[sacw] SACW #2 (05 January. 02)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #2 | 5 January 2002
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------
#1. Do We Have To Wait For A War To Bring These Politicians To Their=20
Senses? (TARIQ ALI)
#2. Here is a truth we can all agree on (Kamila Shamsie)
#3. The ISI Facade: Pakistan can fight India only if we have internal
unity. But the ground realities seem entirely different (Hamid Mir)
#4. Bridge over troubled waters (Ashutosh Misra)

________________________

#1.

[Published in The Independent (UK), 4 January 2002]

TARIQ ALI: DO WE HAVE TO WAIT FOR A WAR TO BRING THESE POLITICIANS TO=20
THEIR SENSES?

'On one level, it would suit both sides to have a small war. But who=20
could guarantee a small war?'

05 January 2002

Despite pleas of the new pro-Western regime, Afghanistan is still=20
being bombed. Innocent people die every day. Osama bin Laden is still=20
at large, but attention has already shifted to Pakistan. The=20
destabilising effects of the war in Afghanistan were always likely to=20
be felt here first. The reasons are obvious.

The Pashtun population in Pakistan's North-Western Frontier Province=20
shares linguistic and ethnic ties with the region that formed the=20
principal base of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The same brand of=20
Deobandi Islam is strong on both sides of the border. It is worth=20
stressing that there was less actual fighting on the ground in the=20
last three months than there has been over the last quarter century.=20
The bearded ones chose not to fight. A sizeable section of the=20
Taliban forces simply came back home to Pakistan. Some of them are=20
undoubtedly demoralised and happy to be alive, but there is probably=20
a large minority that is angered by Islamabad's betrayal and is eager=20
to link up with the armed fundamentalist groups already in the=20
country.

The leaders of the most virulent jihadi sects have been arrested, but=20
who will disarm their militants? Until late last year some of the=20
Islamist leaders were boasting that they had chosen 20 cities on=20
which Islamic laws would be imposed. The unstated threat was clear.=20
If any authority attempted to interfere, they would unleash a civil=20
war. When the latest Afghan war began, Washington made no secret of=20
its fear that a massive Western intervention in Afghanistan that=20
overtly used Pakistan as a launching-pad might trigger major unrest=20
or even a coup against a collaborationist regime. The US did=20
everything to maintain decorous appearances for General Musharraf,=20
Pakistan's ruler, while making sure of the practical compliance of=20
Islamabad. In return for this, sanctions were lifted and money and=20
the latest weaponry began to flow into Pakistan once again.

But now that the Taliban have been defeated, can anyone be sure that=20
the various fig-leaves will really insulate Pakistan from the=20
indignation of the faithful? Everything depends on the unity of the=20
officer corps. To some degree, if one difficult to gauge, Sunni=20
fundamentalism has also penetrated the ranks of the armed forces.=20
Across the country, radical Islamism of one kind or another is a=20
vocal, if minority, force. General Musharraf's military regime itself=20
is, moreover, a very recent and none-too-strong creation, with little=20
positive civilian support.

The abandonment of its own creation in Afghanistan will be a bitter=20
pill for many in the army, especially at junior levels of command,=20
where religious influence is strongest. However, even more=20
secular-minded officers are not pleased at the outcome. The Taliban=20
takeover in Kabul was the Pakistan army's only victory. Privately the=20
ruling elite - officers, bureaucrats and politicians - congratulated=20
each other for having gained a new province. It almost made up for=20
the 1971 defection of Bangladesh. As if to rub salt into the wounds,=20
the Northern Alliance and its Washington-selected Prime Minister,=20
Hamid Karzai, have just declared their intention of forging close=20
relations with India, as was the case from 1947-89. This has further=20
weakened the position of the general ruling Pakistan.

It is true that, at more senior levels, the American crusade against=20
the Taliban has been seen as a godsend. For at a stroke it has=20
allowed the Pakistani generals to recover their traditional regional=20
priority for Washington, assured them of credits they desperately=20
need and lifted opposition to their nuclear arsenal. Unlike its Arab=20
counterparts, the Pakistani army has never seen a coup mounted by=20
captains, majors or colonels - when it has seized power, as so often,=20
it has always done so without splits, at the initiative and under the=20
control of its generals (a tradition of discipline inherited from the=20
Raj).

