[sacw] SACW #1 | 11 Feb. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1 | 11 February 2002

------------------------------------------

#1. The wages of obedience (Pervez Hoodbhoy)
#2. My lost country (Muzamil Jaleel)
#3. Council of Advocates International (Press release)

________________________

#1.

The News International
Monday February 11, 2002

The wages of obedience

Pervez Hoodbhoy

Buried under the rubble of the World Trade Centre lies a decade-worth=20
of Pakistani foreign policy. Faced by a furious United States,=20
Pakistan's establishment abandoned what had earlier been declared as=20
vital national security interests. First, Pakistan junked the mullahs=20
beyond the western border. A still bigger earthquake followed just=20
weeks later as thousands of jihadists suddenly found themselves being=20
hunted down and carted off to jail rather than ushered across the=20
Line of Control.

General Musharraf did well to surrender to these American demands. In=20
all likelihood the Americans would "have done an Iraq on Pakistan",=20
as one highly placed member of the foreign ministry conceded to me in=20
the week after September 11. He was probably right. Generations of=20
Pakistanis would have cursed a leadership that gave the US a reason=20
to destroy the country's agricultural and industrial infrastructure.

But pragmatism should not be mistaken for principle, and temporary=20
reprieve for victory. Pakistan's present crisis desperately demands=20
reflection upon the ruinous impact of its past plans and policies.=20
Tragically, our officially designated foreign policy experts remain=20
unmoved. They cavort daily on television screens, fill newspaper=20
columns with vacuous political commentaries, and energetically=20
condemn today what they had passionately defended until yesterday. As=20
ever, they are tasked with articulating, elaborating, and justifying=20
the ever-changing wishes and desires of their patron-of-the-moment.

The aim of this article is to understand the systemic failure of a=20
whole class of people to think honestly and seriously, in short a=20
failure to do their job as political analysts. Personalities are=20
incidental. Therefore various analysts referred to below shall be=20
merely denoted as X,Y,Z... However, the quotes are accurate and were=20
published on the indicated date in a major Pakistani newspaper. A=20
sufficiently interested reader may duly verify them.

Consider first the writings of columnist X. Well-known for=20
impassioned defence of the Taliban, X ridiculed those who insisted=20
Pakistan was being isolated internationally for supporting the=20
mullahs of Kabul. In "The Myth of Isolation", X glowed about our=20
being in the best of all possible worlds since "Pakistan's bilateral=20
relations with its regional friends and other global players are on=20
track....There exists no crisis in diplomatic, security and economic=20
relations with any of these countries." [25.2.2000]. An article=20
entitled "Defending Taliban" was followed with another wherein=20
Mullahs Mutawakil and Omar were represented as tragically=20
misunderstood by the world. X reassured us the kinder, gentler=20
aspects of the Taliban needed only our eyes to see: "since coming to=20
power the Taliban worldview has demonstrably evolved. There is also a=20
demonstrable willingness to gradually adopt a contemporary mode of=20
governance"[3.3.2000].

Alas for the Taliban, X's staunch support evaporated immediately=20
after Pakistan joined the US led coalition and B-52's darkened the=20
skies of Afghanistan. The death, the dying, the refugees, our=20
responsibility in helping destroy Afghanistan, induced no remorse or=20
rethinking from X. Instead, we were given proof of the triumph of=20
strategic analysis over commonsense as X insisted that "the=20
fundamentals of Pakistan's Afghan policy remain unchanged"=20
[13.11.2001].

Example Number Two. Before September 11, columnist Y had a similar=20
world-view but still more critical of the US and UN (for not=20
recognizing Mullah Omar's regime). As Pakistan ditched its friends, Y=20
somersaulted, writing "The rapid fall of the Taliban government from=20
Kabul vindicates Pakistan's support to the anti-terror coalition"=20
[22.11.2001]. Never short of praise for whatever the state chooses, Y=20
was moved to laud "Pakistan's timely decision to join the war on=20
terrorism" [30.12.01]. A tailor of principles, Y explained the now=20
urgent need to deal with the "armed obscurantists" who had "led so=20
many innocent and misguided Pakistani youth to their death in=20
Afghanistan".

