[sacw] SACW #1 | 23-24 Feb. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1 | 23-24 February 2002

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#1. India-Pakistan standoff: recalling October 1962 (M V Ramana)
#2. Pakistan: Secularism 'door ast' (Kuldip Nayar)
#3. Pakistan: Concern over depoliticization of society (Nadeem Saeed)
#4. India: Compromises of coalition politics , backroom deals with=20
business have not, however, altered the BJP's ideological agenda=20
(Anjali Mody)
#5. India: Portrait of a 'historian' as a propagandist (Vir Sanghvi)
#6. Indian Town's Seed Grew Into the Taliban's Code (Celia W. Dugger)
#7. Network of Women in the Media (NWM), India (Jyoti Punwani)
#8. UK: Seminar - Anshuman Mondal, "'Sexuality, Desire and the=20
Politics of Communalism in Gandhi's Discourse on Gender' (Oxford, 28=20
Feb)

________________________

#1.

The Friday Times
February 22-28, 2002

India-Pakistan standoff: recalling October 1962

M V Ramana
says the Indian Agni test during the current standoff was highly=20
provocative and should have been avoided=09=20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
=09=20
The eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between India and Pakistan=20
following the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament continues,=20
making this one of the longest warlike situations between two=20
countries possessing nuclear weapons. The state of affairs is=20
reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis, arguably the closest the=20
world came to nuclear war. It is worth recalling some lessons from=20
that crisis for South Asia.

Much has been written about the Cuban missile crisis and it suffices=20
to recall the events briefly. On October 15, 1962, US reconnaissance=20
photographs revealed missile sites being constructed in Cuba. After=20
seven days of intense debate within the upper echelons of the US=20
government, President John F Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine=20
around Cuba. He also warned that any nuclear missile launched from=20
Cuba would result in massive nuclear retaliation on the Soviet Union.=20
On October 24, the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) moved to DEFCON 2,=20
the highest military alert short of all-out war. Tensions finally=20
began to ease on October 28 when Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced=20
that he would dismantle the installations and return the missiles to=20
the Soviet Union. During the peak period, 1479 bombers, 182=20
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and 112 Submarine=20
Launched Ballistic Missiles were on alert.

Many analysts argue that nuclear deterrence worked since the Cuban=20
missile crisis did not result in war. But what this view misses out=20
is the high risk that the two superpowers could have gone to war not=20
by design but by accident. In his masterful study The Limits of=20
Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton=20
University Press, 1993), Scott Sagan identifies several incidents=20
involving errors, safety issues, accidents, false warnings and so on=20
that could have led to nuclear war. At many stages during the crisis,=20
low-level personnel had effective control over nuclear weapons that=20
they possessed; in principle, they could have used their weapons=20
without being authorized by the political leaders, and with=20
disastrous consequences.

One serious error that Sagan described involved a B-52 bomber that=20
got lost and headed directly towards the Soviet Union and was only=20
about 300 miles from Soviet airspace when its mistake was noticed; at=20
this point, it was almost certainly within range of Soviet=20
interceptors. An example of a safety violation that opened up the=20
possibility of unauthorized launch involved new minuteman ICBMs that=20
were jerry-rigged leaving military officers with the physical=20
capability though not the authority to launch these missiles.

More serious were the many false alarms during the crisis. One=20
bizarre incident occurred on October 25 when an air force guard saw a=20
"person" climbing the security fence at a base and set off the alarm=20
at all nearby air bases. At one of these, the alarm system was faulty=20
and the signal was interpreted to be an enemy attack; pilots started=20
taxiing down the runways on nuclear-equipped F-106 aircraft assuming=20
that nuclear war had started. Just before takeoff further=20
communication revealed that no attack was underway and the aircraft=20
stopped. The "person" climbing the fence turned out to be a bear.

Similarly on October 28, a radar picked up what appeared to be a=20
missile launch from Cuba against the US and reported it over the=20
voice hotline to the command center. Even after rechecking the data=20
was unambiguous. Since the missile was short range, there was nothing=20
to do but wait for the detonation. Only a few minutes after the=20
expected detonation did not occur it became clear that someone had=20
inserted a software test tape at the same time as when the radar had=20
detected a satellite, resulting in confusion.