At all events, short of a break in this long-established pattern, it=20
seems unlikely that the top-brass of the Pakistani regime will suffer=20
much from the pieces of silver with which they have been showered.=20
However, the scale of the Pakistani defeat is such that, once the=20
flow of money and weapons ceases, General Musharraf might well be=20
toppled from within. Power-hungry generals have never been a rare=20
commodity in Pakistan.

This is what makes the tension with India potentially dangerous. The=20
irony is that Pakistan is led by a secular general and India by a=20
fundamentalist Hindu politician: an ideal combination to make peace.=20
Yet on one level it would suit both sides to have a small war.=20
General Musharraf could prove that he was not a total pawn. And Atal=20
Bihari Vajpayee, India's Prime Minster, could win an election. The=20
Kashmiris would continue to suffer. But who could guarantee a small=20
war?

The fact is that Pakistan's infiltration of jihadi groups, such as=20
the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, into Indian-occupied=20
Kashmir has created an alternative military apparatus that Islamabad=20
funds and supplies but can't fully control - just like the Taliban.=20
It's obvious that the attack on the Indian Parliament was carried out=20
by one of these groups to provoke a more serious conflict. Some of=20
the jihadis don't much care for Pakistan as an entity. Their aim is=20
to restore Muslim rule in India. Crazy? Yes, but armed and capable of=20
wreaking havoc in both countries. If General Musharraf won't deal=20
with the menace, Mr Vajpayee will.

If Washington can wage its "war on terrorism", why can't Delhi? Just=20
because it can't get retrospective sanction from the UN? But as any=20
Second World politician will tell you, for UN read US. The threat of=20
an Indo-Pak war has concentrated minds in Washington: how to give the=20
Indians their pound of flesh without destabilising Pakistan? Perhaps=20
the time is coming when General Musharraf can be sacrificed in the=20
name of a return to democracy in Pakistan. The problem is that no=20
civilian politician in Pakistan is strong enough to challenge the=20
army, which has ruled the country longer than any political party.

The real solution lies in Kashmir, the cause of a dispute that could=20
lead to nuclear conflict. Kashmiris have suffered long enough. The=20
brutality of the Indian occupation made many of them turn to=20
Pakistan, but the behaviour of the jihadi infiltrators has shocked=20
most Kashmiris. The very thought of Talibanisation has led many=20
educated professionals, male and female, to flee. They would like to=20
be rid of both sides.

An autonomous Kashmir, which shares sovereignty with both India and=20
Pakistan, and even China, could become a haven of peace in the=20
region. Sooner or later the situation will require some such=20
solution, but do we have to wait for a war to bring politicians to=20
their senses?

Verso will publish the writer's 'Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades,=20
Jihads and Modernity' in April

_____

#2.

The Guardian (UK)
Thursday January 3, 2002

Here is a truth we can all agree on

There can't be real friendship between India and Pakistan until two=20
old, angry wounds are healed

Kamila Shamsie

A decade ago, more than 50 of my 96 classmates and I left Karachi to=20
attend university in the US and UK. We didn't give much thought to=20
the fact that many of us would be meeting Indians for the first time=20
in our lives. It's hard now to find anyone among those 50-odd=20
Pakistanis who didn't make at least one Indian friend. But what we=20
all discovered was this: we might agree with our friends from across=20
the border on everything else - our embarrassed attachment to 80s=20
music; our despair at the floundering fortunes of the West Indian=20
cricket team; our inability to eat Uncle Ben's rice without thinking=20
weepily of basmati; our positions on capital punishment, gay rights,=20
abortion, and gun control - but we could not agree, not one whit, on=20
the two interrelated wounds of Indo-Pak relations: partition and=20
Kashmir.

There are worse things, I suppose, than discovering at 18 that, no=20
matter how many books you read and analytical skills you acquire,=20
your truths will never be objective.

It would be nice to say that, after a decade of talk, those Indo-Pak=20
friendships have resulted in a shifting of positions which can serve=20
as an example to the politicians of our two countries. Perhaps this=20
is true in one or two cases. But, largely, we just learned to stop=20
talking about certain things to each other, and accepted that we had=20
grown up with two different narratives about the same events.

If the "two nations, two narratives" issue only centred on the=20
creation of Pakistan 55 years ago, I expect we could learn to live=20
with our differences. But as long as the situation in Kashmir remains=20
unresolved we will continue to see border tensions and doomsday=20
predictions and radically differing interpretations arising from a=20
basic set of facts.

The basic set of facts we are faced with is this: on December 13=20
there was a failed attack on the Indian parliament, and the attackers=20
were killed along with several Indian security personnel.