Deceptions, contradictions, lies, abound. Consider Y again, who=20
flatly denied that jihadist organizations operated from within=20
Pakistan and warned of those suggesting such a thing, writing "One=20
dangerous theme that is being propagated is that the struggle is=20
being waged by jihadis from Pakistan" [15.06.2000]. Seemingly blind=20
to the obvious implication, Y explains that "the mujahideen struggle=20
on the ground is of prime importance and it cannot be allowed to stop=20
prematurely"[12.07.2001, emphasis added]. Nevertheless, once the=20
jihadists were dumped, Y joined in the chorus of clapping.

Still more interesting is the case of Z, a star of Pakistan's=20
strategic community, who offered publicly the well-considered advice=20
that Pakistan-based mujahideen must attack targets not just in=20
Occupied Kashmir but also deep inside India. This statement was=20
repeated in a BBC Radio program in early February this year. When the=20
Indian Parliament was attacked on December 13, Z took no credit. The=20
heinous attack was, Z said, obviously a cunning plan by the Indians=20
to smear Pakistan.

It is for others to consider why the pundits mentioned here and their=20
many peers did not recognise earlier the ruthless oppression of those=20
who not only stifled and crushed women but also prohibited chess,=20
football, the homing pigeon, kite flying, and singing in Afghanistan.=20
Or why they were so blind to the erosion of Pakistan's social,=20
economic and political fabric by the Kashmir jihad. Are they so=20
filled by hate of India that they see nothing else? Are they mere=20
intellectual soldiers of fortune, paid to defend the indefensible? Is=20
it about getting airtime and column inches, a power trip? Being=20
invited to head institutes or sit on policy meetings?

Nations that have confidence in their future approach the past with=20
seriousness and critical reverence. They study it, try to comprehend=20
the values, aesthetics, and style. By contrast, peoples and=20
governments with an uncertain sense of the future manifest deeply=20
skewed relationships to their history. They eschew lived history,=20
shut out its lessons, shun critical inquiries into the past.

It is an important fact that, over the last decade, several Pakistani=20
dissidents - marginalised and made irrelevant by the establishment -=20
had repeatedly warned that Pakistan's Afghanistan and Kashmir=20
policies, built upon unbridled fantasy and wild assumptions, were=20
doomed to collapse. None said this more eloquently and forcefully=20
than the late Eqbal Ahmad.

Banned from Pakistani television, Eqbal Ahmad wrote about the Taliban=20
as being the expression of a modern disease, symptoms of a social=20
cancer that could destroy Muslim societies if its growth was not=20
arrested. He warned that the Taliban would be the most deadly=20
communicators of this cancer if they remain organically linked to=20
Pakistan. He foresaw catastrophe - and he was proved right.

It is therefore important to seriously reflect on Eqbal Ahmad's words=20
on Kashmir. He warns that although New Delhi's moral isolation from=20
the Kashmiri people is total and irreversible, yet it will be foolish=20
of Pakistani leaders to believe that India's chronicle of failures=20
can ever translate into Pakistan's gain. Pakistan once had most of=20
the cards. Yet, its Kashmir policy has been so fundamentally and=20
severely defective that it has repeatedly "managed to rescue defeat=20
from the jaws of victory".

Over the years, Pakistan's policy has been reduced to bleeding India,=20
and India's to bleeding the Kashmiris, and to hit out at Pakistan=20
whenever a wound can be inflicted. Indian intransigence and=20
bloody-minded determination to crush the Kashmiris has increased, not=20
decreased, as a result of covert Pakistani involvement. Tens of=20
thousands of Kashmiris have died yet the liberation of Kashmir from=20
the Indian yoke is further away today than at any time in the past.