Perhaps the incidents that have the most direct relevance to South=20
Asia are the two missile tests that were conducted during the crisis.=20
On October 26, an Atlas ICBM was launched on a "routine" test from=20
Vandenberg Air Force Base in Southern California without orders from=20
political authorities in Washington. Since in 1962 the Soviet Union=20
did not have reconnaissance satellites to provide early warning, the=20
launch did not have serious consequences. More serious was a Titan II=20
ICBM test launch towards the South Atlantic. Radar operators who were=20
looking for launches from Cuba and who had not been expecting this=20
launch were shocked when the missile showed up on their screens. But=20
after a few tense minutes, it became clear that the missile was=20
heading away from the US and the operators relaxed. Had the missile=20
been launched on a slightly different trajectory, such prompt=20
identification would have been difficult and an alarm set off.

The parallel event in the case of South Asia is the test of the Agni=20
missile by India on January 25. Indian leaders evidently would like=20
to follow the US not only in acquiring nuclear weapons but also in=20
taking the kinds of risks that the US did during the Cuban missile=20
crisis. Fortunately, the missile was launched well away from=20
Pakistan, and one assumes that authorities in Pakistan were notified=20
about the launch. But, at the very least, the launch was highly=20
provocative and avoidable.

The next time may not be so safe. The big firebreak that protected=20
India and Pakistan this time was non-deployment of nuclear weapons.=20
But ever since the tests of May 1998, India has been taking steps=20
towards deployment. Pakistan is almost sure to follow. Deployment=20
could well lead to the kinds of safety problems, near accidents, and=20
false warnings witnessed during the Cuban missile crisis. All of=20
these could potentially escalate into a nuclear war. Then we may be=20
in the same state as the US and USSR. They, as General Lee Butler,=20
head of the US Strategic Air Command from 1992 to 1994 (during which=20
period he was in charge of the US nuclear arsenal), put it,"survived=20
the Cuban missile crisis no thanks to deterrence, but only by the=20
grace of God."

M. V. Ramana, a nuclear physicist, is a research staff member at=20
Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security. He is=20
the author of "Bombing Bombay? Effects of Nuclear Weapons and a Case=20
Study of a Hypothetical Explosion," (Cambridge, USA: International=20
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1999).

______

#2.

