[sacw] SACW #1. | 3 Feb. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1. | 3 February 2002

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#1. Letter from Pakistan (M.B. Naqvi)
#2. Bangladesh: A country still at war (Kuldip Nayar)
#3. Extremists again on march in India (Praful Bidwai )
#4. India: Will Delhi University give lessons in Voodoo now?

________________________

#1.

Letter from Pakistan
by M.B. Naqvi
Karachi February 2:

For Pakistanis uncertainties are galore. Ties or lack of them with India
are strained to the breaking point, what with massive troop deployments in
an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation and jitters over the possible nuclear
war. A major pillar of Pakistan's foreign policy, especially friendly
regime in Afghanistan, is now only a memory. There are fears that the
military Strongman may have to make, if he has not already done so, a
U-turn, similar to Afghanistan policy's, on the central theme of Kashmir
too. Relations with America, hitherto profitable financially, carry many
uncertainties. On top of these painful questions, there are multiple fears
and unsurities in the political life itself. These are of a profound nature
as well as all too familiar.

There used to be a formal democracy, with all the usual constitutions,
until the afternoon of October 12, 1999 when Pakistan Army, yet again for
the fourth time, in short sad history of Pakistan, overthrew the system. It
is true what obtained was only a nominal democracy; not a real one. Why?
because real power was not in the hands of the elected people and in the
elected institution. Real or ultimate power had stayed in the Army and the
'democratic' institutions existed only because the generals thought
directly ruling the people after eight years of Gen. Zia's Martial Law was
risky: it would generate direct opposition to the Army. So they let
civilians rule themselves as best as they could --- but under their
scrutiny for protecting the core interests of the Army.

What were these core interests? Doubtless, the primacy went to the
allocation of maximum feasible resources to national security. On it rested
the Army's capacity to be the locus of ultimate power and influence in the
society. With National Security was bound a foreign policy, the broad
outlines of which were laid down by the Army and no civilian was ever able
to change it. That comprised relations with the US, the Kashmir policy and
through it the preservation of more or less controlled confrontation with
India with its arms races, cold war propaganda and international rivalry.
To this was added Afghanistan since the 1980s.

This lopsided distribution of responsibilities was buttressed by the rigid
structure of national budgeting, on the one hand, and the readiness of the
Army to punish any government with dismissal, on the other. The Army
exercised this privilege five times in 13 years that this supervised
democratic system lasted; indeed no elected government could complete its
full term. All of them were dismissed, with the second Nawaz Sharif
government went the whole system, lock, stock and barrel. Pakistan was thus
back to square one in 1999 as it had done in 1977, 1971, 1969 and 1958.

In order to understand today's worries, a glance backward is necessary to
see in some perspective the gamut of political snares and difficulties. In
short order, earlier dictators had castigated civilians as such for
incompetence and corruption and, above all they could not give the country
either a constitution in the first seven years or a stable government
later. Hence the power play by bureaucrats with the help of Army generals.
Later Ayub destroyed all the democratic structures on flimsy grounds. Ayub
was overthrown by Yahya Khan, alongwith his new Basic Democratic System, on
no ascertainable ground. Yahya Khan was drummed out by other Army officers
for the sin of having lost a war.

A democratic system was brought in by the generals under Z. A. Bhutto ---
who had excellent democratic credentials through the 1970 polls. But he did
not come into office because of any elections. He was put on the throne by
the generals as a ruse not to make honest citizens enraged by continuing to
rule directly after the shame of 1971. Bhutto was the most acceptable face
of Pakistan Army and was utilised for over five years long democratic
system. After that the Army resumed its direct rule in 1977.

But Bhutto had one main claim to Pakistanis' gratitude: he made the first
democratic constitution by consensus, although he did not act on it even
for a day. He used the State of Emergency as an excuse to rule as a popular
dictator would by virtual decree, though he was able to provide the
Parliament's rubber stamping to whatever he did. Bhutto's successor was the
famous Soldier of Islam, Gen. Ziaul Haq. He was a perceptive and crafty
dictator: He made Islam his legitimising programme and said that he would
not touch the socalled Permanent Constitution; he had merely put it in
abeyance (to be used after he had done his job).

For practical purposes Zia had abrogated the Constitution; for if a
dictator sacks the whole parliamentary system and begins ruling by decree,
the constitution stands destroyed. But in 1985, Zia used a nominated
Assembly to make amendments in the Constitution to confer on himself
extraordinary powers of being an elected President who could not only
supervise the working of the government or countermand any decision of the
government but also to sack the whole system: Assemblies, governments and
all bodies based on electoral system.

