[sacw] SACW #1 | 25 Jan. 02

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Fri, 25 Jan 2002 02:35:54 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 25 January 2002

[Interruption Notice: There will be no SACW dispatches between 26-27=20
January 2002]

------------------------------------------

#1. The Indo-Pakistan standoff seems to be working nicely for advancing
America's strategic advantages (M.B. Naqvi)
#2. Can Musharraf reform jihadi culture? Elizabeth Rubin
#3. Pakistani Fundos respond to the Musharaf Govt.
#4. Second coup (Praful Bidwai)
#5. The New York Taxi Workers Alliance would like to initiate a coalition-h=
eld
peace rally in light of the looming war and continuing violence in South
Asia.
#6. WAR & PEACE / JANG AUR AMAN - A New Documentary Film by Anand Patwardha=
n
#7. Exploring Masculinities - A Travelling Seminar (New Delhi=20
February 1-2, 2002)

________________________

#1.

The Indo-Pakistan standoff seems to be working nicely for advancing
America's strategic advantages
M.B. Naqvi
Karachi January 24:

In some ways we in Pakistan are re-living the 1950 when the country=92s
civilian dictator of the day had decided to join the US-led west in its
cold war against Communist Russia and China. At that time (1954) few
could see that those military pacts will serve only political purposes
and Pakistan will not be called upon to participate in a big shooting
war. Right now, Pakistan has already assisted in a war against its own
proteges, the Taliban regime, in Afghanistan and is said to have signed,
alongwith the three central Asian Republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
and Kyrghistan, a pact with the US that is still classified.

Pakistan gave three military bases, later it gave another. But the war
hysteria with India forced it to ask the US to vacate two of these, viz.
Jacobabad and Pasni, as PAF had to have their use during this emergency.
But it has now allowed the use of Karachi airport to the US military.
This has sent a tremor of grave concern among most Pakistanis about the
extent of US domination over national policy-making. Everybody knows
that the military Regime=92s decision to side with President Bush=92s war o=
n
Osama bin Laden=92s Al-Qaeda and Mulla Mohammad Omar=92s regime was forced
on Gen. Pervez Musharraf. He was more or less press-gaugged into siding
with the Yankees. How far will he have to go is the question being asked
here.

Earlier there was the news that was apparently accurate enough about the
FBI being allowed to set up their own counters at major airports to
oversee who goes out, despite quite a lot of earlier explaining by the
Regime about the adoption of a new computer system by the country=92s
immigration service for which the FBI experts will act as teachers. To
many it looked that Americans want checks of their own over who
precisely goes out of Pakistan and they are not confident enough that
the Pakistani agency FIA can be relied upon to help nab all Al-Qaeda
men. It is feared that FBI=92s counters will cross check those who have
been cleared by Pakistan=92s FIA. The second look at the outgoing
passengers is meant for suspected Al-Qaeda and Taliban escaping
Pakistan.

Even so, the growing American activities in Pakistan is seen as
diminishing its sovereignty in the political sphere. As it happens, the
loss of sovereignty in the economic sphere is already substantial. A
country that needs a bailout with the help of the US --- there are no
other terms for it --- every now and then can scarcely exercise any
sovereignty meaningfully. Even otherwise, under WTO rules, national
sovereignties have necessarily to suffer considerable erosion. That
should make people in weaker nations extra careful about the political
sovereignty.

Symptomatically, there are frequent discussions in the US media over the
irrelevance and futility of national sovereignties in the emerging world
(order). It is being shown as a relic of a less civilised past. That may
be so. But the world is also a witness to the growing unilaterlism of
the US, its disdain of the UN and its determination to extract maximum
economic advantage out of its own military prowess and to make the world
safe for MNCs. So long as the world does not have a fair and just order,
ensuring physical security to the small and a fair and just economic
order in which poverty can be eradicated, national sovereignty is a
vital safeguard to the poor and the weak.