DAWN
23 February 2002

Secularism 'door ast'
By Kuldip Nayar

Pakistan is currently in the midst of a healthy and amusing debate on=20
secularism. It is healthy because those who wear Islam on their=20
sleeves are on the defensive. It is amusing because the two-nation=20
theory on which Pakistan is premised does not fit into the=20
accommodation that secularism demands.
It all began over the promise President Pervez Musharraf held out to=20
the world in his January 12 speech: to make Pakistan a moderate and=20
progressive Islamic state. In a subsequent interview to the Newsweek,=20
he went to the extent of describing Pakistan a "Muslim secular=20
state." The interview was tape-recorded. Still the president's=20
spokesman said three days later that Musharraf never used the word=20
'secular.' US Secretary of State Powell has only heightened the=20
debate by tagging the term 'secular' onto Pakistan when Musharraf was=20
recently in Washington.
Indeed, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan, expounded the=20
two-nation thesis on the ground that Hindus and Muslims living in the=20
subcontinent were two separate nations. But after winning Pakistan,=20
he changed the concept of nationhood from religion to country. His=20
opening address before the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan confirmed=20
this: "You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your=20
mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan...=20
You will find that in the course of time, Hindus would cease to be=20
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious=20
sense, because that is a faith of each individual, but in the=20
political sense as citizens of the state."
Even in an interview a few weeks before the partition plan was=20
announced, Jinnah said, "The members of the new nation would have=20
equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or=20
creed." What he was conveying to the people of Pakistan was that=20
they, whichever religion they belonged to, were one nation, like=20
Indians or Americans. The state could not be mixed with religion.
For Jinnah, Pakistan and India were two nations, comprising Muslims=20
and Hindus. He never favoured the transfer of population. And the=20
little time he had before his death, he spent on emphasizing that=20
Pakistan was a democratic, secular country. That Jinnah did not want=20
Pakistan to be run "by priests with a divine mission" goes without=20
saying. Nor did he want the country to be theocratic. He had made=20
this known even before Pakistan's formation.
The post-Jinnah-Liaquat rulers have tried to go back to the=20
two-nation theory, deliberately creating a gulf between Hindus and=20
Muslims. There are several elements in Pakistan which are hell-bent=20
on interpreting Jinnah wrongly. Some quote chapter and verse from the=20
Pakistan Constitution to argue that Article 31 makes it mandatory to=20
follow "the Islamic way."
One, the Constitution was adopted in 1973 during Zulfikar Ali=20
Bhutto's regime. Two, even if the Constitution is strictly followed,=20
Article 31 enjoins only on the Muslims "to order their lives in=20
accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of=20
Islam..."
What kind of secular state would it be, if the 95 per cent people=20
were to live in the "Islamic way?" The founder of Pakistan was=20
opposed to introducing religion in the affairs of the state. The=20
criterion should be what he said: "You may belong to any religion or=20
caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the fundamental=20
principle that we are all citizens of one state."
Musharraf has made speeches on building Pakistan into a modern,=20
progressive state. But for such an edifice to be built, secularism is=20
the foundation stone. He does not have to feel embarrassed over the=20
word secularism, which denotes pluralism. He cannot placate religious=20
groups and secular elements at the same time.
True, Musharraf has restored the joint electorate, which another=20
military dictator, General Zia-ul Haq, had dropped from the=20
Constitution. But secularism does not mean joint electorate alone. It=20
is a temperament that has to be cultivated. It is a commitment to=20
tolerance and open society and means rising above one's own religion.=20
Followers of one belief are not superior to people from other faiths.
Every religion has noble teachings and lofty moral principles. There=20
is a tendency in each of us to mock the unfamiliar in others' faith=20
and worship. Such words as 'heathen', 'idolatry' and 'superstition'=20
are often used as insults. But in the moment of prayer, every man is=20
at his best. He should command respect.
But how can the seeds of such thoughts be sown when the books and=20
teachers in Pakistan spew hatred against the heritage of Hindus?=20
General Ayub Khan abolished most of history from the school system=20
and introduced what was called "social sciences." General Zia-ul-Haq=20
demolished whatever was left of history. He created a new subject,=20
"Pakistan Studies," which was not history but a treatise on Muslim=20
separatism. In the name of ideology of Pakistan, the books have=20
buried deep Jinnah's thought of not mixing the state with religion.
In his latest book 'Pakistan's Political Culture,' Prof. K.K. Aziz=20
aptly describes its effect on a Muslim: "He found himself hanging=20
from a rope stretched over an abyss whose two cliffs were his=20
yesterdays and his todays, and he did not know whether to try to move=20
towards his yesteryear or towards the current times. He could not=20
distinguish between his yesterday and his today. How could he look=20
forward to his tomorrow? His perplexity was complete."
What Pakistan did in 50 years to disfigure history, India, under the=20
BJP-led government, is trying to do in five years, its term till next=20
parliament elections. At the command of Human Resource Minister Murli=20
Manohar Joshi, history is being rewritten to glorify "Hindu culture."=20
Even otherwise, there is an effort to saffronize the country. It is a=20
pity that the BJP-led government should be busy in polarizing=20
society. It will be counter-productive because the majority in the=20
Hindu community believes in pluralism and open society.
In fact, pluralism and open society are the two recognizable traits=20
of a modern state which Musharraf should be following to change=20
Pakistan. But is he prepared to revise the textbooks, change class=20
instructions and repeal the blasphemy law? The government has already=20
refused to drop the blasphemy law. In the same way, it does not want=20
to change the provision that declared the Ahmedis non-Muslim.
If Musharraf wants Pakistan to turn over a new leaf, his fight=20
against obscurantism has to be relentless. Does he have the=20
commitment - and support - to do so? It is one thing to please the=20
West but another to take steps on the ground to reform a society=20
which has lived and developed with a particular identity in the last=20
50 years.
And how can Pakistan be a modern, progressive state without=20
democracy? Musharraf says he will continue as President for the next=20
five years. He needs to have the sanction of people through the=20
ballot box. His ratings of popularity, according to the Pakistan=20
press, are above 60 per cent. Fair and transparent elections have to=20
confirm this.
The Pakistan Supreme Court's directive to conduct the polls by=20
October this year is there. But so far there has been no movement=20
towards implementing the order. Political parties have not been=20
allowed to function. The return of leaders of the two main parties=20
from abroad is not even on the cards.
If Musharraf wants to follow in Jinnah's footsteps, he will have to=20
completely change himself and his military junta. The next few months=20
will show if he wants to do so. But will the army commanders go with=20
him all the way?
The writer is a free lance columnist based in New Delhi.

______

#3.

