1974, the=20
"peace-ful" nuclear test carried out by India provided impetus for a=20
new wave of hysteria in Pakistan. Bhutto launch-ed the Pakistani=20
nuclear programme, with the slogan ghaas khaenge ("we will eat grass"=20
if we have to but we will make the bomb) to emphasise his commitment=20
to the creation of an Islamic bomb. Once the need to combat the=20
perceived Indian threat was re-established as the primary policy=20
concern of the state, it was less important for Mr Bhutto to make=20
good his populist election promises of roti, kapra, makan (food,=20
clothing and shelter) than it was to stand toe to toe with India.

In many ways, Bhutto's tenure was dominated by efforts to banish the=20
disaster of 1971 from Pakistan's collective memory. The nationalist=20
movement had proved that not only did the Bengalis not have any=20
allegiance to the Kashmir cause but that they also disputed the=20
special privileges accorded to an army that was almost exclusively=20
based in the western wing. Indeed, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman consistently=20
and accurately alleged that East Pakistan's export earnings from jute=20
were being used to fund the army and an industrial complex in West=20
Pakistan rather than to cater to the needs of the eastern wing.

So the security paradigm emerged with renewed vigour after General=20
Zia came to power, courtesy the Afghan war. Along with it came the=20
shocks that split the nation along religious, sectarian, and ethnic=20
lines. The promulgation of "Islamic" laws such as the Hudood=20
Ordinance which openly discriminate against women in cases of sexual=20
abuse, the formation of the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) that=20
disturbed the delicate ethnic balance in Karachi and fomented unrest,=20
and the explosion of sectarian conflict, all took place during the=20
Zia era. The de-politicisation of society was accompanied by the=20
politicisation of the intelligence agencies. Political parties=20
remained sidelined for almost a decade. By the time elections took=20
place in 1988 by virtue of Zia-ul Haq's mysterious death, state and=20
society had been transformed.

The fallout of 12 years of unstable democracy was an intensification=20
of the influence of the security apparatus in the affairs of the=20
state. It is now common knowledge that Pakistan-based jehadis were at=20
the forefront of the militarised resistance in Kashmir. As such,=20
therefore, Kashmir policy dominated national politics through the=20
1990s and the military establishment in the post-Zia era has never=20
released its stranglehold on power to any meaningful extent.=20
Development expenditure fell from a high of 7.6 percent of GDP in=20
1991-92 to 2.8 percent in 2000-01. Meanwhile, ex-penditure on defence=20
and debt ser-vicing was equivalent to 88 percent of total tax revenue=20
in 1991 and increased to over 90 percent of total tax revenue in 2000.

The stranglehold that the military establishment has on resource=20
allocation is at least partly due to the fact that it has such a=20
massive influence on the political process. The intelligence agencies=20
that had been made all-powerful during the covert US operation in=20
Afghanistan in the Cold War era have maintained their grip on=20
Pakistani politics. Meanwhile parochial sectarian, ethnic and jehadi=20
groups have injected a new terror into Pakistani society.=20
Unfortunately, these forces are not accountable to anyone - they have=20
no insti-tutional history, and whether they flourish or wither away=20
is a decision over which the Pakistani public has no control.

While the aftermath of 11 September has inadvertently led to the=20
exposure of this nexus, it has not changed the way the Pakistani=20
state is structured or the essential power dynamics that exist within=20
Pakistani society. In fact, the military's domination has been=20
cemented over the past few months. All civilian agencies in the=20
country are now headed by retired or serving army officials. Two out=20
of four provincial governors are retired generals. Three federal=20
ministers are retired army men. The list could go on. (See Himal,=20
June 2002.)

Many political parties have been co-opted into this undemocratic=20
system, which is a reflection not only of the degeneration of=20
politics in the country, but also of the fact that political parties=20
do not expect to ever exercise authority independent of the army's=20
wishes. Ultimately, the established political elite is aware that=20
challenging the military's consumption of a disproportionate share of=20
the budget, or the fact that army men are given special privileges,=20
offices, and rights, will only lead to its own demise. Of course=20
there is the small matter of political parties being unrepresentative=20
and self-interested. Groups with vested interests such as the landed=20
elite, an industrial class which derives its competitive edge through=20
state-sanctioned cronyism, and the civil bureaucracy, have all at one=20
time or the other allied themselves with the military establishment=20
to serve their own needs and wants. To invigorate political process=20
in Pakistan the nature of the state will have to be fundamentally=20
altered.

