[sacw] SACW | 10 Oct. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 10 October 2002

__________________________

#1. A very Nepalese coup (Luke Harding)
#2. Radio Interview with Asma Jahangir about the Pakistan elections=20
(Jennifer Westaway)
#3. Pakistani elections: Ballots in a tin pot (Praful Bidwai)
#4. Roots of Pakistan's voter apathy run deep (Anatol Lieven)
#5. Pakistan poll will barely ease army's grip (Edward Luce and Farhan Bokh=
ari)
#6. USA: Communal Violence, War Clouds and a peace Concert: Nov 2 at USC
#7. Kashmir's Missing An interview with Parvez Imroz of The=20
Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP)
#8. India: Question of Faith - Anti-Conversion Legislation in Tamil=20
Nadu (Ram Puniyani)
#9. India: Akshardham: How Many More Aftermaths? (Bina Srinivasan)

__________________________

#1.

The Guardian (UK)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,806915,00.html

A very Nepalese coup

Nepal's king has dismissed his prime minister, but it will take more=20
than that to defeat the country's Maoist rebels, writes Luke Harding

Tuesday October 8, 2002

Over the weekend royal spin-doctors were doing their best to insist=20
that there had not been a coup. And yet what is happening in Nepal=20
looks very much like one.

On Friday Nepal's King Gyanendra dramatically sacked the country's=20
prime minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, put off general elections and=20
assumed power himself. In an address to his subjects late on Friday=20
night, the king said he was taking over power "for the time being".=20
He described Mr Deuba as "inept"- and said he was dismissing the=20
prime minister because of his decision to postpone general elections,=20
scheduled for next month.

The king apparently felt compelled to act because Mr Deuba had failed=20
to deal with the Maoist problem, now worse than ever. But then none=20
of Nepal's short-lived and generally venal governments have been able=20
to defeat the rebels, who have been fighting since 1996 to end the=20
monarchy. An angry Mr Deuba has described his removal as illegal. Not=20
that he can do much about it: there is nothing in Nepal's=20
constitution that allows him to challenge the monarch's edict.

The mountainous Himalayan kingdom - which had only just recovered=20
from last year's traumatic massacre, in which eight members of the=20
royal family were wiped out - is once again in crisis. Mr Deuba,=20
meanwhile, has appealed to other political parties to support him,=20
pointing out that they agreed with his request to postpone elections=20
because of the Maoist threat.

Will the king's decision to wade into politics make things better?=20
The early signs are not encouraging. On Sunday the Maoists' leader,=20
Pushpakamal Dahal, described the king's apparently temporary takeover=20
as "the beginning of open feudal regression". It was, he said, a=20
setback to the "pro-democracy agitation" in 1990, when the royal=20
family gave up absolute powers and Nepal became a constitutional=20
monarchy.

What most observers find worrying is the fact that King Gyanendra's=20
move has a precedent: in 1961 his father, King Mahendra, overthrew=20
Nepal's first-ever elected government and banned political parties.=20
It took another 30 years before the royal family finally agreed to=20
accept a diminished role.

Government or no government, the Maoists will almost certainly carry=20
on their bloody campaign - of strikes, bomb explosions and attacks on=20
police posts. Their insurgency has now spread from rural areas of=20
Nepal to the capital, Kathmandu, terrifying the country's urban=20
middle class for the first time.

The rebels had already called a general strike to coincide with the=20
first round of voting in next month's elections, but even though the=20
polls have now been abandoned, they are unlikely to give up. Their=20
revolt has scared off tourists, hit growth and wrecked=20
infrastructure. It has plunged the Himalayan kingdom into a mood of=20
fearful gloom. The country is a mess - and Nepal's feuding and=20
corrupt politicians share much of the blame.

Before his dismissal Mr Deuba had fallen out not only with the palace=20
but also with his own party, the Nepali Congress, which has ruled for=20
most of the period since 1990, when democracy was restored. Last week=20
his colleagues got rid of him as leader and he formed his own=20
breakaway faction.

King Gyanendra's move has some popular support: about 500 people=20
marched through the streets of Kathmandu on Sunday, shouting: "Long=20
live the king." Observers say it is not difficult to explain their=20
enthusiasm. "People feel political parties have only served their=20
narrow personal interests and have done nothing for the country,"=20
Dhurba Kumar, who heads the independent Centre for Nepal and Asian=20
Studies at Kathmandu's Tribhuvan University, said over the weekend.

"The king has said he is committed to democracy and constitutional=20
monarchy. It seems like he does not want to hold on to power. So we=20
should trust him now as all political parties are seen to have failed=20
the country."

Nepal's political parties are now meeting to discuss their next move.=20
But the problem remains how long will the king hang on to power?

