[sacw] SACW #2. (11 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #2.
11 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1.[ 2 articles by MB Naqvi]
- Pakistan India: if these two countries genuinely reconcile with each othe=
r...
- Beware of bearers of Eid gifts
#2. India: A Brief Survey of Communal Situation in the Post=20
Babri-Demolition Period
(Asghar Ali Engineer)
#3. India: In Early December Every Year (Dilip D'Souza)
#4. Jihad's Lost Battalions Mourned by Pakistani Kin (John F. Burns)
#5. India: Hindutva ire (Praful Bidwai)
#6. Book Proposal: "A Framework For Modernization, Democratization=20
and Secularization in the Muslim World" (Ishtiaq Ahmed)

________________________

#1.
Pakistan India: if these two countries genuinely reconcile with each other
by MB Naqvi
Karachi December 10:

Now that SAARC summit is scheduled to meet in Khatmandu on Jan 4-6 next
year, the old query returns: would the Indian Prime Minister and
Pakistan's President meet on the sidelines of that Summit? There is now
no dialogue at any level between the two countries that otherwise are
neighbours with thousand and one commonalties that require cooperation
and coordination. This has been so since July --- a long long time for a
non barat.

Reports reaching here are that the main constituencies that support the
BJP government in New Delhi --- led by Sangh Parivar and strongly
supported by Indian media and the security establishment --- are going
ahead with the efforts to isolate Pakistan by driving a wedge between
the US and Pakistani. Emphasis on cross-border terrorism is thought to
be the likeliest wedge to do the job. What follows is the advice to PM
A.B. Vajpayee not to meet Gen. Musharraf in Khatmandu thus repeating his
last September's performance in New York. It amounts to a strong
pressure on Vajpayee.

On the other hand, virtually the whole world is counselling both
countries to sit down and sort out their differences. There is an
unending stream of PMs and FMs who are offering their services as
mediators, if the two cannot manage to start talking themselves. South
Block has a stock answer: 'no thank you'. But this does not dampen the
mediatory enthusiasm of the rest of the world, nor does New Delhi tire
of repeating its mantra without further movement. Pakistan, of course,
wins debating points by going on requesting each Foreign Minister or PM
or President even at hailing distance to please mediate and is otherwise
anxious for the resumption of dialogue with India at any level.

By offering unwanted mediation, the foreigners do not wish to embarrass
India. They are just frightened of what might happen if the two nuclear
powers, so bitterly divided over Kashmir and working hectically against
each other's interests, do not return to the negotiating table. If they
do not talk, they will have to fight. That carries the risk of their
using nuclear weapons. Hence the panic and offers of good offices. The
fears of nuclear exchange are heightened by Pakistan's assertions that
it reserves the right to make the first strike. Even otherwise,
possession of nuclear weapons is itself a reason for their use. Look at
the US. In its utterly unequal war with Taliban, it has weighed quite
seriously the use of nuclear weapons.

Isn't there anything in the general fear of a nuclear exchange on the
Subcontinent? True, India's security establishment has convinced itself
that it can safely take the next logical step in Kashmir --- the pursuit
of Mujahedin into Azad Kashmir. Pakistan's military Junta makes no bones
about it: it will use its deterrent early enough, depending upon actual
circumstances. It impresses most foreigners as being likely enough, even
if the Indian leadership affects to believe that Pakistan will not dare.

There is no way to be too sure about the issue. But the consequences of
the total deadlock between India and Pakistan, with no realistic hopes
of earnest negotiations, need to be considered. A preliminary
cost-benefit analysis of this stand-off should be made by each country:
what will it lose and what can it expect to gain from resuming the
dialogue as such --- not just an isolated summit. But above and beyond
such partial and short-term considerations, there are other and more
serious issues to consider.

In the earlier stages of Musharaf's July visit to India, Vajpayee was
concerned about the 'vision thing'. There must be a view of what the two
countries want to be in the long run and whether they find the
international situation around them to be congenial and helpful; or is
it constricting their freedom of action that may go on becoming more
constricting. Apart from the rhetoric of the military regime in
Islamabad, there are serious issues in Pakistan and India that need
cooperation and coordination between New Delhi and Islamabad, in
addition to Kashmir.

One hears there is euphoria in India's powerful middle class over the US
War on Terrorism and the growth of Indo-US ties, including military
ones, as the creation of a helpful climate for India to achieve its
objectives: suppressing terrorism within India --- in Kashmir, the
northeast and central and peninsular regions, attracting more American
capital and dual-purpose technology and to emerge as a pre-eminent power
in South Asia --- amidst mutually beneficial cooperation with the US.

It is to be hoped that greyheads in India have not forgotten to look at
things, especially the new Asian order now being blasted into shape by
the US in central Asia and Ariel Sharon in the Middle East (preparing to
swallow Palestinian Authority and moving toward what might become the
final solution of the Palestinian Problem) and the US is apparently
weighing moves that might change the maps in not only West Asia but also
elsewhere in Asian regions.

There is a notion abroad that the ongoing changes in the Asian situation
are the results of forces that are larger and more powerful than either
India or Pakistan. There is anyhow very little thinking about any
possible dispensation other than the Pax Americana; this latter is
commonly regarded as semi-ordained by God. A simple analysis can be made
to see the difference between two situations:

One is of course the existing one of Pakistan and India staying aloof
and mentally at war with one another. The immediate consequence is that
they cancel each other's influence on the course of events even around
themselves. Witness how easily Pakistan's proxies have been plucked and
thrown out of power in Afghanistan; Pakistan is the odd man out in
Afghanistan despite its 25 year long effort.

Now consider the impact on areas and events around them if these two
countries genuinely reconcile with each other --- at people-to-people
level as France and Germany did --- and begin speaking with one voice.
The whole scene in Asia would have been different if some such thing
could be achieved earlier. Things can begin changing seriously if they
do so in near future.

o o o

[Mon, 10 Dec 2001]

Beware of bearers of Eid gifts
By M. B. Naqvi

The first was Air Marshal Asghar Khan, a politician of unimpeachable
integrity, who vouchsafed that President Pervez Musharraf will hold
elections to National and Provincial Assemblies by the due date and that
he will seek confirmation or re-election from the Assemblies in November
next year. The bearer of second set of gifts was Syed Anwar Mahmoud, the
Information Secretary. Said he that the President will promulgate as
many as four laws to regulate the media before Eid.

While one cannot but welcome the prospect of elections by the date,
provided they are truly free and well-prepared, Anwar=92s Eid gifts are
more questionable. No one need question his bonafides; Musharraf
government has so far conducted itself admirably vis-=E0-vis the media,
especially the press. And it has been rewarded thereby. That has been,
so far, its only plus point for the outside world; free press and media
have been specially beneficial to the General himself; it was the
credibility of the uncensored give and take of his famous breakfast at
Agra that gave him the flattering image of being straight-talking and
straight-dealing man. One hopes he and his government will remember
that.

