[sacw] SACW #2 (29 Nov. 01)

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Wed, 28 Nov 2001 23:05:44 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #2
29 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Nepal Curbs Rights After Maoist Attacks
#2. Bangladeshi Court Acts to Protect Hindus
#3. Sri Lanka: Anti-political politics (Jayadeva Uyangoda)
#4. India: The perils of POTO (Praful Bidwai)
#5. War in Afghanistan: Feminist Front (Cassandra Balchin)
#6. India: Public Discussion "Resist The Slaughter of History" (Delhi , Dec=
. 3)
#7. Reports & Photo essay on Aghan Women (Time Magazine)
#8. Pakistan's Environmental Nightmare (Michael Kamber)
#9. India: Video Film "Mahasweta Devi: Witness, Advocate, Writer"
#10. The Afghan crisis: Impact on South Asia - a discussion meet (=20
Hollywood, Dec. 9)

________________________

#1.

The New York Times November 27, 2001
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/27/international/asia/27NEPA.html

Nepal Curbs Rights After Maoist Attacks

Reuters

Nepalese soldiers guarding a post in Katmandu on Monday, when King=20
Gyanendra declared a state of emergency after attacks by Maoist=20
rebels ended a four-month period of cease-fire and peace talks.
[...]
On Friday and again on Sunday and today, the Maoists struck at army=20
posts for the first time. Their actions and the government's decision=20
to mobilize the army and to classify the Maoists as terrorists=20
constitute a serious deepening of a conflict that has claimed 2,000=20
lives and now affects about a third of Nepal's 75 districts.
The renewed violence is yet another blow to Nepal's struggling 11-=20
year-old democracy. The country is still trying to absorb the=20
massacre of King Birendra and much of the royal family on June 1 in=20
what witnesses described as a drunken, drug-induced rampage by Crown=20
Prince Dipendra, who then killed himself.
[...]
"We were liberal and restrained, but they took it as weakness," Mr.=20
Deuba said at a public meeting. "Now I assure you, I will fulfill my=20
duty to maintain law and order."
The government is likely to use its new powers to limit news coverage=20
of the insurgency and to quiet the political opposition. "The media=20
prints whatever they hear and whatever they find," said Krishna=20
Kharnal, a political scientist at Tribhuvban University. "That flow=20
of information may be restricted."

The government has already shown an inclination to clamp down on the=20
news media. It had the editor of Kantipur, the country's largest=20
daily, arrested on sedition charges after the royal massacre for=20
publishing a column by a rebel leader, but dropped the charges after=20
protests that senior politicians had really been motivated by the=20
newspaper's critical coverage of them.
Human rights workers said the state of emergency would erode=20
democracy. "The country is now heading to a new era of=20
authoritarianism," said Krishna Pahadi, president of the Human Rights=20
and Peace Society. "The era of enjoying fundamental freedoms is=20
almost ended."
[...] .

_____

#2.

The New York Times November 27, 2001
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/27/international/27DHAK.html?searchpv=3Dpast=
7days

Bangladeshi Court Acts to Protect Hindus

DHAKA, Bangladesh, Nov. 25 (Agence France-Presse) =97 The High Court=20
has ordered the government of Bangladesh to explain its failure to=20
take steps to protect the Hindu minority in this Muslim-dominated=20
country, judicial officials have said.
This weekend, the court gave the government one month to explain why=20
it should not be asked "to take proper steps to protect the country's=20
religious minorities from terrorist attacks on minorities," the=20
judicial officials said today.
Judges Abdul Matin and Marziul Huq issued the order late Saturday=20
following a petition filed by a legal rights group that claimed that=20
both before and after last month's national elections, "the=20
minorities came under various threats, attacks and persecution and=20
were subjected to looting of their properties."

The Oct. 1 elections ended in a victory for Prime Minister Khaleda=20
Zia and her Islamist supporters over her longtime rival, Sheik Hasina.
The government has denied that Hindus have been attacked.
Citing what it said were its own investigations and newspaper=20
reports, the legal rights group, Ain-O- Salish Kendra, also claimed=20
in its petition to the High Court that women and even children had=20
been subjected to rape. [...] .

_____

#3.

The Hindu Thursday, November 29, 2001
ANTI-POLITICAL POLITICS
By Jayadeva Uyangoda

LESS THAN two weeks before the December 5 parliamentary polls, Sri=20
Lanka's two main contenders for power - the ruling People's Alliance=20
(PA) and the Opposition United National Party (UNP) - are locked in a=20
battle to define themselves in the eyes of the electorate. In this=20
battle, the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Tamil=20
secessionist group which is out of the poll fray, seems to be the=20
decisive factor. In fact, the Tigers are present in the election=20
campaign in their absence. The PA and its new ally - the Janatha=20
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - have been accusing the UNP of having a=20
`secret pact' with the LTTE.

