[sacw] SACW #2 | 16 Jan. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #2 | 16 January 2002

------------------------------------------

#1. Blasphemy on the beach
There may be a South Asian version of Mutually Assured Destruction.=20
But a little less madness would do us good. (Daniel Lak)
#2. Colin Powell arrives in Islamabad on Wednesday on
what is not called by its proper name: mediation. (M.B. Naqvi)
#3. Gender and Property Law in Pakistan - Resources and Discources=20
(Rubya Mehdi)
#4. India - Laws : Secular, But Not Uniform (Nirmalendu Bikash Rakshit)
#5. 'India's Two Great Emperors Were Both Non-Hindu' - Interview=20
with Amartya Sen

________________________

#1.

Nepali Times
11-17 January 2002

Blasphemy on the beach
There may be a South Asian version of Mutually Assured Destruction.=20
But a little less madness would do us good.

Daniel Lak

Do nuclear weapons work? As agents of mass destruction, Hiroshima and=20
Nagasaki are a constant reminder of their effectiveness at dealing=20
death and destruction. No, I wonder about the nuclear arsenals of=20
India and Pakistan, and whether they haven't helped keep the peace=20
between two angry neighbours, beset by internal tensions and=20
pressures and, until now, largely ignored by the rest of the world.

Like many, I went ballistic at the Indian nuclear tests in May of=20
1998. Pakistan's follow-on was even more maddening. Here were=20
twoTitans of Poverty pouring funds-in Pakistan's case, largely money=20
freed up by overgenerous aid donations-into hideously dangerous=20
weapons. They'd fought three largely pointless wars and spent the=20
better part of six decades finding reasons to hate each other.

In mid-1998, they recklessly upped the ante hugely, endangering a=20
region that I've come to love and live in. Now I'm not so sure. Call=20
me shallow, or driven by events, but I wonder if the relatively small=20
nuclear arsenals in both countries haven't helped avoid all out war,=20
at least twice in the past two years. Whoa, I can hear the screams of=20
outrage already, not least from my abolitionist wife who marched the=20
1980s away protesting against American and Soviet nuclear weapons.

But let's consider the evidence. The Kargil conflict in 1999 was=20
widely described as South Asia on the brink of all out nuclear war.=20
Pakistan had organised an incursion into Indian-controlled territory=20
along the line of control, India fought back fiercely, and with a=20
little help from Bill Clinton, saw off the threat from across the=20
line.

Hundreds of young Indian men died retaking ridges and mountain peaks=20
that would defy the skills of mountaineers. We'll probably never know=20
how many from the other side were killed, but my friends in Gilgit=20
and Skardu told me that funerals went on for days after the killing=20
stopped.

Yet it remained a largely local skirmish. Despite immense rhetorical=20
pressure from fire breathing desk generals of the Indian media and=20
the bellicose middle classes of Delhi, Atal Behari Vajpayee kept his=20
troops on his side of the LOC. An American diplomatic source told me=20
afterward that there were credible threats from Islamabad that=20
nuclear weapons might be used if the Indians crossed the line. That's=20
denied in public by both India and Pakistan yet it makes some sense.=20
And if it's true, then we must acknowledge the role of the South=20
Asian version of mutually assured destruction-the unwritten=20
NATO-Moscow equation that kept the peace during the Cold War.

I wonder too about the current round of Delhi-Islamabad hostilities.=20
The usual suspects in India (media, middle classes, pundits) bray for=20
war. Vajpayee makes all the right noises, General Musharaff regrets=20
but talks equally tough. Meanwhile, he quietly rounds up militants=20
while India's wily leader keeps the military preparations firmly=20
within reversible limits. War fears fade as quickly as they flared=20
and only the frighteningly callow commentariat in Delhi seems=20
disappointed.