DAWN
22 February 2002
http://www.dawn.com/2002/02/23/op.htm#3

Concern over depoliticization of society
By Nadeem Saeed

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) chairperson Mr=20
Afrasiab Khan Khattak and secretary Ms Hina Jilani were in town the=20
other day as part of a tour of southern Punjab during which they also=20
went to Bahawalpur, Muzaffargarh and Rajanpur.
In Multan, the HRCP office-bearers first spoke at a seminar at a=20
hotel near Kumharanwala chowk. Later, they addressed the district bar=20
association and in the evening attended a reception organized by Mr=20
Allah Nawaz Durrani in their honour. Apart from district Nazim=20
Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Husain Qureshi, political leaders,=20
intellectuals, writers, traders and civil activists were present on=20
the occasion.
Welcoming the guests, the zila Nazim threw light on the advantages=20
and disadvantages of the new system of district governments. He said=20
the people were really fed up with the police excesses and added that=20
this department should be more answerable to the people's=20
representatives to check its highhandedness. He said the government=20
had tried to create a balance between the people and the bureaucracy=20
through the system.
He said that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the first politician who tried=20
to bridle the bureaucracy through people's power. Comparing the=20
military regimes of Zia and Musharraf, the Nazim thought that society=20
was not going through the intellectual suffocation which was the mark=20
of the Zia period.
Ms Jilani said her experience showed that the cause of human rights=20
had furthered more during even the worst of civilian rules than=20
during the best of military dictatorships. She blamed the politicians=20
for military rules in the country, saying "whenever the military=20
roars, the politicians rush in their burrows within no time".
The HRCP chairperson expressed concern over the depoliticization of=20
the Pakistani society, saying the establishment had imputed all the=20
negative attributes to politics. "Politics is the most important part=20
of the civil society," he added.
Recalling the MRD struggle during the Zia era, he lamented that there=20
was no such political movement and awareness in society at present.=20
He said the commission was organizing seminars in various parts of=20
the country to build a political consensus on minimum points to lead=20
the country back to civilian rule. "We are using the term civilian=20
rule because in our point of view there has never been a democratic=20
government in Pakistan, he added."
* * * * *
The Multan police have become notorious for inviting public wrath and=20
involving themselves in clashes with the people. The recent 'feather'=20
in their cap was their action in Bangalwala village of Qadirpur Rann,=20
some 20 kilometres from here.
Reportedly, some policemen trespassed into a house at midnight. The=20
inmates overpowered them and called the neighbours. They gave a sound=20
thrashing to the 'trespassers' thinking they were dacoits. A gang of=20
outlaws was active in the area looting the people in police uniform.=20
The house in which the police trespassed had earlier been looted by=20
bandits wearing police uniform.
When informed, a police party led by the Qadirpur Rann SHO rushed to=20
the area and tried to forcibly get their men released. But the angry=20
mob also beat them up.
At this, SP CIA Javed Shah along with a heavy police contingent=20
reached the spot and ordered the villagers to release the officials.=20
The people argued that they would only hand over the officials to the=20
district Nazim. Upon this, the police personnel entered the houses=20
and ransacked them, brutally beating up men, women and children=20
irrespective of their age and getting the officials released.
Police claimed that they entered the house to arrest a wanted man but=20
villagers said that there was no such person in the house. The union=20
council Nazim Arshad Raan alleged that the "dacoits in police=20
uniform" would be those officials who were caught by the people.=20
Police registered a case against scores of villagers.
Earlier, the Multan police invaded the Makhdoom Rasheed area, beat up=20
the people there and registered a case against hundreds of people=20
under various sections, including the anti-terrorism act, 1997. The=20
people in Makhdoom Rasheed were protesting against the rising number=20
of dacoities in their area, including incidents involving 'dacoits in=20
police uniform'.
* * * * *
The University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, has awarded PhD degree to=20
Mr Din Muhammad Zahid of the University College of Agriculture,=20
Bahauddin Zakariya University, in forestry. The topic of his thesis=20
was "improving quality of farm grown eucalyptus wood to promote its=20
utilization". A BZU publication claimed that Mr Zahid is the first=20
person in the country to get a PhD degree in forestry.

_____

#4.

The Hindu
23 February 2002

The party with a difference
By Anjali Mody

The compromises of coalition politics and of backroom deals with=20
business have not, however, altered the BJP's ideological agenda
http://www.hinduonnet.com/stories/2002022300041000.htm

_____

#5.

The Hindustan Times, February 23, 2002=20=20
=09=20
Portrait of a 'historian' as a propagandist
Vir Sanghvi
(New Delhi, February 22)
Among the new members of the reconstituted Indian Council for=20
Historical Research is Navratna S. Rajaram. His appointment has led=20
to a controversy with historians objecting to his inclusion on two=20
grounds. One, he is not a historian. And two, he is essentially a=20
propagandist for the fundamentalist faction of the "parivar".

Interestingly, Mr Rajaram does not claim to be a historian in the=20
traditional sense. The biographical note to his book A Hindu View of=20
the World describes him as follows: "Rajaram is a mathematician,=20
computer scientist and linguist and historian of science." His=20
background includes a spell as advisor to NASA, the US space agency.=20
If he has any degrees in history or has taught the subject, then his=20
own biographical note is strangely silent about this.

