[sacw] SACW #1. (6 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
6 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

[ This issue of SACW is dedicated to the memory of all those who died=20
in communal riots in India in the aftermath of 6 December 1992, when=20
the Babari mosque was demolished by fascists in India. Secular=20
activists are meeting and organising peace actions in major cities=20
of India on 6 December 2001 to combat fundamentalist politics. SACW=20
extends its symbolic hand of solidarity with them. ]

------------------------------------------

#1. Nepal : Shangri La no more, Shangri La, yet (commentary, Himal)
#2. Nepal: Rooting Out the Reds (Meenakshi Ganguly)
#3. Pakistan: Islamic Threat to Stability :How Real? (Fr=E9d=E9ric Grare)
#4. Creating a Climate of Confidence in Indo-Pakistan Relations=20
(Brian Cloughley)
#5. India: When mythology becomes history
#6. India: Hindutva brigade's bloody build-up in Maharashtra and=20
their campaign for the Ram temple in Ayodhya (Teesta Setalvad)
#7. India: History as nonsense - So let's welcome our new historians:=20
swamis, munis, mullahs

________________________

#1.

Himal South Asian
December 2001
Commentary
NEPAL
Shangri La no more, Shangri La, yet

Nepal is little understood by outsiders because it was not colonised=20
- the reason why there was not enough written about it till the=20
mid-20th century. The country is also a bit mysterious because there=20
is so much variety within it - demographic, geographic, climatic - to=20
be fathomed easily . The feudal era, which lasted all the way till=20
the 1950s, did not help in the understanding of history either.=20
Finally, Nepali scholarship has itself been weak, and what is written=20
with on-the-ground sincerity is mostly available in the Nepali=20
language.

The world therefore understood Nepal first as a Shangri La, and that=20
representation endured for decades after the tourists disco-vered=20
Nepal in the 1960s. That two-dimen-sional image of the country was=20
made up of key markers which included: Himalayan Buddhism, the snow=20
massifs (himals), the Tibetan societies of the Himalayan rimland, and=20
the Kathmandu Valley culture. The highly populated midhill region -=20
which actually provides Nepal its own self-image - and the Tarai were=20
largely excluded from the mind's picture of Nepal.

The Shangri La image took its first beating when the promoters of the=20
'Himalayan degra-dation theory' claimed that the Nepali pea-santry=20
was wreaking havoc on its forests, which was leading to landslides,=20
reduced agricultural yield, and enhanced floods in Bangladesh. It=20
turned out not to be so bad, in hindsight, but the damage had been=20
done, with even the locals convinced by this development propaganda.

Then democracy arrived in 1990, after which several factors aided the=20
steady decline of Nepal's exotic-forbidden-kingdom image. The fact=20
that democracy had unfettered long-held societal angst meant that=20
ethnic and religious assertion came to the fore and suddenly the=20
country seemed to be (and was) in turmoil. The politicians did no=20
service by becoming quickly corrupt, and the fact that Nepali=20
democracy could not deliver fast enough on its promise led to the=20
birth of a violent Maoist insurgency, which gave the lie to the=20
belief that Nepal, the birthplace of the Buddha, is a peaceful land.

In the latest segment of this unfolding story, the royal palace=20
massacre of 1 June 2001 battered the kingdom's image further, then=20
the Maoists feigned as if to parley and then in the second half of=20
November decided to violently dare the state and establishment. The=20
Nepali Government of Sher Bahadur Deuba reacted by: a) declaring the=20
first-ever state of emergency in Nepal; b) approving an=20
anti-terrorism ordinance; and, c) ordering the army out to pursue the=20
Maobaadi.

For a country that relies on tourism, possibly nothing could have=20
been worse than this continuous self-inflicted assault on its=20
persona. But to look at the positive side of things - and indeed=20
there is such a side even in these despondent times - the country has=20
been going through a period of telescoped learning whose end result=20
is a polity that will be better able to manage itself and rid itself=20
of contradictions.

The world is shocked to see where Nepal has ended up. But Nepalis are=20
equally sur-prised to see that they still have a country. Even in the=20
most excruciating moments of national crisis, such as when an entire=20
royal clan was massacred and an unknown void stared the people in the=20
face, all the institutions of state remained in place and=20
functioning. Nepal, indeed, is a country that seems to be able to=20
take constant pummeling and yet remain standing. But this resilience=20
is not useful if, at the end of it, there is not a trace of social=20
and economic advance for the people.