One narrative surrounding these basic facts goes like this: soon=20
after Israel showed how easy it is to milk the "no distinction=20
between terrorists and those who harbour them" line, gunmen=20
miraculously got through security checks, in a time of heightened=20
alerts, and attempted to destroy the Indian parliament. In a further=20
miracle, none of the ministers were hurt and the terrorists were=20
killed. The Indian government refused to show the faces of the=20
terrorists to reporters, insisted that the terrorists were part of=20
two groups fighting for the liberation of Kashmir (though that is not=20
quite how the Indians phrased it), and that the attack was planned in=20
training camps in Pakistan and involved the collusion of Pakistan's=20
intelligence agency, the ISI. Pakistan offered a joint inquiry into=20
the affair, and India refused.

The other narrative, in which I'm not as well-versed, follows these=20
lines: Pakistan decided to take advantage of its newly warmed=20
friendship with the world's superpower by launching yet another in a=20
long series of attacks on India. Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups=20
attempted to bring the Indian government to its knees by blowing up=20
the Indian parliament. The plan was foiled and the terrorists were=20
killed. If the war against terrorism is to be a global war then=20
surely India must have the right to attack Pakistan. But the US=20
cautioned restraint, and Pakistan, in a brazenly cheeky move,=20
insisted that it be part of the investigation into the attack.

Or, here is the condensed version of the two narratives, which can=20
stand in for the two narratives during any conflict between India and=20
Pakistan.

Narrative one: India always lies.

Narrative two: Pakistan always lies.

But there is an important third narrative. In the first days after=20
President Musharraf came to power in Pakistan more than two years=20
ago, he repeatedly expressed his admiration for the aggressively=20
secular Kemal Ataturk. And then, abruptly, he went silent. It was=20
widely believed that Musharraf was warned against the perils of=20
taking on the hardline religious groups. But in a post-September 11=20
Pakistan the extremists have been dealt a severe blow due to their=20
inability to drum up significant support for their anti-government=20
rallies, and the president has been speaking openly about the need to=20
combat those who have been holding hostage a nation which is=20
essentially moderate.

Pakistan's best chance to move against the extremists is now. But=20
it's one thing for Musharraf to root out terrorists; it's quite=20
another for him to appear to do so at the behest of India. In=20
government circles, it is being said that Musharraf is furious about=20
the attacks on the parliament building, and - more importantly - that=20
India's belligerent demands that he arrest militants are actually=20
slowing down the crackdown on extremists. Perhaps this is the=20
narrative to which more Indians should be paying attention.

For a moment I thought I could end this column on that previous line.=20
But to do so would be to leave out the most important narrative here:=20
that of the 70,000 and more (every week, more) who have died since=20
1990 in the struggle for Kashmir's future. When Indo-Pak narratives=20
clash, the fallout is almost always in Kashmir. India insists there=20
is no genuine struggle for self-determination and that the uprising=20
in Kashmir is Pakistan-sponsored. Pakistan insists it offers only=20
moral support to the Kashmiri struggle.

India lies.

Pakistan lies.

But here is a truth we can all agree on: a solution to the Kashmir=20
dispute must be found so that the phrase "threat of nuclear war" can=20
be consigned to the history books and the next generation of=20
Pakistanis and Indians does not become so accustomed to such a phrase=20
that, in the midst of the massive build-up of troops along the=20
border, it continues to live its life as though nothing out of the=20
ordinary is going on. (I don't know about the major cities of India,=20
but in Karachi New Year was a wildly celebratory affair, and not just=20
among groups who are associated with fiddling during fires.)

And here is another, no less important truth: a solution must be=20
found for the sake of the Kashmiris who have waited far too long=20
already to approve a joint narrative of peace.

=B7 Kamila Shamsie is the author of Salt and Saffron (Bloomsbury, =A36.99)

Guardian Unlimited =A9 Guardian Newspapers Limited 2002

_____

#3.

The Weekly Independent
Jan. 3, 2002
COLUMN

The ISI Facade
Pakistan can fight India only if we have internal
unity. But the ground realities seem entirely
different

By Hamid Mir
Mr. Hamid Mir is the Editor of Daily Ausaf Islamabad
and also writes for some Paksitani and Indian English
Magazines.