I am willing to bet both Musharaff and Vajpayee were well aware of=20
the immense risks they were taking, and knew how far they could go=20
before starting to tone things down. The problem lies in Pakistan's=20
conventional inferiority to India. As a smaller, poorer country that=20
has been subjected to an American arms embargo for more than a=20
decade, Pakistan is simply not able to best India in conventional=20
battle. The Pakistani armed forces are well trained, morale is high=20
but they lack technology and numerical weight.

So asymmetrical strategies like nuclear weapons and support for cross=20
border insurgencies are a natural part of Pakistan's arsenal.=20
Islamabad might have little choice but to use its atomic bombs if=20
invaded by Indian armour and infantry. But lest a flock of hawks=20
gather round me, let me say I still hate nuclear weapons. Just=20
because they deter war in times of rhetorical hostility doesn't mean=20
that defusing tensions is not imperative.

And there are other, frightening issues like the absence of command=20
and control, extremist forces in both countries, nuclear accidents=20
and so on. It all underlines the need to move towards regional peace=20
and the prosperity that will follow. Even Washington and Moscow=20
eventually abandoned mutually assured destruction, known by its=20
highly appropriate acronym, MAD. A little less madness in South Asia=20
would do us all a world of good.

______

#2.

Colin Powell arrives in Islamabad on Wednesday on
what is not called by its proper name: mediation.

by M.B. Naqvi
Karachi January 15:

The US Secretary of State Colin Powell arrives in Islamabad on Wednesday on
what is not called by its proper name: mediation. It is being termed a
mission of friendly persuasion of India and Pakistan to de-escalate the
military tension on their borders, its immediate objective. Included in
this is the nudging the two to resume their dialogue now that India's
preconditions for its resumption have largely been fulfilled.

The true response of India to Musharraf's Jan 12 address was formulated by
the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes: India will not pull back its
troops (and armour) from the borders until it is sure that Pakistan has
stopped its cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. That is to say, he wants to
see this happen over a period to be sure that it has happened, though he
has not explained what evidence of good behaviour and over what period he
wants it from Pakistan. The latter, for its part, has declared that
Pakistan Army will also not pull back from its forward positions on the
borders with India until it has the evidence of a similar but prior Indian
withdrawal has actually taken place --- a yet another deadlock.

Many questions have thus arisen here. What precisely was the bottomline of
India in this coercive diplomacy. Is it to go to war, no matter what
Pakistan does, with its punishment as the real aim? Or is it to demonstrate
to the Indian electorate how masterfully has the BJP-led government dealt
with Pakistan and how it has humbled it --- for garnering more votes. Or is
there some other reason in between these two extremes?

Pakistan, during all this crisis, has remained on the defensive, if not on
the retreat. It was still nursing its deep wound on the body politic caused
by its U-turn on the Afghan policy, when it suffered an even deeper second
one last Saturday (Jan 12) through the presidential address at the height
of the military Crisis on its eastern borders. President Musharraf said he
was doing all that was right and had to be done anyhow. He certainly met,
in full, the Indian demands or preconditions for defusing the tensions with
India. The only reservations he made were two: Pakistan shall not surrender
any Pakistani national to India and secondly Pakistan will not stop morally
and politically supporting the cause of Kashmiris' Azadi. Even on the
matter of not handing over the men wanted by India, he has only exempted
Pakistani nationals from being extradited. Thus all the others would seem
to be subject to negotiations.

As for moral and political support to the Kashmir cause, it can scarcely be
a major ground for continuing the confrontationist course --- so long as it
stays just that. That is a whole world short of cross-border terrorism,
India's main grouse. The other Indian ground for not relaxing its pressure
is that mere verbal change of policies is not enough. Unless these changed
the policies that are visible on the ground, New Delhi will not be
impressed. As one writes, it is only the fourth day after the speech.

Vigorous action not only against the two impugned organisations ---
Jaish-i-Mohammad and Lashkar-i-Tayba --- and their top leaders has already
been taken, there are three other bodies which have been banned and their
central leaders arrested and offices sealed. Literally thousands of active
workers of these five bodies and some others have been arrested. A few
Indian objections have already been heard. These organisations can continue
to work after changing their names and hiring other office premises. In
theory there is no way of preventing that. But the political context in
Pakistan, with its dynamics, needs to be focused on.