To establish the credibility of the polls in the eyes of the Pakistanis
themselves and the rest of the world, a lot will have to be done by the
general himself. He has to find a Chief Election Commissioner with
adequate power and experience for being able to ensure that sections of
bureaucracy are not able to manipulate the processes of polling,
counting and announcing to produce Zia-like "positive results".
Personality of the CEC matters. Look at the example of Mr. Seshan as the
CEC of India; he changed the very concept of a CEC's powers. He was not
a retired judge. He could put the powerful Indian bureaucracy where it
belonged: actually subservient to the CEC and through him to the people
for the duration. His bureaucratic background --- he was a Secretary to
GoI --- enabled him to conduct the polls in a free as well as orderly
manner and implemented many a necessary reform that had seemed too
difficult to effect. We too may need someone with ample bureaucratic
experience, proven integrity and tact such as the former Vice Chancellor
of Quaid-e-Azam University who rid the institution of many ills of
factionalism and politics.

The steps that are vital --- increasing the number of seats in each
Assembly, delimitation of constituencies and up to date electoral rolls,
lowering the voting age, abolishing the separate electorate etc --- need
to be taken now. In some cases intricate dovetailing of processes will
have to be done if the deadline has to be met by October next. But these
steps presuppose prior changes in the constitution; the procedure and
credibility of the changes being as important as the merits of the
change itself. Time is of the essence and its seems the General has in
fact fallen behind his own schedule.

In the aftermath of the War in Afghanistan Musharraf government has to
face three major domestic crises, both legacies of so many previous
government under the influence of his own institution, the Army: the
delayed reactions to the decimation of Taliban power in Afghanistan.
Secondly, the focus of international Coalition against Terror is likely
to shift from Taliban to Kashmir. That is likely to create an even
bigger Crisis for the Army regime. Thirdly, regularisation of his
confirmation as the Eighth Amendment kind of President, together with
constitutional amendments=92 merits and procedure, are also sure to cause
controversy. How does it propose to cope with these crises?

Which is where the gifts borne by Anwar Mahmoud come in. That the
Information Ministry, with its history and the mind set created by long
experience of a basically non-democratic institution, has felt rather
naked without power-conferring laws during the post-Junejo period is
known. That it has been hankering after new laws is also known. How many
manoeuvres on codes of conduct for Journalists, a Press Council of many
shapes and powers and laws to "regulate" the media it has not been
making is on record.

It is hard to see why "regulation" of the media is thought necessary.
Take the case of the press, perhaps the most important medium for
opinion-making. There is supposedly no one to issue the Declarations for
new publications. While a new authority --- Nazims? --- can easily be
found, the question is why should it be necessary? What functions does a
Declaration perform? There can be many ways to count the periodicals. It
is a relic of an ugly past. President Musharraf now enjoys full US
support. Is it the reason why he needs more laws for the media?

At any rate, tampering with the freedom of the press --- if anyone is
thinking of it --- can be dangerous for a non-democratic ruler --- yes,
especially for him. Pakistan press has remained controlled and
regimented for many decades. What did it, and the rigidly controlled
electronic media, do for the dictators? Did Ayub Khan remain in power
because of the media control? Did this control enabled him to rule one
day longer than what the next dictator in line permitted? Could Yahya
Khan stay longer than the end of the tacit support of other generals?
Similarly no civilian leader could rely on media support to last his or
her full term simply because of media support. A regimented media is no
help to any ruler, least of all to dictators. They get punished for
inevitably believing their own lies.

As for there being too many satellite channels, most of them hostile to
Pakistan, the bureaucracy sees the urgent need for regulating them. It
is going to be a losing battle if anyone thinks he can make it
impossible for a channel to be received here. The first casualty of the
effort will be to discredit the local channels as so many propaganda
outlets; people will hanker after BBC and CNN and many in the process
swallow their slants and implicit prejudices. While there might be a
case of simple regulation to avoid confusion in wavelengths and for
other technological reasons. But none for favouring this and
disfavouring of that channel. Let the people choose what they want to
hear or see.

Pakistani journalists have done without a written code of conduct or
ethics or a government-approved Press Council all these years. They are
none the worse for it. Their conduct by professional standards has been
satisfactory, not counting the linguistic competence in the English
language press. A specific body with some authority, with or even
without government participation, runs the risk of meddling by the
government. Why should it be allowed to do so? More so in times of
intense political controversies in which the government may be a party.

There are sure to be major controversies in near future, apart from
Taliban and extremism, on the Kashmir policy and on the way Mr.
Musharraf proposes to remain an all-powerful President, not to mention
the merits of constitutional amendments. Buoyed by American support, is
Mr. Musharraf trying to copy the methodology through which other
military strongmen stayed in power for a decade? Times change. Old ways
may no longer help. He would be well advised to reflect on his two years
plus and analyse how much he has gained from a free press and from mere
intimations of a glasnost in the PTV through a relatively free
discussion of national issues. He would be well advised to leave the well
alone.

______

#2.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF COMMUNAL SITUATION IN THE POST BABRI-DEMOLITION PERIOD
by Asghar Ali Engineer

(Secular Perspective December 1, 2001)

It is about 10 years since demolition of Babri Masjid on=20
6th December 1992. The demolition of Babri Masjid itself was a major=20
event, which seriously dented our commitment to secularism. The=20
demolition also created a serious crisis of identity for Indian=20
Muslims and resulted in earth-shaking riots in Mumbai and number of=20
other places in India. In this article we will take a brief look at=20
the communal situation in India in the post-Babri demolition period.
As pointed out above the demolition of Babri Masjid was=20
followed by outburst of communal violence throughout India=20
particularly in Bombay, Ahmedabad, Surat, Calcutta, Kanpur, Malegaon,=20
Bhopal, Delhi and several other places in which hundreds of people=20
lost their lives. In fact the whole decade of eighties and early=20
nineties was a period of great communal crisis.

As it is well-known the Ram Mandir controversy was purely=20
political one; it was neither religious nor even historical in=20
nature. Most eminent historians belonging to secular schools of=20
thought maintained firmly that there is absolutely no historical or=20
archaeological proof for existence of any temple at the site of the=20
Babri mosque. When confronted with the historical and archaeological=20
arguments the Sangh Parivar leaders changed the line of arguments and=20
started saying that it is not historical matter alone, it is=20
basically a matter of faith for the Hindus.
However, in this article we are more concerned with the=20
post-Babri demolition decade and communal situation therein than all=20
these endless arguments. As pointed out the Ram Mandir controversy=20
was raised only to polarise votes between Hindus and Muslims. And=20
there is no doubt that the BJP was great political beneficiary of=20
this controversy. It went on increasing its seats in parliament=20
thanks to the Ram Mandir controversy and through strategic alliances=20
in the elections. It had increased its strength from two to 88 seats=20
in Parliament in 1989 elections itself with the help of this=20
controversy and through alliance with V.P.Singh's Janata Dal and=20
other secular parties. In 1991 elections this controversy was at its=20
height and the BJP further increased its strength from 89 to 114.