_____

#2.

CBC Radio (Canada)
On This Morning Asma Jahangir, a Paksitani human rights activists=20
talks about the election with Jennifer Westaway.
(Runs 12:17)
http://media.cbc.ca:8080/ramgen/newsworld/clips/rm-audio/tm_pakistan_021009=
.rm

_____

#3.

The News International
Thursday October 10, 2002

Ballots in a tin pot

Praful Bidwai

As Pakistan's 72 million electors go (or don't go) to the hustings=20
today, the crucial issue is not how representative, free and fair the=20
polls will be, not even whether they will give some legitimacy to the=20
militarised and quasi-authoritarian political system General Pervez=20
Musharraf has put in place through his numerous fiats and acts,=20
especially in the past six months. Rather, the issue is how deep will=20
be the political crisis which the elections results are likely to=20
precipitate in combination with other factors at work in Pakistani=20
society.

So widespread, cogent and acerbic is the criticism of Musharraf's=20
recent record of governance by liberal and progressive Pakistani=20
analysts themselves that it would seem almost redundant for an Indian=20
to reiterate it, or even add to it. Nevertheless, a few issues do=20
bear repetition and some new points need to be made, especially from=20
across the border and by someone who would like to see matters=20
improve both within Pakistan and between India and Pakistan.

Musharraf has so rigged the electoral process as to be able to secure=20
what the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) calls=20
"pre-determined results". Apart from splitting the PML (Nawaz Sharif)=20
and propping up outfits based on individual political entrepreneurs=20
and pliable conservative leaders at the Federal level, important=20
functionaries of the regime, from provincial Governors to nazims,=20
have been pressing candidates to switch parties or allegiances and=20
thus alter poll outcomes.

Musharraf's August 21 Legal Framework Order is a steamrolling Mother=20
of an Edict to perpetuate the military's overwhelming preponderance=20
in Pakistan's politics well beyond the elections. The country's two=20
largest parties are fighting the elections without their top=20
leaders-barred under dubious orders. Even if the King's party is able=20
to emerge big, as a result of their finessing of each other, the=20
election outcome will not have much popular legitimacy. Nor,=20
ironically, will be (unlikely) outright victory of the PPPP or=20
PML(N). Short of a miracle, the elections seem unlikely to produce a=20
political breakthrough or light at the end of the proverbial tunnel.=20
They could well turn out to be "failed elections".

Turnout will be a significant factor. If it is under 40 percent-ie,=20
less than the level of polling in embattled Jammu and Kashmir-despite=20
the lowering of the voting age to 18, then Musharraf will have a=20
gaping hole in his claim that his elections are representative and=20
"sustainably" democratic, while Indian Kashmir's are not. His=20
legitimacy crisis will be further aggravated if the government rigs=20
the polling figures or if the Election Commission's officials tamper=20
with the ballot boxes.

None of this is likely to create external conditions which are even=20
remotely favourable either for Pakistan's image within the larger=20
world community, or for the prospect of a thaw in relations with=20
India. It is hard to overemphasise the generally negative perception=20
of Pakistan which has grown the world over in the past few months,=20
especially since the Presidential referendum.

As for India, it is nobody's case that the Vajpayee government is=20
eager to start a dialogue with Pakistan even after the J&K elections,=20
for which the counting begins today. But its intransigence-and the=20
Hindutva hardliners' weight in the Cabinet-will grow if the general=20
elections in Pakistan lack legitimacy and produce no clear popular=20
mandate.

The absence of an Indian response favouring a thaw or dialogue will=20
probably draw a symmetrically reciprocal, hostile reaction from=20
Islamabad, further exacerbating mutual rivalry-and yet again making a=20
military confrontation likelier, with horrific effects.

More important are the elections' consequences for Pakistan's own=20
people. Three years ago, Musharraf probably deluded himself that his=20
coup d'etat against the corrupt and discredited Nawaz Sharif regime=20
came close to the description that US ambassador Emerson chose for=20
Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal of Prime Minister=20
Nazimuddin in 1953-namely, "one of the most popular coups in=20
history". This reflected not reality, but Washington's affection for=20
its emerging Cold War ally.

Whatever the myth-making about October 12, 1999-and we now have some=20
pointers that Musharraf's was not a counter-coup, but according to=20
reports quoting former Navy chief Fasih Bokhari, a move planned well=20
in advance-the hope that direct military rule would prove more=20
socially benevolent, if not politically more desirable, than degraded=20
civilian rule, has once again been smashed to smithereens.

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif without doubt inflicted enormous=20
damage upon the core institutions of governance, corroding their=20
integrity. But under Musharraf too, the "basic features of the=20
federation based on a parliamentary form of government have suffered=20
erosion", says the HRCP.