The security paradigm and the accompanying forms of social control=20
that allow the military to continue its domination of state and=20
society are intact. Textbooks used in schools propagate untruths=20
about the atrocities of the independence movement; they also promote=20
intolerance toward religious minorities. State-run television and=20
radio spew out long propaganda programmes highlighting India's evil=20
designs and the need for combat-ready armed forces and modern weapons=20
to repel Indian aggression. PTV often shows a short programme called=20
Kashmir File after its 9 pm Khabarnama, showcasing graphic footage of=20
Kashmiris being abused by Indian soldiers, calling for their freedom=20
from oppression. As an example of how such condi-tioning begets=20
itself, newspapers covering, say, a natural disaster in India will=20
phrase headlines almost as if the disaster were divine punishment:=20
"Heat wave kills 300 Indians".

Nevertheless, cracks are emerging. The military establishment has=20
been forced to re-evaluate its role in facilitating conflicts on its=20
western and north-eastern borders. The most recent stand-off with=20
India seems to have been averted, and US pressure has seen Pakistan=20
acknowledge, and make moves to arrest, "cross-border infiltration".=20
Still, one feels that so long as it is US persuasions that compel the=20
army to make a retreat, any retreat is only temporary.

Nation-states peripheral to the global system such as Pakistan have=20
almost completely surrendered sovereignty in crucial affairs, and so=20
perhaps even a US-imposed change could negate the original US-created=20
extremist threat. But US interests do not include forcing a=20
fundamental reorientation of Pakistan's state ideology. The US=20
military-industrial complex reaps many profits from Pakistan's hunger=20
for military technology and infrastructure, and very much wants to=20
maintain its market share in South Asia.

Any genuine change in Pakistan must be organic and based on public=20
recognition within Pakistan that the prevailing state ideology is=20
untenable. Only once this happens will there be any fundamental=20
compulsion for the military to retreat to the barracks. So far=20
political parties have failed to play the role of challenger to the=20
state, public frustration is ever on the rise, poverty is rampant and=20
growing, and post-referendum, resent-ment towards the army is=20
widespread. There is talk now about how much the conflict over=20
Kashmir has cost Pakistan and its people. And there are livelihood=20
movements that are beginning to come into direct conflict with the=20
state.

As the latest budget is released, Pakistani policy-makers are once=20
again hard put to explain away the low growth and the poor level of=20
poverty-related expenditure. They point to a 14 percent increase in=20
defence spending over the past year by way of excuse. They will=20
continue to do so until the global hegemon, international financial=20
institutions or some other influential actor challenges their=20
policies and the wisdom of the imperatives that guide them. The=20
Pakistani people can hardly afford to entrust their destinies and the=20
destiny of their political culture to a verifiably fickle=20
international community. If anything is to really change, the will to=20
reshape the Pakistani state must be generated by the Pakistani people=20
themselves.

____

#2.

Weekly Independent (Lahore, Pakistan)
July 25-31, 2002

WE OWE AN APOLOGY TO BANGLADESH

by Hassan Abbas

Pakistan armed forces committed human rights violations during the milita=
ry
operation in East Pakistan in 1971, testifies the declassified Hamoodur Rah=
man
Commission report.