The Narsimha Rao Government, however, continued for full=20
term until 1996. In this election though the BJP increased its=20
strength further. However, it was isolated from other secular=20
parties. It tried to form its government on the basis of being the=20
largest party and hoped that once it forms government other 'secular'=20
parties will be tempted to support it for temptation of power.=20
However, until then the secular parties considered the BJP as really=20
untouchable and refused to come to its rescue. Thus the BJP=20
Government failed after 13 days in existence. And Janata Dal was=20
invited to take the reins of power as it managed to gather necessary=20
strength in parliament.

Then it appeared as if the secular parties cared for=20
ideology and refused to compromise with communal forces. But this=20
situation lasted but for a short period and soon number of 'secular'=20
parties teamed up with the BJP to ride piggyback to power. It is true=20
that in the post-modernist world ideologies have lost all meaning.=20
However, religious ideologies are gaining in strength and hence=20
religious fundamentalism has gained in strength all over the globe.=20
In India Hindu fundamentalism, as in Pakistan Islamic fundamentalism=20
has gained in strength considerably. But for temptation for power by=20
these secular parties the BJP would not have been in a position to=20
lead the NDA coalition.

Meanwhile the Shiv Sena -BJP alliance came to power in=20
Maharashtra. It is interesting to note that under the Congress=20
Government at the Centre and in Maharashtra the Muslims had suffered=20
so much that in sheer desperation a small section of Muslims voted=20
for the Shiv Sena candidates. Their argument was that it is better to=20
deal with a known enemy than with a hidden enemy. There was also=20
another contributory factor to the victory of Shiv Sena-BJP alliance=20
in 1995.

Angered by the 1992-93 riots in Mumbai in which about=20
1000 people had died or disappeared, some anti-social elements=20
allegedly led by Dawood Ibrahim and it's cohorts and aided and=20
abetted by Pakistan's ISI. It naturally had greatly angered the=20
people of Maharashtra. The Government in Maharshtra at that time was=20
of the Congress and was headed by Shri Sharad Pawar. Also the Shiv=20
Sena made several promises to the voters like providing free houses=20
to the slum dwellers of Mumbai. All this combined the Shiv Sena-BJP=20
alliance won the 1995 assembly elections.

The BJP of course cashed in on the Ram Mandir sentiments. The=20
Maharashtra was one of the most affected states by the Ram Mandir=20
controversy. The RSS was after all founded by a section of Brahmins=20
in Maharshtra. The Success of the Shiv Sena-BJP alliance was partly=20
the result of Babri Masjid-Ramjanambhoomi controversy. The bomb blast=20
in March 1993, which was result of Mumbai riots of 1992-93 also, as=20
pointed out, contributed to the success of Shiv Sena-BJP alliance in=20
Maharashtra.

COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN POST-BABRI DEMOLITION PERIOD
It is interesting to note that the number of major=20
communal riots in post-Babri Masjid demolition period went down=20
considerably. Three major riots took place in this period, besides=20
several small riots in which 2 to 6 persons were killed. These three=20
major riots are Coimbatore in in Tamilnadu in1997, Kanpur in U.P. in=20
March 2001 and Malegaon in Maharashtra in October 2001. In Coimbatore=20
riots more than 40 persons were killed while in Kanpur and Malegaon=20
more than 15 persons were killed. In between these major riots more=20
than 150 small riots have taken place throughout India since the=20
Mumbai riots of 1992-93.

However, absence of major riots should not delude us to=20
conclude that the communal situation has eased in India in the=20
post-Babri demolition period. Far from it. It has, on the contrary=20
worsened. Two important trends are quite noticeable in this period.=20
The South India which was relatively free of communalism and communal=20
violence began to experience outburst of communal violence. Thus the=20
Coimbatore communal riot and subsequent bomb blast there during=20
February 1998 is symptomatic of this. The Coimbatore communal riot=20
was result of aggressive communal propaganda by the Hindu Munnani=20
which gave rise to some Muslim youth taking to path of violence to=20
pay the Hindu Munnani in the same coin. Some Muslim youth murdered=20
RSS activists and the Hinud Munnani people murdered Palani Baba, a=20
Muslim saint who was allegedly the inspiration of the Muslim=20
fundamentalist youth. Ms. Jaylalitha also tried to take advantage of=20
the situation and adopted rather pro-Hindutva stance. It is alleged=20
that the Hindu Munnani got political support from her.

The second noticeable trend was anti-Christian attacks=20
after the BJP came to power in Gujrat and after the BJP-led=20
Government consolidated its power at the Centre. The attacks on=20
Christians were not known earlier. Communal riots usually took place=20
between Hindus and Muslims. However, since 1998 anti-Christian=20
violence began and mainly the VHP and Bajrang Dal were involved in=20
these attacks on Christians. After Gujrat number of incidents took=20
place in U.P., Maharashtra, M.P., Bihar and Orissa. Orissa witnessed=20
the ghastly incident of burning alive of a Christian priest Father=20
Grahm Staines and his two young children at the hands of Bajrang Dal=20
activists. The Wadhwa Commission report also concluded that Bajrang=20
Dal had a hand in this ghastly incident.

The Gujrat also witnessed number of anti-Muslim incidents=20
particularly in the rural areas after the BJP assumed power in=20
Gujrat. The BJP adopted most aggressive communal stance in Gujrat in=20
the post-Babri demolition period. The Bajrang Dal and VHP cadres=20
adopted very aggressive stance against Christian and Muslim=20
minorities in that highly communalised state.

Since the BJP came to power at the Centre it has to be=20
rather cautious in communal matters to keep the alliance together.=20
Various secular partners of the National Democratic Front have to=20
care for their minority, especially Muslim voters in their respective=20
states, particularly in Andhra Pradesh. It, therefore, keeps out of=20
the Hindutva agenda, which still includes construction of Ram temple=20
in Ayodhya. But the other constituents of the Sangh Parivar like the=20
Vishwa Hindu Parishad have no such constraints. Thus its office=20
bearers like Mr. Singhal and Pravin Togaria openly talk of starting=20
the construction of Ram temple at Ayodhya from March 2002. The Sangh=20
Parivar is not only keeping the issue alive but is also exploiting it=20
for the forthcoming elections in U.P. in early 2002.