The wait for such advance, hopefully, will not be long. In the=20
meantime, the world needs to know that Nepal is no longer a Shangri=20
La, but that it is Shangri La, yet. Meaning that all that is written=20
in the tourism brochures is true - isolated exotic communities,=20
Hindu-Buddhist comity, great mountain peaks, forbidden kingdom. And=20
it is also true that Nepal is a country of 23 million going through=20
dislocating change aided by market penetration and satellite=20
television, amidst a messy exercise in parliamentary democracy. In=20
the latter sense, Nepal is like any other developing country in the=20
world and to have thought otherwise was to have made the initial=20
mistake. And this non-exotic image of Nepal actually makes Nepal more=20
real, more a country of living human beings than a fantastical space=20
inhabited only by gods, temples, and monasteries. Like everywhere, it=20
is the people who make the difference, and Nepal's multiple=20
identities are its saving grace and it is this diversity that has to=20
be saved in this globalised age. The very hetereogenity of Nepal=20
makes for a unique homogeneity, which is what makes the country=20
different from so many regions in the neigh-bourhood. This is what=20
makes Nepal truly exotic - an exoticism worth preserving even as the=20
kingdom strives to 'develop' economically.

So, to look at the brighter side: even the Maoist insurgency has it.=20
At the very least, it professes to be fighting for a classless=20
society, which is different from the fight for identity which marks=20
the 29 insurgencies that pepper the Himalayan landscape all the way=20
eastward from Nepal to Burma. On the ground level, thanks to a=20
democracy, Nepalis are today more questioning of authority than ever=20
before, and if that is not the foundation stone of democracy then=20
nothing is. Then there is ethnic assertion, gender activism, dalit=20
activism, and tarai activism - not always effective, but nevertheless=20
there. The press is free, the only problem being that it does not use=20
its freedom to the hilt.

Nepal is experimenting with democracy in fast-forward, and the=20
Emergency put in place by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba should be=20
only a brief aberration. The country needs to go swiftly back to=20
democracy as usual. Except that it should not be democracy 'as=20
usual', but one that begins to deliver economic and social benefits=20
to 23 million people.

_______

#2.

Time
5 December 2001
Rooting Out the Reds
As talks fade into deadly turmoil, Nepal goes into emergency mode to=20
fight a leftist rebel group
BY MEENAKSHI GANGULY

http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/daily/0,9754,187040,00.html

______

#3.
Economic and Political Weekly
01 December, 2001
Commentary

Pakistan: Islamic Threat to Stability

How Real?

Following the Pakistan government's support to the American-led=20
actions, the Jamaat-i-Islami, has emerged as a leading and vociferous=20
critic of the Musharraf regime. However, as unfolding events=20
demonstrate, and weighed down by its role in Pakistan's past, the=20
Jamaat finds itself isolated and playing much of a lone hand.

Fr=E9d=E9ric Grare

The attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on=20
September 11, 2001 have once again raised questions about political=20
Islam as an actual threat to international security. On a new scale,=20
however. The emergence of political Islam on the international=20
political arena was not new but had remained reminiscent of a=20
supposedly outmoded era. The use of modern means of transport=20
(planes) as instruments of mass destruction has now made it a=20
component of modernity and therefore all the more frightening.

As a part of the international Islamic movement, the Jamaat-i-Islami=20
Pakistan deserves particular attention. It is not as such a=20
representative of the entire movement, but it has been presented by=20
some observers as a threat to the Pakistani regime and, subsequently,=20
as a potential impediment to the American war against the Taliban=20
regime in Afghanistan and Al Qaida.

Jamaat's Discourse
After general Pervez Musharraf's address to the nation on September=20
19, Jamaat-i-Islami was one of the two Pakistani political parties to=20
refuse the use of Pakistani soil against Afghanistan. The Jamaat's=20
response to the September 11 events was articulated in three ways:

(1) Condemnation: As early as September 11, Jamaat president Qazi=20
Hussain Ahmed had termed the attacks against the World Trade Centre=20
and the Pentagon as 'blatant acts of terrorism' and expressed=20
solidarity with the victims. He later described these acts as=20
'nothing but crime against human values', insisting that 'no religion=20
allows the killing of innocent people'.

(2) Conspiracy against Islam: Even in his first statement, Qazi=20
Hussain Ahmed had criticised the unfounded media hype implicating=20
Muslims and Osama bin Laden with the attacks. He went further a few=20
days later. He denounced the attacks as a Jewish conspiracy to divert=20
the investigations towards Muslims and disgrace Islam. This reflected=20
the old fear of the Jamaat that the implication of Muslims in=20
terrorist acts would step up the persecution that they have to endure=20
all over the world. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, a prominent Jamaat=20
member, even declared that Israel and its intelligence agency, the=20
Mossad, were behind the terror attacks in New York and Washington.=20
Another Jamaat officer declared that although more than 5,000 Jews=20
were working in the World Trade Centre, none had come to their=20
workplace on September 11. He added that Jews had shares in the=20
airlines whose planes were hijacked and used for attacks on the World=20
Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