The judiciary has been thoroughly compromised by repeated oaths of=20
allegiance. Political parties have been emasculated. Worst of all,=20
Musharaf has steadily militarised the bureaucracy too-unlike=20
Pakistan's three other military rulers who shared power with the=20
civil service.

The appointment of some 70-odd generals and 600 brigadiers and=20
colonels to civil service posts, and the armed forces' control of=20
countless state agencies and public sector units-like the Karachi=20
Port Authority, National Shipping Corporation, National Fertiliser=20
Corporation, Pakistani Steel Corporation, the Oil and Gas Development=20
Corporation and the Minerals Development Corporation-is likely to=20
leave permanent scars upon the institutions of administration and=20
economic governance too. It will be just as difficult to reverse=20
these appointments, as it will be to control the Fauji Foundation's=20
military-industrial and commercial empires.

The next National Assembly and to an extent provincial assemblies=20
will be hard put to halt and roll back this military juggernaut-even=20
if their legislative power to do so is not directly assaulted. Yet,=20
one hopes that the very logic of their location and the overall=20
situation would impel them to oppose the military's intrusion into=20
the public space. This spells conflict, turmoil and instability.

Islamic extremist forces and al-Qaeda-Taliban allies both inside and=20
outside the government will find such instability particularly=20
conducive. From across the border, it is hard to assess whether the=20
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal will cross the seven percent barrier of=20
Islamicist parties. (One opinion poll gives it just five percent,=20
compared to 25 for the PPPP and 19 for the PML(N). But should=20
instability and turmoil lead to increased activity among the=20
mujahideen forces, then even the last vestiges of the "gains" from=20
Musharraf's halting, incomplete, but nevertheless real, campaign=20
against these currents would be wiped out.

The post-September 11 conjuncture offered Musharraf a unique=20
opportunity to cleanse Pakistan of extremist forces and begin=20
transforming it into a modern, moderate state. He did not fully=20
succeed, but he did put some of these forces on the defensive. If=20
they again raise their head, the effect could be disastrous.

_____

#4.

Financial Times

Roots of Pakistan's voter apathy run deep
By Anatol Lieven
Published: October 7 2002 5:00 | Last Updated: October 7 2002 5:00

A striking apathy has afflicted Pakistanis as the country prepares=20
for Thursday's elections. General Pervez Musharraf, the country's=20
military ruler, will remain in overall control whatever happens,=20
whether as a result of helping certain parties to win or by arranging=20
deals with others after the vote. The outcome will probably be=20
greeted with resignation by most of the population.

The lack of mass engagement in these elections has two main causes.=20
The first is the deliberate strategy of the military-led=20
administration to reduce the influence of the main political parties=20
by exiling their leaders and restricting their ability to campaign.=20
That reflects Gen Musharraf's interest in remaining president and his=20
open contempt for most politicians.

The other reason is that this contempt seems to be shared by most=20
ordinary Pakistanis. The democratically elected governments of=20
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s were marred not only by=20
gross corruption but also by abuse of power.

Nor are these recurring patterns only the result of individual=20
personalities. Arbitrary behaviour, contempt for law and obsession=20
with short-term personal and group advantage permeate Pakistani=20
society and are inevitably reflected in Pakistani democracy.

The Pakistani army has often acted to undermine democracy. Yet the=20
armed forces are the only effective modern institution that Pakistan=20
possesses. Their power and influence, therefore, is to some extent=20
natural.

The present depoliticisation of the electorate is not unique to Pakistan.

But the challenges to the Musharraf administration, and the Pakistani=20
state itself, are a great deal more formidable than those to most=20
regimes around the world: from India, from Islamist extremists and=20
terrorists, and from an obstinately stagnant economy weakened further=20
by military expenditures.

The Islamist and terrorist threats should not be exaggerated so far=20
as the short term is concerned. The new alliance of religious parties=20
is expected to improve on the 5 per cent or so of the vote its=20
members have gained in recent elections - but not massively and only=20
in certain parts of the country. As for the terrorists, their=20
atrocities pose as yet no threat to the survival of the Pakistani=20
state.

In the longer run, however, terrorism could certainly damage=20
Pakistan, by worsening the already monstrous obstacles to economic=20
development. Pakistan risks being caught between the three claws of a=20
rising population, a growing ecological crisis and continuing tension=20
with India which makes reductions in the military budget impossible.=20
And if Pakistan enters a period of steep decline, the radical=20
Islamists will be in a position to fill the gap left by the collapse=20
of the traditional parties.

What are Gen Musharraf's chances of saving Pakistan from this road to=20
ruin? An end to tension with India seems ruled out at present by=20
intransigence on both sides. At home, his administration has=20
conducted sensible economic measures, and achieved a small reduction=20
in Pakistan's debt.