While the General Aslam Begs and General Hamid Guls fantasise about=20
bleeding India to death, it is now Pakistan that teeters on the brink=20
of a precipice. Internationally, Pakistan stands isolated - countries=20
that support Pakistan's stand on Kashmir can be counted on the=20
fingers of one hand. Today India and Pakistan must realize that a=20
military solution of the Kashmir dispute is simply not possible. The=20
solution must be political, may take decades, and must be left for=20
the Kashmiris to handle. The people of Pakistan will support General=20
Musharraf if he takes this wise course.

The proof for this support exists: ordinary Pakistanis condemned the=20
killings of innocent Afghans as they fled the Daisy Cutter bombs and=20
the Cobra gunships flying from Pakistani bases into the=20
slaughterhouses of Qila Jhangi and Kunduz. But almost everyone=20
breathed a sigh of relief at being rid of the misogynist and mindless=20
Taliban. There was also silent public approval as the=20
Lashkar-i-Tayyaba and the state-sponsored Jaish-i-Mohammad were=20
stripped off their status as liberation movements, declared=20
"terrorist organizations", and their accounts frozen.

The people of Pakistan have their own battles to fight against the=20
monsters of mass unemployment, ignorance, misogyny, ethnic and=20
religious hatreds. It is time we turned our attention to these=20
battles, started reflecting seriously upon battle strategies, and=20
stopped the puppet shows on PTV.

The writer teaches at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad

______

#2.

<http://www.observer.co.uk>The Observer
Sunday February 10, 2002

My lost country

Muzamil Jaleel grew up in the meadows and mountains of Kashmir. Then=20
he saw friends and family die in its pursuit of independence. His=20
country has become a battlefield - and he knows it can never be the=20
same.

Not long ago, somebody asked me what kind of stories I wrote.=20
Obituaries came to mind. As a reporter in Kashmir I have been=20
literally writing obituaries for the past 10 years; only the=20
characters and places change, the stories are always the same, full=20
of misery and tears.

And when in October last year I got a chance to leave Kashmir, I=20
hoped for a change. Every human being has a threshold for pain and=20
agony. I felt mine had been reached. I wanted to escape. But within=20
days, Kashmir was in the headlines and although I was thousands of=20
miles away, I found myself in the middle of it all again.

I was born in Kashmir. I grew up in its apple orchards and lush green=20
meadows, dreamed on the banks of its freshwater streams. I went to=20
school there, sitting on straw mats and memorising tables by heart.=20
After school my friends and I would rush half-way home, tear off our=20
uniforms and dive into the cold water. Then we would quickly dry our=20
hair, so our parents would not find out what we had done. Sometimes,=20
when we felt especially daring, we would skip an entire day of school=20
to play cricket.

My village lies in the foothills of the Himalayas. During summer=20
breaks, we would trek to the meadows high in the mountains carrying=20
salt slates for the family cattle, sit around a campfire and play the=20
flute for hours. The chilling winter would turn the boys and girls of=20
our small village into one huge family - huddled together in a big=20
room, we would listen to stories till late into the night. Sipping=20
hot cups of the traditional salt tea, the village elder who had=20
inherited the art of storytelling would transport us to the era of=20
his tales. He had never been to school but he remembered hundreds of=20
beautiful stories by heart. Kashmir was like a big party, full of=20
love and life. Today death and fear dominate everything.

I was in Kashmir too when the first bomb exploded in 1988. People=20
first thought it was the outcome of a small political feud, although=20
everybody knew the pot was boiling after years of political=20
discontent. Then that September a young man, Ajaz Dar, died in a=20
violent encounter with the police. Disgruntled by the farce of=20
decades of ostensible democracy under Indian rule, a group of=20
Kashmiri young men had decided to fight. They had dreamt of an=20
independent Kashmir free from both India and Pakistan. Although this=20
young man was not the first Kashmiri to die fighting for this cause,=20
his death was the beginning of an era of tragedy.

Separatist sentiment had been dominant among Kashmiris since 1947,=20
when Kashmir was divided between India and Pakistan during partition,=20
and the two countries fought over it. But it was not until 40 years=20
later that most of the youngsters opted for guns against Indian rule,=20
in reaction to the government-sponsored rigging of the assembly=20
polls, aimed at crushing dissent.