Pakistan's is not a closed or totalitarian society; what goes on here can
easily be monitored by all. The anti-terrorist measures being undertaken
are open and a change can already been seen in the political discourse.
Full impact of the change to be visible on the ground by the Indians --- on
the assumption that insurgency in Kashmir Valley is due mainly to
Pakistan's sending armed infiltrators into Kashmir from across the LOC ---
should take some time.

There is no reason to suppose that the assumptions that Indians are making
are all based on hard facts and are not exaggerations. While Islamabad and
its secret agencies have been quite capable of doing what New Delhi alleges
and may well be culpable to an extent, as many Pakistani analysts and
politicians concede. But it will be exceedingly odd that they can create an
insurgency of the kind in a foreign land out of no local material or basis.
Anyhow, the kind of political change that India and more importantly the US
were demanding --- the latter behind the scenes --- has been largely
implemented. It is causing the political eddies that confirm that the
action taken is more than proforma words; it is a serious change of policy
on the ground too.

Doubtless, full results of such a change can only become apparent to all
after they have had time to work through the society. Where the Indians may
be right is the fact that Islamic extremism of the kind that has produced
Taliban and other Mujahideen in Kashmir, some of whom have mounted suicide
attacks, is not produced or destroyed in a week. It was a long time, with
much state aid, in coming into being.

Even international media and US master publicists had assisted in the
creation of an elaborate mythology about Jihad in Afghanistan --- much of
it was bodily transferred to the Kashmir, powerfully reinforced by the
officially-sponsored anti-India and anti-Hindu propaganda. Changing that
mind set will surely take a long time. But insofar as the physical Kashmir
Jihad is mainly sustained by Pakistan, it should begin dying out within
weeks.

But preliminary results of India's coercive diplomacy --- more clearly
articulated by the trio of Advani-Jaswant and Farnandes --- can be seen in
the shape of unending visitations by luminaries of all major powers.
Insofar as American and British high officials are concerned, their
intrusive facilitation is mediation except in name. Immobility on the
ground by the Indians and Pakistanis is an open invitation that cannot be
rejected in the circumstances.

______

#3.

Gender and Property Law in Pakistan
- Resources and Discources
by Rubya Mehdi

320 pages, 2001

ISBN 87-574-0695-2

Crucial to the social position of women in Pakistan is their access=20
to and control of material resources. A key factor is the situation=20
of legal pluralism in the country whereby state laws derived from=20
Pakistan's Islamic and colonial heritages are often contradicted by=20
local customary laws and practices.

This book is based on extensive fieldwork in four villages in=20
different provinces of Pakistan, and takes both a socio-legal and an=20
anthropoligical approach. Its focus includes many other areas of life=20
that have a bearing on women's access to property and enables the=20
reader better to envisage the environment.

Arguing that official law is largely ineffective in securing property=20
rights for women, the book offers insights into the interaction of=20
customary and state laws in Pakistan, that will be of interest to=20
scholars, lawyers and development specialists. The book also provides=20
background to students, researchers and scholars engaged in studies=20
on Pakistani immigrants in Europe.

Contents

* Acknowledgements
* Foreword by Gordon R. Woodman
* Introduction
* Gender and Property Relationships under Shariah, Pakistani=20
Law and Custom
* Plural Discources of Disputing
* Sindh
* Punjab
* NWFP (The North-West Frontier Province)
* Balochistan
* Normative Cultures: Cross-Provincial Comparison
* Customary Law Revisited

Jurist- og =D8konomforbundets Forlag
Lyngbyvej 17
Postboks 2702
2100 K=F8benhavn =D8, Denmark
Tlf. 39 13 55 00
Fax 39 13 55 55
Email fl@d...

______

#4.