(3) Strong anti-Americanism: From the very beginning, the Jamaat=20
pointed out the responsibility of the US in the events, in particular=20
with reference to its policies in Chechnya, Kashmir and Palestine.=20
Washington was 'reaping the bitter fruits of certain policies'. It=20
also blamed the US for being unjust with Pakistan, pressurising it to=20
use its soil against Afghanistan while condemning it for its nuclear=20
tests. It asked the Pakistani government not to grant facilities to=20
the US. As the government did not comply with its request, the Jamaat=20
demanded that it should step down and a civil establishment that=20
could hold elections be set up.

The Jamaat leaders and members were as shocked as anybody else by the=20
September 11 drama. Their refusal to believe that 'true believers'=20
could have committed such acts led them to search for scapegoats. The=20
Jews were a convenient one. Not only did this exempt Muslims from any=20
responsibility but also, due to their link with the Palestine=20
question, allowed the Jamaat to present Muslims and Islam as the=20
victims of a vast international conspiracy. US policies (or absence=20
of policies) in Palestine, Chechnya and Kashmir were presented as=20
examples of this conspiracy.

The Jamaat's discourse points to a new phase in the party's=20
evolution. Ironically, although not surprisingly, the Jamaat's=20
condemnation of the American intervention in Afghanistan and=20
subsequently of Pakistan's support to it have not been formulated in=20
religious terms. They have been articulated essentially around=20
geopolitical considerations. On October 15, while addressing parents=20
and families of 'martyrs' in the Kashmir and Afghan struggles, Qazi=20
Hussain Ahmed argued that allowing the US to use military facilities=20
in Pakistan was annoying both its friends, China and Iran and would=20
necessarily result in the installation of an anti-Pakistan government=20
in Kabul. He insisted that India would be the only beneficiary of the=20
situation.

The quasi-absence of religious references in the Jamaat's discourse=20
is typical of a long and gradual process of 'nationalisation' of what=20
was initially a revivalist movement, refusing vehemently both the=20
notion of a nation state and nationalism, which in its historical=20
dialogue with the Pakistani state, the party regarded as the vector=20
of the realisation of the Muslim Ummah. The Jamaat progressively=20
espoused the objectives of the Pakistani state but asked in return=20
the islamisation of the latter as only Islamic nationalism could be=20
exempt from all the evils associated with the very notion of=20
nationalism. The objective of an Islamic state, much more that the=20
specific policies followed by the Pakistani government, have been at=20
the core of the rivalry between the Jamaat and general Musharraf. It=20
matters little to the Jamaat to now back the Taliban against the=20
groups it had been supporting before, like the Jamaat-i-Islami of=20
Afghan Northern Alliance president Rabbani to which it is=20
ideologically close.

Tactical considerations are not absent from the Jamaat's reaction.=20
The Jamaat tried to use the opportunity to mobilise and manipulate=20
the international Muslim opinion around its own views, thus trying to=20
bolster its own image. On September 13, the party issued a statement=20
on behalf of some three dozen Islamic movements accross the world. In=20
a rare show of solidarity, they voiced their condemnation of the=20
attacks which claimed thousands of lives in New York and Washington.=20
The intention was to mobilise Muslims beyond the traditional=20
supporters of these organisations and to channelise the resentment=20
against the US in the entire Muslim world to its own benefit.

Jamaat Activism and Pakistan's Stability
In the present circumstances, the question arises whether the Jamaat=20
will contribute significantly to a possible destabilisation of=20
Pakistan. In other words, is the Jamaat a threat for the present=20
Pakistani regime? This requires a careful analysis of two points. Is=20
it willing to topple the government ? Does it have the capacity to do=20
so, alone or in association with other groups or segments of the=20
Pakistani society ?

Although, from the very beginning, the Jamaat opposed the American=20
intervention in Afghanistan, its willingness to overthrow the=20
government emerged only after the failure of its attempt to convince=20
president Musharraf not to ally with the US. It initially did attempt=20
to pressurise the government by trying to mobilise the All Party=20
Conference and inviting retired generals in order to gain the=20
sympathy of the army. But it was not successful. As a matter of fact,=20
Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the party's amir, remained careful not to=20
antagonise the army. He warned on October 5 that 'masses would not=20
let the sitting regime be in the cradle of power if the rulers=20
allowed the US to launch an attack on Afghanistan from Pakistani=20
soil', and that president Musharraf would not remain in power if he=20
continued his support to the Americans. Probably expecting to rally=20
the military after general Musharraf had sacked three generals on=20
October 9, he declared, 'Musharraf's days (were) numbered'.