Since the NDA Government led by BJP has come to power the=20
education system has been greatly communalised. It is well known=20
policy of the BJP to take over most sensitive like Human Resource=20
Ministry which not only controls education but also premier research=20
institutions like the ICHR, ICSSR, NCERT etc. All these key research=20
institutions have now been taken over by the hard core RSS elements.=20
All key research projects are being now monopolised by them. The=20
important Towards Freedom volumes which were critical of the RSS role=20
during freedom struggle and its pro-British stance were suddenly=20
withdrawn from publication. Also, the school text books are being=20
tempered with. Recently the CBSE (Central Board of Secondary=20
Education) suddenly has issued circular to edit out certain portions=20
of history text books written by noted secular historians like Romila=20
Thapar, R.S.Sharma, Bipan Chandra and Satish Chandra. Such selective=20
withdrawal will help indoctrination of young minds and will be=20
prohibitive of encouraging critical understanding of history. The=20
communal forces often temper with history and project the past=20
uncritically as the golden era particularly the past dominated by the=20
majority community rulers and denounce whole sale the past if=20
dominated by minority community rulers.

CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that India has been passing through=20
very critical period in the post-Babri demolition period as far as=20
its secular polity is concerned. Not only political but also social=20
and cultural space has been communalised. The eighties of course=20
witnessed major communal riots but the BJP began to acquire strength=20
by raising historical controversy like the Ramjanambhoomi and=20
communalised politics as never before. But after it came to power as=20
a major partner of NDA it began to monopolise the educational and=20
cultural space which is much more harmful. The Sangh Parivar in U.P.=20
did not allow shooting of the film Water whose script was approved by=20
the Home Ministry. Indian cultural space is being increasingly=20
communalised. Secular space in the fields of education and culture is=20
of vital importance for unity and integrity of India. A long term=20
damage will be done to Indian unity if socio-cultural spaces come=20
under communal ideology. All secular forces should come together to=20
prevent this.

(Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, Mumbai.[India])

______

#3.

Rediff.com
December 7, 2001
http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/07dilip.htm

Dilip D'Souza

In Early December Every Year

Seventeen years ago this week, a cloud of noxious gas seeped out from=20
a large factory in Bhopal. Swift and silent, it spread over the=20
surrounding areas, where thousands of unsuspecting Indians lay=20
asleep. Several thousand died. The health of many more thousands was=20
damaged to the extent that they feel the effects even today; to the=20
extent that their children born in later years feel the effects as=20
well.

Books have been written about the Bhopal gas disaster of December 3,=20
1984, films made, talks given, seminars held, letters dispatched,=20
demands made, radio programmes broadcast (I appeared on one such, all=20
the way back in 1989) ... on and on, all kinds of things. And yet to=20
me two features of that tragedy stand out today, seventeen years=20
later. One, nobody of any particular significance has been punished=20
for what happened. Two, there's a general impatience with the subject=20
in India, a feeling that this is now ancient history and why is=20
anyone bothering with it at all? And to me that second feature is far=20
more disturbing than the first, which is bad enough by itself.

Nine years ago this week, a crowd of noxious goons gathered around a=20
large mosque in Ayodhya. Swiftly but not really silently, egged on by=20
some of the most prominent people in India today, they swarmed onto=20
the mosque and tore it down. As swiftly, vicious rioting broke out in=20
several parts of the country. The worst was in my city, Bombay, where=20
about a thousand ordinary Indians were murdered over the next two=20
months; another month or so later, a supposedly "retaliatory" series=20
of bombs killed another 250-300 ordinary Indians.

And yes, books have been written about the demolition of the Babri=20
Masjid on December 6, 1992, and the violence that followed. Films=20
have been made, talks given, seminars held, demands made, letters=20
dispatched ... on and on, all kinds of things. And again, to me two=20
features of this tragedy stand out today, nine years later. One,=20
nobody of any particular significance has been punished for the=20
crimes we all witnessed then. Two, there remains that general=20
impatience with this subject as well, a feeling that it's all ancient=20
history and why is anyone paying it any attention? And yet again,=20
that second feature disturbs me far more than the first, bad as the=20
first is.

Indeed: it is one great Indian shame that we remain profoundly unable=20
or unwilling to punish those who commit crimes. In the case of Bhopal=20
we can at least point at the unsuccessful, if feeble, efforts we have=20
made to extradite the officials of Union Carbide. This leaves a=20
number of other questions still unanswered -- for example, about the=20
lackadaisical distribution of compensation money to victims -- but at=20
least we have demanded their extradition. But in the case of so many=20
other crimes -- whether the 1984 massacre of Sikhs or the destruction=20
of the Babri Masjid or the riots that erupted afterwards or something=20
else -- there is not even the question of extradition. We know who=20
the guilty are, we have had inquiries that name them, they live among=20
us right here in India -- and yet the years pass without even a sign=20
that we will punish them.

The still greater Indian shame lies right there. In how we let the=20
years pass, how we let that passing itself become reason to gloss=20
over crime.

Yet we all mourn the increasing venality of our politics, the rising=20
crime in our cities, the corruption that is endemic and everywhere.=20
Why should we mourn? If we are both unwilling to punish criminals and=20
willing in just a few years to forget they even committed any crimes,=20
why should we mourn?

And for me, that's the lesson of early December, every year.

Every time December rolls around, I hear of meetings to remember=20
Bhopal and the Babri Masjid demolition, some of which I manage to=20
attend. 2001 is no exception.

On December 6, for example, Indians gathered outside the Indian=20
embassy in Washington, DC, to "show that [they] have not forgotten=20
Bhopal; demand the Indian government extradite corporate criminal=20
Warren Anderson [once head of Union Carbide] to face charges in=20
Bhopal courts; [and] demand the Indian government pursue Dow Chemical=20
Company [with which Union Carbide has since merged] and its=20
subsidiaries on criminal charges".

Also on December 6, Indians gathered at Ram Ganesh Gadkari Chowk in=20
Dadar, Bombay, to "resolve to work for promotion of communal harmony=20
and preservation of the democratic and secular fabric of our=20
Constitution; [to] demand that the UP Government file fresh [cases]=20
against the guilty of the Babri demolition forthwith; [to] urge the=20
central government to bring to book any violation of the laws by=20
communal organisations, whichever religion they belong to".

I read announcements like these and I can't help admiring these=20
Indians, in DC and Bombay and elsewhere, can't help envying their=20
spirit. I admire the dedication with which they pursue the hope of=20
justice and keep alive the memory of these Indian tragedies.

But as the years go by, I also can't help the thought that their=20
dedication comes to so little. The criminals they talk about so=20
easily evade any possibility of punishment. On top of that, so many=20
of the rest of us, let alone the authorities, nurse a sort of=20
contempt for the efforts of the Dadar and DC demonstrators. A feeling=20
that these misguided people are flogging horses that have been dead=20
for a long time and in fact are best left that way.

Indeed, just the day before I wrote these lines, I got a letter that=20
exclaimed in disgust: "We are in 2001 and you still want to talk=20
about the 1992 riots!" Meaning thereby: "Why are you bringing up this=20
stuff from the past? Stop bothering us with these trivialities that=20
happened years ago! Don't you know India is moving ahead?"

How many of us, how many of you, feel just that?

And because so many seem to, in early December every year I wonder=20
most of all about this way that India is "moving ahead".