There is a long history of Americans propping up military dictatorship
in Pakistan. Gen. Ayub Khan had a free run of it for over 10 years; Gen.
Ziaul Haq had nearly 11 years of unfettered power --- all because of
American protection and special help. Gen. Yahya Khan was foolish and
too clever by half; he too could have had a long innings if he had stuck
to his Nov 1970 agreement or understanding with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman
after the great Tidal Wave. Now President Bush has promised to work for
the stabilisation of Musharraf Presidency, not of Pakistan. That sounds
like a sentence to Pakistanis of another 10 years of dictatorship ---
election, Assemblies and civilian governments as show pieces
notwithstanding. Both earlier cases of Ayub and Zia showed just that.

The Musharraf regime can of course agree that giving the use of Karachi
Airport to the US military is a subtle security measure. Should a war
break out the Indians will think twenty times before bombing Karachi or
letting their Navy attack Karachi harbour. That might be true. But this
will also be a telltale symbol of Pakistan being yet another satellite
of America. Disturbing signs are growing that most policy-making in
Islamabad is being done with a view of winning approval in Washington
and many of the major policy initiatives --- like resuscitating the old
offers of No War Pact and a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for South Asia ---
are calculated to look good in the American eyes.

That this can also be said, to an extent, of New Delhi seems true
enough. But that strengthens the US propensity to "manage" these two
quarrelling young states for enhancing its own role in South Asia so as
to use this region as a sort of foundation for its power play in Central
Asia and to contain and counter the Sino-Russian strategic consensus.
The Indo-Pakistan standoff seems to be working nicely for advancing
America's strategic advantages while the two degrade and reduce their
own importance.

_____

#2.

The Christian Science Monitor
from the January 24, 2002 edition

Can Musharraf reform jihadi culture?
Pakistan's president is trying to quell militancy while avoiding a backlash=
.
By Elizabeth Rubin | Special to The Christian Science Monitor
MUZAFARRABAD, PAKISTAN - As Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf walks the=20
delicate political line between quelling Islamic militancy without=20
inciting violent backlash, one of the biggest questions is whether he=20
will be able to transform the jihadi culture, bred in the Islamic=20
schools that spawned the Taliban. But if 16-year-old Hafeez is any=20
indication, Mr. Musharraf may be on the right track.

Hafeez comes from a village in the line of fire from the Indian Army=20
in the divided Himalayan region of Azad Kashmir. He says Musharraf's=20
recent speech, declaring a crackdown on Islamist extremist groups and=20
a push to modernize the education system, was fabulous. "The=20
president took a revolutionary step to upgrade the standard of=20
education at the Deeni madrassahs," says Hafeez at a tea house here=20
in the capital of Azad Kashmir, where he attends a government-funded=20
Islamic school. "If you only have religious education, you're only=20
option is to be a [religious teacher]. But now he wants to introduce=20
computers, and math, and other general subjects, so more professions=20
will be open to us."

Ten years ago, Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria took up arms, after=20
the military cancelled elections.

We're discussing the repercussions with an expert on Islam and=20
democracy, and Algeria.
Join us for this Q&A event.

Indeed, Musharraf's plans to round up 2,000 suspected militants has=20
received widespread support here. Nevertheless, some Islamabad=20
intellectuals are skeptical that the jihadi culture which was bred in=20
these very madrassahs and fostered by the Pakistani intelligence=20
agency can be easily shut down.

"The thinking of Pakistani officials is that mullahs resort to=20
violence only because they are not aware of modern sciences like math=20
and geography," says Arif Jamal, a journalist with the Pakistani=20
daily The News who has written about jihadi groups for years. "The=20
problem is, they don't understand the mind-set of these people. If=20
you teach them English, they'll teach jihad in English; if you teach=20
math they'll tell you Allah has multiplied jihad for God by 35,000."

There are two deep-rooted sources of Islamic violence, Mr. Jamal=20
says: religious scriptures, and grinding poverty. "The Koran says=20
clearly that Christians and Jews should be killed. You can't ban the=20
words of the prophet, and you can't ban the Koran," he says. "The=20
second is poverty, absolute helplessness, and dictatorships, which=20
make the ground fertile for people to grasp irrational solutions to=20
their problems.... Unless these root causes are eliminated, Islamic=20
terrorism will continue."