For the last 30 years, it is only around December 16 (fall of Dhaka) ever=
y
year that newspapers carry articles on the subject. The high school level
textbooks, instead of focusing on the causes of separation, explain how Ind=
ia
played an evil role in the dismemberment of Pakistan. Every effort has been
made to cover up what the political, military and bureaucratic elite of thi=
s
country did to Bengalis. Even at Master's level (History), the subject is d=
ealt
with at a somewhat superficial level. Moreover, very few Pakistani scholars
choose to write on the subject. The only other community that is burdened w=
ith
this aspect of Pakistan's history is the candidates of the Civil Superior
Services (CSS) exam, who have to prepare an answer to a possible question o=
n
the issue. But they also mostly stick to the official position, because
critical approach may endanger their aspirations of joining the civil servi=
ce.
Professor Moonis Ahmer sometime ago very aptly summarised the tragic episod=
e in
a column in a Pakistani English daily: "Overwhelming majority of people of =
East
Pakistan were simple, patriotic, moderate and democratic people who couldn'=
t
cope with the feudal, tribal, bureaucratic and military traditions of West
Pakistan." From day one, Bengalis were treated as second-rate citizens of
Pakistan. The West Pakistani feudal elite postponed elections during the ea=
rly
years to avoid the possibility of power shifting into the hands of Bengalis=
.
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1947 was by no means truly representing=
the
federating units, e.g. six members of this assembly from East Pakistan,
including Liaquat Ali Khan, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Khan Abdul Qayyum
Khan, and Ghulam Muhammad were non-Bengalis. On the other hand, Hussain Sha=
heed
Suhrawardy, one of the most brilliant politicians this land has produced, w=
as
disqualified to be a member of the Constituent Assembly on the grounds of n=
on-
residence.

Signs of discontent were visible right from the beginning: in the East Be=
ngal
provincial elections of 1954, all the Bengali members of the Constituent
Assembly lost their seats. On May 23, 1954, The New York Times carried the
interview of East Bengal's chief minister Fazlul Haq in which he was quoted
desiring the independence of the province. Instead of trying to understand =
what
made the mover of the 1940 Pakistan Resolution change his heart, Iskander M=
irza
was sent as the new governor of the province to keep a watch.
Ayub Khan's martial law proved to be fruitful for West Pakistan in economic
terms. But for Bengalis, it was a death knell. In the elections of 1962 and
1965, many of the new members of the National Assembly were the sons and cl=
ose
relatives of the landlords and feudal lords of West Pakistan but the majori=
ty
of opposition members belonged to East Pakistan and were from middle class.=
It
was clearly a division between political haves and political have-nots.
Awami League's Six-points was a natural reaction. According to Rounaq Jahan=
, a
Bengali scholar teaching in USA, Mujib even hinted at negotiating the six-
points but the signals fell on deaf ears. Hence, success of Awami League in=
the
1970 elections was an obvious outcome of regional disparities and class
inequalities perpetuated by military dictatorship. Bengalis again were deni=
ed
the chance to form the government at the centre. Their constitutional right=
was
again being whisked away. Use of force was the response they received but t=
he
pile of combustibles already smouldering blew up this time. Mukti Bahni was
also involved in indiscriminate killings, but the retaliation was greatly
disproportionate. The Bengali disenchantment was too deep-rooted and
disillusionment so complete that no one could have bridged the gulf of
estrangement by then. It was all over. India, as ready as ever to harm
Pakistan, jumped into steal the show.

Reconciliation can take place only if Pakistani leadership can gather the=
guts
to accept that they were wrong and that they were unfair, and last but not =
the
least, that they were brutal with Bengalis. Pakistan owes an apology to the
Bengali nation. General Musharraf should seriously consider offering an
official apology to Bangladeshi people during his forthcoming visit to
Bangladesh.

The writer, a police officer from Pakistan, is South Asian specialist at =
the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is also an adjun=
ct
faculty member of the Pearson Peacekeeping Center, Canada.

_____

#3.