Do we progress if we brush crimes under our carpets? Do we move ahead=20
if we are willing to think the very passing of time means criminals=20
need not be punished, justice need not be done? Will we get anywhere=20
if we think justice for crimes committed, for all Indians, is a=20
notion to be laughed at? Can we respect ourselves if we allow=20
criminals to rule us?

In early December every year, the only answer I come up with for=20
those questions are the few words a tribal activist friend of mine=20
said to me some years ago. "A country that looks after all its people=20
will advance," he said to me. "But we are not that way, so we won't."
_____

#4.

The New York Times
December 10, 2001

Jihad's Lost Battalions Mourned by Pakistani Kin
By JOHN F. BURNS
John F. Burns/The New York Times
"Jihad is the shortest road to Paradise - Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen," says=20
a sign in Urdu in the Malakand district, citing an Islamic militant=20
group.

SWAT VALLEY, Pakistan, Dec. 4 - From this lush valley alone, a=20
sinuous reach of sugar cane fields and citrus groves that runs a=20
morning's drive north of the old frontier city of Peshawar, villagers=20
say 10,000 to 15,000 men marched off to Afghanistan to fight America=20
in October, and 2,000 to 3,000 have not returned.

Defeat in the war against America has been bitter in this lovely=20
corner of northwest Pakistan.

It has roused angry voices among thousands of Pashtun tribesmen who=20
volunteered to fight with the Taliban, and bitter grief among=20
families whose fathers, brothers and sons - some as old as 75, some=20
as young as 13, many with old breech-loading rifles, muskets and=20
pistols, and running shoes for boots - have not returned.

Precise figures on the numbers of volunteers, or jihadis, as they=20
known among Islamic militants, are impossible to find.

If anybody knows how many went, and how many may have died, it is the=20
Islamic militant leaders who ignited religious passions with cries of=20
"Jihad!" - or holy war - then dispatched legions of untrained men and=20
boys across the border to face the terrors of American B-52 bombers=20
and Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Like their kind down the ages, the militant leaders mostly stayed=20
home, or crossed the frontier only long enough to declare themselves=20
holy warriors before hastening back.

Many of those firebrands are in detention now, prisoners of a=20
Pakistani government that has taken the debacle of the jihadis as an=20
opportunity to tighten its crackdown on the militant groups so as to=20
sever their hold on millions of the country's poor and illiterate.

In any event, those leaders - elderly men grown rich and pampered=20
from their preachings, men who saw to it that their own sons and=20
grandsons stayed out of the war - have powerful reasons now to=20
disguise the extent of the miseries they caused.

While their deputies storm up and down the valley, calling meetings=20
after Friday Prayers to heap venom on America, many tribe members=20
blame the disaster on the militant leaders, saying they sent the=20
valley's sons to their deaths, then did nothing to help the families=20
left behind.

That has left the accounting to survivors and relatives of the=20
missing. The figures they give, in village after village, checking=20
lists of those who went and those have not come back, are woeful.

Talk to any jihadi who made it back, and he will list the names of=20
those who are missing. "There is Ehsanullah, from Dara Ramora," one=20
man said, his eyes filling with tears. "Then there's Salim, from=20
Chakdara. And there's another Salim. He lived a little out from=20
Chakdara. The ones who died were mostly young. They were 18 to 20=20
years old."

Some who made it back make a brave face of it, saying it was a=20
glorious chance to "fight in the path of Allah" and vowing to "make=20
jihad" again if asked, especially if the enemy is America.

Men like Bakht Wali - the name is a pseudonym, chosen after Islamic=20
leaders threatened to kill followers caught talking to Western=20
reporters - even say, without much conviction, that they wish they=20
had fallen to the American bombs and missiles, earning the=20
reverential title of shahid, or martyr, bestowed on any Muslim who=20
dies fighting for the faith.

Could these really have been the favored ones, a visitor asked his=20
host, a man who gave his age as 47 but looked 10 to 15 years older,=20
with a sun-wizened face and a proud, jutting salt-and-pepper beard at=20
least six inches long, like the Taliban?

Bakht Wali smiled as he sat on a bed of woven rattan in the courtyard=20
of a farmer's mud-walled home in Chakdara, perhaps because he knew=20
his answer might sound false, after discussing the miserable deaths=20
some of those who went with him into Afghanistan almost certainly met.

"In the sight of Allah, the ones who died are the lucky ones," he=20
said, "because they died fighting for his cause. And from my point of=20
view too, they are the lucky ones, because they have gone to Paradise=20
now, with all the pleasures they have been promised in the Koran.

"Now they will have girls, and wine, and music, and all the things=20
forbidden to them here on earth. Now they will be happy, as we who=20
remain can never be here on earth."

Only later did the visitor learn that this man's pseudonym meant "man=20
of sacred fortune" in Pashto, the language of 20 million to 30=20
million Pashtuns who straddle the Pakistan- Afghanistan border - the=20
ethnic group that made up an overwhelming majority of the Taliban,=20
and of the volunteer legions who rushed from Pakistan to fight beside=20
them.

Adopted after much bantering with his friends, the name suggested=20
that they, at least, considered him fortunate not to have been killed.

The fundamentalist form of Islam espoused by the militant leaders,=20
and turned into state policy by the Taliban, is a powerful weapon in=20
these parts, made more so by poverty.

According to the families of the missing jihadis, few of them had=20
ever had a job, and those who had rarely earned more than the=20
equivalent of $1.20 for a day of backbreaking work in the fields, and=20
that only in the planting and harvesting seasons.

Those men, in districts like Malakand, Mohmand and Dir, were cannon=20
fodder to the militants, even if they sang the praises of Allah and=20
the Taliban as they marched to war.

Bakht Wali, like many others, did not expect to return. After=20
attending a rally called by Sufi Muhammad, an octogenarian militant=20
leader whose will is paramount in the Swat Valley, Bakht Wali, the=20
father of eight children, aged 1 to 21, wrote a will, gave it to his=20
wife and listed debts to other villagers that should be paid if he=20
died. And who would have looked after his family, had he been killed?

"My conviction is that God looks after everybody," he said, again=20
without much conviction. "I suppose they would have been looked after=20
by my relations." Notably, in the light of the abandonment of other=20
families, he made no mention of the militant groups.

What awaited Sufi Muhammad's jihadis across the frontier would be=20
hard to square with anybody's vision of a path to Paradise. At best,=20
as those who returned described it, there were days of camaraderie in=20
training camps set up at remote villages inside Pakistan, places=20
where the younger men, at least, were shown the workings of=20
Kalashnikov rifles, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, the=20
Taliban's basic armory. For the older men, and the boys, though,=20
there was little but talking and running menial errands.
Afterward, there was the frontier crossing, sometimes on foot across=20
mountain paths, sometimes in trucks that halted at Pakistani border=20
posts long enough for the men to register their names, villages and=20
weapons with Pakistan's frontier constabulary.