When he took power, Gen Musharraf often referred to Ataturk's Turkey=20
as his model. He then dropped this line. However, he still wants to=20
imitate one aspect of the Turkish system, which is the way in which=20
the Turkish military acts as the ultimate custodian of national=20
interests without engaging in repeated military coups. This new=20
relationship is supposed to be institutionalised in a new National=20
Security Council embracing the chiefs of the military and the top=20
elected figures.

Ideally, this body should help avoid the disastrous seesaw between=20
irresponsible civilian rule and military dictatorship that has been=20
the case in the past. The military will in any case be central to the=20
Pakistani state for the foreseeable future. Any hope of banishing it=20
from politics is therefore empty and the only sensible course is to=20
formalise and regulate its influence.

Unfortunately, however, factors on both sides make the development of=20
a stable civil-military relationship very difficult. The politicians=20
tend to intrigue with the military when in opposition, then try=20
vainly to reduce its power when in office. The military for its part=20
has become not only a kind of political party of its own but also a=20
business giant which has swallowed much of the economy. The defence=20
of these interests requires a continual active engagement in politics.

As for Gen Musharraf, he is no bloodstained dictator, but in many=20
ways a mild, honourable, patriotic and progressive figure. But he is=20
no more immune than any other leader to the malign patterns of=20
Pakistani political culture; and in the past at least these have=20
always pointed, not towards the creations of rules and institutions,=20
but towards increasingly personal and arbitrary power.

The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for=20
International Peace in Washington DC

_____

#5.

Financial times

Pakistan poll will barely ease army's grip
By Edward Luce and Farhan Bokhari
Published: October 8 2002 19:28 | Last Updated: October 8 2002 19:28

On Wednesday Pakistan's 81m electorate are able to vote in the=20
country's first election since General Pervez Musharraf seized power=20
three years ago. Few are likely to do so with enthusiasm.

The colourful buntings, processions and rallies of previous elections=20
are for the most part absent. Pakistan's voters appear to understand=20
that whoever wins tomorrow - assuming the result brings any clarity -=20
will finish second to the Pakistan army.

Although he is not standing in the election, Gen Musharraf was=20
returned for a five-year presidential term last April in a referendum=20
that even he admitted was flawed. And under a flurry of=20
constitutional amendments rushed through in recent weeks, the=20
president will have the power to sack the prime minister, dissolve=20
the national assembly and veto any cabinet decision.

As if that were not insurance enough, Gen Musharraf has banned the=20
leaders of Pakistan's only two genuinely national parties from=20
running in the parliamentary election tomorrow. Benazir Bhutto, whose=20
Pakistan People's party is effectively a family business, and Nawaz=20
Sharif, whose Pakistan Muslim League split into two at the start of=20
the campaign, will be observing the poll from exile in London and=20
Saudi Arabia respectively.

Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Pakistan's=20
"transition to democracy" feels underwhelming. "This is an issue-less=20
campaign in which nobody is making any serious arguments at all,"=20
said a western diplomat.

But it would be wrong to assume that the sullen public mood reflects=20
resentment against Gen Musharraf or his military regime. A recent BBC=20
Urdu language service poll found that more than half of Pakistanis=20
wanted the army to have a permanent role in the political system.=20
More than two-thirds thought Gen Musharraf's performance had been=20
"good".

Many Pakistanis agree with Gen Musharraf's view that Pakistan's=20
political parties are feudal, corrupt and inept. Judging by their=20
campaign so far, the parties have yet to address this view with any=20
seriousness.

With the exception of one or two smaller parties, led by Farooq=20
Leghari, a former president of Pakistan, and Imran Khan, a former=20
cricket star, none have issued proper manifestoes or attempted to put=20
forward coherent programmes for governing Pakistan. This might partly=20
reflect their scepticism about the nature of the poll. But it also=20
reflects the bankruptcy of Pakistan politics.

"The more the Pakistan military intervenes in politics, the less room=20
Pakistan's political parties have to grow and mature," said Stephen=20
Cohen, a south Asia expert at the Brookings Institution in=20
Washington. "It is a Catch 22 situation in which the Pakistan army's=20
cynicism becomes self-fulfilling, thus justifying further military=20
intervention in politics."

Even so, there are enough parties in the fray to make the outcome=20
unpredictable. There are three main groups. One, led by the breakaway=20
faction of Mr Sharif's Muslim League, is popularly known as the=20
"King's Party", because it is expected to provide obedient support to=20
Gen Musharraf.

