[sacw] SACW #2. (10 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #2.
10 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

[This issue of the SACW is dedicated to the memory of Agha Shahid=20
Ali. One of the finest poets from South Asia Agha Shahid Ali passed=20
away on the 8th December 2001 in the United States. Many on this list=20
may be familiar with the work of Shahid. For those of us who knew=20
him, he will live on forever in our memories.]

------------------------------------------

#1. Muslims & the West After 11 September (Pervez Hoodbhoy)
#2. Was Pakistan being Talibanised? (Khaled Ahmed)
#3. India: Propaganda as history won't sell (Romila Thapar)
#4. Sri Lanka: Managing uncertainty (Jayadeva Uyangoda )
#5. India: What is history? (V. Krishna Ananth )

________________________

#1.

MUSLIMS AND THE WEST AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER
Pervez Hoodbhoy

America has exacted blood revenge for the Twin Towers. A million=20
Afghans have fled US bombs into the cold wastelands and face=20
starvation. B-52s have blown the Taliban to bits and changed Mullah=20
Omar's roar of defiance into a pitiful squeak for surrender. Osama=20
bin Laden is on the run (he may be dead by the time this article=20
reaches the reader). But even as the champagne pops in the White=20
House, America remains fearful-for good reason.

Subsequent to September 11th we have all begun to live in a=20
different, more dangerous world. Now is the time to ask why. Like=20
clinical pathologists, we need to scientifically examine the sickness=20
of human behavior impelling terrorists to fly airliners filled with=20
passengers into skyscrapers. We also need to understand why millions=20
celebrate as others die. In the absence of such an understanding=20
there remains only the medieval therapy of exorcism; for the strong=20
to literally beat the devil out of the weak. Indeed, the Grand=20
Exorcist-disdainful of international law and the growing nervousness=20
of even its close allies-prepares a new hit list of other Muslim=20
countries needing therapy: Iraq, Somalia, and Libya. We shall kill at=20
will, is the message.

This will not work. Terrorism does not have a military solution.=20
Soon-I fear perhaps very soon-there will be still stronger, more=20
dramatic proof. In the modern age, technological possibilities to=20
wreak enormous destruction are limitless. Anger, when intense enough,=20
makes small stateless groups, and even individuals, extremely=20
dangerous.

Anger is ubiquitous in the Islamic world today. Allow me to share a=20
small personal experience. On September 12th I had a seminar=20
scheduled at the department of physics in my university in Islamabad,=20
part of a weekly seminar for physics students on topics outside of=20
physics. Though traumatized by events, I could not cancel the seminar=20
because sixty people had already arrived, so I said, "We will have=20
our seminar today on a new subject: on yesterday's terrorist=20
attacks". The response was negative, some were mindlessly rejoicing=20
the attacks. One student said, "You can't call this terrorism."=20
Another said, "Are you only worried because it is Americans who have=20
died?" It took two hours of sustained, impassioned, argumentation to=20
convince the students that the brutal killing of ordinary people, who=20
had nothing to do with the policies of the United States, was an=20
atrocity. I suppose that millions of Muslim students the world over=20
felt as mine did, but probably heard no counter-arguments.

If the world is to be spared what future historians may call the=20
"Century of Terror", we will have to chart the perilous course=20
between the Scylla of American imperial arrogance and the Charybdis=20
of Islamic religious fanaticism. Through these waters, we must steer=20
by a distant star towards a careful, reasoned, democratic,=20
humanistic, and secular future. Else, shipwreck is certain.

INJURED INNOCENCE "Why do they hate us?", asks George W. Bush. This=20
rhetorical question betrays the pathetic ignorance of most Americans=20
about the world around them. Moreover, its claim to an injured=20
innocence cannot withstand even the most cursory examination of US=20
history. For almost forty years, this "naivet=E9 and=20
self-righteousness" has been challenged most determinedly by Noam=20
Chomsky. As early as 1967, he pointed that the idea that "our"=20
motives are pure and "our" actions benign is "nothing new in American=20
intellectual history- or, for that matter, in the general history of=20
imperialist apologia".