Complicating Musharraf's struggle to redefine Pakistan as a=20
progressive Muslim state is the Pakistani support for the Kashmiris,=20
who are variously called freedom fighters or terrorists. Today's=20
armed movement began when the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front=20
(JKLF), a political organization founded in the 1970s, detonated two=20
bombs in Srinegar in the summer of 1988. The idea was to force India=20
to fulfill the UN resolution of 1948 which allowed for a plebiscite=20
to be held by the Kashmiri people.

As the years went on, however, other militant groups sprang up - some=20
wanting to accede to Pakistan, others, like JKLF, fighting for=20
independence. With the withdrawal of Russian forces from Afghanistan,=20
Pakistan's ISI, which trained and supported the mujahideen with money=20
from the CIA, turned its attention to Kashmir, and helped to convert=20
the indigenous insurgency into a jihad that included many Pakistanis=20
trained in Afghanistan.

"After two or three years, our movement was hijacked by religious=20
extremists, and we were crushed by both India and Pakistan," says=20
Amanullah Khan, the founder and chairman of the JKLF, which has its=20
offices in Rawalpindi. In 1994 the party abandoned militancy and=20
adopted a wholly political pro-independence party line.

Now Musharraf is in a bind. He can't abandon Kashmir - as he said in=20
his speech, "Kashmir is in our blood" - and yet that's what the=20
Americans are pressing for.

Meanwhile, the Kashmiris are squeezed between Pakistan and India. [...].

_____

#3.