It is to those posts that families of the missing go, day after day,=20
hoping their loved ones will show up on the ever-shortening lists of=20
those re-entering Pakistan. With the Taliban now routed from every=20
city in Afghanistan, hope dwindles by the day.

Once in Afghanistan, many of the jihadis found themselves unwanted.

The fittest and best-trained were hived off and sent quickly to the=20
front lines, which until the Taliban's sudden collapse in late=20
November, defined the war. Trenches there faced the mustering forces=20
of the Northern Alliance, and American bombs, north of Kabul and=20
outside Mazar-i- Sharif, Herat and Kunduz, cities north and west of=20
the Hindu Kush mountain range that divides Afghanistan. These were=20
the men, mostly, who never came back.

But others, like Bakht Wali, endured weeks of aimless waiting and=20
wandering, unwanted and even resented by the Taliban, who seem to=20
have considered the untrained Pakistanis a drain on their time and=20
their resources, especially the limited supplies of food.

Bakht Wali's group, originally about 130 men, all from Chakdara,=20
moved from the eastern city of Jalalabad to Kabul, the capital, where=20
they were quartered in an abandoned building on the outskirts until=20
40 of the fittest men were chosen by the Taliban to go to the front=20
lines.

For three weeks the closest Bakht Wali's group came to the enemy were=20
the vapor trails in the skies above Kabul left by B-52's heading for=20
the Taliban front lines further north. Then, suddenly, they were=20
moved to an old mud-walled fort outside the town of Tagab Bazaar,=20
about 50 miles northeast of Kabul.

Outflanked, the Pakistanis in the fort found themselves under heavy=20
rifle, rocket and mortar fire from Northern Alliance troops, with=20
nobody to command them.

The Taliban, as they did at Kabul and at Mazar-i-Sharif, had pulled=20
out under cover of darkness, not telling the Pakistanis. Alone,=20
muddled and frightened, the Pakistanis talked among themselves about=20
resisting, then surrendered by the light of a crescent moon.

For them, abandoned by Afghans they had gone to help, the jihad was=20
over without a shot fired, their pitiful old rifles, muskets and=20
pistols seized by alliance soldiers, their wallets and even their=20
sweaters and shoes stolen.

They were many days from home, with no telephones, no food, many of=20
them now barefoot. But they were alive, and they had learned some=20
lessons about the Taliban, about abandoned loyalties and about the=20
uncertainties of faith.

"When the attack on the fort came," Bakht Wali said, "the Taliban=20
were not there. We didn't know the area. We knew nothing. We were=20
alone."

What then, he was asked, did the Pakistanis make of the Taliban's=20
promise to fight to the death beside them? "Well," he said, "not=20
every Taliban is a bad person. There are good men among them. But our=20
strong complaint is they never told us we should retreat."

To Bakht Wali's group, the conclusion as they made their way back to=20
Pakistan, clambering aboard trucks heading for the border, was that=20
the alliance troops, if not better than the Taliban, were at least no=20
worse.

"They're all Afghans," he said. "The only difference is in the beards=20
and the turbans."

But further north, where the 40 younger men from the group had been=20
sent, around Taliban entrenchments at Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz,=20
things were different. So far, none of those men have made it back to=20
Chakdara, and the likelihood is that none ever will.

Here in the Swat Valley, it is the Islamic militant leaders who seem=20
likely to have to answer for those men who have not come back. Sufi=20
Muhammad, like most of the other top militant leaders, is in jail=20
now, sentenced last week to three years' imprisonment on charges of=20
inciting the Pakistani Army to revolt.

In his absence, his lieutenants are still preaching hellfire against=20
America up and down the valley and still raising money, though not=20
for the families grieving for jihadis who have not come home.

"The people who went to Afghanistan were not soldiers," said Syed=20
Zaffar Saghir, a disillusioned activist for Sufi Muhammad's group who=20
"made jihad" against Soviet forces in Afghanistan but stayed behind=20
this time. "Just having a gun does not make you a warrior.

"So a lot of innocent people have died, and Sufi Muhammad and other=20
religious leaders are responsible for this. They sent people who had=20
no training whatsoever to war, and then they stayed back in Pakistan.=20
They are still alive, while so many others have died."

______

#5.
Frontline
Volume 18 - Issue 25, Dec. 08 -21, 2001

Hindutva ire
The NCERT's censorship of history textbooks represents a Hindutva=20
attack on the ideas of pluralism and tolerance.

THE Bharatiya Janata Party is playing with fire. Its campaign to=20
rewrite history and excise "inconvenient" passages and unpatriotic=20
"distortions" from school textbooks published by the National Council=20
for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) is the most obnoxious=20
ideological project yet undertaken in India by anyone. It aims to=20
influence young minds in the way they view this society, its whole=20
past, and its present character. The project is an assault on the=20
pluralist-secular conception of India. The campaign has now received=20
the approval of Atal Behari Vajpayee, who has discarded his "liberal"=20
mask and joined the Hindutva chorus rationalising the censoring of=20
history textbooks.

The BJP has openly linked this effort to its electoral preparations=20
in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. The incendiary mixing of politics with=20
the doctoring of the textbooks should itself expose the mala fide=20
nature of the Hindutva education project. Its content and process are=20
both repugnant.

The manner in which the "objectionable" paragraphs were removed was=20
grossly, profoundly, undemocratic. It originated with Human Resource=20
Development Minister Murli Manohar Joshi, who has no business to=20
judge history textbooks in the first place. It was executed without=20
even the pretence of transparency by NCERT Chairman J.S. Rajput -=20
without informing the authors, obtaining their consent, or=20
undertaking a content review.

No worthy democracy can countenance such censorship by fiat, which=20
makes a mockery of the long deliberation over syllabi, author=20
selection, expert consultation, and legal contracts forbidding=20
editorial changes, through which textbooks are produced. Yet, the=20
NCERT is not going to stop with this. It has a clandestine history=20
syllabus and a range of new textbooks, written by prejudiced authors,=20
which are under production and due for release next April.

R.V. MOORTHY
Human Resource Development Minister Murli Manohar Joshi.

There is every reason why the coming batch of textbooks, as well as=20
censorship of existing ones, should be thoroughly opposed. State=20
governments not in hock to the BJP must produce their own textbooks=20
in keeping with their rights. They must also legally challenge the=20
coming series, and repudiate the censored texts. We need a massive=20
counter-campaign of resistance. Or else, our historians and children=20
will be muzzled, and vital truths about India's past, such as=20
casteism, will be suppressed.