Whether to attack Pakistan or not? The Indian
government has given 10 days to its Army to decide on
this important question, while the Indian generals
have already expressed their preparedness for a war.
Military experts in India are of the view that a
limited action in 'Pakistani-administrated Kashmir'
cannot lead to a full-scale war, since the political
situation in Pakistan will not allow the Musharraf
regime to undertake a full-fledged combat.
The war of words between India and Pakistan is
intensifying, with the Indian leaders' statements
giving clear indications that Delhi will not hesitate
to aggress Pakistan. A majority of the analysts here,
however, are reluctant to believe that the two nuclear
powers could actually jump into a war.
India got the opportunity of putting pressure on
Pakistan after the suicide attack on its parliament in
New Delhi on December 13. As the history goes, Bhagat
Singh also bombed the parliament in New Delhi, for
which the British government hanged him in 1930. At
that time, Mahatma Gandhi justified the act declaring
Bhagat Singh a freedom fighter. A few years back,
renowned Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayyar, wrote a
book on Bhagat Singh and incidentally, Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee was the chief guest at the
launching ceremony of that book.
The Indian government is accusing Pakistan's Inter
Services Intelligence and two militant groups,
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad for the
Parliament attack. Reacting, Pakistan government is
asking for concrete evidence. But it appears that the
Indian side does not seem interested in a peaceful
settlement of the issue. The Indian High Commissioner
has been called back, while the reports of a Pakistani
diplomat mugged in the Indian capital have also hit
the headlines. India has further suspended Samjhota
Express and Lahore-Delhi Bus Service, from January 1.
Western diplomats in Islamabad believe that some
Pakistan-based militant organisation might be involved
in the attack on Indian parliament, to boost the
morale of jehadis in Kashmir, who were demoralised
after the fall of the Taliban. But, at the same time,
they hold that Pakistani government is not involved in
the attack. Even the US government does not support
the Indian thesis of Pakistan's involvement. However,
the US has made it clear to Pakistan that it should
crack down on the militant outfits otherwise the
chances of an attack from India could not be ruled
out.
There are two main reasons for India being so hostile
in present circumstances. First, the ISI has come
under attack not only in the western but also in the
Pakistani Press. Second, the government relations with
the jehadi elements and the mainstream political
parties are tense at the moment and a majority of the
militants in Indian occupied Kashmir are demoralised
after the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
As the Press in Pakistan continues to castigate the
ISI, rightly or wrongly, it has provided India with
'ideal' situation to exploit. Some time back, Newsline
of Karachi accused the ISI for sectarian terrorism in
the country. Later, Herald started picking on the
spying agency. In the December 2001 issue of Herald,
its Editor Aamer Ahmed Khan wrote: "Senior police
officials in Punjab are convinced to this day that ISI
officers were instrumental in engineering the escape
of dreaded terrorist Riaz Basra from a trial court in
Lahore. At one point, the Military Intelligence wrote
to the government complaining against the ISI's
'training methods'. Among other things, the MI asked
why the ISI was training militants to shoot from
motorbikes given that motorbikes have never been
preferred mode of transportation for militants active
inside Kashmir. Many senior army and police officers
attribute sectarian attacks inside Pakistan to the
militants trained by ISI."
Discussing the ISI role in national politics, only a
few would disagree that people like Hameed Gul, Asad
Durrani and Ziaudin Butt have brought a bad name to
this institution. Hameed Gul openly admitted that as
DG ISI he formed a political alliance against the
Pakistan People's Party in 1988. Asad Durrani
submitted an affidavit with the Supreme Court,
admitting that as ISI chief, he was asked by Nawaz
Sharif to distribute money among politicians and
journalists, in a bid to ensure the defeat of the PPP
in the 1990 elections. While Hameed Gul and Asad
Durrani represent the facade of ISI, not many people
know about the services of the agency inside and
outside the country for the cause of national
security. It is so lamentable that the acts of a few
black sheep have brought a bad name to the ISI.
Today, the political pigmies of Pakistan, be it Farooq
Leghari or anybody else, know quite well that they
cannot win the elections without getting an NOC
(no-objection certificate) from the ISI. The chief
editor of an Urdu daily advised Begum Abida Hussain
the other day at a dinner that if she wanted to get
more seats in the coming election, she must develop
good relations with the internal wing of ISI. He even
named a serving ISI major general who could help Abida
win elections. It is a pity that names of serving ISI
officers are discussed in the political circles and
this is the root-cause of the problem.
I personally believe that the ISI must stop its
political operations in the interest of its own
existence. Moreover, militant outfits like
Jaish-e-Muhammad should be disbanded whose leadership
is very close to the sectarian parties. Few people
know that Jaish chief Maulana Masood Azhar wrote an
article sometime ago against Lashkar-e-Taiba with some
serious sectarian implications. The Jaish was raised
and patronised by none other than Lt Gen Mehmood
Ahmad, the recently retired ISI chief.
The general made two major moves as ISI director
general. Firstly, he pressurised Hizbul Mujahideen for
a premature cease-fire in 2000 and used Jaish to
destabilise Lashkar and Harkatul Mujahideen. Lately,
the same Jaish has turned out to be a major threat for
the whole Kashmir movement.
I believe Pakistan can fight India only if we have
internal unity. But the ground realities seem entirely
different. The national Press continues to criticise
the ISI, which is adamant to create further rifts
between the PPP and PML. The government, on the other
hand, has put the topmost religious leaders behind the
bars. Their supporters and activists are critical of
the government policy and thus bitterly oppose General
Musharraf.
This could be an ideal situation for India to attack
Pakistan. We must get united to repulse the expected
Indian attack and for this, not only Musharraf but ISI
should also take some positive steps. I have no doubt
that Masood Azhar has indirectly served a lot to the
interests of Indians and the anti-jehad forces in and
outside Pakistan. All those, who allowed and
facilitated him in launching Jaish-e-Muhammad did no
favour to the Kashmir movement.
One wonders if Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Professor Hafiz
Muhammad Saeed could be pressurised to quit in favour
of Abdul Wahid Kashmiri, why not a similar formula be
applied on Masood Azhar, who is apparently working on
American agenda. Meanwhile, with the threat of an
Indian attack looming over Pakistan, the Musharraf
regime seems to be in total isolation. The regime had
already pushed the two mainstream political parties -
the PPP and PML, to the wall. The religious parties
too have turned against the regime for siding with the
US. Under these circumstances, it would be most
appropriate for General Musharraf to go for a national
reconciliation drive to mend fences with mainstream
political parties.