http://www.khilafah.com.pk/

>To: The Religious Affairs Minister Dr. Mahmood Ahmed n,Ghazi
>
>We address you as a minister in the Government of Pakistan. We do=20
>this, even though there is a contradiction between the function of a=20
>minister in this government and the Islamic concept of ruling. The=20
>Islamic ruling system does not permit the position of minister as it=20
>has been used in the West and as it is copied in Pakistan. In the=20
>Western system, the minister is a ruler and part of the collective=20
>ruling body whereas leadership in Islam is singular.
>
>We also address you as the head of the religious affairs ministry.=20
>We do so even though the concept of a ministry of religious affairs=20
>is in direct opposition to the Islamic concept about the State. In=20
>Islam, the entire state is responsible for Islam, not just one=20
>ministry. The religious ministries are set up in Muslim countries=20
>only to preserve the separation of Islam from life's affairs.
>
>We address you also as a member of the Musharraf Govt. And this is a=20
>govt that has embarked upon a lengthy program of deconstructing=20
>Islam in this country from the strategic and ideological aspects.=20
>This is also a government that espouses an openly secular agenda,=20
>and whose head, on assuming this position, publicly expressed his=20
>admiration for Mustafa Kamal, the destroyer of the Islamic Khilafah.
>
>Finally, we address you as a student of Islam and a teacher of it.=20
>And it is in this role primarily that we demand that you fulfil your=20
>duty in front of Allah to challenge the policies of the Musharraf=20
>govt and explain their deviation from Islam. We call you to be like=20
>those noble scholars from our history who used their tongues to=20
>speak the truth in front of the rulers and not like the government=20
>scholars of today who use their tongues to justify the evil of the=20
>rulers. In this regard we would like to draw your attention to the=20
>speech of General Musharraf on 12 January 2002, which he is said to=20
>have written personally with the assistance of visiting US=20
>congressmen. We address some of the key points of this speech below:
>
>Your Chief Executive alleged regarding the ulema, "majority of them=20
>are blessed with wisdom and vision and they do not mix religion with=20
>politics."
>
>The separation of religion from politics is a kufr concept that has=20
>no basis in Islam. The Muslim must live his complete life according=20
>to Islam, including his political life. Not only the ulema but even=20
>the ordinary Muslims know that Islam encompasses all aspects of=20
>life, including government and politics. Allah's speech (Subhanahu=20
>Wa ta'ala) in this regard in the Qur'an can be rendered as,
>
>"Do you then believe in a part of the Book and disbelieve in the=20
>other? What then is the reward of such among you as do this but=20
>disgrace in the life of this world, and on the day of resurrection=20
>they shall be sent back to the most grievous chastisement, and Allah=20
>is not at all heedless of what you do." [TMQ Al-Baqarah :85]
>
>Your Chief Executive extensively attacked members of Islamic groups=20
>referring to them as 'extremists'. For example, he said, "These=20
>extremists were those who do not talk of 'Haqooq ul-Ibad'. They do=20
>not talk of these obligations because practising them demands=20
>self-sacrifice."
>
>The word 'extremist' is a Western invention that is used as a label=20
>for anyone that is opposed to the norm. Those who carry Islam are=20
>opposed to the norm throughout the Muslim world because they are=20
>convinced that the rulers of Muslims are Western-backed agents that=20
>continue to implement Western kufr systems of government in order to=20
>impose Western kufr colonialism on the world. In such a situation it=20
>is correct to be opposed to the norm, whether or not the West and=20
>their puppet rulers then insist to call such people 'extremists'.
>
>As regards 'haqooq al-ibad', we would like to ask how the Government=20
>of Pakistan understands that it fulfilled the haqooq of our Muslim=20
>brothers and sisters in Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan=20
>opened its airbases, airspace, intelligence, logistics, military and=20
>resources to the kaafir Crusaders thereby exposing the Muslims of=20
>Afghanistan to B52 bombers, daisy cutters and cluster bombs.=20
>Meanwhile, it was the Islamic groups in this country that were=20
>foremost in calling for the haqooq of the Afghani Muslims and=20
>leading the opposition to the kaafir Crusade.
>
>Your Chief Executive says about the Islamic State, "do we want=20
>Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic Islamic welfare=20
>state? The verdict of the masses is in favour of a progressive=20
>Islamic state"
>
>The need to qualify the Islamic State with adjectives such as=20
>'progressive', 'dynamic' and 'welfare' are only attempts to invoke a=20
>meaning that is different to what would be understood by simply=20
>using the words 'the Islamic State'. In truth, Pakistan should=20
>emerge as the Islamic State and the verdict of the masses is in=20
>favour of the Islamic State.
>
>Your Chief Executive said about Jihad, "Have we ever thought of=20
>waging Jihad against illiteracy, poverty, backwardness and hunger?=20
>This is the larger Jihad."
>
>Illiteracy, poverty, backwardness and hunger would be addressed by=20
>removing the oppressive western kufr systems that are currently=20
>implemented over Muslims and establishing in their place the Islamic=20
>ruling system, i.e. the Khilafah. The Khilafah will take it upon=20
>itself to solve deep, widespread problems such as illiteracy,=20
>poverty, backwardness and hunger and will not abandon such problems=20
>to welfare organisations, foreign NGOs and United Nations agencies.
>
>Jihad is obligatory in the case where kuffar attack or occupy Muslim=20
>land. This obligation is foremost upon the state and the armed=20
>forces. Allah (Subhanahu Wa ta'ala) revealed over a hundred ayaat of=20
>the Qur'an on the subject of physically fighting the kuffar and the=20
>mushrikeen.
>
>Muslim rulers today neither solve the problems of illiteracy,=20
>poverty, backwardness and hunger, and nor do they undertake jihad.=20
>Instead they leave all this to individual Muslims and Muslim groups=20
>to undertake.
>
>Your Chief Executive said about intellectual discussion, "I request=20
>them to express their views on international matters in an=20
>intellectual spirit and in a civilised manner through force of=20
>argument. Views expressed with maturity and moderation have greater=20
>convincing power."
>
>The experience of those who express the pure Islamic viewpoint is=20
>that they are hounded by intelligence agencies, locked up in prison,=20
>and entangled in lengthy legal processes. The rulers of Muslims=20
>today cannot tolerate the expression of the Islamic viewpoint so=20
>these rulers respond to intellectual discourse with force.
>
>Your Chief Executive said about the affairs of Muslims in other=20
>parts of the world, "I would request that we should stop interfering=20
>in the affairs of others."
>
>Islam does not permit that we ignore the problems of Muslims in=20
>other parts of the world. The statement of Allah (Subhanahu Wa=20
>ta'ala) in the Qur'an may be rendered as,
>
>"This Ummah of yours is one Ummah, so worship me."[TMQ Al-Anbiyyah: 92]
>
>And the hadeeth of the Prophet (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) may be=20
>rendered as,
>
>"The believers, in their love, mutual kindness, and close ties, are=20
>like one body; when any part complains, the whole body responds to=20
>it with wakefulness and fever."
>
>Finally, your Chief Executive said about Pakistan, "Don't forget=20
>that Pakistan is the citadel of Islam".
>
>We would like to ask how it is possible for a state to be 'the=20
>citadel of Islam' if it is not the Islamic State? There was only one=20
>citadel of Islam, and that was the Khilafah, which remained in=20
>existence under various leaderships from the time that it was=20
>established by the Prophet (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) in Madinah=20
>until it was finally destroyed by the kaafir and western agent=20
>Mustafa Kamal in 1924.
>
>The Muslims of Pakistan have the capability and the will to=20
>re-establish the Khilafah State and they will succeed in doing this=20
>irrespective of the plans of the kuffar or their agents amongst the=20
>present-day rulers of Muslims, insha'Allah.
>
>Hizb ut-Tahrir
>Wilayah Pakistan
>14 January 2002