It is not a surprise that India's most wanted Kashmiri militant=20
leader, Syed Salahudin, contested that assembly election from=20
Srinagar, nor that, unofficially, he was winning by a good margin.=20
When the elections were rigged, he lost not only the election but=20
faith in the process as well. His polling agents and supporters were=20
arrested and tortured; most of them later became militants.

Neighbouring Pakistan, which occupies a third of Kashmir, also=20
smelled the changing mood in Kashmir and offered a helping hand by=20
providing arms training and AK-47 rifles. Violence was introduced=20
amid growing dissent against India and hundreds of young people=20
joined the armed movement. Kashmir was changing.

I had just completed secondary school then and was enrolled in a=20
college - a perfect potential recruit: the entire militant movement=20
belonged to my generation. The movement was the only topic of=20
discussion on the street, in the classroom and at home. Soon people=20
started coming out onto the streets, thousands would march to the=20
famous Sufi shrines or to the United Nations office, shouting slogans=20
in favour of ' Azadi !' (freedom). These mass protests became an=20
everyday affair, frustrating the authorities, who began to use force=20
to counter them. Dozens of protesters were killed by police fire.

Many of my close friends and classmates began to join. One day, half=20
of our class was missing. They never returned to school again, and=20
nobody even looked for them, because it was understood.

Although the reasons for joining the militant movement varied from=20
person to person, the majority of Kashmiris never felt that they=20
belonged to India. What had been a relatively dormant separatist=20
sentiment was finally exploding into a fully-fledged separatist=20
uprising.

I too wanted to join, though I didn't know exactly why or what it=20
would lead to. Most of us were teenagers and had not seriously=20
thought about the consequences. Perhaps the rebel image was=20
subconsciously attracting us all.

I also prepared for the dangerous journey from our village in north=20
Kashmir to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir where all the training camps=20
were. One didn't just have to avoid being sighted by the Indian=20
soldiers who guarded the border round the clock, but also defeat the=20
fierce cold and the difficulties of hiking over the snow-clad=20
Himalayan peaks that stood in the way. I acquired the standard=20
militant's gear: I bought the Wellington boots, prepared a polythene=20
jacket and trousers to wear over my warm clothes, and found some=20
woollen cloth to wrap around my calves as protection from frostbite.

Fortunately, I failed. Three times a group of us returned from the=20
border. Each time something happened that forced our guide to take us=20
back. The third time, 23 of us had started our journey on foot from=20
Malangam, not far away from my village, only to be abandoned in a=20
dense jungle. It was night, and the group had scattered after hearing=20
gunshots nearby, sensing the presence of Indian army men. In the=20
morning, when we gathered again, our guide was missing. Most of the=20
others decided to continue on their own, but a few of us turned back.=20
We had nothing to eat but leaves for three days. We followed the=20
flight of crows, hoping to reach a human settlement. I was lucky. I=20
reached home and survived.

As the days and months passed, and as the routes the militants took=20
to cross the border became known to Indian security forces, the=20
bodies began to arrive. Lines of young men would disappear on a ridge=20
as they tried to cross over or return home. The stadiums where we had=20
played cricket and football, the beautiful green parks where we had=20
gone on school excursions as children, were turned into martyrs'=20
graveyards. One after another, those who had played in those places=20
were buried there, with huge marble epitaphs detailing their=20
sacrifice. Many had never fired a single bullet from their=20
Kalashnikovs.

One day, I counted my friends and classmates in the martyrs'=20
graveyards near our village. There were 21 of them. I could feel the=20
smiling face of Mushtaq, whom I had known since our schooldays. He=20
would have been 31 this January, but the ninth anniversary of his=20
death is just two months away. He was killed in April 1993. His=20
mother could not bear the pain and lost her mental balance. For all=20
these years, she has been wandering around the villages carrying the=20
shirt he wore on the day of his death.