It was this constitution, with an omnipotent President, that governed the
country during the days of 'supervised' democracy that is still in
abeyance. This charade of the abeyance of a constitution was invented by
Gen. Zia to get over the old whirlpools that could never be successfully
navigated through in the earlier history. These were the issues of the
respective powers of the Central and Provincial governments. In the 1950s
and 1960s East Pakistanis' largely implied demand of managing their own
affairs in East Pakistan and prevent the Central Government in Islamabad to
cheat them in economic and financial matters while politically enslaving
them to West Pakistani generals. But the issue was not resolved after the
demise of East Pakistan. Today, people in Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan are
as disaffected with Islamabad as East Pakistanis were in 1960s.

There was the other fear: raucous Islamic parties and groups have kept up
from day one the clamour for an Islamic State (Nizam-I-Shariat in today's
rhetoric). Each constitution had ample Islamic provisions to keep this
lobby happy: the first, 1954's, constitution that dictator Ghulam Mohammad
prevented from being passed in its very last stages, had satisfied ulema of
the time. Then the 1956 Constitution had more Islamic provisions by volume
or quantum and it too satisfied the ulema. Later, the 1962 did break from
this rut, though it renamed Pakistan as an Islamic republic and it too
retained the Objectives Resolution and he made a few Islamic noises. Later
still, the 1973 Constitution had the most Islamic provisions that at the
time satisfied all the main ulema. The strange circumstance is that while
the ulema accept a basic law as adequately Islamic initially but later
resume the demand for a 'really' Islamic dispensation. Secondly, the volume
or quantum of Islamic provisions has gone on increasing and there is still
dissatisfaction with what is called a secular system on platforms and
pulpits.

In a manner of speaking Pakistan is again in the grip of electioneering.
Elections impend, to be held in October this year, though there are
wide-scale doubts whether they can be held in October for purely technical
reasons: fresh delimitation of constituencies have to be undertaken and if
all the usual procedures are adopted, the time to Oct is too short. For one
thing, many other issues bearing on new constituency delimitations are
still to be decided or agreed upon.

Above all there is the mother of all uncertainties: what amendments will
dictator Pervez Musharraf make in the much-amended 1973 Constitution ---
now supposedly in abeyance --- before elections are held to a controlled
democracy. No one knows what amendments are required for the satisfaction
of Musharraf and how precisely are they to be made? But this prospect has
taken Pakistan back to all its old controversies.

Doubtless, the new policy orientation is largely anti-Islamic extremism,
though the President is also trying to reassure parts of the religious
lobby and more moderate Ulema that he is not anti-Islam or anti-Mullah as
such; he is merely anti-extremism. Where finally he would stand on
President's powers, provincial autonomy --- the biggest of issues ---
Islamic provisions and what the socalled reforms he would want to save
while insisting on a blanket amnesty of all his, his associates and
subordinates actions in the 1999 takeover and since that were outside the
Constitution.

Among the uncertainties the substantive one is how is Musharraf going to
ensure that the next Parliament will live ever happily under his own
Presidentship, no matter what its political stripes? He has already
declared that (a) he will remain the President for at least five more
years; and (b) the future civilian government will not be able to reverse
any of his major policies or reforms. That should knock out some of the
pretensions about the nature of the democracy-to-be.

Yet another major controversy may soon engulf political Pakistan. One of
the heads of a faction of PML, Pir Saheb Pagara, a self-confessed GHQ's
man, has said that the old constitution will not do; the country needs a
new one. That will put a cat among the pigeons. Initially, every
commentator will want to know whether the GHQ is testing the political
waters through him. The design could be to contain and manage the next
National Assembly by making it embroiled in a long-drawn-out and
controversial constitution-making. It may be that the Musharraf amended
'interim' constitution may lay down that the elected Assembly will first
write a new constitution before governing the country --- a constitution
that is acceptable to the President.=20
______

#2.