The Telegraph (India)
16 January 2002

FIFTH COLUMN / SECULAR, BUT NOT UNIFORM

BY NIRMALENDU BIKASH RAKSHIT

It is interesting to note that the recent Supreme Court judgment in=20
favour of providing maintenance to divorced Muslim women beyond the=20
three month iddat period has resulted in a heated controversy within=20
the Muslim community. It is also important that the call for reform=20
has come from Mushtaq Ahmed, who served as the All India Muslim=20
Personal Law Board lawyer in the Shah Bano case. In an open letter,=20
he has drawn the attention of the community to the need for reform of=20
Islamic laws.

Article 44 of the Constitution expressly directs the state to codify=20
civil laws without discriminating between different communities. It=20
also directs the state to frame a "uniform" civil code for all=20
citizens without taking into account differences in religion. Thus,=20
although the Constitution has granted sufficient freedom of religion=20
to all, it has hoped to bring them under the same law.

In other words, the writers of the Constitution envisaged that in a=20
secular state, various religions would exist, but the law must be=20
uniform and identical, and that all people should be under one legal=20
system. Despite this ideal, Article 44 has so far remained dormant.=20
Five decades have passed without the framing of such a code out of=20
fear that it may evoke a serious outburst in the Muslim community.

Impersonal law
Thus, although Hindu personal law has been drastically modified,=20
Muslim personal law has remained untouched. The apex court has, of=20
course, ordered the government to go ahead with the uniform civil=20
code. The court has also felt that such a codification will help the=20
cause of national integration and common citizenship. It needs to be=20
emphasized that Article 44 does not, in any way, seek to affect the=20
religious rights of the Muslims. It only aims at making the law=20
uniform in civil life.

That legislative competence and political courage are separate has=20
been established through the years. The Muslim Women (Protection of=20
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was passed by the Rajiv Gandhi=20
government to override or bypass the court's verdict on divorce. This=20
act had pleased only the most reactionary elements of the minority=20
community.

In the same year, the court pronounced a momentous verdict in the=20
Diengdeh V. Chopra case. Various provisions contained in the Hindu=20
Marriage Act (1955), Special Marriage Act (1954), Parsee Marriage and=20
Divorce Act (1936) were taken into account.

Act together
It was felt that the laws relating to judicial separation, divorce=20
and anullment of marriage were widely different. The court had=20
therefore stated that the "time has now come for a complete reform of=20
the marriage law and the adoption of a uniform law applicable to all=20
people irrespective of religion or caste". The court had also=20
directed the ministry of law and justice to do the needful in this=20
respect and to submit a report on the progress of its measures.

This order by the apex court falling on deaf ears, another case of an=20
unequal civil code soon came up before the apex court concerning=20
Geeta Rani who was married to Pradeep Kumar according to Hindu rites=20
in 1983. In 1991, however, he converted to Islam and married another=20
woman. In this case, the conversion to Islam was only for the purpose=20
of facilitating a second marriage. Thus, the differences in the laws=20
of different communities regarding marriage, divorce and so on were=20
the root cause of social injustice and, therefore, the apex court=20
once again called for the codification of uniform laws. Justice=20
Kuldip Singh stated that "personal law=8Acan be superseded/=20
supplemented by introducing a uniform civil code=8ANo community can=20
oppose the introduction of uniform civil code for the citizens in the=20
territory of India."

Yet, no attempt to enact such a uniform law has been made. It is=20
unfortunate that an important provision in the Constitution has=20
remained dormant because of inaction on the part of legislators. In a=20
secular state, all laws should be separate from religious=20
injunctions, making it possible for them to be applicable to all=20
citizens. Otherwise, this discrimination would eventually breed=20
discontent among different communities and undermine the basis of the=20
secular state.

______

#5.