Another friend, Javaid, was his parents' only son. Extremely=20
handsome, he was obsessed with seeing change in Kashmir. The day he=20
died, he was wearing my clothes. He had come to our house in the=20
morning and changed there. He was 23, and even six hours after his=20
death, when they took him for burial, blood still oozed out of his=20
bullet wounds. I will never forget the moment when I lifted the=20
coffin lid away from his face: there was that usual grin. For a=20
moment, he seemed alive to me.

Javaid's sister was to have been married 15 days later but the shock=20
of his death gave her a heart attack. She died a few days before what=20
would have been her wedding day.

Today, there are more than 500 martyrs' graveyards dotting Kashmir,=20
and every epitaph standing on a grave tells a story - a tragic story=20
of my generation. Engraving epitaphs has become a lucrative business.

As the death toll of Kashmiris mounted, the world saw the violent=20
movement only as the outcome of a territorial dispute between India=20
and Pakistan which had its roots in the 1947 partition. India always=20
called the rebellion a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist movement, while=20
Pakistan projected it as a jihad - a Kashmiri struggle to join=20
Pakistan just because they shared a common faith.

For India, the future of Kashmir is non-negotiable - it is an=20
'integral part' of the country, the only Muslim majority state in the=20
union and thus a cornerstone of its democracy and secular=20
credentials. For Pakistan, Kashmir is also important because the=20
majority of its population is Muslim - it is Pakistan's 'jugular=20
vein', and an unfinished task from the subcontinent's partition in=20
which Pakistan was born as a home for Indian Muslims.

With these claims on Kashmir, both countries have choked the voice of=20
Kashmiris. The Indian government has reacted with an iron fist,=20
deployed large numbers of security men and turned Kashmir into one=20
massive jail.

Pakistan's hands are not clean either. When hundreds of thousands of=20
Kashmiris came out in support of the separatist movement in 1990,=20
Pakistan's lust for Kashmir's land was exposed. It hijacked the=20
separatist movement, painted it with religious fundamentalism and=20
introduced pro-Pakistan, and later jihadi groups to ensure it enjoyed=20
absolute control.

Within years, Kashmir turned into yet another battlefield in the=20
pan-Islamic jihad and its warriors as well as its leaders were now=20
made up of non-Kashmiris whose agendas transcend the demand for=20
self-determination. In the process, the genuine political struggle=20
for the unification of Kashmir and the demand of the people that they=20
should be allowed to decide their own future was forgotten.

Whatever attention Kashmir was given was because it was a flashpoint=20
between two nuclear neighbours and not because Kashmiris were=20
suffering. India and Pakistan seem to share one common policy on=20
Kashmir - to force Kashmiris to toe their respective lines. In fact,=20
it seems that both countries want to fight to the last Kashmiri.

The Indian government held state elections in 1996 apparently aimed=20
at ensuring a representative government in Kashmir. But actually it=20
was nothing more than a farce. The security forces herded people to=20
polling stations and even conducted 'nail parades' to check - by the=20
indelible ink pasted on the nail of the forefinger - that people had=20
voted.

The man who represents Kashmir - not only in New Delhi, but across=20
the world as India's junior Foreign Minister - is Omar Abdullah, the=20
son of Kashmir's Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah. He received just 5=20
per cent of votes in his constituency - after coercion by the police=20
and the security forces - and he won the elections. Who he does=20
actually represent, nobody knows.

I have been a witness to all this. I have seen Kashmir change. I=20
still remember my grandmother worrying whenever the sky turned red.=20
'Murder has been committed somewhere,' she would say. Now that=20
suspicion can no longer be reserved for red skies: the daily death=20
toll is 20.

Kashmir used to be known as a crime-free state. One of my neighbours=20
was a senior police officer in the mid-Eighties; he once told me that=20
the average yearly murder rate in Kashmir was three or four. Today,=20
if three people perish in a day, itis considered peaceful.