DAWN
2 February 2002

A country still at war
By Kuldip Nayar

Every time I go to Bangladesh - and I go regularly - I find the=20
country still in the midst of war. The guns of 1971 stopped long ago=20
but conflicts and tensions have not. The society remains divided from=20
top to bottom. The people of Bangladesh can be categorized into two=20
groups: pro-liberation and anti-liberation forces.
The first claims to represent the forces which fought against=20
Pakistan to create an independent Bangladesh. It mostly favours=20
Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of=20
Bangladesh. The second group supports Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. Her=20
husband, Ziaur Rahman, headed free Bangladesh through a coup.
After 30 years of independence who did what during the liberation=20
struggle is getting hazier every day, but not the prejudice. Some=20
impressions about people - a few may well be true - remain=20
implacable. The worst part of it is that there is no mood of=20
forgetting and forgiving. The liberation or the anti-liberation label=20
has become such a prized possession that the fakes and failures use=20
it to settle scores politically and, worse, violently.
The cleavage, really speaking, is like India's caste system, with its=20
prejudices and biases. Appointments, transfers and even allocations=20
of funds are made in Bangladesh on the basis of who was on which=20
side. "All of us are pro-liberation," says the foreign minister. But=20
his remark does not span the distance which is yawning relentlessly.
True, the country went through hell in the nine months of operations=20
by the Pakistan army. All tiers of government were used to crush=20
defiance and local administrative machinery was wrecked. Freedom=20
fighters were the worst sufferers. Not many people sided with=20
Pakistan at that time. That was three decades ago. Now the situation=20
is different: 'We and They.' Some way has to be found to overcome the=20
bitterness which continues to cast a shadow over the nation's=20
homogeneity.
The two leaders, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, representing two=20
opposite viewpoints, could have integrated the society. But their=20
hatred of each other is so deep that when one of them comes to power,=20
the other stokes the fires of revolt. Hasina denounced the elections=20
when she lost.
Her party, Awami League, has started a countrywide agitation to throw=20
out Khaleda's government. The latter's response is=20
repression.Khaleda's Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was agitating=20
till a few months earlier when Hasina was in power.
This political see-saw and the welter of the hatred have not allowed=20
anything common, not even a strain of emotion, to come up. It is a=20
nation which is perpetually tearing itself apart. It is more than=20
cussedness. There are no two opinions that Mujib is the father of the=20
nation. Why should the Khaleda government not give him that=20
recognition? The Sangh parivar has no love for Mahatma Gandhi.
Still, the BJP, the parivar's member, hails him as the father of the=20
nation and extends him all the honour due to him. In a way it has=20
helped the BJP to hide its Hindutva fangs.
Khaleda has removed even the picture of Mujib from Bangladesh=20
currency notes. She wants to amend the act which prohibits people=20
from pulling down Muijib's picture from public places and government=20
offices. Probably, Khaleda wants to hang the picture of her husband,=20
General Zia, along with Mujib's. Officially it is possible. But how=20
do you put the founder of Bangladesh and an army general on the same=20
pedestal?
Bangladesh continues to suffer from non-issues. I try every time to=20
find an answer to my question from the faces in the long queue of=20
people before the immigration authorities at the airport. The scene=20
is reminiscent of what I watched in early 1972. Then passengers were=20
shouting 'Jai Bangla'. They wanted to reach the promised land. They=20
still do. But the queue I see at the airport moves slowly. And the=20
people, mostly young in years, are taking outward flights. Pride is=20
still writ large on their faces but there are signs of strain and=20
sorrow.
It looks as if the zeal exhibited during the days of struggle against=20
West Pakistan has burnt itself out. As happens in every liberation=20
struggle, a better way of life was expected from the time guns fell=20
silent. That did not come true. Most people still live on the=20
periphery of existence. Liberation has brought them sovereignty, not=20
economic betterment. This was the main reason why they broke away=20
from West Pakistan to create a new country.
Still poor, the nation has come a long way from the time when every=20
farmer had lost either his bullocks, ploughs or seeds after the=20
withdrawal of the Pakistani forces. The countryside has repaired=20
itself. It is self-reliant. The 1999 cyclone saw farmers managing the=20
ravages of a big calamity though they had skimpy resources. Hardly=20
anyone has gone to the streets of Dhaka, a practice for years to seek=20
help.
Where I see the nation slipping is in its secular ethos. Muslim=20
fundamentalists went berserk in the wake of the victory of Khaleda.=20
So shocked was liberal press opinion that it brought out special=20
editions to highlight the plight of minorities to shame the Muslim=20
majority. In a special issue titled "A Puja marred," The Star, a=20
leading daily, reported how "rape, arson, robbery and forced eviction=20
of Hindu families in some parts of the country, have left the=20
community in shock and fear". Shalier Kabir, author and documentary=20
filmmaker, exposed the naked cruelty against the Hindus. The=20
government imprisoned him for anti-national activities.
When I questioned Khaleda about the incidents, she was defensive. Her=20
explanation was that it had happened mostly at the time when the=20
caretaker government was in power. The other argument she advanced=20
was that it was the "doing of the Awami League," which expected the=20
Hindus to vote for it but "pounced upon them" when it found that they=20
had voted for the BNP. "You can ask the Hindus," she said. "I shall=20
give you their names." When she saw that I looked unconvinced, she=20
said that she had ordered a judicial inquiry. She went on in the same=20
vein to blame the Awami League.
Incidentally, one of the two Jamaat ministers is in charge of the=20
social welfare ministry, which is supposed to look after the Hindu=20
community as well. Khaleda was equivocal on Bangladeh's relations=20
with India. But there was no anti-India remark from her.
She said that there were some kinks. They would have to be ironed=20
out. She was keen on the Ganga water treaty being reviewed. I asked=20
her point-blank to specify the problems between Bangladesh and India.=20
"Tension on the border between the police of both countries," was her=20
reply. Reported infiltration of religious fundamentalists into India=20
may aggravate the problem.
The reason why there are lengthy queues at Dhaka airport is the=20
failure of successive governments to provide opportunities. Even the=20
reservoir of gas, which could have been utilized to keep the wheel of=20
industry in the country moving, has remained untouched. The ruling=20
BNP did not allow the sale of gas when it was in the wilderness. Now=20
the Awami League is deadly opposed to it.
My assessment over the years is that both parties, indeed, both=20
ladies, have done little to solve most of the country's troubles. All=20
that people could do was to ensure that the military stayed in the=20
barracks. They have restored democracy. But what they have failed to=20
do is to put pressure on the two ladies to change. They join them=20
during the agitations. What will happen next? "Much will depend on=20
the groundswell of opinion in our favour," a tall Awami League leader=20
told me when I asked him about the prospects of an agitation to throw=20
out Khaleda.