_____

#4.

The Hindustan Times
Friday, January 25, 2002

Second coup
Praful Bidwai

In his first interaction in mufti with the media after seizing power=20
in October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf emphatically delivered a=20
message: he was not going to be a military dictator in the Yahya Khan=20
or Zia-ul-Haq mould.

Thus, he got himself deliberately photographed in an 'un-Islamic'=20
image, with a dog. He made copious and glowing references to secular=20
and modern identities and symbols. And he declared Turkey's radical=20
reformer, Kemal Ataturk, to be his hero.

Many progressive and liberal Pakistanis told me they welcomed this,=20
with abundant scepticism. Their scepticism got strengthened when in=20
mid-2000, Musharraf beat a retreat on blasphemy law reform, which=20
bigoted mullahs fiercely opposed because that would have reduced the=20
power of the sharia-based courts.

The liberals felt reassured, however, when Musharraf took on the=20
mullahs last June at the Seerat Conference, savaging their jehadi=20
interpretation of Islam, their 'phoney' claim to tolerance, their=20
support to 'cowardly' terrorism. They felt even more encouraged when=20
during his visit to India last July, Musharraf carefully avoided=20
paying obeisance to orthodox Sunni-Muslim monuments - an encouraging=20
sign despite the Agra gloom.

When Pakistani liberals watched Musharraf on January 12, they weren't=20
merely clutching at symbolic straws. They were witnessing a serious,=20
coherent, focused, effort to elaborate an agenda and a vision, of a=20
kind not heard since Jinnah promised a secular, modern future to=20
independent Pakistan. Musharraf was now fleshing out the ideas he=20
first publicly proposed two years ago.

To call a spade a spade, Musharraf has done something that no=20
Pakistani ruler has ever done, and few rulers anywhere do: he has=20
outlined an audacious plan to dismantle a major pillar of the=20
ideological foundation which has sustained the edifice of his own=20
state for two decades. This is militant, muscular Islam, wrought into=20
a malign force under Zia through his campaign for a Nizam-i-Mustafa=20
or sharia-based government.

Our reservations notwithstanding, we must honestly admit that=20
Musharraf's agenda represents not incremental, marginal change, but a=20
major transformatory change of intent, a radical shift of purpose.=20
His address falls in the category of declarations that can move=20
social and political goalposts, create new paradigms, and release=20
huge social energies - like 'Garibi Hatao' once did.

Musharraf promises to sever the links between political Islam and the=20
State, between the military and the mullahs, and between Kashmir and=20
terrorist violence, and thus put Pakistan on the road to=20
modernisation and secularisation. At the core of his reform programme=20
is trenchant criticism and rejection of the heady mix of religion and=20
politics which characterises Pakistan, which he clearly identifies as=20
the source of the intolerance and bigotry which underlie extremism=20
and terrorism.

Musharraf's address unconditionally condemned all forms of terrorism=20
and the 'Kalashnikov culture' of all religious extremism. Equally=20
significant was his insistence that Pakistani groups must not mess=20
around in other countries - no matter what the cause. This has had a=20
sobering impact on many Pakistani opinion-shapers who now call for=20
returning to a pre-1989 Kashmir policy.