OUTLOOK (India)
Magazine | Jan 21, 2002=20=20=20=20
Pradip Sen
INTERVIEW
'India's Two Great Emperors Were Both Non-Hindu'
On the Hindutva version of Indian history - and how India was never a=20
Hindu rashtra.
Though extremely busy with a workshop on 'education, equity and human=20
security' in Calcutta, Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya Sen still=20
took time out to talk to Outlook, and articulate his views on the=20
Hindutva version of Indian history. Sen had condemned the Babri=20
Masjid demolition in 'Threat To Secular India', published in the New=20
York Review shortly after the epoch-changing incident. Here he=20
describes the Hindutva version of Indian history as sectarian and=20
combative, and argues that India was never a Hindu rashtra. Excerpts=20
from an exclusive interview with Subhoranjan Dasgupta:
In your address to the Calcutta History Congress last year, you=20
described the spirit and discipline of history as 'capacious=20
heterodoxy'.

"To study history, we have to have a sense of space.=20
Heterodoxy is important in understanding history."

That's a wonderful expression. Could you please elaborate on it?
Well, I'm glad you like the expression. What I intended to say by=20
that is that in order to study history, we have to have a sense of=20
space-that there could be different ways of looking
at past events and in case there are differences, we should be able=20
to argue it out. Heterodoxy is important because understanding=20
history requires different approaches. Furthermore, heterodoxy itself=20
is sometimes among the most interesting things to study in the=20
history of a civilisation or a culture. So, for both these points of=20
view-heterodoxy as a method and as well as a subject matter to be=20
studied-history has to be deeply concerned, I believe, with it. If=20
you want to know what exciting things are happening at a certain=20
period in a certain country, you look not just at what the ongoing=20
tradition is, but where people are disagreeing and in what way. I am=20
not a historian but that is the way I tend to see history, a subject=20
on which I occasionally try to write and which I greatly like reading.
If the study of Indian history is infused by this spirit, what sort=20
of textbooks should our schoolgoers be reading? Because there is a=20
current effort, for instance, to portray the Muslim period as an age=20
of darkness.

Obviously blacking out the Muslim period-what you are describing as=20
the "Muslim period"-as an age of darkness would be just a gross=20
mistake. Textbooks should contain truths rather than falsehoods. It's=20
not just a matter of understanding our past,

"There is a 'category mistake' in thinking that comparisons=20
with terrorists is a cogent way to assess historians."

but also our present. If you look at anything today-Indian painting,=20
music, literature, philosophy, history itself as a discipline-the=20
great contributions of Muslim scholars, intellectuals and artists are=20
part and parcel of the richness of Indian civilisation. I think it's=20
also important to emphasise that we cannot talk about the history of=20
this period as if it could be split into Muslim activities and Hindu=20
activities. They were interactive. Really, in every branch of art or=20
intellectual study, you will find Hindu and Muslim activists, artists=20
and scholars working side by side and interacting with each other.=20
So, there's no way we can talk about the period without taking into=20
account the massive contribution made in an interactive way by those=20
who happened to be Muslims by religion as opposed to others who were=20
Hindus or Sikhs or Parsis or Christians.
Your grandfather Kshitimohan Sen wrote the classic text Hinduism=20
(Penguin Books, 1960). In what basic sense does his vision of Indian=20
history and civilisation, or for that matter the vision of=20
Rabindranath Tagore, differ from the saffron family's version?
I shouldn't really comment on this as I am not a great expert on=20
Hindutva of any kind, and my role in my grandfather's book on=20
Hinduism was primarily that of a translator.

I think the remarkable difference between the book and a sectarian=20
view of Hindutva is that my grandfather's as well as Tagore's vision=20
is not combative at all. They were both keen on seeing what different=20
influences operated on Hinduism. Both authors locate themselves in an=20
interactive environment. In The Religion of Man, the lectures that=20
Tagore gave at Oxford, he mentions that his family was situated at=20
the confluence of three sets of influences-Hindu, Muslim and=20
European. The same would apply to my grandfather. As a Sanskritist,=20
he was educated in Benares, in traditional centres of learning, which=20
were, at that time, open and non-sectarian.