Here, without comment, we reproduce some of the things this noted=20
historian and newly appointed member of the ICHR has written in a=20
book containing "essays in the intellectual historical tradition".

* On Islam: "History shows us that it is the second kind of prophet -=20
the so-called God's messenger - who has brought much violence and=20
bloodshed and poses the greatest threat to the world. The legacy of=20
Prophet Mohammad and his followers is a blood-soaked history.

"In reality, the life of the Prophet was the combination of the=20
luxuriance of Solomon and the despotism of Moses."

* On the Haj subsidy: "The 'secular' Nehru like a modern day=20
Aurangzeb re-introduced his own version of jeziya (tax on=20
non-Muslims) in the form of Haj subsidies to be paid by taxpayers."

* On Christianity: "Christianity like Islam cannot live by faith=20
alone. It needs power and above all it needs money. It is now losing=20
both. Indians should know what is happening and make sure that they=20
don't swallow one more thing that the West has discarded.

"In 1944 alone the Nazi contribution to the Vatican amounted to over=20
$ 100 million - worth nearly a billion and a half dollars at today's=20
values. This lucrative source is now drying up. And this is what is=20
behind the antics of Indian bishops clamouring for support from the=20
Indian government for 'Dalit Christians'; they want Indian taxpayers=20
to compensate for their losses in Europe."
[...]
* On the Congress: "Secularism. Who was it that gave this mantra? Not=20
Gandhi but inveterate Hindu-hater Nehru.... It was not just Hindus=20
that he despised but also the Jews.

_____

#6.

The New York Times
February 23, 2002

Indian Town's Seed Grew Into the Taliban's Code

By CELIA W. DUGGER

DEOBAND, India =97 The orthodox Islamic school of thought that came to=20
find its most virulent expression in the Taliban originated in this=20
placid north Indian town where Hindus and Muslims peaceably coexist=20
to the eternal rhythms of sowing and harvesting.

Along streets ornamented with shrines to blue-skinned Hindu gods,=20
cows, sacred in Hinduism, forage unfettered. Five times a day, the=20
muezzins' calls to prayer sound from the minarets of the 135-year-old=20
Darul Uloom seminary that is famed throughout the Islamic world and=20
teaches the form of Islam known as Deobandism.

But while the Deobandis of India, and India's 130 million Muslims in=20
general, have embraced India's secular Constitution and religious=20
diversity, the Deobandis of Afghanistan and Pakistan sought to impose=20
their fundamentalist brand of Islam by force.

Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, the nations that were once Britain's=20
Indian empire, have the world's second-, third- and fourth-largest=20
Muslim populations. Almost one out of every three of the world's 1.2=20
billion Muslims lives in the subcontinent.

So, to American policy makers newly interested in South Asia, it is=20
important to ask why South Asia's Deobandis have taken such sharply=20
divergent paths.

PHOTO:Amit Bhargava for The New York Times
Scholars at the Darul Uloom seminary in Deoband, India, birthplace of=20
the Islamic tradition of Deobandism.

"Everybody thinks of Islam as Arab, but you have to pay attention to=20
Islam in South Asia," said Vali Nasr, a political scientist at the=20
University of San Diego. "If you don't, you confront something like=20
the Taliban and everyone says, `Where did these guys come from?' To=20
understand that, you have to understand Deoband."

Here in Deoband, the concept of jihad as a holy war is simply not=20
taught. "In our madrassas you will not find even a stick to beat=20
anyone," said Marghboor Rahman, the seminary's elderly vice=20
chancellor.

By contrast, the Deobandi madrassas of Pakistan became training=20
grounds for holy war and many of the Taliban leaders. Masood Azhar,=20
Deobandi leader of the Pakistan- based Army of Muhammad, is believed=20
to have been behind terrorist attacks on India, and the Taliban, as=20
the Deobandi harborers of Osama bin Laden, posed a mortal threat to=20
the United States.

The answers about the different brands of Deobandism on the=20
subcontinent appear rooted in India's secular, democratic tradition=20
and in the region's complex interplay of history, politics and=20
demography.

To step onto the campus of Darul Uloom in Deoband is to step back in=20
time. The 3,500 boys and young men, mostly from peasant backgrounds,=20
attend free of charge. They leave their sandals outside the scalloped=20
doorways of classrooms that are more than 100 years old.

In one, a teacher read by the hour from the Hadith, a collection of=20
the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, while hundreds of students=20
wrapped in shawls against the winter chill and wearing white caps sat=20
on the floor, listening respectfully.