They appear to be backed by a number of independents. Last week it=20
was revealed that more than 90 apparently diverse candidates were=20
running under the same electoral logo - the Islamic crescent. This=20
suggested that Pakistan's military regime was helping co-ordinate=20
their campaigns. "Electoral manipulation has been relatively subtle,"=20
said Hussain Naqi, of Pakistan's Human Rights Commission in Lahore.=20
"It's less about ballot stuffing and more about the use of carrots=20
and sticks behind the scenes."

The second group, led by the loyalists of Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif,=20
opposes military involvement in politics. But they dislike each other=20
even more and have been unable to agree on a proper seat sharing=20
arrangement. "The chances of these two co-operating after the poll=20
are much slimmer than Gen Musharraf being able to buy off their=20
support," said the diplomat.

The third group is composed of six radical Islamist parties who=20
appear to be the only grouping arguing a consistent line. Their=20
campaign has been vehemently anti-America and anti-India. But the=20
Islamist parties are unlikely to get more than 20 of the 342 seats.

Pakistan's supposedly independent election commission will declare=20
the poll results next week. The real outcome, however, will be=20
determined by the horse-trading behind the scenes. "Ultimately Gen=20
Musharraf will remain in charge," said Gen Beg. "But a big vote for=20
the anti-status quo parties would make his life more difficult."

_____

#6.

From: indian progressive study group
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 9:40 PM

Subject: Communal Violence, War Clouds and a peace Concert: Nov 2 at USC

Communal Violence, War Clouds, and a Peace Concert
Saturday, November 2, 2002
University of Southern California

November 2nd will mark the 18th anniversary of the 1984 massacres in=20
Delhi. Join us to mark this anniversary with a discussion meeting=20
followed by a peace concert. The meeting will focus on the ongoing=20
violence in Gujarat and the war clouds that hang over South Asia.

The last six months of continual violence in Gujarat is a stark=20
reminder that the legacy of November 84 cannot be wished away. As=20
people have begun to take the initiative in their hands to secure=20
justice and protection, peace and dignity in the face of continued=20
inaction and complicity on the part of the officialdom, it is=20
important to deliberate how people can be effective? What roadblocks=20
do they face? How can the trend of politics of violence be negated?

If recent events are anything to go by, war preparations and war are=20
an active part of the agenda for governments all over the world.=20
Contentions and collusions between big powers and governments of=20
South Asia pose a grave danger to the security and progress of=20
people. How do people intervene in the situation to defeat the plans=20
of all those who plan to engulf the region in war and chaos?

The evening will conclude with a concert for peace. Rejecting war as=20
an option for dealing with problems, the concert captures the=20
prevalent anti-war sentiments, and is an expression of peoples'=20
initiatives to prevent war in the region. The peace and friendship=20
concert will feature recitals by Ustad Shujaat Husain Khan (sitar)=20
from India and Ustad Tari Khan (tabla) from Pakistan.

PROGRAM for the AFTERNOON/EVENING

Public Meeting:
War Clouds and Communal Violence: What Role must People Play?
Taper Hall of Humanities, Room 212 (or THH 212), USC
3:30-6:00 p.m.
Everybody welcome event is free
Organized by IPSG-LA

Indian Food: 6:30-7:30 will be sold outside Bing Theatre

Evening Concert:
India/Pakistan PeaceConcert: War is not an option
Bing Theater, USC
7:30 p.m. 10:00 p.m.
Performers:
Ustad Shujaat Husain Khan (sitar) and Ustad Tari Khan (tabla)

General Admission: $15; Students: $10
For tickets, please call or visit the USC Ticket Office at (213)=20
740-7111 (open from 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m., Monday to Friday)
Sponsoring Organizations: SCIA-USC, IPSG-LA, SAF, SAN, USC Dept. of=20
Classics and others

For more information: please call
Shonali (323) 655-1276
Phiroze (323) 655-7318
_____

#7.

The Times of India
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2002
INTERVIEW
Kashmir's Missing

The Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP) was set up=20
by lawyer- activist Parvez Imroz in association with Parveena=20
Ahangar, a woman whose son was allegedly 'picked up' by the security=20
forces in 1994. A member of the Asian Federation Against Involuntary=20
Disappearances (AFAD), the Srinagar-based civil rights group has=20
since been tracking the fate of 'missing' Kashmiris in the state.=20
Humra Qureishi spoke to Imroz about the scope of APDP's work:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/articleshow?artid=3D24702373

______

#8.