DAWN (Karachi)
26 July 2002

Lessons of the Mianwali outrage

By I.A. Rehman

In the case of qatl-i-amd, an adult sane wali may, at any time on=20
accepting badal-i-sulh, compound his right of qisas; Provided that=20
giving a female in marriage shall not be a valid badal-i- sulh. (Sec=20
310(1), Pakistan Penal Code).
Human rights activists can derive some consolation from the fact that=20
their campaigns against the denial of women's rights have raised=20
Pakistani elite's consciousness of these matters and sometimes prompt=20
response is possible. The latest instance is the Mianwali case in=20
which the offering of eight girls as badal-i- sulh is being sought to=20
be upset through suo motu proceedings initiated by the chief justice=20
of the country and an executive order issued by the Punjab governor.=20
And Aitzaz Ahsan has made an impassioned appeal for preventing any=20
more of Meerwalas.
While these interventions are welcome, it is necessary to ensure that=20
the focus of public anger is not confined to this case alone and that=20
an attack is mounted on the root cause of a grave injustice to women,=20
particularly little girls.
Two special features of this case need to be noted.
First, the compromise negotiated in this case relates to a trial=20
under the penal code and not to proceedings before a jirga or=20
community gathering. Thus, the normal law is being subverted through=20
extra-legal arrangements. Therefore, while examining the practice of=20
giving away women in marriage as badal-i-sulh the non-formal forms of=20
settlement also need to be scrutinised.
Secondly, in this case the terms of compromise negotiated between two=20
persons sentenced to death for murder and the victims' families=20
became public. If the victim party had chosen to cover up the=20
nefarious deal under a common statement that they have forgiven the=20
killers, the matter might have been hushed up in the manner many=20
murder cases are believed to be compounded. Both of these issues need=20
to be critically examined by the custodians of the justice system,=20
including the Law Commission.
However, it is time attention was paid to the giving away of girls in=20
marriage as badal-i-sulh by jirgas and community forums.
Some time ago the Peshawar High Court decided a case in which an=20
infant girl belonging to a murderer's family was given in marriage to=20
boy of the victim family. The girl was left with her parents for 25=20
years. Her husband declined to take her to his home and argued that=20
as a badal-i-sulh wife she had no rights and he was free to dispose=20
of her as he wished. The wife, after 25 years, started proceedings=20
for dissolution of marriage and secured a decree in her favour. The=20
husband came in appeal before the Peshawar High Court.
The honourable judge not only upheld the decree in the woman's favour=20
but also pleaded for abolition of the 'sawara' custom, under which=20
girls have been offered in settlement of tribal feuds in the Frontier=20
region for decades. The judge also referred to Sec 310(1) of the PPC,=20
which prohibits the offering of girls as badal-i-sulh and noted that=20
no punishment had been prescribed for violations of this law.
No notice was taken by the masters of the Pakistani people's destiny.
About two years ago, settlement of a feud was reported from Rajanpur=20
district in the Punjab. At a tribal gathering attended by tribal and=20
political notables of the area a six-year-old girl was given away in=20
badal-i-sulh. The case was duly reported by the newspapers and the=20
community was outraged.
These reports had no effect on the custodians of the state.
Last year a 6-year-old girl was given away in marriage to a much=20
older man as badal-i-sulh in Jharak, Sindh. The newspapers protested=20
against the horrible deal.
No notice was taken by the rulers.
The essential fact is that whether women are given away in forced=20
marriage, often at a tender age, to settle disputes through normal=20
courts or whether this is done at non-formal forums, the state cannot=20
repel the charge of connivance with perpetrators of foul deeds. We=20
have seen that jirgas where verdicts against women are passed are=20
attended by political notables, district officials and now by Nazims,=20
too. This amounts to official sanction for extra-legal forums of=20
settling disputes. This must stop, otherwise the jirga system will=20
continue to spread across the land, as has been happening over the=20
past decade.
Take the present case. The Mianwali district authorities saw nothing=20
wrong in the affair until the Supreme Court Chief Justice and the=20
Punjab Governor took notice. In future too the administration will=20
not react to such human rights abuses unless giving away of girls to=20
end feuds started by their patriarchs is made a crime, which at the=20
moment it is not. Thus:
1. The Pakistan Penal Code should be amended to make the offering of=20
woman as badal-i-sulh a cognizable offence, carrying a stiff=20
punishment.
2. The law of Qisas and Diyat needs to be reviewed. By removing=20
murder from the list of offences against society and making it=20
compoundable, the state has cleared the way for abuse of law. Murders=20
are committed with confidence in the killers' ability to win reprieve=20
through a law that favours them.
3. The state must realise that by allowing total freedom to jirgas=20
and similar forums it is helping the consolidation of a parallel=20
system of justice. The situation is worse than what we had when jirga=20
jurisdiction was limited under regulatory laws. If the state finds=20
itself incapable of abolishing the jirga system it must at least,=20
take steps to ensure that the powers of the jirgas are restricted so=20
that they do not take and enforce decisions that are egregious abuses=20
of human rights and cause indescribable anguish to the people and=20
some embarrassment to state institutions.
4. The excesses against women cannot end until the laws that=20
legitimise discrimination and cruelty against them, such as the=20
Hudood ordinances in particular, are repealed.
5. The wrong that is done to women in Pakistan is not merely a law=20
and order, or even a legal, issue. Determined affirmative action by=20
the state is needed to change the social attitudes, to empower women,=20
and to end gender imbalances.