As intentions go, Musharraf's plan is the most ambitious reform=20
programme announced in South Asia to deal with the issue of religion=20
and politics. It represents a total overturning of the Islamisation=20
project launched by Zia-ul-Haq to acquire a figleaf of legitimacy for=20
his brutal dictatorship. That project's logic unfolded in its most=20
developed form via the Taliban through Pakistan's attempt to=20
virtually annex Afghanistan and acquire 'strategic depth', and=20
through the promotion of a variety of militant groups.

Musharraf has launched South Asia's biggest-ever crackdown on=20
communalist extremists, exceeding even the banning of the RSS after=20
Gandhiji's assassination. His proscription of five organisations,=20
arrest of 2,500 militants and sealing of 900 offices may well be the=20
beginning of what is likely to be a prolonged process which will=20
inevitably involve purging the army of pernicious religious-political=20
influences and even cleansing the ISI.

Musharraf has thus embarked on an extraordinary bold and risky=20
mission. It is not clear if he will succeed. Arrayed against him are=20
numerous jehadi militants inflamed by the Taliban's defeat in=20
Afghanistan, bigoted mullahs, even his own military colleagues. His=20
own survival is not guaranteed.

It will not do to minimise the significance of Musharraf's overall=20
reform agenda, while conceding it has 'positive elements' (Vajpayee)=20
or is even 'path-breaking' from the purely 'internal' point of view=20
(Advani), but claiming it is weak on the 'external' front.

The 'internal' and 'external' components are strongly, organically,=20
inter-related. Implicit in the insistence on limiting Pakistan's=20
external role is the view that the country has paid dearly by=20
pandering to pan-Islamic ideas - themselves a consequence of the=20
domestic Islam - politics mix. Musharraf wants Pakistan to be seen as=20
a 'normal', moderate, non-aggressive, 'responsible' nation in the=20
region and the world.

This paradigm-shift reform need not be attributed solely to personal=20
conviction. Musharraf may have acted under external - especially US -=20
pressure, and used the opportunity provided by the post-December 13=20
developments to push his anti-extremist agenda, just as after=20
September 11 he had cut the umbilical cord with the Taliban.

That should not detract from the importance of his endeavour or=20
coherence of his purpose. Far-reaching changes sometimes occur not=20
because there is a 'genuine' change of heart, but because 'soft'=20
options vanish, and there is a compelling need to change. This was=20
true of Ataturk's 'need' to give Turkey a viable non-Caliphate=20
identity after the collapse of the Ottoman empire, or of the=20
importance of Marshall Plan in providing legitimacy to the West in=20
the face of the post-World War II communist challenge.

Musharraf has followed his address with some action. He has abolished=20
communal electorates and expanded the National Assembly's size by 48=20
per cent. He is preparing to hold elections by the Supreme Court -=20
stipulated October 2002 deadline.

It's possible, as Pakistani progressives say, that he is not doing=20
enough: he should have banned not just the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and the=20
Jaish-e-Mohammed, but also the Markaz-Dawa-Wal-Irshad and the=20
Jamaat-i-Islami, and disbanded the ISI's Kashmir desk. Musharraf's is=20
very much a reform 'from above', unaccompanied by a radical programme=20
of economic change and popular empowerment. His implementation agency=20
is, woefully, the State, a thoroughly corrupt and unreliable entity.

However, even if Musharraf achieves a quarter of his goals, he will=20
have made a qualitative, directional, difference, and put Pakistan on=20
the road to becoming a modern, more tolerant, plural, forward-looking=20
society not totally obsessed with religious identity. Post-Musharraf,=20
someone else could build on that gain.

In contrast to Pakistan, India is evolving in a retrograde direction=20
under the most conservative Right-wing anti-pluralist political=20
leadership in its history. There is a fresh explosion of obscurantism=20
and chauvinism. Our education system is being consciously=20
re-engineered to promote illiteracy in history, Vedic=20
(we-knew-it-all-2,500 years ago) cultural supremacism, and toxic=20
forms of national hubris, as well as to teach pseudo-sciences.

An epidemic of superstition has broken out. Tub-thumping nationalism,=20
obsession with 'national security', and aggressive identity-assertion=20
are undermining the values of reason, tolerance, dialogue and=20
compassion.