However, the actual practice of the Jamaat tells more about its real=20
intentions than its discourse. Although the Jamaat started calling=20
for the resignation of the government, it acted strictly within=20
constitutional and democratic means. Demonstrations were held all=20
over the country but remained largely peaceful. The party amir=20
understood well the limits of his own margin of manoeuvre. On October=20
29, promising to topple president Musharraf, who, he said, had become=20
a 'security risk', Qazi Hussain Ahmed called a meeting of Pakistani=20
religious groups to plan a march in Islamabad and a subsequent=20
demonstration but asked his supporters to remain peaceful and not=20
bring weapons.

The government responded in kind. Although Qazi Hussain Ahmed was=20
asking for its dismissal, it let the Jamaat protest and organise=20
various demonstrations. The government only prevented the Jamaat from=20
demonstrating in places where American troops were located. Qazi=20
Hussain Ahmed, for example, was barred from proceeding to Jacobabad,=20
where he was supposed to hold a meeting, for fear of a clash between=20
the local population and the US forces. The amir of the Jamaat had to=20
content himself with addressing his supporters on phone. Similarly,=20
he was banned from entering Sind for fear of riots in the already=20
agitated city of Karachi but could address rallies in Lahore and=20
Islamabad. Some members of the Jamaat were arrested at Sukkur airport=20
and released a few hours later. But unlike the Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam,=20
whose leader was put under house arrest, the Jamaat-i-Islami was=20
given relative freedom of action.

Can the Jamaat overthrow the government? It should be observed that=20
representing around five per cent of the Pakistani electorate, it=20
would be impossible for the Jamaat alone to mobilise public opinion=20
to the extent that it could destabilise the present regime. It would=20
necessarily have to act in association with other political parties.=20
So far, however, in the present situation, the Jamaat has been unable=20
to find allies outside the Islamic circles. Moreover, most of the=20
parties that have rallied around it are quite marginal. The only=20
politically significant partner that the Jamaat has in its opposition=20
to the government's Afghan policy is the Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam. It is=20
no secret that the two organisations are competing on the=20
Islamic scene and do not get along very well with each other. The=20
emergence of the Taliban, supported by the Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam and=20
ideologically linked to it, led the Jamaat-i-Islami to completely=20
lose its influence over Pakistan's Afghan policy.

During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the=20
Jamaat-i-Islami had supported Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami and, although=20
to a lesser extent, the Jamaat-i-Islami of Burranuddin Rabbani and=20
Ahmad Shah Massoud. Only a few weeks before the Taliban took over=20
Kabul, Qazi Hussain Ahmed had been instrumental in bringing about a=20
reconciliation between Hekmatyar and Massoud, the former becoming=20
prime minister of a government in which the latter was defence=20
minister. Moreover, the always very elitist Jamaat-i-Islami had never=20
been comfortable with the Taliban and their literal interpretation of=20
the Quran. Its leaders, in private, considered the Taliban's=20
interpretation stupid and sometimes, in particular with regards to=20
women, un-Islamic. Therefore, beyond the fa=E7ade, one can seriously=20
doubt the real unity of the Islamic movement in Pakistan on the=20
Afghan issue. It should also be added that even a unity of the=20
two main Islamist parties would not seriously alter the political=20
balance in the country. The support enjoyed by the=20
Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam in Pakistan is very limited to say the least.

The Jamaat in Pakistan's History
One should also note that, historically, the Jamaat played a=20
significant role in shaping the political landscape in Pakistan only=20
on the occasion of the overthrow of the Bhutto government in 1977.=20
Due to the extreme polarisation in politics, which had led to=20
fraudulent elections, the agitation led by the Islami=20
Jamiat-i-Tulabah, the student wing of the party, was sufficient to=20
convince the military to take over. But today, Pakistan's political=20
scene is very different. If the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of=20
former prime minister Benazir Bhutto remains a significant political=20
force, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) has split into four different=20
factions. Moreover, although Benazir Bhutto has asked for the=20
constitution of a national government, she is supporting general=20
Musharraf in the present crisis saying that he has taken the right=20
decision in the national interest. In contrast, the PML (N), one=20
faction of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's PML, has condemned=20
the US attacks against Afghanistan whereas the Qaid-i-Azam faction=20
has demanded the writing off of loans by the US, Europe and Japan in=20
exchange of Pakistan's support for the US action. In such a=20
situation, it is difficult to foresee the circumstances which could=20
possibly lead to the formation of a front which could ultimately=20
topple the government.