Question of Faith
Anti-Conversion Legislation in Tamil Nadu

Ram Puniyani

Tamil Nadu Govt. has passed a legislation banning the conversions by
force, fraud and allurement. Earlier Orissa Govt. had also passed a
legislation on similar lines and one bill by Anant Geete of Shiv Sena is
pending in the Parliament for discussion. This bill calls for a ban on
conversions and also equates free education as allurement! As per these
proposals a prior permission/intimation will be needed to be given to the
authorities who will sit on judgement whether the conversion is legal or
not. In a way most of these legislations violate the fundamental rights of
citizens, the right to personal freedom affecting profession, practice and
propagation of faith (article 25)

Just a month ago 150 Dalits in Kootharanbakkam village of Tamil Nadu had
converted. Similarly on Nov. 4, last years thousands of Dalits had
converted to Buddhism under the leadership of Udit Raj and this set the
trend for conversion in many places. As such in recent memory the
conversions in Meenkashipuram in 1980, where many a dalits had converted
to Islam was the major event which was projected as the invasion of petro
dollars for conversion to Islam in India. The issue was used to
consolidate the upper caste-class reaction against the social changes
especially related to the aspirations of Dalits. The same issue was raked
up again from 1997 when the anti Christian violence was orchestrated. It
was alleged that Christian missionaries are converting by force and
allurement. It was also alleged that these are being sponsored by the
foreign money courtesy the Pope. The major victim of this propaganda was
Pastor Graham Steward Stains who was burnt alive along with his two sons
when the trio was sleeping in the Jeep. During this period churches begun
to be attacked, Bibles were burnt and Christian priests were attacked. The
very suddenness and countrywide spread of the phenomena came as a bolt
from the blue.

The attacks were accompanied by the intercommunity divided on the ground
that new followers of Jesus are abandoning their old communitarian norms
and so the conflicts are coming up. The most surprising part of the
forcible conversion story was that this took place when the percentage of
Christian population is declining. The census data, and the data from
Justice Wadhava Commission of inquiry gave the truth of conversions away.
The All India Christian population in 1971 was-2.6%, in it was 1981-2.44%
and in 1991 it stood at 2.32%. This shows a marginal decline in the all
India population of Christians.

In Manoharpur in Keonjhar district Pastor Dr.Stains was doing his work
amongst the lepers. Justice Wadhava report gives an interesting
statistics. As per this report there is a rise of Hindu population by
2.52%, and that of Christian population by.008% between the years 1991 to
1998. These figures totally demolish the foundation of the argument that
massive forced conversions are on. The point to be noted is that the
conversions are projected to be a purely passive process in which the poor
Adivasis are converted by inducement and allurement. This again is a point
which gives the image that those converted are mere passive beings bereft
of intelligence just because they are poor and so susceptible to the
'anti-National' activities of the missionaries.

A slight peep in to history of conversions in India will make the matters
clear for us: whether conversions are active or a passive process? If we
recall a while ago the major component of anti-Muslim propaganda was that
Muslim Kings converted the Hindus by the sword, and this construct formed
the base of the anti Muslim sentiments in the social common sense. Before
we go into the historical process whereby Islam spread in India lets have
a look at the opinion of Swami Vivekanand on the issue (Collected works-
Vol. VIII, page 330). Says Swamiji Why amongst the poor of India so many
are Mohhamedans? It is nonsense to say that they were converted by the
sword, it was to gain liberty from Jamindars (Feudal lords) and priests.
Islam, contrary to the popular belief came to India through the Arab
traders who used to visit the Malabar coast for trade, and it were the
Hindu Kings who built the initial Mosques to sustain the trade. Also there
are still communities in the coastal areas who practice mixed, Hindu and
Muslim, rituals.

The major spread of Islam in India took place through the Sufi saints
whose spiritual strength and attitude of being close to the people
attracted the lower castes to embrace Islam in the hope of escaping the
Brahminical oppression of which they were the victims. There is no doubt
that some conversions also took place out of fear of the invading Muslim
Kings and also out of the anticipation of reward from the Muslim Kings,
but surely this number is inconsequential. Similarly even today there are
some insignificant boisterous Christian groups who blow their trumpet and
propagate in an aggressive way. Again their impact is insignificant.
It is interesting that Sikhism, which drew heavily from Islam as well as
Hinduism, attracted more of low caste untouchables in big number. Many of
them converted to Sikhism in the early part of twentieth century despite
stiff opposition from the Arya Samaj and other elite Hindu streams. The
case of Ambedkar and his followers embracing Buddhism needs a bit of
recounting. Dr. Ambedkar tried his best to have a place in the Hindu
social order. In this direction he led the Chavdar Talav movement, to
have access to public drinking water, he led the Kalaram temple agitation,
to gain entry to Hindu temples. The violent reaction of the upper caste
Hindus to these agitations made him to say that that though I was born a
Hindu I will not die as a Hindu. Further he went on to burn Manusmriti and
later decided to convert to Buddhism.