Muslim leaders have mirrored America's claim and have asked the same=20
question of the West. They have had little to say about 11 September=20
that makes sense to people outside their communities. Although they=20
speak endlessly on rules of personal hygiene and "halal" or "haram",=20
they cannot even tell us whether or not the suicide bombers violated=20
Islamic laws. According to the Virginia-based (and largely=20
Saudi-funded) Fiqh Council's chairman, Dr. Taha Jabir Alalwani, "this=20
kind of question needs a lot of research and we don't have that in=20
our budget." Fearful of backlash, most leaders of Muslim=20
communities in the US, Canada, and Europe have responded in=20
predictable ways to the Twin Towers atrocity. This has essentially=20
two parts: first, that Islam is a religion of peace; and second, that=20
Islam was hijacked by fanatics on the 11th of September 2001. They=20
are wrong on both counts. First, Islam-like Christianity, Judaism,=20
Hinduism, or any other religion-is not about peace. Nor is it about=20
war. Every religion is about absolute belief in its own superiority=20
and the divine right to impose itself upon others. In medieval times,=20
both the Crusades and the Jihads were soaked in blood. Today,=20
Christian fundamentalists attack abortion clinics in the US and kill=20
doctors; Muslim fundamentalists wage their sectarian wars against=20
each other; Jewish settlers holding the Old Testament in one hand,=20
and Uzis in the other, burn olive orchards and drive Palestinians off=20
their ancestral land; Hindus in India demolish ancient mosques and=20
burn down churches; Sri Lankan Buddhists slaughter Tamil separatists.=20

The second assertion is even further off the mark. Even if Islam had,=20
in some metaphorical sense, been hijacked, that event did not occur=20
on 11 September 2001. It happened around the 13th century. A quick=20
look around us readily shows Islam has yet to recover from the trauma=20
of those times.

A DISMAL PRESENT Where do Muslims stand today? Note that I do not ask=20
about Islam; Islam is an abstraction. Moulana Abdus Sattar Edhi and=20
Mullah Omar are both followers of Islam, but the former is overdue=20
for a Nobel peace prize while the other is a medieval, ignorant,=20
psychotic fiend. Edward Said, among others, has insistently pointed=20
out, Islam carries very different meaning to different people. It is=20
as heterogeneous as those who believe and practice it. There is no=20
"true Islam". Therefore it only makes sense to speak of people who=20
claim that faith.

Today Muslims number one billion, spread over 48 Muslim countries.=20
None of these has yet evolved a stable democratic political system.=20
In fact all Muslim countries are dominated by self-serving corrupt=20
elites who cynically advance their personal interests and steal=20
resources from their people. No Muslim country has a viable=20
educational system or a university of international stature.

Reason too has been waylaid. To take some examples from my own=20
experience. You will seldom encounter a Muslim name as you flip=20
through scientific journals, and if you do the chances are that this=20
person lives in the West. There are a few exceptions: Abdus Salam,=20
together with Steven Weinberg and Sheldon Glashow, won the Nobel=20
Prize for Physics in 1979 for the unification of the weak and=20
electromagnetic forces. I got to know Salam reasonably well-we even=20
wrote a book preface together. He was a remarkable man, terribly in=20
love with his country and his religion. And yet he died deeply=20
unhappy, scorned by his country and excommunicated from Islam by an=20
act of the Pakistani parliament in 1974. Today the Ahmadi sect, to=20
which Salam belonged, is considered heretical and harshly persecuted.=20
(My next-door neighbor, an Ahmadi, was shot in the neck and heart and=20
died in my car as I drove him to the hospital. His only fault was to=20
have been born in the wrong sect.)

Though genuine scientific achievement is rare in the contemporary=20
Muslim world, pseudo-science is in generous supply. A former chairman=20
of my department has calculated the speed of Heaven: it is receding=20
from the earth at one centimeter per second less than the speed of=20
light. His ingenious method relies upon a verse in the Qur'an which=20
says that worship on the night on which the Qur'an was revealed, is=20
worth a thousand nights of ordinary worship. He states that this=20
amounts to a time-dilation factor of one thousand, which he puts into=20
a formula belonging to Einstein's theory of special relativity.

A more public example: one of two Pakistani nuclear engineers=20
recently arrested on suspicion of passing nuclear secrets to the=20
Taliban had earlier proposed to solve Pakistan's energy problems by=20
harnessing the power of genies. The Qur'an says that God created man=20
from clay, and angels and genies from fire; so this highly placed=20
engineer proposed to capture the genies and extract their energy.=20
(The reader may wish to read the rather acrimonious public=20
correspondence between Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and myself in 1988=20
on this subject, reproduced in my book "Islam and Science-Religious=20
Orthodoxy And The Battle For Rationality", published in 1991).

A BRILLIANT PAST THAT VANISHED Today's sorry situation contrasts=20
starkly with the Islam of yesterday. Between the 9th and the 13th=20
centuries-the Golden Age of Islam-the only people doing decent=20
science, philosophy, or medicine were Muslims. For five straight=20
centuries they alone kept the light of learning ablaze. Muslims not=20
only preserved ancient learning, they also made substantial=20
innovations and extensions. The loss of this tradition has proved=20
tragic for Muslim peoples.=20=20

Science flourished in the Golden Age of Islam because there was=20
within Islam a strong rationalist tradition, carried on by a group of=20
Muslim thinkers known as the Mutazilites. This tradition stressed=20
human free will, strongly opposing the predestinarians who taught=20
that everything was foreordained and that humans have no option but=20
surrender everything to Allah. While the Mutazilites held political=20
power, knowledge grew.