Mr. Rahman, 86, the school's leader, turns to history when he talks=20
about why India's Deobandis are different from their cousins across=20
the border. He explains that the seminary opposed the creation of=20
Pakistan, a Muslim homeland. "We are Indians first, then Muslims," he=20
said, speaking in Urdu.

The divide between Deobandis had its origins in the 1947 partition of=20
the British Indian empire into India and Pakistan, an event that set=20
off cataclysmic violence between Hindus and Muslims and sundered the=20
Muslims of the subcontinent, too.

No longer were devout young Muslims from all over the former empire=20
free to attend the seminary at Deoband, and today, the Deobandis of=20
Pakistan who were educated in Deoband itself have largely died out.

"They have adopted the same educational syllabus, but beyond that,=20
they developed in a different manner," Mr. Rahman said. "We do not=20
have any relationship with them."

The seminary in Deoband was founded in 1866 to preserve Muslim=20
identity and heritage in the face of British imperialism, which had=20
replaced the rule of the Mughals, India's Muslim conquerors.

The seminary's teachers imparted to their students a socially=20
conservative vision of Islam purified of folk and Hindu customs and=20
concerned with teaching individuals how to practice their faith=20
properly.

In politics, the Deobandis joined the independence movement led by=20
Mohandas K. Gandhi, a Hindu, and opposed the separate Muslim homeland=20
of Pakistan that was ultimately founded by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a=20
secular-leaning barrister who smoked cigarettes, wore hand-tailored=20
suits and spats and married a Parsi, a non-Muslim.

"Jinnah never used to offer prayers, so how could he have created an=20
Islamic state?" Mr. Rahman asked.

Secular democracy has proved to be a bulwark against fundamentalism=20
in India, and it was built on a demographic foundation that made=20
Islamic nationalism impractical here.

While Pakistan is 97 percent Muslim =97 and religion has been routinely=20
exploited there for political gain =97 India, a much more populous=20
nation with almost as many Muslims numerically, is only 12 percent=20
Muslim.

"The Muslims of India are scattered all over the place," said Syed=20
Shahabuddin, editor of Muslim India, a monthly magazine. "Out of 545=20
parliamentary districts, just 11 have a Muslim majority. How can you=20
make a Muslim political party?"

Still, in more districts Muslims form a crucial swing vote in a=20
social system where the Hindu majority is often fractured politically=20
by caste. As a result, they have a measure of influence at the ballot=20
box, if not the ability to win outright control.

Deoband is in the state of Uttar Pradesh, where the state election=20
season is under way. The political parties of the low castes and the=20
peasant castes are competing ferociously for Muslim votes.

The severest provocation of Muslims happened here in Uttar Pradesh in=20
1992, when Hindu fanatics tore down a 16th-century mosque at Ayodhya.=20
Ever since, Muslims have often cast their votes tactically for the=20
party best positioned to defeat the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya=20
Janata Party, whose leaders led the movement to build a Hindu temple=20
on the site of the mosque.

Less than a mile from Deoband is the majority-Muslim village of=20
Labakri. The villagers consider themselves Deobandis, but the purity=20
of Islamic practice expounded by the scholars at the nearby seminary=20
does not extend even this far from the gates of Darul Uloom.

The people continue to follow a caste system that is theoretically=20
forbidden. Like most Muslims in India, their forebears were low- to=20
middle- caste Hindus who converted to Islam over centuries. Hindu=20
cultural practices of caste and dowry have persisted.

In this village, people had barely heard of Mr. bin Laden and voiced=20
little interest in distant Afghanistan, far from their everyday=20
concerns of the sugar cane harvest, low wages, petty corruption and=20
poor government services.

Liaquat Ali, a 48-year-old farmer, declared that he supported the=20
Samajwadi Party, led by a Hindu from the cowherd caste, because it is=20
more secular and more influential.

But as Mr. Ali ranted on about the evils of the Hindu nationalist=20
Bharatiya Janata Party, a young farm hand, Mohammad Mustaqeem, cut=20
him off. "He was the B.J.P. regional chief in the area!" Mr.=20
Mustaqeem exclaimed. "He voted B.J.P. last time! He supported them=20
because he realized they would be in power and that it would be good=20
to be friendly with them."

A bit defensive, Mr. Ali conceded the point but insisted, "I=20
supported the B.J.P. because they talked about justice, but in the=20
past five years, they did everything but deliver it."

The Deobandi villagers of Labakri, like the Muslims of India, have=20
overwhelmingly chosen to express themselves at the ballot box, not=20
through organized violence.
Amit Bhargava for The New York Times
Scholars at the Darul Uloom seminary in Deoband, India, birthplace of=20
the Islamic tradition of Deobandism.