"In 'The Religion of Man', Tagore mentions his family was=20
situated at the confluence of three sets of influences-Hindu, Muslim,=20
European."

I should also mention that one of my grandfather's books-which I=20
don't think is available in English, only in Bengali, called Hindu=20
Musalmaner Jukta Sadhana (The Joint Work of Hindus and Muslims)-is=20
quite a major work in the cultural history of India, showing that=20
there is

no substantial area of artistic or intellectual activity in which=20
Hindus and Muslims have not worked together. You cannot think of=20
Hindus and Muslims as somehow mechanically mixed together, rather=20
than being chemically compounded in an integrated civilisation.
Isn't there an affinity between the saffron version of Hindutva and=20
Samuel Huntington's categorisation of Indian civilisation as Hindu?
I think you are right there that Huntington's description of Indian=20
civilisation as Hindu civilisation almost seems to be taken out of=20
the writings of the Hindutva champions. In Huntington's case, the=20
problem was that he wanted to classify the world according to one=20
principle only and that was what he called 'civilisation', which in=20
his case ended up being primarily religion. So he had to contrast=20
Islamic civilisation with Western, Christian civilisation or Buddhist=20
civilisation, etc. Then, well, how do I accommodate India? Since=20
Islamic was already spoken for, he classified India as just a Hindu=20
civilisation. Well, that's a serious mis-description. India has more=20
Muslims than any country in the world with the exception of Indonesia=20
and marginally Pakistan. Also, the entire cultural and intellectual=20
history of India has been an integrated one, as we just discussed.
Historian Romila Thapar has described Hindutva's history as=20
propaganda where the past is manipulated as political instrument.=20
What is the political goal in question-a Hindu rashtra?
Well, I don't really know what the political goal in question is.=20
Romila Thapar, of course, is one of our leading historians. I haven't=20
seen this particular writing of hers, but I guess what she's pointing=20
out is that a lot of writing on history by people who are champions=20
of Hindutva seems to have an underlying political agenda. Whether=20
this is meant to be a preparation for a Hindu rashtra or whether it=20
is just a misunderstanding of the nature of India, I don't know. You=20
have to ask them.
India was never a Hindu rashtra, even before Muslims came to India.=20
In the first millennium BC as well as the millennium that followed,=20
the Gupta period for example, India had a powerful presence of=20
Buddhism along with Hinduism and Jainism. Christians came to India by=20
the 4th century AD latest, and there were Christians here well before=20
there was a single Christian in Britain. Similarly, Jews came to=20
India very early. Parsis came when persecution began in Iran. Also,=20
Muslims came first as traders across the Arabian Sea, well before the=20
Muslim military conquests in the north. India has had a variety of=20
religious influences all this time. Just to mention one thing-if you=20
are thinking of the two greatest emperors of India, you would tend to=20
think of Ashoka and Akbar. One was a Buddhist and the other a Muslim.

Must a 'Hindutva' history necessarily depend on half-truths, lies and=20
legends to sustain itself? For example, that ancient India revered=20
the cow as 'gomata' and did not consume beef; that Akbar was a=20
foreigner, despot and sectarian?
Well, I think if one has a particular way of looking at the past and=20
if there are uncomfortable facts which do not fit into that narrow=20
way of looking, then the proponents of that way of looking would=20
naturally tend to deny the facts.It's fairly easy to point out that=20
these are not half-truths; these are not truths at all. Actually, I=20
can give you many other examples of this kind.

"The introduction of European scholars to the Upanishads was=20
mostly based on the Persian translation by Dara Shikoh."