But in the twelfth century Muslim orthodoxy reawakened, spearheaded=20
by the cleric Imam Al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali championed revelation over=20
reason, predestination over free will. He refuted the possibility of=20
relating cause to effect, teaching that man cannot know or predict=20
what will happen; God alone can. He damned mathematics as against=20
Islam, an intoxicant of the mind that weakened faith.

Held in the vice-like grip of orthodoxy, Islam choked. No longer, as=20
during the reign of the dynamic caliph Al-Mamum and the great Haroon=20
Al-Rashid, would Muslim, Christian, and Jewish scholars gather and=20
work together in the royal courts. It was the end of tolerance,=20
intellect, and science in the Muslim world. The last great Muslim=20
thinker, Abd-al Rahman ibn Khaldun, belonged to the 14th century.

ISLAM UNDER IMPERIALISM Meanwhile, the rest of the world moved on.=20
The Renaissance brought an explosion of scientific inquiry in the=20
West. This owed much to Arab translations and other Muslim=20
contributions, but it was to matter little. Mercantile capitalism and=20
technological progress drove Western countries to rapidly colonize=20
the Muslim world from Indonesia to Morocco. Always brutal, at times=20
genocidal, it changed the shape of the world. It soon became clear,=20
at least to a part of the Muslim elites, that they were paying a=20
heavy price for not possessing the analytical tools of modern science=20
and the social and political values of modern culture-the real source=20
of power of their colonizers.

Despite widespread resistance from the orthodox, the logic of=20
modernity found 19th century Muslim adherents. Modernizers such as=20
Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Rida of Egypt, Sayyed Ahmad Khan of India,=20
and Jamaluddin Afghani (who belonged everywhere), wished to adapt=20
Islam to the times, interpret the Qur'an in ways consistent with=20
modern science, and discard the Hadith (ways of the Prophet) in=20
favour of the Qur'an. Others seized on the modern idea of the=20
nation-state. It is crucial to note that not a single Muslim=20
nationalist leader of the 20th century was a fundamentalist. Turkey's=20
Kemal Ataturk, Algeria's Ahmed Ben Bella, Indonesia's Sukarno,=20
Pakistan's Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, and=20
Iran's Mohammed Mosaddeq all sought to organize their societies on=20
the basis of secular values.

However, Muslim and Arab nationalism, part of a larger anti-colonial=20
nationalist current across the Third World, included the desire to=20
control and use national resources for domestic benefit. The conflict=20
with Western greed was inevitable. The imperial interests of Britain,=20
and later the United States, feared independent nationalism. Anyone=20
willing to collaborate was preferred, even the ultraconservative=20
Islamic regime of Saudi Arabia. In time, as the Cold War pressed in,=20
nationalism became intolerable. In 1953, Mosaddeq of Iran was=20
overthrown in a CIA coup, replaced by Reza Shah Pahlavi. Britain=20
targeted Nasser. Indonesia's Sukarno was replaced by Suharto after a=20
bloody coup that left a million dead. Pressed from outside, corrupt=20
and incompetent from within, secular governments proved unable to=20
defend national interests or deliver social justice. They began to=20
frustrate democracy. These failures left a vacuum which Islamic=20
religious movements grew to fill. After the fall of the Shah, Iran=20
underwent a bloody revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini. General=20
Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq ruled Pakistan for eleven hideous years and=20
strove to Islamize both state and society. In Sudan an Islamic state=20
arose under Jaafar al-Nimeiry; amputation of hands and limbs became=20
common. Decades ago the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was=20
the most powerful Palestinian organization, and largely secular.=20
After its defeat in 1982 in Beirut, it was largely eclipsed by Hamas,=20
a fundamentalist Muslim movement. The lack of scruple and the=20
pursuit of power by the United States combined fatally with this tide=20
in the Muslim world in 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded=20
Afghanistan. With Pakistan's Zia-ul-Haq as America's foremost ally,=20
the CIA advertised for, and openly recruited, Islamic holy warriors=20
from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Algeria. Radical Islam went into=20
overdrive as its superpower ally and mentor funneled support to the=20
mujahideen, and Ronald Reagan feted them on the lawn of White House,=20
lavishing praise on "brave freedom fighters challenging the Evil=20
Empire".=20

After the Soviet Union collapsed the United States walked away from=20
an Afghanistan in shambles, its own mission accomplished. The Taliban=20
emerged; Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda made Afghanistan their=20
base. Other groups of holy warriors learned from the Afghan example=20
and took up arms in their own countries.