Mr. Hamid Mir is the Editor of Daily Ausaf Islamabad
and also writes for some Paksitani and Indian English
Magazines.

_____

#4.

The Hindustan Times
Saturday, January 5, 2002
=20=20=09=20
Bridge over troubled waters
By Ashutosh Misra

If the Indus Waters Treaty becomes a casualty of spiralling tensions=20
between India and Pakistan, this would be most unfortunate for both=20
countries - apart from denigrating all those negotiators, engineers=20
and decision-makers who had toiled day and night to see through a=20
13-year-long marathon effort.

The treaty, facilitated by the World Bank, was signed on September=20
19, 1960, between Jawaharlal Nehru and Field Marshal Ayub Khan. It is=20
one of the few examples of a successful settlement of a major=20
international river basin conflict. The treaty has withstood the test=20
of time and survived all highs and lows of India-Pakistan relations.=20
It also provides answers to many present diplomatic and political=20
riddles.

The standard literature on negotiations mentions four stages:=20
ripeness of the issue, pre-negotiations, negotiations and the=20
agreement. Application of this framework on the Indus waters=20
negotiations may facilitate our understanding of the dynamics of=20
successful negotiating in the future.

What made the Indus waters issue 'ripe' was that both nations were=20
anxious to reach a settlement through a mutually agreed approach to=20
resolve it. Considering the technicality of the issue and the=20
financial resources it demanded, both India and Pakistan agreed to=20
involve the World Bank. With its technical and financial assistance,=20
the negotiators, engineers and political leaders of the two nations=20
agreed to a framework within which negotiations were conducted.

There also existed a shared perception of the desirability of an=20
accord on both the sides. India and Pakistan were eager to solve the=20
problem as they knew that its resolution would accrue enormous=20
economic dividends. Besides, Nehru and Ayub Khan were politically=20
strong enough not only to conclude an accord but also to implement=20
it. This catapulted the dispute to a maturity point where=20
negotiations could be launched.

During his visit in 1951 to India and later to Pakistan , David=20
Lilienthal of the Tennessee Valley Authority convinced the two=20
leaders of the benefits of a settlement. He even argued that by=20
developing the full potential of the Indus system, the ongoing=20
Kashmir problem could be muted, if not resolved. After initial=20
discussions (read pre-negotiation), India and Pakistan then formally=20
agreed to participate in the meeting of engineers. The World Bank=20
thus found a way out of the impass=E9 reached in bilateral discussions=20
between the parties.