But in Pakistan, Deobandis, who are Sunni Muslims, have been=20
instrumental in armed Islamic militancies in Afghanistan and Kashmir=20
and in efforts to turn Pakistan into a theocratic state.

A series of powerful players - Pakistani military dictators and=20
democrats, rich Saudis and the American government - tried to harness=20
Islam to their own political and geopolitical purposes. They fed=20
zealotry on a rich diet of money, patronage and arms, creating a=20
fundamentalist force in Afghanistan and Pakistan that no one could=20
control, say scholars and political analysts.

The Pakistani military sought to strengthen its rule through an=20
alliance with clerics and from the 1980's funded thousands of=20
madrassas.

The Saudis, many of whom followed their own austere and conservative=20
brand of Islam known as Wahhabism, sought to build a Sunni wall=20
around Shiite-dominated Iran and contributed heavily to Pakistan's=20
Deobandi madrassas, as well.

The Americans poured money into Pakistan to fund Islamic militants=20
who fought the Russians in Afghanistan. The elected government of=20
Benazir Bhutto nurtured the Taliban in the hopes of setting up a=20
malleable government in Afghanistan.

Since the mid- to late 1990's, both Pakistani military rulers and=20
prime ministers have allowed secret funding of Islamic radicals who=20
have fought Indian rule of Kashmir, India's only majority-Muslim=20
state. (Notably, with the exception of Kashmiris, India's Muslims=20
have not joined the war against their own country and often insist,=20
like Hindus, that Kashmir belongs to India.)

Even here on the campus of Darul Uloom in Deoband, students admire=20
the exploits of the Taliban, the Deobandis they have never known, but=20
who stood up to the Americans.

"Our schools have nothing to do with them, but still, what Americans=20
did to the Taliban was unfair," said Khalil-ur Rehman, 20. "They=20
wanted to finish the Taliban because they brought Islamic rule. They=20
tried to implement the teachings of Allah."

But asked whether he would rather live in Afghanistan under Taliban=20
rule, or in secular India, Mr. Rehman did not hesitate. "India is our=20
motherland," he said. "And we love it."

_____

#7.

[Appeared in Indian Express Sunday magazine section Feb 10 , 2002]