At least until 11 September, US policy makers were unrepentant. A few=20
years ago, Carter's U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew=20
Brzezinski was asked by the Paris weekly Nouvel Observateur whether=20
in retrospect, given that "Islamic fundamentalism represents a world=20
menace today", US policy might have been a mistake. Brzezinski=20
retorted:

What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or=20
the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the=20
liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war? But=20
Brzezinski's "stirred up Moslems" wanted to change the world; and in=20
this they were destined to succeed. With this, we conclude our=20
history primer for the 700 years uptil September 11, 2001.

FACING THE FUTURE What should thoughtful people infer from this whole=20
narrative? I think the inferences are several-and different for=20
different protagonists.

For Muslims, it is time to stop wallowing in self-pity: Muslims are=20
not helpless victims of conspiracies hatched by an all-powerful,=20
malicious West. The fact is that the decline of Islamic greatness=20
took place long before the age of mercantile imperialism. The causes=20
were essentially internal. Therefore Muslims must introspect, and ask=20
what went wrong.

Muslims must recognize that their societies are far larger, more=20
diverse and complex than the small homogenous tribal society in=20
Arabia 1400 hundred years ago. It is therefore time to renounce the=20
idea that Islam can survive and prosper only in an Islamic state run=20
according to Islamic "sharia" law. Muslims need a secular and=20
democratic state that respects religious freedom, human dignity, and=20
is founded on the principle that power belongs to the people. This=20
means confronting and rejecting the claim by orthodox Islamic=20
scholars that in an Islamic state sovereignity does not belong to the=20
people but, instead, to the vice-regents of Allah (Khilafat-al-Arz)=20
or Islamic jurists (Vilayat-e-Faqih).

Muslims must not look towards the likes of bin Laden; such people=20
have no real answer and can offer no real positive alternative. To=20
glorify their terrorism is a hideous mistake -the unremitting=20
slaughter of Shias, Christians, and Ahmadis in their places of=20
worship in Pakistan, and of other minorities in other Muslim=20
countries, is proof that all terrorism is not about the revolt of the=20
dispossessed.

The United States too must confront bitter truths. It is a fact that=20
the messages of George W. Bush and Tony Blair fall flat while those=20
of Osama bin Laden, whether he lives or dies, resonate strongly=20
across the Muslim world. Bin Laden's religious extremism turns off=20
many Muslims, but they find his political message easy to relate=20
to-stop the dispossession of the Palestinians, stop propping up=20
corrupt and despotic regimes across the world just because they serve=20
US interests. Americans will also have to accept that the United=20
States is past the peak of its imperial power; the 50's and 60's are=20
gone for good. Its triumphalism and disdain for international law is=20
creating enemies everywhere, not just among Muslims. Therefore they=20
must become less arrogant, and more like other peoples of this world.=20
While the U.S. will remain a superpower for some time to come, it is=20
inevitably going to become less and less "super". There are=20
compelling economic and military reasons for this. For example,=20
China's economy is growing at 7% percent per year while the U.S.=20
economy is in recession. India, too, is coming up very rapidly. In=20
military terms, superiority in the air or in space is no longer=20
enough to ensure security. In how many countries can US citizens=20
safely walk the streets today?

Our collective survival lies in recognizing that religion is not the=20
solution; neither is nationalism. Both are divisive, embedding within=20
us false notions of superiority and arrogant pride that are difficult=20
to erase. We have but one choice: the path of secular humanism, based=20
upon the principles of logic and reason. This alone offers the hope=20
of providing everybody on this globe with the right to life, liberty,=20
and the pursuit of happiness.

_______

#2.

The Friday Times
Dec.7-13, 2001

Was Pakistan being Talibanised?