WHY did Joshi and Rajput censor the textbooks? The "objectionable"=20
portions were at odds with Hindutva's brahminical version of history=20
which glorifies India's past and presents it as a series of "Hindu"=20
achievements, unmatched anywhere else. Crucial here is the tailoring=20
of truth to specific prejudices. For instance, the paragraphs deleted=20
from Professor Romila Thapar's textbooks say, "beef was served as a=20
mark of honour to special guests" in ancient India, but that "in=20
later centuries, Brahmans were forbidden" from eating it. Similarly=20
"objectionable" is a Modern India paragraph, which says the Jats=20
established "a state in Bharatpur, conducted plundering raids in the=20
region around Delhi. They also participated in court intrigues" -=20
something that many communities did in the 16th or 18h century.

Hindutva's ire is also especially directed at passages which say=20
there is no archaeological evidence of an ancient settlement around=20
Ayodhya, and that the "earliest inscriptions" in Mathura do not=20
attest Krishna's presence. This runs counter to the literal,=20
superstitious belief that Rama and Krishna were actual historical=20
figures (rather than mythological ones). However, the BJP's new=20
official line, enunciated by spokesperson V.K. Malhotra, is that Rama=20
and Krishna are historical personages. Similarly, the axe has fallen=20
on any discussion of the rigidities of the caste system and of the=20
role of "brahminical indoctrination" in promoting fatalism about=20
varna among the lower castes.

Hindutva's saffron agenda in education has another angle too. This is=20
to erase one central truth about Indian culture and civilisation for=20
2,000 years - namely, its plural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious=20
character. As Amartya Sen says: "It is futile to try to understand=20
Indian art, literature, music, food or politics without seeing the=20
extensive interactions across barriers of religious communities.=20
These include Hindus and Muslims, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, Parsees,=20
Christians... Jews... and even atheists and agnostics. Sanskrit has a=20
larger atheistic literature than exists in any other classical=20
language."

Hindutva ideology, and the Vajpayee government, simply cannot stomach=20
this. Their mortal fear of facts is rooted in ignorance, hatred (of=20
"the Other") and a deep inferiority complex about Indianness itself.=20
This complex demands that everything in India's past must be depicted=20
as uniquely great. On this view, India's past was a sort of=20
continuous Golden Age interrupted only by external "aggression". This=20
dogma runs counter to facts. Ancient India undoubtedly had many=20
remarkable accomplishments: in literature, linguistics, dance,=20
dramaturgy, mathematics (although not "Vedic mathematics"),=20
astronomy, architecture and sculpture. But many other civilisations,=20
Chinese, Arab, Persian, Greek, Roman, and so on, also had great=20
achievements.

There are many worthy things about, say, 2nd to 10th century India,=20
which led A.L. Basham to write The Wonder That Was India. But there=20
were very ugly things too: casteism, Dalit oppression, entrenched=20
social inequalities and power hierarchies, religious factionalism,=20
rampant superstition, extreme gender discrimination, low levels of=20
productivity, and widespread deprivation and disease. India's=20
interaction with the world was important. For instance, during the=20
Middle Ages, India received a great deal from the Arab world in=20
administrative systems, land and revenue management, music,=20
architecture, chemistry, medicine, even couture. Similarly, it gave a=20
great deal to the rest of Asia, and Europe.

Understanding all this, and grappling with the reality of sati,=20
widespread illiteracy, or tyrannical village life, requires=20
confronting, not censoring, the past. Such understanding is=20
absolutely indispensable if we are to have a future, indeed even=20
relate to our present. Hindutva makes this impossible. It suppresses=20
all complexity.

Because Hindutva nationalism suppresses the negative or egregious=20
aspects of the past, it cannot reform what the present inherits from=20
it. Its glorification agenda ends up rationalising and perpetuating=20
past horrors. This sets it apart from the freedom struggle, which=20
even today remains a major inspiration for progressive,=20
people-empowering politics. The freedom movement had two components:=20
opposition to imperialism and an agenda of internal social reform.=20
Both were crucial to its popular appeal. There were more or less=20
radical elements in that movement, but they all shared this general=20
orientation. Hindutva did not.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was not part of the freedom=20
movement. It set its face firmly against social reform and popular=20
empowerment. It has now resurfaced in an expanded form as a deeply=20
conservative anti-reform force. Falsification of history to=20
rationalise casteist privilege or gender inequality is closely linked=20
to this conservative agenda.

At work is a narrow, sectarian, anti-pluralist mindset which is=20
crucial to Hindutva. In some qualitative respects, Hindutva is no=20
different from the Taliban or Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalists,=20
with whom the BJP has been rightly compared. The Taliban could not=20
stand pluralism or "dilution" of Islam. They destroyed the Bamiyan=20
Buddhas to "purify" Afghanistan. The BJP-VHP-RSS could not stand=20
pluralism and the Babri mosque. They razed it. Both Hindu and Islamic=20
fundamentalisms are equally intolerant and allergic to what they=20
regard as interfering or "alien" elements.

For instance, history is taught in Pakistan through "Pakistan=20
Studies", courses which are compulsory at school and college. In its=20
"official" format, history jumps straight from Harappa and=20
Mohenjo-Daro to the next "real" civilisation, which "naturally"=20
begins with the "Islamic conquest" of Sindh. The intervening=20
"Buddhist" and "Hindu" periods are treated as pitiable voids or=20
unpleasant aberrations. Scholars like Pervez Hoodbhoy and Mubarak Ali=20
have analysed the biases and elisions in Pakistan's "official"=20
history.

Hindutva's version of history neatly parallels these. It too has a=20
gaping medieval hole which is sometimes filled with fantasies such as=20
P.N. Oak's insane "theory" about the Taj Mahal being a Hindu temple!=20
(Recently, RSS supremo K.S. Sudarshan dramatically extended this even=20
to the modern period, by claiming at his Vijayadashami address that=20
one Talpade test-flew an airplane in India before the Wright Brothers=20
did!)

Pakistani civics textbooks blatantly project a view of that country=20
modelled on "nation-building" principles purportedly derived from=20
patriarchical Islam. Counterposed to this is the contemptuous=20
treatment of India as a "feminine" and "weak" but "mean" entity. A=20
standard text claims that Islam empowers women: "Islam gives respect=20
to all women... They are considered mothers, wives, daughters and=20
sisters. Prior to the advent of Islam, a woman's status was that of a=20
slave or servant. Islam gave women human rights and the right to=20
inheritance."

At the same time, the book asserts: "In Pakistani society, the male=20
is superior. The male is the head of the household and descent goes=20
down in his name... Islam has determined woman's status. A Pakistani=20
woman, unlike Western women, is not free of parental control or=20
suffocated like women in traditional Hindu society. She is looked=20
upon as the Queen of the Home. Heaven lies about her feet and this is=20
an important concept."

This mirrors the infamous Hindutva formulation of the rape report of=20
the National Commission for Women: "However, in India, in ancient=20
times, women had enjoyed an able position in the household and in=20
society. As the 'queen' of the household, her position was envied by=20
her counterparts elsewhere. Unfortunately, constant invasions by=20
foreign elements from about the 8th century changed the scenario to=20
the detriment of women. Her vulnerability to abuse by the invading=20
hordes bestowed upon man a responsibility to protect her and from=20
thence developed the inherent dominant role of the male within the=20
family fold and her inevitable dependence on the male."