Can there be a coup within the army ? Although Qazi Hussain Ahmed=20
protested on October 30 that he was not trying to create a rift among=20
the army generals, he had earlier, according to The Times of India,=20
asked the army to remove Musharraf the same way it had sacked former=20
prime minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999. There has been a public=20
discussion in Pakistan, and even more abroad, of an increasing=20
'Islamisation' of the officer corps. In the 1998 edition of his=20
famous book, The Pakistani Army, Stephen Cohen wrote about 'the=20
emergence of a possible 'Zia generation' of officers : individuals=20
who were socially more conservative, perhaps more 'Islamic' in=20
orientation and not overly worried about the army's role in Pakistan=20
politics'.

But as Cohen himself underlines, if there is some evidence that the=20
Tablighi Jamaat has grown in influence among the officer corps, the=20
Tablighi are not Islamist, but a devout, pious, loosely organised=20
proselytising group, themselves opposed to the doctrinaire Wahabis of=20
Saudi Arabia. For example, general Osmani, one of the generals sacked=20
by general Musharraf on October 9, is said to belong to the Tablighi=20
Jamaat. There is no evidence of organised infiltration of the=20
Jamaat-i-Islami in the Pakistan army. So far the calls of the Jamaat=20
leader to the army to overthrow general Musharraf have remained=20
unanswered. They are likely to remain unanswered in the near future=20
as it is gradually becoming clearer that Pakistan has not completely=20
given up its policy on Afghanistan and is likely to preserve its own=20
security interest there. It should not go unnoticed that the new=20
governor of Punjab, Lt General Khalid Maqbool, will most probably be=20
firmer with the Jamaat-i-Islami than his predecessor, general=20
Muhammad Safdar. Finally, whatever direction the army takes will be=20
decided from within and not under the influence of external elements.=20
Qazi Hussain Ahmed has already experienced it. After he tried to=20
pressurise the Corps Commander high command to act collectively to=20
sack general Musharraf, he was put under house arrest on November 4th=20
and charged with sedition.

In all probability, the Jamaat's activism is very unlikely to make=20
any difference to the political landscape in Pakistan. The current=20
crisis will most probably demonstrate once more the Jamaat's=20
impotence, although unforeseen circumstances cannot completely be=20
ruled out. Whatever the future might hold, the Jamaat will do no more=20
than trying to surf on the events. It will be very vocal but will be=20
unable to capitalise politically on discontent. Ultimately, the=20
Jamaat's management of the current crisis raises questions about the=20
nature of the party. It tends to demonstrate that, despite its claim=20
to be a radical alternative to the present power, it is no more than=20
a constituent of the institutional opposition, a part of the=20
political establishment. It has so far contributed to channel=20
protest, in particular anti-American feelings, and to prevent more=20
radical elements of the society from turning violent. Much to its=20
dismay, it is therefore an ally of the Pakistani establishment and,=20
as such, an element of stability.

______

#4.

[ Recieved via Prof. Ishtiaq Ahmed for Asiapeace ]
o o o

THE FIFTH DR LM SINGHVI LECTURE IN PLURALISM

Presentation to the Centre for the History of Religious and Political Plura=
lism
Department of History, University of Leicester [UK]

CREATING A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE IN INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

By
Brian Cloughley, AM
Director of the Akhter Education Trust
Thursday 29th November 2001

Last year I visited India and Pakistan. First I went to Pakistan for=20
three weeks, then to India for a week, including three days in=20
Kashmir, then back to Britain, then again to Pakistan for ten days.=20
I met many old friends and made some new ones, and in general our=20
exchanges of views were enjoyable, informative and productive. Of=20
some personal and wider significance is the fact that an impression I=20
had had for some years was translated to certitude and even=20
reinforced. I had confirmation of my belief that there is a=20
regrettable lack of knowledge and understanding in both countries=20
concerning each other. Not only regrettable, but barely=20
understandable, intellectually dissatisfying, unnecessary, and even=20
dangerous.

To even the most intelligent people it seemed that the 'other side'=20
presents an enigma. The most-asked question posed me was "what are=20
they like?" - as if I were a Marco Polo or an Ibn Battuta returned=20
from ultima Thule, having experienced strange peoples and bizarre=20
social phenomena. This was perhaps understandable when talking with=20
charming ladies who lunch, but it was disquieting to be subjected to=20
it by people having more extensive horizons.

My reply was: they are just like you (and me), and reflect=20
everything you are, because they want to know what you are like. I=20
was moved on one occasion to quote inaccurately from Shakespeare, and=20
my quotation was corrected and completed by a distinguished gentleman=20
whose nationality is immaterial : indeed he could have been Indian=20
or Pakistani, which is the whole point of this talk.