Khaled Ahmed's A n a l y s i s

Pakistan was ripe for the plucking. The state had almost transformed=20
completely into a Talibanised state. One reason why the Pakistani=20
clergy is unhappy with General Musharraf is that he bucked the trend=20
and sided with the global coalition against Osama bin Laden and Mulla=20
Umar. Most Pakistanis are not extremists but support the=20
anti-Musharraf front in Pakistan for other reasons. Pakistan may be=20
difficult to pluck out of its Talibanisation trap, but after=20
September 11 those who wish to get rid of Talibanisation stand a=20
better chance of succeeding. There must be few examples in human=20
history of how a creed can undermine a state without touching the=20
soul of the people living in it. That is one reason why it is so=20
difficult to accept that Pakistan was Talibanised and still is
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PTV discussion led by host Talat Hussain on 18 November 2001 had=20
PPP's Aitzaz Ahsan and PML's Wasim Sajjad giving their opinion on=20
whether Pakistan was being Talibanised before the September 11=20
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Both gentlemen tended=20
to agree that Pakistan was a moderate society and that the tough=20
Islam enforced by the Taliban was not acceptable here. Aitzaz Ahsan=20
clearly stated that Pakistan was being Talibanised, that is, being=20
subjected to the tough Islam of the Taliban. When Talat Hussain=20
challenged him on the basis of the so-called 80 percent of the=20
population that had not sided with the clergy after September 11, he=20
did not say much. The discussion seemed to imply that Pakistan was=20
too moderate in its soul to accept Talibanisation. Does that mean=20
that Pakistan was not being Talibanised?

Pakistan and tough Islam: Pakistan's march towards a tougher version=20
of Islam began as early as 1949. It had come into being on the basis=20
of the support the Pakistan Movement got from the Barelvis (Low=20
Church). It had faced opposition from the National Indian Congress=20
which was supported by the Deobandi seminaries (High Church). However=20
after the establishment of Pakistan as an Islamic state under he 1949=20
Objectives Resolution, ideology could be defined only in terms of the=20
teachings of High Church. Barelvi Low Church was too mixed up with=20
mysticism to be a proper source of Islamic law-making. Ironically,=20
Pakistan had to move away from the 'spiritual pluralism' of the=20
Barelvis, who had supported Pakistan, and rely on the more=20
puritanical Deobandis who had opposed it. Then during the Afghan war=20
and its offshoot, the Kashmir jehad, Deobandi warriors were permitted=20
immunity from law inside Pakistan and their clergy were treated as=20
patrons of state ideology. State functionaries including the=20
judiciary were indoctrinated in favour of strict Islam and the common=20
man was brainwashed in favour of something the state had embraced,=20
and the warrior priests were prepared to enforce with weapons that=20
the state allowed them to carry.

The urge for strict Islam was created by Islamisation under General=20
Zia. The rise of Imam Khomeini tended to upstage even General Zia in=20
the eyes of those who wanted a 'punitive' Islam as a means of=20
spiritual reform. With the decline of the ayatollahs in Iran, the=20
focus shifted to Mulla Umar in Afghanistan after 1994. The seminaries=20
of Deobandi persuasion supplied young men for Kashmir jehad and were=20
protected against any local reaction against them by the state.=20
Deobandi clerics were more outspoken and blunt and constantly rebuked=20
the state for being insincere in enforcing true Islam. Other schools=20
of jurisprudence like the Ahle Hadith began affecting the state=20
institutions because of their strict world view. In 1996, the Lahore=20
High Court handed down a verdict against a Muslim woman's freedom to=20
marry a man of her choice. The judges began sporting beards and=20
writing hymns in praise of the Holy Prophet PBUH and sitting in=20
'etekaf' (holy trance). In 1999, before General Musharraf came on the=20
scene, prime minister Nawaz Sharif had told the Defence Committee of=20
the Cabinet that he perceived security threats from the Taliban; and=20
his brother as chief minister of Punjab had rounded up hundreds of=20
important Deobandi activists to remove the threat against the Shia=20
community and against himself. The state, dominated by the army and=20
the intelligence agencies aligned with it, did not agree.

Politicians 'give' under pressure: Prime minister Nawaz Sharif was=20
himself under threat from the rising tide of Talibanisation and=20
attempted a mythridatic solution by planning his famous 15th=20
Amendment. Earlier in 1997, he had chosen a cleric judge Tarar as=20
president in a similar 'sympathetic' attempt to cure his weakness=20
vis-a-vis Talibanisation. It was during his tenure that a formal=20
movement for the imposition of the Taliban-style rule had been=20
initiated by Sufi Muhammad and his Taliban organisation Tehreek Nifaz=20
Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) in Malakand. [TNSM supplied thousands of=20
fighters to the Taliban in Afghanistan after September 11].=20
Cunningly, Nawaz Sharif had supported a nascent TNSM before 1997 to=20
embarrass the PPP government which faced a near revolt in the Swat=20
region asking for courts run by clerics like Afghanistan rather by=20
judges from the judicial service of Pakistan. Down in Karachi, the=20
Taliban centre of power was the Banuri Mosque where the Deobandi=20
leader Mufti Shamzai had emerged as the great preceptor of=20
Talibanisation. It was in his office in Karachi that Mulla Umar and=20
Osama bin Laden had met for the first time during the Afghan war.=20
During the reign of Ms Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the Taliban of=20
Karachi had taken over the city several times. In the north, Maulana=20
Samiul Haq, from whose seminary in Akora Khatak near Peshawar many of=20
the Taliban leaders had graduated, proclaimed the Taliban version of=20
the shariat as the only version acceptable in Pakistan.