Dr. Ambedkars trajectory is the classical example of low caste Hindus
adopting a different religion by choice. And this is what has been the
phenomenon all through-attempts by the low castes to escape the
Brahminical Social Order by embracing different religions. Be those the
religions of Indian origin or be they of foreign origin, what is important
is that, the oppressed have been active partners in the process and not
the mere objects for the conversions.

Using this as a tool for communal politics is a favorite weapon all
through. As such Hinduism is based on caste system and Brahminism has been
its dominant factor. It is not a religion based on the teaching of any
prophet, and there by spreading, preaching it to others is not the norm.
Earlier Brahmin groups, being the elite, insisted more on exclusion of
others rather than on proselytisation. As such the Dalits, belonging
presumably to the same religion were untouchables and had to live in the
ghettoes outside the village. Other Indian religions, which based on
teachings of prophets (Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism), did believe in
propagating and thats how Buddhism in particular spread far and wide, to
other countries.

Hindu and Muslim political forces in early part of 20th century did
undertake conversions (shuddhi to Hinduism and tanzim and tabligh to
Islam). The shuddhi was more to attract those low castes that had adopted
Islam or Sikhism as their religion. The current Gharvapasi campaign of VHP
draws its legitimacy from the assertion that Adivasis are Hindus. If ones
belief systems, deities, holy books, and communitarian determine religion
functions than in which way the are the Adivasis Hindu? They many a times
have been beef eaters, are unaware of Ram and other deities of Hindu
religion, are oblivious to the Hindu holy books i.e. Gita, Ramayan, Maha
Bharat, and Vedas, and are practicing the animism in their own way. As
per the obligatory criterion of Religion they cannot be called as Hindus.
But they are being labeled as Hindus as a part of the phenomenon of
political will and for the necessities of Hindutva (not Hinduism, and they
are different categories) onslaught, which is trying to match Islamic
fundamentalism in its pernicious methods. Gharvapasi is a proselytisation
in a cleverer garb. The adivasis are being baptized in newer ways (Holy
baths, washing their feet with sacred water etc.) and this being backed up
with teaching them the Hindu ways, i.e. making them aware of the Hindu
deities, Hindu holy books Hindu festivals etc. Today, despite the claims
to the contrary many a Hindutva outfits are indulging in proselytization.

The spread of Hinduism is always a problem. Politically Hindutva needs to
assert that all those except Muslims and Christians, are Hindus. Here, the
criterion applied is the Nationalism of Religions. One is doubtful if
Religions can be tied to any Nation. Buddhism, which originated in India
is the religion of majority of people in Thailand, Sri Lanka.
Christianity, originated in Jerusalem but today it is major religion of US
Europe etc. While in Gharvapasi campaign the new caste of Adivasis remains
a vague issue. What is remarkable is not that conversions as a marginal
phenomenon have been a part of Indian reality from ages but the fact that
political phenomenon of intolerance has made it a political issue today.

(Writer works for EKTA, Committee for Communal Amity Mumbai)

______

#9.

Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 2002 7:06 PM

AKSHARDHAM: HOW MANY MORE AFTERMATHS?

Bina Srinivasan

On the evening of 24th Sept 2002 some friends from Delhi dropped in=20
to visit me in Ahmedabad. Soon after, a phone call interrupted the=20
conversation giving us the grim news. Akshardham had been attacked by=20
terrorists.

We absorbed the news without comprehension. Then the implications=20
sank in. =A0What if????

Phone calls flew in thick and fast. Friends, relatives and=20
journalists called to share the confusion. Panic plastered in thick=20
layers all over the city as people rushed back to safe places. In my=20
apartment building everything was electric. Fear hung like thin=20
strings of livewire. My friends left in a hurry. Get back to Delhi=20
immediately, their relatives told them.

The next day there were prayer meetings everywhere in Ahmedabad. =A0In=20
Muslim areas banners had come up overnight: The entire Muslim=20
community condemns the attack on Akshardham. =A0This time nobody wanted=20
to take any chances.

A season for bandhs. The Congress and the VHP had swung into action.=20
In the meantime, people from Naroda Patiya streamed into the Shah=20
Alam dargah. Ditto other erstwhile camps like Sundaram Nagar.

The night before the VHP bandh the mood in the Shah Alam dargah was=20
so tense you could cut it with a knife. The women there were torn=20
between fear and anger.

Kill us at one stroke, they said. Don=B9t do this to us. How dare they=20
attack a temple? We are glad those terrorists were killed. Life has=20
become impossible here. Last time the bandh reduced our lives to=20
shambles. This time, they will finish us. Now, either they will get=20
us, or we will end up killing ourselves.