I remind you of the play The Merchant of Venice, and if we replace=20
the words Jew and Christian with Muslim or Indian or Pakistani or=20
Hindu - in the context of the passage they are all appropriate - we=20
may obtain an understanding that was apparent to the playwright 400=20
years ago:

Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions,=20
senses, affections, passions! Fed with the same food, hurt with the=20
same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means,=20
warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is?=20
If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us do we not laugh?=20
If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us shall we not=20
revenge?

The message is that most of us are alike in our approach to life's=20
problems, although it is the last question that is of considerable=20
concern, because revenge is a call to stir the blood. In blunt=20
dictionary terms, it is "a vindictive feeling" and "a desire for=20
vengeance" which represents a basic or even primal imperative in=20
human emotions and actions.

The power of words to influence the public should not be=20
under-estimated, and it is only too often that it is used for=20
incitement to violence rather than encouragement of peaceful=20
development. Only too often, also, are words and meanings=20
deliberately twisted and manipulated to suppress the proposals of=20
those who advocate peace and to suit the designs of those who preach=20
war and revenge. This is apparent throughout the world, but in few=20
places is manipulation more indulged in and evident than the=20
sub-continent, for the 'vindictive feeling' appears to have=20
superseded desire for co-operation and understanding. As the=20
respected journalist and member of the Rajya Sabha, Kuldip Nayar,=20
stated in July, the countries have been existing in a state of=20
"perpetual scepticism and mistrust."

[...] .

[Full text of the above paper (56k) is available to all on request.=20
Drop a note to <aiindex@m...> requesting a copy in the subject=20
line. Requests will be entertained till the 23rd Dec.]

______

#5.
The Hindustan Times
6 December 2001
Editorial

When mythology becomes history

Historians might as well pack their bags and take up gardening. If=20
HRD Minister Murli Manohar Joshi has his way, religious leaders will=20
weed out all the 'bias' from textbooks and present a story that will=20
hurt no sensibility, confuse no soul.

So while Hindu sentiments were unknowingly being battered all these=20
years when readers came across passages telling us that beef was=20
consumed by our ancestors, or that a caste system was constructed to=20
prohibit social mobility of those lower down in the pecking order,=20
there was no way in which to protest against these unpalatable bits.=20
Until now.

To 'correct' the debilitating effect of 'communist' historians that=20
one was brainwashed to put one's trust in, religious leaders will now=20
make sure that no community is presented in a 'poor light'. No point=20
trying to convince their appointees that Satish Chandra, for=20
instance, was quoting Persian sources when writing that Guru Tegh=20
Bahadur was executed after resorting to 'plunder and rapine' in the=20
province of Punjab. (Why is it that no Jew to date has protested=20
against historians quoting Hitler's description in Mein Kampf of=20
fellow Jews?)

Just to add his bit of hot air to the draught, BJP spokesperson V.K.=20
Malhotra has called historians like Romila Thapar and R.S. Sharma=20
"perverts". Unlike Mr Joshi who maintains that unpalatable facts=20
should be kept away from 'impressionable minds', Mr Malhotra has gone=20
one step further by labelling the prevailing history as a pack of=20
'lies'. While the spokesperson's latest rantings may seem the more=20
offensive, it is Mr Joshi who is taking the more serious steps to=20
'revise' history - by destroying it as a discipline. Religious=20
leaders deciding what goes into textbooks and what stays out is like=20
Darwin's The Origin of Species made to pass the muster of theology=20
rather than science. Quite obviously, what Mr Joshi has in mind is to=20
swamp history with mythology - until the latter becomes the former.

______

#6.

Tehelka.com
5 December 2001
Illustration: Shoumik
Maharashtra's ultra-saffronisation: following in Gujarat's slipstream

Teesta Setalvad records the Hindutva
brigade's bloody build-up in Maharashtra to their campaign for the=20
Ram mandir in Ayodhya

Mumbai, December 5

In the last two months, there have been a series of attacks on=20
Muslims, their homes, businesses and places of worship, and in small=20
villages or qasbahs (small towns) where they are numerically in a=20
minority. Reports have been consistently flowing in from Maharashtra,=20
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. Attacks on Christian nuns and=20
priests continue, too, with precious little protection from the law=20
and order machinery.

There are indications that the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and=20
Bajrang Dal in Maharashtra, ably assisted by their brethren, the=20
ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Gujarat, could be responsible=20
for these attacks. Or the Shiv Sena, often supported by members of=20
the ruling Congress and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) combine in=20
rural Maharashtra.