By the time General Musharraf took over in October 1999, the process=20
of Talibanisation had taken strong root in Pakistan. The Islamisation=20
of the judiciary delivered its first fruit in the shape of the=20
Supreme Court Appellate Bench verdict on the abolition of bank=20
interest in 1999. The motive of 'punishment' central to=20
Talibanisation informed the judges' attitude some of whom had not=20
enjoyed good reputation as judges. The sectarian conflict that came=20
in the wake of Deobandi jehad, and which the army in some ways=20
protected from being proceeded against, came full circle. Karachi was=20
its natural epicentre given the fact that the big exponents of the=20
ideology were located in the Banuri complex. In 2000, the big Taliban=20
preceptor Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi was murdered. The Taliban of=20
Karachi immediately took over the city and burnt a number of=20
buildings, including the office of Business Recorder . [Karachi corps=20
commander was a Deobandi bearded general]. The murder was avenged by=20
the ambush of the Sunni Tehreek leader Saleem Qadiri in 2001. What=20
came centre stage was a vendetta between the High and Low Church=20
varieties in Pakistan. The Barelvis fell under the spell of stringent=20
Islam and took on some High Church characteristic (like banning of=20
human likeness) that they thought the state liked. In 1996, Barelvi=20
Dawat Islami had killed six Deobandis in Multan. The great Deobandi=20
congregation in Lahore by the Tablighi Jamaat is the largest=20
gathering of tough Islam in Pakistan. It is considered apolitical but=20
in the past there were reports about it supplying recruits to Afghan=20
jehad as recorded in Agony of Algeria by Martin Stone. The=20
Bangladeshi Taliban found fighting in Afghanistan against the=20
American attack came from the background of Tablighi Jamaat=20
congregation in Dhaka which is second only in size to the annual=20
pilgrimage to Holy Makka.

Dominance of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan: The Taliban-Al-Qaeda merger in=20
Afghanistan led to powerful external changes, especially in Pakistan=20
where the state was rendered more vulnerable to the spiritual=20
ascendancy of Talibanisation than to India's military supremacy.=20
After September 11 it was revealed that the main New York attacker=20
Muhammad Atta was funded by someone from Pakistan. The money was=20
remitted from Pakistan by Sheikh Umar, a member of Al-Qaeda who was=20
sprung from an Indian jail by Osama bin Laden through the hijack of=20
an Indian airline plane in 1999. The other Al-Qaeda member who was=20
sprung from jail together with Sheikh Umar was Masood Azhar, leader=20
of Jaish-e-Muhammad, who had gone to Sudan with Osama in 1996. It was=20
revealed that the remittance to Muhammad Atta was made under the=20
tutelage of the ISI whose chief was thereafter removed.

The nuclear establishment was not immune from Talibanisation. The=20
Islamic fantasist-scientist Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood (who thought=20
Pakistan could exploit the energy of the fire-based jinns) and his=20
highly qualified two scientist sons were discovered to be active in=20
Afghanistan with their Umma Tamir-e-Nau organisation. Mehmood was=20
suspected by the Americans of transferring enriched uranium to Osama=20
bin Laden. After Pakistani interrogators cleared him of all charges,=20
Mehmood was taken to the American embassy in Islamabad and allegedly=20
given a lie-detector test, which he failed, and promptly had a heart=20
attack. But he was not alone. The FBI is also probing a fellow=20
nuclear scientist Majeed and two naval officers. According to The=20
Nation (18 November 2001), Commander (Retd) Humayun Niaz and=20
Commander (Retd) Arshad Chaudhary worked inside Pakistan's nuclear=20
establishment and had links with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Pakistan was ripe for the plucking: Pakistan was being rapidly=20
Talibanised before September 11. The clergy, aligned with=20
Talibanisation, thought they could remove General Musharraf and take=20
over the country. In March 2001, Chakwal's fiery leader of the=20
Naqshbandis with linkages in the army, Maulana Akram Awan, announced=20
his march on Islamabad. He was joined by General (Retd) Zaheerul=20
Islam Abbasi who had just finished serving his sentence after being=20
caught staging an unsuccessful coup as a major-general in the GHQ in=20
1995. Other Deobandi clerics with powerful warrior backing like=20
Maulana Azam Tariq of Sipah Sahaba too joined him and declared that=20
he would enforce Talibanisation in 20 selected cities of Pakistan.=20
When General Musharraf referred to the Akram Awan threat to his corps=20
commanders, at least three fundamentalist generals were seen to be=20
favouring Talibanisation. Out of the three, General Usmani had his=20
Deobandi spiritual master in Lahore running a seminary of children=20
whom he allegedly sexually abused.