Network of Women in the Media (NWM), India
by JYOTI PUNWANI

``I wasn't paid for three months. When I asked my editor, he said=20
`the municipal elections are due, you will be getting money from the=20
candidates anyway.'''
``Can we call those stringers `bichari' who sleep with the editor and=20
then decide who gets hired and fired?''
```Soft' stories are actually those which require the hardest work,=20
whereas `hard' political stories require the least.''
``The entire Manipuri press closed down for a week, and not a word=20
appeared in the so-called national press.''
``No rural reporting - a written directive saying this was sent to=20
the newsroom.''
``When Delhi was paralysed with workers blocking the streets, not one=20
paper thought fit to send a reporter to talk to the workers. They=20
remained a faceless mass inconveniencing the lives of the middle=20
class.''
Does a forum exist for media professionals to discuss such issues?=20
Working conditions and sexual harassment, professional ethics and=20
current trends in the media?
Well, it just got formed. Last week, more than 100 mediawomen from 16=20
states got together in Delhi to launch the Network of Women in the=20
Media (NWM), India. The three-day workshop initiated by a group of=20
concerned women journalists, facilitated by the Bangalore-based NGO=20
Voices and supported by UNESCO, saw women debating not just issues=20
concerning them as female media professionals, but also issues=20
concerning the current state of the media as a whole.
It's not just women journalists who don't get paid for months, be it=20
in AP or Bihar, or who face the brunt of militants and the army in=20
the North East. But there exists no forum for journalists to raise=20
these concerns, let alone try and do something about them.=20
Journalists' unions are weak, as they are in all sectors these days,=20
and Press Clubs are nothing more than drinking joints where=20
occasionally a good press conference is organized. A case in point is=20
the large turnout of both male and female journalists at the only=20
panel discussion in Mumbai on the media's coverage of the Afghan War=20
last year, which was organised by the informal women's journalists=20
group there.
The coverage of Kargil and the current war hysteria in the media came=20
up more than once in the Delhi workshop, with one participant from=20
Bihar criticizing both as a ``celebration of war'', specially on TV,=20
with minimum coverage given to its consequences, not just in terms of=20
casualties, but also for civilians, for example, the displacement of=20
villagers on the border. Significantly, this `celebration' was being=20
done by both male and female reporters, though there was consensus=20
that women generally covered conflict far differently from men. For=20
one, they talked to women, which few men did; this gave their reports=20
a different perspective. For another, the human story interested them=20
more than how many got killed.
A perfect example was the coverage in this paper of the recent riots=20
in Malegaon. In the extensive coverage of all aspects of the riots,=20
it was the female reporter who met every one of the families of those=20
killed in the police firing. Their accounts brought out both the=20
tragic pointlessness of the violence and the indiscriminate nature of=20
the firing.=20
In traditional journalist terms, she would have been described as=20
doing the `soft' riot story. The sexist division between `soft' and=20
`hard' stories was a recurring theme in the workshop. It was a=20
two-edged sword: women resented not being automatically assigned the=20
`hard' political stories the way men were. Perhaps never would a male=20
reporter - not even a trainee - be sent to cover a `rose show', just=20
the same way that a photograph of such a show would never show a male=20
looking at the roses.
At the same time, women pointed out that many of the so-called=20
`soft' stories that were looked down upon, for eg, the human interest=20
stories, the environment/health/education beats assigned to them,=20
required more leg work, for one had to visit the site and speak to a=20
number of people, while political stories often originated from=20
routine encounters with politicians.
The complexity arose when it became clear that despite this caste=20
system (which existed everywhere, including the bureaucracy, as=20
Magsaysay Award winner Aruna Roy said in her inaugural address), many=20
women who took their profession seriously, chose the `soft' beats.=20
Cabinet reshuffles or Mantralay intrigues just didn't interest them=20
as much as starving tribals in Melghat or the unchanging criteria by=20
which poverty lines continue to be calculated.
The shrinking space for such `soft' stories was a great cause for=20
concern, seen as a result of increasing commercialization of the=20
media. (again, to quote Aruna Roy, 70 % of India occupied barely any=20
space in the press). At the same time, other `soft' stories: eg,=20
Page 3 glamour stuff, was occupying more and more space.
The fallout of this extended to working conditions: female TV=20
journalists complained that they were asked to look `presentable'=20
before being sent on an assignment, while if they happened to be=20
good-looking, they simply didn't get sent, but instead were made the=20
anchor/newsreader.
If this sounds like `you can't please women, whatever you do', take=20
a look at their working conditions, specially in the Indian language=20
press: no salaries for months, no separate toilets, no night shifts=20
because of hostel timings (which meant no promotions), sexual=20
propositions from the boss just when promotions are due, pay day=20
becoming `Terror Day' because of the drunken orgies by male=20
colleagues (this stopped when more women were employed in that=20
particular paper), daily wages with no weekly offs for TV reporters=8A
So is the NWM going to change all this?
Primarily, it will fulfill the need to reach out and end the=20
isolation many mediawomen, specially those outside the main=20
metropolitan media centres, spoke about to freelance journalist Ammu=20
Joseph when she wrote her book Women in Journalism - Making News,=20
(The Media Foundation/Konark Publishers, 2000). The book was the=20
catalyst for the three regional workshops of mediawomen held over the=20
last year in Bangalore, Jaipur and Shillong. The Delhi meet was the=20
culmination of these.
Already, the informal collectives set up over the last year after=20
these workshops, have made a difference. Kerala mediawomen reported=20
their higher visibility now in the Kerala Union of Working=20
Journalists after they discovered that the state level committee had=20
not a single woman member. But the NWM will not replace existing=20
journalists' unions. Women hope that it will act as a support group=20
for victimized mediawomen as well as a pressure group on existing=20
institutions, which are supposed to protect women's rights but rarely=20
do.
The small but important achievements made by the informal collectives=20
show the direction which the NWM will have to take - and avoid. In=20
some states, the workshops provoked a severe backlash against the=20
participants because their proceedings were reported extensively in=20
the main newspapers; in others, the gap between the English and the=20
Indian language journalists gradually reduced.
The most significant gain perhaps was the end of the isolation of NE=20
mediawomen. Incidentally, their experiences revealed not only the=20
peculiar problems faced by the media in an insurgency-riven region,=20
but also that men and women there not only faced the same problems=20
but also supported one another.
Will that ever happen all over India?
Jyoti Punwani

_____

#8.

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD (UK)
Faculty of English Language and Literature

postcolonial Theory Graduate Seminar
Hilary term 2002

February 28: Anshuman Mondal (SOAS), "'Sexuality, Desire and the=20
Politics of Communalism in Gandhi's Discourse on Gender'

The seminar will be held in the Old Seminar Room, Wadham College,=20
Thursdays at 5pm.

Convenors: Rajeswari Sunder Rajan (Wolfson College), Robert J. C.=20
Young (Wadham College)

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