Could you give just one?
The introduction of European scholars to Hindu scriptures, in=20
particular the Upanishads, was to a great extent based on the Persian=20
translation of the Upanishads done by Dara Shikoh, the first-born son=20
of Shah Jahan. Dara Shikoh

was not a great Sanskrit scholar but he did work hard with the help=20
of Hindu pundits to learn Sanskrit and he translated parts of the=20
Upanishads into Persian. It is this translation that William Jones=20
(pioneering Indologist) first read which attracted him to India and=20
to the study of the Hindu religion. Quite a lot of the revival of our=20
understanding of our Hindu past was based on Jones' efforts and those=20
of others at the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal. I have not seen any=20
mention in the Hindutva literature of the contribution of this Mughal=20
prince to the spread of understanding of Hinduism at home and abroad.
The publication of the Towards Freedom volume edited by Sumit Sarkar=20
and K.N. Panikkar has been thwarted by the ICHR, apparently because=20
it exposes the 'loyalist' role of the rss in the 1940s.
Well, I can't comment on why the ICHR has held up the publication of=20
this volume. It could well be that the rss figures in a rather=20
negative light as a pro-British force in some of the documents. It=20
could have been something else, I don't know. I have also not read=20
the introduction Sumit Sarkar and K.N. Panikkar have written. But I=20
can definitely say that the two are not only among the top historians=20
in India, they would be regarded as major historians anywhere in the=20
world. I personally happen to know Sarkar very well and admire his=20
writings as well as the quality of his mind tremendously. I find it=20
impossible to think that the introduction could have been devoid of=20
their serious professionalism. The episode is puzzling and deeply=20
disturbing.
No one would claim that whatever the 'secular' school of historians=20
has done from Sushobhan Sarkar onwards is flawless. In fact, quite a=20
few critiques have been levelled against secularism per se and you=20
have examined them in your essay 'Secularism and its Discontents'.=20
But do these offer a better alternative in the Indian context?
I wouldn't describe these historians as primarily 'secular'. They are=20
primarily probing and conscientious historians. The fact that they=20
also happen to be secular is interesting, but I don't believe that=20
this dominates their writing of history. I can speak certainly about=20
Professor Sushobhan Sarkar. He was a historian of impeccable=20
scholarship, with great insistence on rigour and scrutiny. So I would=20
describe him first as a terrific historian rather than as primarily a=20
'secular historian'.

The second point is, as far as secularism itself is concerned, it is=20
of course really a political belief and as such a subject matter of=20
history, rather than a method of dealing with history. I think that=20
if one has to look at India, one has to see the interactive presence=20
of different religions as well as the presence of non-religious=20
thoughts-sciences and mathematics for example. Aryabhatta, for=20
instance, is quite sceptical of the received doctrines about eclipses=20
and also about the belief that the sun goes round the earth. He=20
didn't think that eclipses were caused by Rahu but by the earth's=20
shadow over the moon and the moon obscuring the sun. He talked of the=20
diurnal motion of the earth and the appearance of the sun going round=20
us. So, a historian of Indian ideas has to look at non-religious=20
thought as well as anti-religious thoughts like Charvaka and=20
Lokayata. The subject matter of Indian history cannot be just=20
Hinduism. The historian has to take note of different religious and=20
non-(or-anti) religious ideas.Recognising these varieties does not=20
require any special political belief in secularism.
It has been proposed that religious leaders, like sadhus and imams,=20
should vet history texts so that unpalatable facts-that could injure=20
impressionable minds and specific communities-can be carefully=20
eliminated from textbooks?
I am appalled to hear about this proposal. I hope you don't vet this=20
interview by a sadhu or an imam!
HRD minister Dr Murli Manohar Joshi has described those he calls=20
'Marxist' historians, like Irfan Habib, Sumit Sarkar and liberals=20
like Romila Thapar, as 'worse than terrorists'...
If the report is correct, we must react with horror. First, there is=20
what in philosophy is called a 'category mistake' here in thinking=20
that comparison with terrorists can be a cogent way of assessing=20
historians. Second, the historians mentioned are, of course, leading=20
historians, and so acknowledged across the world. It is difficult to=20
think how anyone could have made a remark of that kind, least of all=20
the minister in charge of education. I have to believe that he has=20
been misreported and will no doubt issue a corrective.

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