Pakistan was ripe for the plucking. The state had almost transformed=20
completely into a Talibanised state. One reason why the Pakistani=20
clergy is unhappy with General Musharraf is that he bucked the trend=20
and sided with the global coalition against Osama bin Laden and Mulla=20
Umar. Most Pakistanis are not extremists but support the=20
anti-Musharraf front in Pakistan for other reasons. Pakistan may be=20
difficult to pluck out of its Talibanisation trap, but after=20
September 11 those who wish to get rid of Talibanisation stand a=20
better chance of succeeding. There must be few examples in human=20
history of how a creed can undermine a state without touching the=20
soul of the people living in it. That is one reason why it is so=20
difficult to accept that Pakistan was Talibanised and still is.
______

#3.

The Hindustan Times
9 December 2001

Propaganda as history won't sell
Romila Thapar

The recent deletion of passages from the NCERT History textbooks, by=20
the NCERT and the CBSE raises many important questions that concern=20
matters relating not only to the teaching of history, but also to=20
questions of ethical norms and the rights of authors as well as the=20
handling of knowledge in education.

The action of the NCERT and the CBSE is a contravention of the=20
agreement that was made with the authors of the History textbooks.=20
The contract stated that no changes were to be made in the books=20
without the permission of the authors. In the past when changes were=20
suggested by various agencies, and even if these were marginal, the=20
permission of the author was required. Where permission was not=20
given, the text remained unaltered.

The book on Ancient India for Class VI was used from 1966 and was=20
revised by me in 1987. Periodic revision became necessary with=20
advances in knowledge. The objection, therefore, is not to revising=20
the books but to making changes without the consent of the author.=20
One expects government institutions at least to honour agreements and=20
not infringe the rules of copyright.

The passages axed are based on historical evidence and cannot,=20
therefore, be described as one-sided history. It is said that the=20
most offensive refer to the eating of beef in ancient times. Yet=20
these are statements drawn from well-known sources, as for example,=20
the Shatapatha Brahmana 3.4.1.2; and the Vasishtha Dharmasutra 4.8.,=20
which mention honouring guests by serving beef. The Brihadaranyaka=20
Upanisad 6.4.18., makes the interesting statement that if a learned=20
and long-lived son is desired, then rice cooked with veal or beef=20
should be eaten.

The eating of beef is also attested from archaeology as has been=20
discussed by Professor HD Sankalia ('The Cow in History', Seminar,=20
May 1967, 93). Professor BB Lal, in his report on the excavation at=20
Hastinapur, a site that he suggests may, at the lower levels, have=20
been settled by arriving Aryans (Ancient India, 1954-55, Nos. 10 and=20
11, p. 151), states that the occurrence of charred bones of cattle,=20
buffalo, sheep and pig, bearing definite cut marks on them, shows=20
that these animals were slaughtered for food (p. 14).

Comparative studies of cattle keeping economies point to people=20
generally not eating their livestock indiscriminately, but eating=20
beef on ritual occasions or as a mark of status. The archaeological=20
evidence suggests a more widespread use of cattle for food. The=20
introduction of a prohibition may acquire a religious sanction but=20
the rationale for it may also derive from other factors such as=20
changes in livestock and ecology, or even political demands. These=20
call for historical investigation and particularly in a society where=20
the management of cattle has been an important feature.

The issue is not that there is no evidence for the eating of beef in=20
ancient India, but whether this is something that students at school=20
should know about. Given its prevalence for many centuries followed=20
by the introduction of the prohibition in some Hindu identities of=20
more recent times, it is important for those studying Indian society=20
- as all students of history do - to know the historical reasons for=20
the prohibition. There is a need to understand when and why=20
prohibitions are introduced since such knowledge provides a deeper=20
understanding of social and religious concerns. The sentiments of the=20
various religious communities are not God-given, they are gradually=20
built up through particular beliefs and social practices and often in=20
the context of particular historical situations. If the sentiments=20
are to be appreciated then they have also to be comprehended in their=20
social and historical context.

The same is true of references to the sanctioning of social=20
inequalities through the system of varna/caste. How can varna and=20
caste be taught without discussing which social groups formulated it=20
and how and why; and who were its supporters and when did it become=20
widespread? What were the compulsions in a society that accepted=20
these divisions and was there a protest against them? How can a=20
teacher explain why the policy of reservation is in practice if the=20
teacher is not permitted to discuss the formulation of caste in the=20
classroom? Dalit sentiment would certainly want the inequities of=20
caste to be stated, known and discussed.