Literature being distributed by the Maharashtra unit of the VHP in=20
far-flung villages and districts indicates a systematic religious=20
mobilisation of local communities around the Ram mandir issue. The=20
VHP plans to commence construction on March 12 (Maha Shivratri day),=20
2002. A series of preparatory jalabhisheks and other semi-religious=20
functions are also being planned to mobilise cadres for the event.=20
Meanwhile, the ban on Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),=20
following the terrorist attacks on America, and the crude=20
demonisation of the Muslim minority ("All Muslims are not jihadis,=20
but all jihadis are Muslims" - M G Vaidya, Rashtriya Swayamsevak=20
Sangh (RSS) spokesperson), have started the process of communal=20
polarisation.

On the night of October 9, a mob from the village of Mangle in=20
Shirale taluka of Sangli district (western Maharashtra) set on fire=20
10 homes, two timber marts and one saw mill belonging to Muslims. In=20
the process, 80-year-old Zainuddin Muhammad Sattar was burnt to death.

The "provocation"? Members of the Muslim minority had dared to=20
approach the Maharashtra State Minorities Commission a month earlier=20
to complain of continuing intimidation, abuse and threats by fellow=20
villagers.

The background? In Mangle village, on August 8, four wrestlers were=20
taken into police custody over the alleged desecration of a Ganesh=20
idol. Among these were Yunus Moosa Shaikh, Santaji Khambkar, Gopi=20
Khumbhar, Sanjay Patil and two others. Following police intervention,=20
a peace committee consisting of Dada Patil, Prahlad Ankush, Satish=20
Nilkanth, Vilas Mhaske, among others, was formed.

Ironically, members of this very peace committee issued a fatwa on=20
September 7, severely curtailing religious practices of Muslims from=20
their village: The heads of all 35 Muslim families from the village=20
of over 1,000 homes must shave off their beards; no dress with=20
"Muslim appearance"; no wearing of a cap during namaaz; no five times=20
a day namaaz, once is enough; no azaan on loudspeakers; and finally,=20
all Muslim members must in writing endorse the "hukumnama" to drive=20
the entire family of Yunus Shaikh (detained by the police), including=20
the three uncles, out of the village.

The following morning, September 8, at a gram sabha meeting held=20
within the premises of the Mahadev temple, at which 1,500 villagers=20
were present, Muslim members were subjected to filthy abuses against=20
their faith. In utter fear, they had shaved off their beards before=20
attending the gram sabha meeting.

Tension simmered until the victims approached the state director=20
general of police (DGP) Subhash Malhotra, as also the Maharashtra=20
State Minorities Commission. However, with the recent round of arson=20
and murder, the situation in the village remains far from normal.

In a bid to tide over the tensions in the village, the local=20
administration and police persuaded the affected Muslims to sign a=20
statement that they had "shaved their beards voluntarily". After a=20
visit to the village, one of the members of the State Minorities=20
Commission team, Munaf Hakim, said, "Like in other states, especially=20
Gujarat, there is a systematic plan to terrorise Muslims wherever=20
they are in a small minority, attack their homes and businesses and=20
eventually squeeze them out of their means of livelihood by taking=20
over their enterprises. It is a dangerous trend that needs to be=20
nipped in the bud."

On October 9, after the arson and killing, the state police imposed a=20
curfew in the village, and detained 56 persons responsible for the=20
arson until October 18. "There was anger in a section because of the=20
idol desecration during Ganeshutsav," District Superintendent of=20
Police Ritesh Kumar said. "But things are under control now. It is=20
not Hindu extremist elements, but members of different parties=20
involved here," he added. As we go to press, there were reports of=20
mounting pressure on the local police to release those guilty of=20
criminal conduct, arson and murder.

Meanwhile, the Shiv Sena mouthpiece Saamna has chosen to give a=20
distorted and communal picture of the whole episode, reporting that=20
the eve-teasing of a Hindu girl by a Muslim youth led to the attack=20
by villagers on the homes and businesses of his relatives - a=20
narrative that figures neither in the victims', nor the police's=20
rendering of events!

In another incident in the village of Saswad, barely 40 kms out of=20
Pune, violence - reminiscent of the violence that followed the=20
Ramshila poojan programmes of the 1990s and the L K Advani-led rath=20
yatra between 1990-1992 - followed a jalabhishek programme, organised=20
by the VHP and Bajrang Dal, in the town on October 7. With no=20
provocation at all, the mob that had gathered, ostensibly for a=20
religious programme, attacked a dargah and sheds located within a=20
graveyard. In the pre-planned destruction that followed, Muslim-owned=20
bakeries, shops and homes were also destroyed. Saswad has not had a=20
history of communal tensions before this incident.

The crowd allegedly raised demeaning slogans against Muslims. The=20
police have arrested 30 persons in this connection. "It was clearly=20
extremist elements, like the Bajrang Dal and the VHP, who instigated=20
the attack," said State Director-General of Police Malhotra.