The pre-negotiations period - from February 1951 (when Lilienthal=20
visited India) to March 1952 (when formal negotiations started) -=20
centred around India and Pakistan 'defining the problem', 'developing=20
commitment to negotiation' and 'arranging the negotiations'. In this=20
period, the two countries moved from considering conflicting=20
unilateral solutions to a search for a cooperative multilateral or=20
joint solution.

The first crucial element that made for success in the negotiations=20
phase was that it had a pragmatic and rational - rather than a=20
political - drive. There was also a broad understanding that the=20
waters of the Indus rivers system "should be solved on a functional=20
basis independently of political issues". Codified law, legal=20
principles and procedures were preceded by principles of water=20
resources development, irrigation and engineering.

The second factor was the composition of the working party. The=20
principal negotiators were engineers and administrators rather than=20
diplomats or political leaders. There was no political point to score=20
and no place for rhetoric or inflammatory debating tactics. The=20
working party consisted of engineers who dealt with the=20
technicalities and the discussions were controlled by the lawyers.=20
But significantly, considerable emphasis was placed by both sides on=20
the need to secure agreement on at least some part of the work to be=20
done jointly and avoiding the talks to break down.

The third factor was that the negotiators possessed intimate=20
knowledge of the subject matter of the negotiations. They had respect=20
for one another and enjoyed a pleasant rapport. Through their=20
experience, they overcame occasional obstacles and were not at all=20
bothered by public opinion.

The fourth important factor was the faith the leaders had in their=20
negotiators. As a result, the latter enjoyed greater autonomy of=20
action and decision-making. Critical decisions were taken at the=20
political level, but the protracted and complex negotiations were=20
conducted by senior professional officers or engineers.

The fifth crucial element was the skill and ability of World Bank's=20
team and its financial assistance. The bank was able to raise $ 1=20
billion for the replacement of canals - an important consideration=20
for Pakistan in the final outcome. The World Bank played more than a=20
financial role. It did not have any political leverage, but its=20
ability to bring in friendly countries with financial commitments was=20
a key feature. At various stages, the bank's subtle threats to=20
withdraw pressurised both parties to make compromises.

The sixth critical factor was the venue of the negotiations. The=20
negotiations were eventually held in Washington - far from the=20
subcontinent. This enabled the negotiators to pay full attention to=20
the work, away from distractions at home and saved them from=20
reporting on a daily basis to their governments. Not much public=20
debate occurred, since the negotiators could not be approached by=20
their national media.

The seventh and very important factor which helped in the negotiation=20
was the political stability in both countries at crucial moments.=20
>From 1947 to 1960, India was stable under Jawaharlal Nehru. Pakistan,=20
however, had a chequered political history with Mohammed Ali Jinnah,=20
Liaquat Ali, Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Chaudhary Muhammad Ali,=20
H.S. Suhrawardy, I.I. Chundrigar and Firoz Khan Noon playing musical=20
chairs. But after Field Marshal Ayub Khan assumed power in 1958,=20
there was a relatively stable internal political situation.

Before 1958, weak and changing governments in Pakistan often put its=20
negotiators in difficult positions. Sometimes, the government gave=20
conflicting instructions and assigned roles to foreign engineers and=20
lawyers. With Ayub Khan in command, within two years the Indus treaty=20
was signed.

The eighth factor was India's accommodative attitude. International=20
law did not impose limitations on the freedom of a State to use=20
waters at their own discretion. But Indian leaders of the time viewed=20
the problem of water as a human problem capable of being solved on=20
the basis of humanitarian considerations. The contents of the treaty=20
show the extent of India's compromise on the issue. The financial=20
assistance which India also extended to Pakistan was also an=20
important gesture.

The last and most important factor was that the two parties -=20
particularly Pakistan - agreed to de-link the dispute from the=20
resolution of the Kashmir issue. The treaty itself, however, dealt=20
with the water problem in isolation and a provision was made in=20
Article XI to the effect that the water settlement would not=20
constitute any recognition or waiver of any rights or claims=20
whatsoever other than those expressly recognised or framed in the=20
treaty.

It was essential that the problem of waters should be separated from=20
the intricate legal and political issues involved in the Kashmir=20
question. The spirit of compromise displayed in regard to this=20
problem, it was hoped, would eventually permeate the consideration of=20
other issues.

The Indus Waters Treaty came to be written with extreme care and=20
precision so that its implementation did not pose any major=20
obstacles. The nine elements of success mentioned above contributed=20
to the eventual success of the treaty and stand relevant even after=20
four decades.

The writer is Programme Consultant, Malaviya Centre for Peace=20
Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, Banaras Hindu University

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