The more significant question then is why these deletions are being=20
insisted upon at this time. Are there really objections emanating=20
from religious bodies that are claiming to speak for an entire=20
religious community, or is this a blatant attempt to replace=20
mainstream history by the Hindutva version of history? Recent=20
newspaper reports indicate that pressure from the RSS led to these=20
deletions and the attempt was to encourage state school education to=20
conform to the curriculum of the RSS Shishu Mandirs.

If the Shishu Mandirs are now to be the models for state schools,=20
then the teaching and understanding of history will inevitably be=20
undermined. History in these schools is taught as a catechism -=20
consisting of questions and answers, where the answers are frequently=20
what the ideology dictates with no reference to accuracy or fact. For=20
example, children are taught that the first Ramjanmabhumi temple was=20
built by the son of Rama, Maharaja Kusha; that it was destroyed by=20
Menander the Greek in 150 BC; that it was rebuilt by Chandragupta=20
Vikramaditya in AD 308; and was plundered by Salar Masud, the nephew=20
of Mahmud of Ghazni. None of these statements have any historical=20
basis. History in any case, cannot be taught in question-answer form=20
since the essence of good history is that it should reflect and=20
incorporate the many aspects and nuances of human activity.

The sudden rush to delete these specific passages seems also to have=20
a more immediate purpose. It is seen as tied to the coming elections=20
in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. The propaganda over the deletions will=20
help galvanise upper caste Hindu, Sikh and Jat opinion in favour of=20
the BJP. Recognising its potential as election strategy is making=20
parties like the Congress also jump onto the same bandwagon. This is=20
not an attempt to salvage the discipline of history as is being=20
claimed but rather an attempt to mangle it in the interests of=20
election propaganda.

The confrontation is being projected as between Leftist and Rightist=20
historians. The confrontation is not between Leftist and Rightist=20
historians but between professional historians and politicians=20
sympathetic to the Hindutva persuasion. And those who are at the=20
policy-making levels of NCERT echo the politicians. Professional=20
historical writing requires a critical enquiry that includes the=20
application of historical methodology, assessing the reliability of=20
evidence and drawing on logical argument in making casual=20
connections. It differentiates between the invention of a narrative=20
that fantasises about the past and an interpretation that attempts to=20
critically analyse the evidence. History is not an arbitrary=20
narrative where myth can override facts. There is also today the=20
viability of contending interpretations, but each has to be based on=20
accepted historical methodologies. This is evidently not understood=20
by those who are out to undermine history.

The act of changing history through a political command draws no=20
respect from the profession. Politicians can go on attempting to=20
denigrate the authors of the textbooks by referring to them as "the=20
progeny of Macaulay, Marx and the madrassas", but the impact of this=20
ranting remains marginal on the profession. Ironically, it is the=20
Hindutva version of history that draws its inspiration from the Mills=20
and the Macaulays in its definition of Indian civilisation and of=20
monolithic communities dominating history. The hostility of the Sangh=20
Parivar to the madrassas is partly because it is also trying to base=20
its authority on the same kind of educational structures.

The CBSE has now taken on a new role of doctoring the contents of=20
prescribed books. But what is even more disturbing is the directive=20
that there should be no discussion on the passages that have been=20
deleted from the textbooks. Apart from being an infringement of the=20
freedom of speech, that such discussion should be forbidden in school=20
makes nonsense of education. Discussion and the exploration of ideas=20
is a primary function of schooling. And prohibitions, as we all know,=20
whet the appetite for more of what has been forbidden.

This is also an assault on the fundamentals of acquiring and handling=20
knowledge. If knowledge is to progress in any field there needs to be=20
a critical enquiry and analyses of the subject and this includes the=20
exploration of conventional, controversial and sceptical ideas. If=20
this approach is to be encouraged in the sciences, as scientists=20
assert, its dismissal in the social and human sciences is a disaster.=20
The CBSE directive should be alarming for those who support critical=20
historical enquiry, as indeed it should also be for those who are=20
concerned with the advance of knowledge.

(The author is an eminent historian.)
_____

#4.

The Hindu
Monday, Dec 10, 2001

Managing uncertainty
By Jayadeva Uyangoda

The time has come for Sri Lanka's divided ruling elite for sober=20
reflection and careful action. [...].
http://www.hinduonnet.com/stories/2001121000351000.htm

_____

#5.

The Hindu
Monday, Dec 10, 2001
What is history?
By V. Krishna Ananth

What the NCERT did was to replace one history with another. This goes=20
far beyond changing `one-sided' history to one that is many sided.=20=20
[...] .
http://www.hinduonnet.com/stories/2001121000361000.htm

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