Contradictorily, and in an exact replica of the Pakistani text, this=20
supposedly "exalted", "honourable" position of women is identified=20
through rubrics such as 'ardhangini', 'grahlaxmi' and the=20
'dharmapatni'- all male-derived categories. If Pakistani textbooks=20
denigrate India - in which "the Muslims and untouchables are=20
mistreated and not provided with justice" - pro-Hindutva texts=20
glorify India and vilify Pakistan and Islam. Both lay claim to an=20
intense militant nationalism. The comparison is relevant because=20
Pakistani textbooks are now recognised as one of the prime sources of=20
Taliban-style fundamentalism and ideological obscurantism. Their=20
Indian counterparts are growing in number on the strength of=20
identical prejudices.

The NCERT's "National Curriculum Framework" and many other saffron=20
tracts exude these same prejudices. But it is in Gujarat, the=20
country's most developed laboratory of communalism, that Hindutva=20
textbooks reach their full-blown, complete, vicious, expression.=20
Sahmat's recent booklet, The Saffron Agenda in Education, has=20
discussed these issues at length. It will suffice here to outline the=20
stated "objectives" of the Class VI syllabus, pertaining to ancient=20
India. These aim to ensure that the pupil

* Is introduced to Vedic literature which is an expression of Indian cultur=
e;

* Knows about the respectable status of women in Indian culture;

* Gets acquainted with the basic truths of life against a backdrop of=20
Indian culture;

* Learns for himself the truth; that in the context of Indian culture=20
a person acquires a high status not by right of birth but by merit;

* Knows about how in the Indian cultural context the rules were=20
oriented towards the subjects;

* Imbibes the basic values of Indian culture expressed by the=20
narratives of the epics, Ramayana, Mahabharata, and by the main=20
characters in it; for instance, the importance of 1) the purity of=20
domestic life 2) steadfastness in adhering to truth even at the cost=20
of suffering;

* Moulds the character which makes one abide by one's duty when there=20
is a conflict between personal relationship and a sense of duty.

OTHER textbooks in Gujarat present the varna system as "a precious=20
gift of the Aryans to the mankind" (sic), and label all minorities as=20
"foreigners". A Class IX textbook discusses the "problems" of the=20
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the following manner: "Of=20
course, their ignorance, illiteracy and blind faith are to be blamed=20
for lack of progress because they still fail to realise importance of=20
education in life. Therefore, there is large-scale illiteracy among=20
them and female illiteracy is a most striking fact." This is a=20
specious argument. It is also insulting to Dalits and Adivasis.

It would not be long before NCERT books resemble such garbage. The=20
vile prejudices underlying the censorship episode make nonsense of=20
the very idea of education, which has to do with cultivating the mind=20
to think critically, understand complexity, and value truth.

BJP apologists have rationalised textbook censorship as a means of=20
promoting "tolerance" by removing passages that can "hurt sentiments"=20
(of Jats, Sikhs and other communities). In reality, it amounts to=20
promoting the sum-total of intolerances by appeasing varying=20
parochial sentiments. Nor is the present controversy an esoteric=20
dispute between Liberal-Left scholars and others. Rather, it=20
separates those who see history as a truthful account of reality,=20
which demands continual reinterpretation, from those who yoke history=20
to narrow "nation-building" agendas inculcating irrational national=20
"pride". The latter will make whole generations ignorant. They will=20
breed hatred and hubris - as Hitler did with his Master Race myth.=20
Under the BJP's "leadership", India seems headed that way - and at=20
least towards the destruction of secularism and pluralism. Nothing=20
could be more dangerous.

______

#6.
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2001 16:41:05 +0100
From: "Ishtiaq Ahmed" <Ishtiaq.Ahmed@s...>

Dear Members and Friends of Asiapeace,
In continuation of my initiative to start a self-critical appraisal=20
of the relationship between Muslims and Islam in the Modern Age, I am=20
pleased to announce that voices long suppressed under the debris of=20
self-righteousness, self-pity or self-glory, unreason, reaction,=20
apologia and circumlocution, are now beginning to be raised. The=20
latest is a brilliant article by Mr Mohammed Wakil, sent to me by Mr=20
Shad Moarif.

AN IDEA HAS COME TO MY MIND: I SUGGEST THAT SOME OF US - PERVEZ=20
HOODBHOY, MOHAMMED WAKIL, MANZUR EJAZ, I MYSELF AND OTHERS WHO WANT=20
TO JOIN US - QUICKLY PUT A BOOK TOGETHER. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE=20
VARIOUS CHAPTERS IS ALREADY THERE IN THE VARIOUS PIECES SENT TO ME=20
AND POSTED BY ME ON THE VARIOUS LISTS. I WILL OF COURSE BE THE EDITOR=20
AND ESTABLISH THE STANDARDS AND THE INTERNAL COHERENCE AND LOGICAL=20
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK. The title of the book could be: A FRAMEWORK=20
FOR MODERNIZATION, DEMOCRATIZATION AND SECULARIZATION IN THE MUSLIM=20
WORLD. We need Muslims who are by profession economists,=20
psychologists, sociologists, and others to approach the above theme=20
from the vantage point of their respective disciplines. Time should=20
not be wasted by meaningless assertions like, 'Islam is a complete=20
code of life' , 'There is no conflict between the laws of Islam and=20
the laws of nature'; 'science and Islam are the same'; 'Islam has a=20
superior system of democracy and human rights'. I think the period=20
for such patently nonsensical statements is over. Islam as a great=20
spiritual force, as the religion which strongly emphasized equality=20
of all human beings and did from time to time establish a=20
proto-pluralist order, are all correct assertions but they are of no=20
use for theorizing about our own modern world. Neither in ontological=20
nor in epistemological sense can one make such assertion without=20
indulging in pure metaphysics. Therefore, I suggest that while some=20
of us can engage ourselves in developing a modern Islamic ethics=20
which is consistent with human rights, this should not be confused=20
with the need to establish the foundations of true science and the=20
philosophy of science in Muslim culture. I think while Sir Syed was=20
the most advanced in terms of clarity on science, his later followers=20
and particularly Iqbal and his fellow modernists backtracked from=20
that vision and created a false belief in the efficacy of the Quranic=20
message as a means of establishing a modern, egalitarian order. It is=20
time to call a spade a spade. Quite simply a secular, democratic=20
state in which Islam belongs to the private realm, is the only model=20
that will take us out of the quagmire in which we have been sinking=20
for the last many centuries.

Warm regards,
Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed
Moderator, Asiapeace
******
[The full text of the paper by Mohamad Wakil can be obtained via Prof=20
Ishtiaq Ahmed <Ishtiaq.Ahmed@s...> or via <aiindex@m...>

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