One woman sat next to me, her anger reverberating against the=20
intricate jalli work of the dargah. I lost two of my sons in the=20
violence. I know what death is. How can I condone what they have=20
done to innocent people in Akshardham? The death of a family member=20
cripples you for life. It leaves scars forever. These people,=20
whether Hindu or Muslim, are all peddlers of violence. Her voice=20
broke; in reflex I reached out a hand to hold her. She shrank back=20
instantly, staring at me, eyes wide with alarm.

The men were resigned or simply drained out. Sister, they said, we=20
don=B9t know when this will end. This cycle of violence is not good.=20
We had just begun work, gone back to our homes and now this=8A.. One of=20
them wiped the tears from his eyes, his hands shook so much it was=20
difficult to watch.

The day of the VHP bandh I went to Gomtipur and Bapunagar. Groups of=20
people sat together under various shelters hiding from the scorching=20
heat. Some Dalit women stood near a couple of vegetable carts; their=20
faces tense but defiant. Aren=B9t you afraid of violence, I asked them.

We are more afraid of hunger, they answered. We have had enough.=20
Our children have gone without proper food all these months. How can=20
we live with so much uncertainty? Nothing is in our hands. But we=20
have to think of our rozi-roti. So we will do our work. If they=20
come to send us back home, we will go back. And return once they=20
have gone.

You come into our houses and see what we have been reduced to, said=20
one of them, her red bindi flashing in the sun. =A0We have no stores=20
left, and nothing for the present, nothing for the future. So we=20
cannot afford to sit at home when we should be earning a living.

The next week I found myself in Akshardham. An imposing building,=20
barricaded now by large gates. Tall green trees surrounded the=20
entire place. The serenity was soothing after the pollution of=20
Ahmedabad. It was difficult to imagine that this had been the scene=20
of such bloody violence only a few days back.

In the Intensive Care Unit of the Civil Hospital the reality of the=20
attack is brought home with a rude jolt. Specially when you come=20
upon a tiny two-month old child with a gauze strip criss-crossed down=20
the middle of her bare stomach. And when you see her mother with a=20
broken jaw, now held together with a leather strip. The mother wants=20
to talk. Her eyes are full of curiosity. She makes an effort and I=20
understand with difficulty.

Two months old, says this Sikh woman, waving a weak hand towards the=20
child who lies on a huge machine. A relative comes in and points out=20
the injuries on both mother and child.

In the next room is her relative who has been so badly hurt I wonder=20
how she will recover. Her legs, thighs and torso have been ripped=20
apart. She heaves for breath, clinging to life through intense pain.

She whispers, the woman with the baby does not know her husband is=20
dead. We have not told her. She and her husband had come visiting=20
from Kota; they wanted to visit Akshardham. We told them there are=20
other places, but she insisted. She lapses into silence.

It reminds me of the woman who had gone visiting her mother in Naroda=20
Patiya in February, to end up losing two of her sons. She herself=20
was badly burnt in the violence in Patiya.

I saw the terrorists, says the woman in the hospital. Fifteen days=20
back I had a dream that some terrorists were shooting at me. =A0I told=20
my husband. He laughed at me. Then her eyes fill up with tears and=20
she says my husband is in coma in the Gandhinagar Civil Hospital.=20
One son is injured, he is in another ward. =A0I want to see my husband.=20
If he is alright, I am alright.

She closes her eyes, a slow tear running down her cheek. In helpless=20
solidarity I hold her shoulder, the only uninjured part of her body.=20
Her mother and other relatives look on in silence.

I meet the commandos. One with a hand in a cast, who walks through=20
the ward once in a while. He explains to me how it all happened.=20
His wife holds her sari over her head and listens intently to him.=20
Another commando is in the next room, he sits on his cot with a=20
gaping hole in his throat.

As I begin to leave a relative of two women I met stops me. She=20
whispers in earnest. Both of them, she gesticulates towards the two=20
rooms, do not know that their husbands have died in the attack. We=20
have told them they are in coma at the Gandhinagar Civil hospital.=20
That we go there every morning and see how they are doing.

Simple, heart-breaking deception.

The child is now awake. Her mother holds her. I go in for a brief=20
moment. I stroke the child=B9s soft-as-down cheeks and the words of=20
the paediatric surgeon who had treated her echo back. Her spleen had=20
to be removed. The spleen is responsible for the body=B9s immune=20
system. Now the child has to watch out. Even a fever can be fatal.

Looking down into the tiny face I am struck by her strength. Those=20
little black eyes look straight back at me without a single streak of=20
pain. =A0Today, there is no rancour in those eyes. What does tomorrow=20
hold for her? =A0And for the thousands of children who have lost so=20
much over the last few months? For how long will the innocent=20
continue to bear the burden of an embittered history?

I step out of the hospital. Taking leave of mangled bodies, bruised=20
minds. If only it was just as easy to take leave of Gujarat.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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