_____

#3.

DAWN
2 February 2002
http://www.dawn.com/2002/02/02/int10.htm

Extremists again on march in India
By Praful Bidwai

NEW DELHI: India's Hindu fundamentalists are on the march again. Nine=20
years after they shocked the world with their Bamiyan-style=20
demolition of a 16th century mosque at Ayodhya in northern Uttar=20
Pradesh state , they want to build a temple to Lord Ram at that=20
precise site.
Mobilized by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council), the=20
fundamentalists, linked to the Bharatiya Janata Party of India's=20
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, demand that the disputed site be=20
handed over to them by March 12.
The 26.8-hectare plot was taken over by the government under a=20
special law in 1993.
On Jan 20, the World Hindu Council organized a gathering of=20
saffron-clad 'sadhus' (holy men) at Ayodhya to reaffirm the March 12=20
"deadline" and launch a 'chetavani yatra' (warning procession) to New=20
Delhi.
A delegation of 'sadhus' met Vajpayee on Jan 27 and extracted from=20
him a promise that he would try to find a legal solution to the=20
temple dispute.
Vajpayee hedged the promise with the condition that there be a=20
"consensus" within the ruling coalition, the National Democratic=20
Alliance, and that even the opposition parties agree to transfer the=20
disputed land to a Hindu trust to build a temple.
Yet ironically, it is Vajpayee, the so-called Hindu "moderate", who=20
boosted the sectarian temple demand last year by saying it represents=20
the "national sentiment". He also legitimized the March 12 "deadline".
The BJP and the World Hindi Council have a close, symbiotic,=20
"revolving door" relationship. They are both members of the 'sangh=20
parivar' (family), so named after the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh=20
(RSS) or National Volunteers' Union, an all-male, rabidly chauvinist,=20
secret society-like group that believes in a Hindu state.
The union, formed in 1925, is the BJP's ideological mentor, political=20
master and organizational gatekeeper. It also founded the VHP as one=20
of its 200-plus "front" organizations.
The VHP in the 1980s launched a vigorous agitation against the=20
Ayodhya mosque, said to have been built by the first Moghul emperor,=20
Babar, in 1528. Numerous BJP leaders, including two of Vajpayee's=20
most senior ministers, Home Minister Lal Krishan Advani and Education=20
Minister M M Joshi, actively led that movement.
This campaign was crucial to the BJP's growth. The party increased=20
its representation in Parliament's 545-strong Lower House, from two=20
seats to 89 between 1984 and 1989.
The BJP's vote has declined in most parts of India since 1998. The=20
party has suffered serious erosion in Uttar Pradesh, India's largest=20
state, where it faces legislature elections in February.
The revival of the temple campaign is widely seen as the BJP's=20
desperate and cynical, tactic to avert a total rout at the hustings.=20
But the poor response to the 'chetavani yatra' suggests it may not=20
yield votes.
The VHP has trashed Vajpayee's latest assurance. Its international=20
secretary, Praveen Togadia says, it will go ahead with the temple=20
construction no matter what happens. "The survival of the Vajpayee=20
government is not our priority", he said. The group says it will=20
forcibly occupy the Ayodhya site on Feb 24. However, there seem to be=20
divisions within the VHP on the campaign and its timing. Its=20
president and vice-president, far better known than Togadia, did not=20
brief the media. The Feb 24 date suggests that the VHP does not want=20
to embarrass the BJP party during its election campaign, which ends=20
earlier.
The VHP probably will not precipitate a confrontation to the point of=20
putting Vajpayee's government at risk, but some friction between them=20
is not excluded.
The temple issue divides the BJP and its Hindu-chauvinist cohorts not=20
just from the largely secular opposition, but also from the rest of=20
the National Democratic Alliance. No party supports the BJP's=20
position on the temple.
The electoral calculations of Vajpayee's BJP party are only one=20
factor behind the "last stage" of the speeded-up temple campaign.
The other factors have to do with a general hardening of sectarian,=20
anti-secular, anti-pluralist tendencies in India in the wake of Sept=20
11 and the US 'anti-terrorist war', which Vajpayee's right-wing=20
government strongly, uncritically, supports.
The extreme Hindu right reckoned that the "anti-terrorism" platform=20
would help it isolate and attack Muslims and flaunt its Rambo-style=20
'national security state' nationalism.
If the key Hindu fundamentalist groups here are doing a balancing act=20
vis-a-vis the United States, Washington too is doing one vis-a-vis=20
Hindu nationalism. Only a lot of fancy footwork can explain the=20
United States' intimacy with a regime mired in anti-secular and=20
obscurantist politics.-Dawn/The InterPress News Service.