I have been fortunate enough to be safe, but my family and relatives=20
have not been that lucky. My younger brother Mudabir was picked up in=20
1994 on suspicion of militancy, and it took us a month just to trace=20
his whereabouts. We divided up the entire Kashmir valley among our=20
family members. Every morning, each one of us would do the rounds of=20
the security force camps to look for him.

My mother had never been to a police station in her entire life, but=20
by the time she finally located my brother, she knew almost every=20
military camp around Srinagar.

And by the time the security forces were convinced of his innocence=20
and released him, he had already been tortured so much that he spent=20
the next two months in bed.

It is now seven years since his release, but he still has nightmares=20
and the mere sight of a soldier sends shivers down his spine. A=20
late-night knock at the door still gives him goose pimples, and sends=20
his heart rate soaring. But this is not exceptional any more in=20
Kashmir.

A cousin's husband bled to death after he was caught in the crossfire=20
while coming out of mosque one evening. He could have been saved had=20
he reached the hospital in time. But the security forces did not=20
allow the family to come out of their house and take him to the=20
hospital, and there was no other way to seek medical help. He bled to=20
death crying for help, and his wife, mother and younger brother could=20
do nothing but watch their own helplessness. A boy was born in the=20
family four months after his death.

By 1992, there were hardly any young men left in the few villages in=20
north Kashmir around my home. Many had joined the militant movement.=20
Some had died, while others had gone underground; some had=20
surrendered and become counter-insurgents and were part of the=20
pro-government militias. Many had migrated to the urban area of=20
Srinagar city, which was then deemed comparatively safe.

The complexion of the separatist movement was changing fast, and it=20
no longer represented the genuine political aspirations of the=20
people. The pro-Pakistan jihadi groups who dominated the movement=20
tried to impose their radical religious, social and cultural agendas,=20
ignoring the fact that their extremism was alien to the very ethos of=20
Kashmir.

Kashmir has a history of composite culture and religious tolerance.=20
In fact, Islam did not arrive in Kashmir through the clatter of the=20
sword. It was introduced by mystics and Sufis who conquered the=20
hearts of the people. In the centuries that followed, Kashmir turned=20
into a melting pot of ideas and a meeting ground for Buddhism,=20
Hinduism and Islam; there was no place for religious extremism.

Now, as fanaticism started to dominate, using the power of the gun,=20
the militant movement was rendered a mere tool in Pakistan's plan to=20
bleed its arch-rival India with a thousand cuts.

I decided to leave my village to move to Srinagar and join Kashmir=20
University. I was so desperate to leave that I applied to almost all=20
the departments. It was mere chance that I got into journalism. And=20
when I started writing about the war later that year, I felt that I=20
had been part of this tragic story from the beginning. I knew the=20
militants and the mukhbirs (the police informers); those who=20
surrendered and those who did not; those who faced death because they=20
had a dream and those who were sacrificed by mere chance, neither=20
knowing nor understanding the issues at stake; those who believed=20
they were fighting a holy war and those who joined for unholy=20
reasons. But, as it turned out, there was more to the story.

My first assignment as a reporter was to visit a city police station=20
and collect information regarding some corpses lying there. I=20
accompanied a few local photographers, who began taking pictures as I=20
stared at the six bullet-riddled bodies. They were in terrible=20
condition: blood-soaked clothes, entrails exposed, faces=20
unrecognisable.

That evening, I was haunted by the picture of bodies lying in a pool=20
of blood - even a drink of water reminded me of blood. I couldn't=20
sleep for days; corpses haunted my dreams.

A few months later I arrived at the site of a massacre to find=20
wailing women and unshaven men sitting in huddles. Bodies lay=20
scattered, like rag dolls discarded by careless children. I felt a=20
lump growing in my throat, my legs felt heavy. I felt incredibly=20
tired and wanted to throw down my notebook and sit silently with the=20
mourners. The noise of the camera shutters invaded my private=20
thoughts, forcing me to think about the story I had to write.