But in a predicable bid to cover tracks and spread misinformation in=20
the rest of Maharashtra, Saamna reported that "anti-national=20
activities at burial grounds" were the cause of the mob burning,=20
looting and destroying of homes and shops.

The Saamna report, which has no official corroboration at all,=20
claims, "SIMI activists were meeting at this unauthorised shed within=20
the burial grounds, and therefore the locals' 'feelings were=20
outraged', and they pulled it down, and also burnt homes and shops=20
and businesses."

Meanwhile, it may be recalled that the Maharashtra Bajrang Dal had=20
mercilessly beaten up Father Oscar Mendonca of the St John's Baptist=20
Church in Thane on August 6, leading to a statewide protest from=20
Christian schools. Arrests were made promptly by the police, but it=20
remains to be seen whether prosecutions against the offenders, too,=20
will be prompt.

On August 26, the local Shiv Sena went on the rampage in Thane,=20
completely destroying a hospital, after their leader Anand Dighe died=20
within its premises. The total losses are estimated at around Rs nine=20
crore, and several hundred hospital staff are now jobless. While the=20
police have been lax in their probe, the Maharashtra State Human=20
Rights Commission is independently investigating the breakdown of law=20
and order, and the arson that followed.

Christian evangelists distributing pamphlets in the Borivali area in=20
north Mumbai were illegally detained by the local police on October=20
6, following a "tip-off" from none less than the Bajrang Dal! It took=20
the intervention of Abraham Mathai, member of the Maharashtra State=20
Minorities Commission to get them released at 1 am, five hours after=20
their detention.

One wonders whether Maharashtra, and perhaps India as a whole, will=20
find itself thrown back to the horror of the early 1990s - the=20
Ramshila poojan and the rath yatra, and the violence, clashes and=20
bloodshed that followed.

______

#7.

Indian Express
EDITORIALS & ANALYSIS
Thursday, December 06, 2001=20

History as nonsense
So let's welcome our new historians: swamis, munis, mullahs

If history visits us, first as tragedy and then as farce, the writing=20
of history under the present political dispensation seems to be=20
following a similar trajectory. The redoubtable Murli Manohar Joshi,=20
Union minister of HRD - which should now rightfully stand for the=20
Historical Reverse-engineering Department - has now made it known=20
that any historical account that hurts ''the feelings of people of=20
any caste, religion, region or language'', will be removed summarily=20
from school textbooks. To ensure that this is done, Joshi wants all=20
history books to be first vetted and cleared by religious heads of=20
various communities before they are introduced in schools. In fact,=20
he would like these tomes to be prepared in consultation with the=20
religious heads of various communities. He wants this done, he=20
explains, for the express purpose of sparing the impressionable minds=20
of children, which are unable to digest ugly and controversial facts.

Imagine then, for a moment, a blemish-free, deodorised, sanitised=20
and, above all, Joshi-ised past. A past which no one can quarrel with=20
because it has been rendered devoid of every uncomfortable detail,=20
purged of every disturbing fact, made hundred per cent pure like desi=20
ghee. A past where no one ate wicked substances like beef thousands=20
of years ago because that would have upset the ''sentiments'' of=20
schoolchildren in the year AD 2001. A past purged of ugly=20
institutions like caste, because that would have meant diminishing a=20
great culture - in any case, what is caste but a convenient invention=20
that nasty folk like Mulayam Singh Yadav and Laloo Prasad Yadav use=20
to garner OBC votes? A past where nobody looted because that would=20
have spoilt the image of a particular community hundreds of years=20
later.

Get ready, therefore, to welcome our new historians. Swamis, munis=20
and mullahs will tell you what you need to know about your ancestors=20
and their ways. The immediate future is then full of intriguing=20
possibilities. Imagine a group of mullahs making a representation to=20
the government asking for the deletion of all references to Islamic=20
invaders from Central Asia looting temples since it hurts their=20
''sentiments''. Would Joshi's compatriots, who have never failed to=20
highlight such details from the past for their own political=20
purposes, accept such a view of history? Since the citing of=20
historical evidence and methodologies does not really figure in=20
Joshi's scheme of things, how will such moot points be settled=20
finally? Interesting question that. But Joshi will be glad to know=20
that his is not the first crusade of this kind. Nazi Germany,=20
Stalin's Russia, White South Africa have all brought a spot of ethnic=20
cleansing to their history writing in order to validate their own=20
agendas. Joshi may not have read Georg Wilhelm Hegel, because he was=20
not from the Vedic age, but it will nevertheless be useful to quote=20
him in this context: ''What experience and history teach is this -=20
that people and governments never have learnt anything from history,=20
or acted on principles deduced from it.''

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