_____

#4.

DAWN (Karachi)
26 July 2002

What is blasphemy?
By Ayaz Amir

Every now and then from some dark corner of the country comes news=20
about a prosecution under the blasphemy law. And every now and then=20
an obliging district judge finding the person so charged guilty hands=20
out a sentence of death. When this happens, the collective image of=20
Pakistan takes another blow on the chin.
Blasphemy is serious business but what exactly is it? Preferring form=20
over substance we have turned it into a technical offence while=20
leaving the larger context in which it might be seen unexplored.
Setting aside the possibility of malicious prosecution - something,=20
incidentally, which happens all the time - for argument's sake let us=20
take the worst case scenario: that some benighted soul has actually=20
burnt a page or two of the Quran or uttered sacrilegious words=20
against God or his Prophet, (peace be upon him). Clearly, no man in=20
his right senses would do such a thing, certainly not in Pakistan=20
where religious sensitivities run high. But still if something of the=20
sort is done, what does the perpetrator deserve? Our compassion and a=20
psychiatric examination or a death sentence?
Suppose in my street someone were to lay claim to godhead or divine=20
revelation. I would be curious and perhaps a bit bemused. I certainly=20
wouldn't go rushing to the police station to lodge a criminal=20
complaint. Even if I was foolish enough to do so I would expect the=20
SHO to tell me to cool it. But if valour prevailed over discretion=20
and a case was indeed registered I would expect the judge concerned=20
to throw out the case for lack of evidence.
The trouble is that over the years bigotry and intolerance have made=20
such deep inroads into our society that all three parties in the=20
blasphemy cycle - complainant, police officer, judge - think that=20
they are doing the right thing, and also earning divine favour into=20
the bargain, when they are pressing charges under this law. This is=20
zeal sanctioned by law and clothed in self-righteousness.
I draw no analogies but consider also the case of the sectarian=20
terrorist, he who murders in the name of Islam. Far from feeling any=20
remorse for his actions, he glories in them because he is convinced=20
that when he kills an 'infidel' he has struck a blow for the faith=20
and has thereby earned for himself a place in paradise. Only in this=20
case zeal is not sanctioned by law.
Again, let us place this behaviour in context. The policies of the=20
Zia regime, fertilized by a copious flow of American greenbacks,=20
fostered the climate which made killing in the name of Islam a legit=20
exercise. We ourselves of course are the authors of many of our=20
misfortunes. But credit must also go to the United States for being=20
the father of some of our discontents.
Partly out of genuine belief, partly out of political expediency, Gen=20
Zia pushed religious rhetoric down the throats of the Pakistani=20
people, all the while applauded by the Reagan administration as a=20
sentinel of the free world. The result is self-evident: falsehood and=20
gimmickry in the name of Islam have distorted national thinking,=20
enshrining hypocrisy in the higher halls of government and spreading=20
a zest for killing in fringe sections of the population.
Mercifully, General Pervez Musharraf is not cut from the same cloth.=20
He has helped stem the tide of bigotry by not playing the religious=20
card. For this, if nothing else, he deserves the nation's thanks. But=20
coming back to blasphemy, to seek it in acts of obvious insanity is=20
to devalue both Islam and the notion of blasphemy. Have we not from=20
our infancies heard the story of the woman in Makkah who would throw=20
refuse upon the Prophet, as he walked past her house? The Prophet=20
never remonstrated with her. Not changing his path, in silence and=20
with bowed head he continued to suffer this indignity until one day=20
the woman, astounded by this forbearance, beseeched the Prophet's=20
forgiveness and embraced Islam.
Blasphemy lies in greater things. For the people to be repeatedly=20
denied their rights in a state founded in the name of Islam is=20
blasphemy. Hunger and deprivation are blasphemy, something which the=20
great Caliph Omar understood when he said that even if a dog went=20
hungry by the banks of the Euphrates the Lord of the Hosts would hold=20
him accountable on the Day of Judgment.
The greatest blasphemy of all is a child going hungry, a child=20
condemned to the slow death of starvation. The miscarriage of justice=20