Over the years, writing obituaries became a routine. When violence=20
rules the day, there is nothing but tears to jerk out of the reader's=20
soul. If I avoided writing about the gory details of death, I would=20
end up writing about orphans or widows. In the process, my reactions=20
to such incidents also began to change. I could no longer relate to=20
these tragedies. Now killings meant stories and bylines, and there=20
was satisfaction to be found in penning them, even if I knew the=20
victims personally.

The continuous interaction with death and destruction was providing a=20
necessary thrill, and the killing fields of Kashmir were becoming=20
nothing but news pastures for me. Every evening, I would wait for the=20
police bulletin that provides the statistics of the daily deaths.=20
Much as a shopkeeper counts his cash before calling it a day, I would=20
count the dead before leaving the office. I once used a calculator to=20
count the 105 men and women dead across the 12 districts in 24 hours.=20
My newspaper wanted a breakdown and I found myself lost in numbers.

I belong to Kashmir's cursed generation - the youth of the Nineties.=20
I have lived all these troubled years in Kashmir and am still well=20
and alive. But in the process my tears have dried up. I have lost=20
normal human feelings to the adventures of reporting day-to-day=20
violence in my country. I am immune to the death of my own people; I=20
have developed an inability to mourn.

And it seems that the outside world too is unable to feel the pain of=20
Kashmir. After more than 50,000 deaths, there still appears to be no=20
headway towards peace. The international community needs to resolve=20
issues between India and Pakistan. It is not only important in order=20
to avoid a nuclear conflict: it is imperative to end the suffering of=20
the Kashmiri people.

______

#3.

Council of Advocates International
------------------------------------------------------
(Press release,Toronto, February,10,2002)

The government employees in Azad Kashmir are forced to organize and=20
participate in the rallies addressed by Islamic fundamentalists and=20
Jahadileaders.Thesecretfundsare used To run the "hate-show"and keep=20
the militant leaders relevant in the changing political scenario.=20
Civil servants and fundamentalist militants living on government=20
assistance in the so-called refugee camps provide the gathering in=20
the rallies. Pakistan may be trying to control the fundamentalist=20
militants in Pakistan but its policy on Jihad and militancy in Azad=20
Kashmir remains unchanged. An official circular was issued directing=20
the government employees to observe the black day on January 26, and=20
militant refugees on the government's financial support were also=20
directed to be present at the rallies. In these rallies the notorious=20
terrorist and Jehadi leaders swear to continue the Jihad till the=20
accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.These rallies are being used to=20
promote hatared, fundamentalism and importance of Jihad in=20
Kashmir.Such an activity on government expense is unwarranted and=20
totally at odds with Pakistan's stand on Kashmir and terrorism. The=20
Council of Advocates international stated this in a press communiqu=E9=20
in Toronto. The council's secretary general Hamid Bashani noted that=20
"this practice Not only violates the fundamental rights of the=20
governments employees in Azad Kashmir but also violates the principle=20
of right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir, and relevant=20
UN resolutions on the subject. Pakistan does not extend its moral and=20
political support to the people of Kashmir, on the contrary, under=20
the pretext of moral and political support; it is pumping in millions=20
to strengthen the pro-Pakistan and pro-accession Islamic=20
fundamentalist forces. The militant leaders were quickly losing the=20
ground under international pressure against terrorism, but the=20
government support is keeping them alive in Kashmiri politics and=20
restart militancy in future. Some government employees have contacted=20
the council of Advocates International and some other human rights=20
watchdogs to seek help against the massive violation of their=20
fundamental rights. The employee have been sending the email messages=20
asserting that pressing them to participate in a political activity=20
against their will and political belief is a serious violation of=20
their rights. It is also inconsistent with the government's claims of=20
fighting terrorism and discourage the culture of Jihad. The Council=20
has started gathering the information and would compile a detail=20
report in this regard.=20
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------------------------------------
Hamid Bashani
Secretary General
Council of Advocates International
99-Howard St,Toronto
(416) 929-1029
E-mail <mailto:bashani2000@y...>bashani2000@y...

______

#4.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996. To
subscribe send a blank
message to: <act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
--=20