_____

#4.

The Times of India
SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 03, 2002

Will DU give lessons in Karvachauth now?
RASHME SEHGAL
TIMES NEWS NETWORK [ SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 02, 2002 11:53:20 PM ]
NEW DELHI: Move over, mother-in-law. She is no longer the last word=20
on how to observe Karvachauth. Soon there will be 21 universities=20
giving lessons in the finer points of annaprashan, mundan, mahurat,=20
naamkaran, Karvachauth, and more.
The new course for aspiring priests, named Paurohitya Pathyakram,=20
will have its own Department of Karmakand to teach students the=20
nitty-gritty of Vedic rituals as varied as observing shraadh, putting=20
up a wedding mandap, and ways to maintain grahshanti in your home.=20
Like the controversial Vedic astrology course being taught in several=20
universities, this one will offer graduate, post-graduate and Ph.D=20
degrees, and get a special grant from the UGC.
Refusing to give a timeframe for its introduction, UGC chairman Hari=20
Gautam nevertheless points out: ''There is a great demand for trained=20
people from across the globe including the US, the UK, Europe,=20
Indonesia and Malaysia. Unfortunately there are few trained priests=20
available for the job.''
The UGC has currently placed this proposal before the Delhi=20
University's Teachers Association (DUTA) to gauge their response.=20
DUTA president Shaswati Majumdar opposes the move in no uncertain=20
terms. ''What kind of consciousness are they trying to create by=20
introducing such courses? The UGC claims there is a market for them.=20
Tomorrow, if they say there is a market for superstition, will they=20
start pushing that also?'' she asks.
Prof Vijay Verma of the Physics Department believes the teaching of=20
such a course will open the floodgates for all kinds of obscurantism.=20
''This will be one step backwards,'' he says.
Historian Sumit Sarkar finds the move ''absolutely scandalous''. The=20
Constitution, he points out, does not allow state-funded universities=20
to teach any particular religion.
To counter this argument, Gautam has said he would be only too=20
willing to sponsor similar courses in other religions. The UGC has=20
been already flooded with demands to open departments to teach=20
Christian priesthood, Sikhism and Deenyat (training of Muslim clergy).
The texts for the karmakand course have been mostly written by=20
Brahmin priests, including Pt Rambhavan Mishra, Pt Lal Behari Mishra,=20
Dr S Chaturvedi and Vithal Dikshit. Majumdar believes this kind of=20
education is a deliberate bid to subvert India's diverse culture into=20
one homogeneous whole, in accordance with the overall Hindutva=20
gameplan.
''It will also serve to reinforce the status of Brahmins since these=20
rituals are invariably performed by members of this caste,'' she=20
points out. However, some other DUTA members, including Dr N K Kakkar=20
of Ramjas College, find nothing wrong with the course. ''A large=20
number of people believe in rituals and would be happy to learn about=20
them,'' he says.
There are others who point out that the course could have been=20
introduced as part of the already existing Department of Religion.=20
''Funds are being drastically cut in the core subjects, especially in=20
the sciences, and yet they have money to waste on all this mumbo=20
jumbo,'' complains a senior scientist.

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