is blasphemy. Misgovernment is blasphemy. An unconscionable gap=20
between rich and poor is blasphemy. Denial of treatment to the sick,=20
denial of education to the child, are alike examples of blasphemy.=20
The Prophet said cleanliness is next to godliness. What would he say=20
about the monuments to dirt and filth raised in the Islamic Republic?
The doctors and professors of the faith, whether our faith or any=20
other, are not to be blamed for emphasizing ritual over substance=20
because it is as interpreters of ritual - by presiding over the=20
timeless activities of birth, death and marriage - that they derive=20
their nuisance value and also their bread and butter. It is the state=20
which must be careful not to legislate in matters of faith or assume=20
the role of the maulvi for only mischief can result from such a=20
course.
What practical benefit has accrued to the people of Pakistan by=20
declaring Ahmedis as non-Muslims? Which is not to say that their=20
version of Islam is correct. It is not. But is this something for the=20
state to decide? Even if for the sake of argument we assume that the=20
Ahmedi heresy was a cancer which had to be eradicated, in what way is=20
Pakistan a healthier or a more prosperous country for having done so?=20
By expelling Ahmedis from the frontiers of the faith have we become=20
better Muslims?
All sorts of weird Christian sects are to be found in the United=20
States, some of them with decidedly odd views about life and the=20
hereafter. Their existence is tolerated, with a smile or a shrug of=20
the shoulders, but no one asks for the US constitution to be amended=20
to have these sects declared as non-Christians. The argument that we=20
are an Islamic state where things have to be ordered differently=20
takes us nowhere, for calling ourselves an Islamic Republic should be=20
no excuse for indulging in irrational behaviour.
Gen Zia of course went a step further when in 1979, as a sop to his=20
allies, he issued an ordinance which made it a criminal offence for=20
Ahmedis to call themselves Muslims or to call their places of worship=20
mosques. This beats the understanding for if a Jew wants to call=20
himself a Muslim, or his synagogue a mosque, it will be odd behaviour=20
but by what stretch of the imagination should this invite the=20
application of the criminal law? If an Ahmedi's place of worship is=20
called a mosque, no one will be bamboozled into crossing its portals=20
if he doesn't want to. There are different mosques in every city of=20
Pakistan: Deobandi, Barelvi, Shiite. We choose to go where we want to.
When we made separate electorates and put minorities on separate=20
voting lists, did that make us purer Muslims? Did we elect better=20
legislators as a consequence? Discriminatory laws have not made=20
Pakistan a better state, let alone one closer to the teachings of=20
Islam. They have only given it a bad name.
Even so, we have to be realistic. No government will touch the=20
anti-Ahmedi constitutional amendment. Such things once done are not=20
easily undone. But the 1979 ordinance making it a criminal offence=20
for a person of the Ahmedi denomination to show himself as a Muslim=20
deserves to be erased from our law books. There will be some protests=20
but that is only to be expected. The right thing must be done not for=20
the sake of the Ahmedi community but for our own sake. Such laws=20
diminish those who make them.
Nothing good has come from the four Hadood laws also passed in 1979=20
by Gen Ziaul Haq. Across the land they have only sown mischief and=20
upped the bribery rates of the police. It is high time these bad laws=20
were also scrapped.
TAILPIECE: Here is the last paragraph of an appeal to the Governor,=20
Punjab, and the Begum Governor (no joking). "We the helpless=20
municipal lady teachers of Punjab do humbly beseech you to let us=20
remain under our respective municipal bodies instead of forcibly=20
making us part of the education department vide Order No (LG)=20
10-1/2002 of 25.6.2002. The education department has no funds to pay=20
our salaries nor any procedure to pay our pensions. Before this the=20
octroi department was wound up but its workers being men could fight=20
their case. They went to court and are now back on their jobs. We are=20
poor and helpless women. With the greatest respect we beseech you in=20
the name of God and his Holy Prophet to let municipal schools stay as=20
part of the municipal bodies. We are in a state of great anxiety."=20
The invocation to God and the Prophet brought tears into the eyes of=20
even a hardened sinner like me.

_____

#5.