The bhadralog middle class is increasingly retreating from modernist=20
and rational goals, even as it psychologically secedes from the=20
people, and mutilates and tramples on secular humanism,=20
egalitarianism, even democracy. Instead of rejecting the perverse=20
logic of 'an eye for an eye', our children are being taught to gouge=20
out 'both eyes' and 'whole jaws'. Torture, draconian 'preventive'=20
detention, witchhunts of suspects ('caught' speaking chaste Urdu) are=20
all rationalised as part of the 'fight against terrorism'.

Rabid male-supremacism and militarism are glorified. As is India's=20
presumed moral superiority and global greatness whose 'unfair' denial=20
by the world produces extreme resentment. Our middle class=20
increasingly equates modernity with McCulture, Bollywood-style=20
vulgarity and cellphones. Its consumerism has a 'western' exterior,=20
but lacks authentic cultural content.

Nothing could be further removed from an emancipatory liberal culture=20
than this phenomenon. This is not the 'Tryst with Destiny' that India=20
made at independence. Such horrific retrogression will turn this=20
society into a cauldron of hatreds, prejudices and superstitions -=20
besides being the world's greatest reservoir of poverty, illiteracy,=20
destitution, economic servitude, and Hindutva-style intolerance.

______

#5.

Dear Friends,
The New York Taxi Workers Alliance would like to initiate a coalition-held
peace rally in light of the looming war and continuing violence in South
Asia. We have received many requests from members and friends to organize
such an event to call for peace and justice in our war-torn region, sending=
a
message of unity to offset the opportunistic war mongers who militarily,
politically and economically continue to offer our people as pawns for
imperialism. We hope that you will join us for a planning meeting on
Thursday, January 31st at 6:00 pm at the NYTWA office at 122 W. 27th St. 10=
th
Fl. [New York City]

We have received many requests from members and friends to hold such an eve=
nt
to call for reason and resolution without any more bloodshed in our region =
or
any other part of the world. As you may know, about 60% of the taxi driver
workforce (120,000 licensed yellow cab, black car and car service drivers)
are from either Pakistan, India or Bangladesh. 90% of the drivers are
immigrants. In October, NYTWA general members overwhelmingly voted to join
the NYC Labor Against the War Coalition on the grounds that the "war agains=
t
terrorism" was in fact a war against Afghanistan and a tool of imperialism =
to
further underdevelop and destabilize the poorest of the poor around the
world. Now, as the puppets of South Asia further jeopardize the economic,
political and social well-being of our region, and fight for their share of
the empire, we in NYC must take action. We must organize against the war
economy driven by imperialism, as the very lives of our people and the futu=
re
of our children are at stake.=20=20=20

Many of our members fear that the divisiveness and war mongering will also
erode the genuine solidarity which our communities have built up in NYC.=20
Certainly, since Sept. 11, our Muslim and Sikh brothers and sisters,
particularly Pakistanis, have faced devastating attacks both on the street
and at the hands of government/military institutions. We've heard hundreds
of reports of roommates and friends disappearing overnight and hundreds
others returning home out of sheer fear. Our members' safety, economic
viability and civil rights have all been under direct attack over the past
several months, exacerbating exploitative conditions. But it is the war at
home that is their greatest concern.

We reach out to all of you to join us in holding a rally for peace in South
Asia. To hold an event with true impact, we need your support. We hope to
see you at the planning meeting on Thursday, January 31st at 7:00 pm at th=
e
NYTWA office.=20

Until then, if you have any questions or comments, please feel free to call
us at the office and ask for Bhairavi: 212-627-5248.

Thank you.

In Solidarity,

Bhairavi Desai=20
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
New York Taxi Workers Alliance
122 West 27th St, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10001

______

#6.

WAR & PEACE / JANG AUR AMAN
A New Documentary Film by Anand Patwardhan

Filmed over three tumultuous years in India, Pakistan,
Japan and the USA following nuclear tests in the
Indian sub-continent - WAR & PEACE / JANG AUR AMAN is
an epic documentary journey of peace activism in the
face of global militarism and war.