The Literary Review
July 2002

Review by Salil Tripathi

Kartography
By Kamila Shamsie
(Bloomsbury 343pp)

In her ambitious third novel, Kartography, Pakistani writer Kamila Shamsie
seizes upon Karachi's anarchic geography and weaves a magical tale.
Navigating an uncharted city is difficult, but Shamsie does it skilfully,
walking us through Karachi=92s and Pakistan=92s turbulent history. She dr=
aws
parallels between the country's agony and the anguish of Raheen and Karim,
two soulmates who grow up together, and of their friends and families.

Karim is obsessed by the city=92s larger problems guns, for example but
such things do not concern Raheen, whose interests do not extend beyond
what she already knows. It is only when she grows older that she realises
the intimacy she craves is a form of social isolationism.

Raheen=92s apathy pains Karim. He feels Karachi's suffering and dreams of
being a cartographer, fixing places at their precise locations, giving
names to streets, humanising the statistics. 'Maps are amazing,' he tells
her. 'They define a city as a single territorial unit, they give a sense
of connectedness.' Raheen disagrees: 'We belong to a city invested in
story-telling =85 What happens to all those streets that hold no stories fo=
r
us?' This is an ancient conflict: Eratosthenes seeking geographic
precision; Strabo wishing to explore the world through memories and
poetry.

Friends since birth, Raheen and Karim are the yin and yang holding this
ambitious novel together. Each is the only one who knows how to make the
other laugh, and who understands why the other cries. They can dream each
other's dreams, and they can complete each other's sentences. Unlike
Arundhati Roy's twins Rahel and Estha, they are not children of the same
parents, but like them, their lives are intertwined. In The God of Small
Things, Rahel had a memory of waking up one night giggling at Estha=92s
funny dream. In Kartography, the night Karim's family migrates to London,
Raheen is certain 'some of my tears were his tears and some of his tears
were mine=92.

Their parents are close friends as well, and their childhood is idyllic.
But then things start to go wrong. In London, Karim's parents, Ali and
Maheen, divorce. Raheen=92s parents, Zafar and Yasmin, stay on in Karachi,
hiding a dark secret from their daughter.

One sizzling summer it is revealed: Zafar was to have married Maheen, but
married Yasmin in her stead; and Ali only married Maheen in place of
Yasmin. To explain the swap, Shamsie takes us to the traumatic year of
1971, when East Pakistan seceded, becoming Bangladesh. Maheen, a Bengali,
a 'Bingo', was in love with Zafar in Karachi, surviving taunts from high
society. She remained by his side even though stories of West Pakistani
atrocities in the East became too obvious to ignore. But Zafar succumbed
to the pressure of friends; in a weak moment he humiliated Maheen, and she
walked out of his life. Ali was waiting for her, and Yasmin stepped in to
marry Zafar.

Two decades later, Karachi is convulsed with violence again, rocking the
relationships of another foursome: Raheen, Karim, and their childhood
friends Zia and Sonia. As adults, they can=92t recapture their shared
innocence, an idea of Karachi that had held them together, now ruined by
Kalashnikovs. Inexorably, they grow apart.

Karim and Raheen clutch at straws. Obsessed by the desire to preserve the
Karachi of his mind, Karim wants to set his city down in a cartographic
grid, so that it can be delineated in precise, crystal-clear lines, its
chaos contained. Obsessions tend to be emotional, and Karim's obsession
never makes sense except as an intellectual one. Raheen=92s transformation
is more convincing. She found the bubble in which she lived soothing, and
believes she can return to Karachi from her American campus at any time,
that her little private world will not have changed. Her Karachi is a
time, not a place; it is full of memories, not facts.

But facts intrude, and in the end Kartography is about that conflict
between the visible city, which disintegrates before them, and the
invisible city, which Raheen imagines, and creates in her stories. Karim
feels frustrated, but Raheen comes round. Towards the end, she tells him:

I=92ve lived my life in such limited circles and it=92s your voice I hear n=
ow,
telling me that limited can be limiting =85 Karachi at its worst is a
Karachi unconcerned with people who exist outside the story-teller=92s
circle, a Karachi oblivious to people and places [that] aren=92t familiar
enough for nicknames.

As this accomplished novel reaches its climax, it becomes an elegiac poem
for a vanishing world.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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