Divided into six compelling chapters, the film is
framed by the murder of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, an act
whose portent and poignancy remains undiminished half
a century later. For the filmmaker, whose family was
immersed in the non-violent Gandhian movement, the
sub-continent's trajectory towards naked and unabashed
militarism is explored with sorrow, although along the
way the film captures joyful stories of courage and
resistance. Amongst these is a visit to the "enemy
country" of Pakistan, where contrary to expectations,
Indian delegates are showered by affection, not only
by their Pakistani counterparts in the peace movement,
but by ordinary citizens who declare without caution
that "hate is the creation of politicians."

WAR & PEACE / JANG AUR AMAN examines not merely the
militarization of India but looks at the costs being
extracted from its citizens. From the plight of
residents living near the nuclear test site to the
horrendous effects of uranium mining on local
indigenous populations, it becomes abundantly clear
that, contrary to a myth first created by the U.S.A,
there is no such thing as the "peaceful Atom." In
nations where "Science" has been hijacked by the war
machine, only a handful of practitioners remind us of
its potential to fulfill the genuine needs of the
people.

Going beyond the story of South Asia, WAR & PEACE /
JANG AUR AMAN shares an extraordinary visit by
Japanese survivors of the Atom Bomb to India and
Pakistan following the nuclear tests. This becomes the
impetus for a re-examination of events that led to the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Were the bombs
"necessary" ? American historians who gathered the
facts five decades later for a Smithsonian Museum
exhibit in Washington DC were amazed to find their
voices suppressed by a nation that did not want to
know.

WAR & PEACE / JANG AUR AMAN slips seamlessly from a
description of home made jingoism to focus on how an
aggressive United States has become a role model, its
doctrine of "Might is Right" only too well-absorbed by
aspiring Third World elites. As we enter the 21st
century, war has become perennial, enemies are
re-invented, economies are inextricably tied to the
production and sale of weapons and in the moral
wastelands of the world, memories of Gandhi seem like
a mirage that never was, created by our thirst for
peace and our very distance from it.

Early Press reviews:

"The film itself is a tour de force, beautifully shot
and often darkly funny and much more riveting than the
dry subject matter might suggest." - Duncan Campbell
in the Guardian, UK

http://www.patwardhan.com

______

#7.

EXPLORING MASCULINITIES - A TRAVELLING SEMINAR
DATE: 1 - 2 February, 2002
TIME: 9:30 am - 5:30 pm
VENUE: Vivekananda Hall, Delhi School of Economics,
Delhi University
Dear Friends,
The Department of Sociology in association with Aakar and=20
UNIFEM/ZONTA INTERNATIONAL cordially invites you to attend Exploring=20
Masculinities - A Travelling Seminar, being held at the Delhi=20
University on 1st and 2nd February, 2002.
The seminar includes presentations of academic papers, activist=20
narratives and films on masculinities. As the title suggests the=20
seminar will be visiting six universities in India. The first seminar=20
was held at Baroda (19-20 December, 2001), Trivandrum (9-10 January=20
2002) Delhi on 1-2 February, 2002. From Delhi it will move to=20
Chandigarh, Allahabad and Shillong.
The seminar explores diverse questions of male sexuality and male=20
culture. Activists and academics involved with gender issues have=20
critically commented on masculinity and its impact on gender=20
relations as well as the institutionalisation of male power in the=20
context of violence against women, the HIV/ AIDS pandemic and the=20
failure of the population control programmes. However, the passion=20
and rigour with which women's lives and women's cultures have been=20
studied and documented in South Asia has been missing in the study of=20
masculinities. This is unfortunate because a textured understanding=20
of the diversity of South Asian men's experiences, attitudes,=20
beliefs, practices, situations, sexualities and institutions is=20
essential to challenge gender based hegemonies and equally critical=20
for building a more humane world. We look at the seminar as a unique=20
platform to introduce the current theories and practices of=20
masculinities to the university community and hope generate interest=20
for further work in the area.
We look forward to your presence and participation in the seminar.=20
Please feel free to inform all those who are interested to come for=20
the seminar.
For further information or queries, please contact:
Rahul Roy (Tel: 6515161, E-mail - aakar@d...) or
Suman Bisht (Tel: 7942338, E-mail - suman@s...)
Yours Sincerely,
Dr. RADHIKA CHOPRA Rahul Roy
Dept. Of Sociology, Delhi University Aakar

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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