The PA's propaganda onslaught initially worked to stem the pro- UNP=20
turn of the Sinhalese electorate. In response, the UNP admitted to a=20
proposal for an interim administration for the Tamil majority=20
northeastern provinces. But the UNP's explanation of its soft=20
approach towards the LTTE has not been particularly convincing.=20
Meanwhile, the UNP party faithful do not seem to bother much about=20
the alleged pact with the LTTE. Yet, the leadership's reluctance to=20
explain the rationale for a possible political accommodation with the=20
LTTE demonstrates that the UNP, as much as the PA, is ill-prepared to=20
deal with the exceedingly complex ethnic conflict.
In the rhetoric of campaign politics as seen this year, the PA has=20
emerged as the leading voice of Sinhalese nationalism of the insecure=20
kind. This may intrigue even the most informed observer of Sri Lankan=20
politics. It is surprising why the Chandrika Kumaratunga=20
administration, with a record of exemplary commitment to pluralism,=20
peace and ethnic conflict resolution through negotiation, has opted=20
for populist rhetoric bordering on Sinhalese racism. An explanation=20
is that in terms of economic, social and foreign policy, there is=20
hardly a major distinction between the PA and the UNP. But, a=20
parliamentary election is fought on clearly established differences=20
among the contenders. Two rivals, vying for power, cannot occupy a=20
zone of political indistinction.

In the absence of major differences with the UNP in terms of policy,=20
the PA appears to have invited the easily demonised enemy, the LTTE,=20
to define the difference. By claiming that the UNP is in league with=20
the secessionist LTTE, the PA tries to define itself in a discourse=20
of anti-terrorism as well as Sinhalese patriotism. Arousing Sinhalese=20
majoritarian fears of the LTTE, the PA is trying to present itself as=20
the nation's saviour.
In explaining the PA's Sinhalese nationalist electoral platform,=20
there is also the question of the erosion of its multi-ethnic voter=20
base. Tamil and Muslim parties, except the EPDP and a faction of the=20
SLMC, have deserted it. It no longer enjoys the admiration and=20
support of other Tamil parties such as the TULF, the EPRLF or the=20
CWC. Aware of its loss of credibility among the minorities, the PA's=20
calculation appears to be one of getting the majority of Sinhalese=20
votes. When the EPDP is assigned to deliver the Tamil vote to the PA,=20
why should Ms. Kumaratunga and her campaigners bother about the=20
minority vote? Meanwhile, the pact the PA entered into with the=20
largely Sinhalese-majoritarian JVP in September seems to have=20
reinforced the former's inclination towards willfully ignoring the=20
Tamil electorate. The alliance with the JVP appears to have=20
strengthened the PA's own Sinhalese nationalist wing, led by the=20
Prime Minister, Mr. Ratnasiri Wickramanayake. It would be too late=20
for Ms. Kumaratunga to realise that though she saved her Government=20
from parliamentary defeat by aligning with the JVP, she also=20
sacrificed the political vision she brought to the PA with great=20
difficulty. After this election, the PA may run the risk of not being=20
the same political entity that was formed in 1993-94.

Against this backdrop, the present campaign indicates a discernible=20
decay in Sri Lanka's democratic gains and political achievements.=20
Symptomatic of this decay is the PA's appeal to the Sinhalese=20
electorate at the expense of ethnic minorities. There is no peace=20
platform in this campaign. Neither is there one for democratisation,=20
human rights, social justice and similar issues of progress,=20
civilisation and emancipation. There is no serious, or even=20
superficial, policy debate at all in the election campaign. Instead,=20
what obtains is a distinct poverty of politics, or the propulsion of=20
anti-political politics.

Meanwhile, what appears to be easily predictable about the coming=20
election is the unpredictability of its outcome. In the past, clear=20
signs of the outcome were discernible around the half-way mark. One=20
factor certain to complicate the result is the possibility of both=20
the PA and the UNP not gaining a majority. The PA is fighting the=20
election from a distinct position of weakness. The broad multi-ethnic=20
and social coalition which gave it a strong electoral base in the=20
past is now in total disarray. The liberal wing of the regime has=20
almost disappeared. The nationalist-Left-populist forces which remain=20
within the PA do not constitute a political foundation strong enough=20
for a comfortable electoral victory. The JVP is certain to eat into=20
the PA's electoral base. The JVP, with its radical-nationalist=20
appeal, might improve on its present strength of ten seats. But the=20
JVP's gain is the PA's loss. One post-election scenario is that the=20
PA with a reduced seat strength can still form a coalition Government=20
with the support of the JVP and the EPDP.
The UNP's chances of gaining a clear majority are not very certain=20
either. The party is fighting the polls on a coalition called United=20
National Front comprising the UNP, the Ceylon Workers' Congress, the=20
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the group of PA dissidents. The=20
post-election stand of the newly-formed Tamil party coalition is not=20
yet clear, but it will certainly not support the PA. But, will it=20
support the UNP? With the LTTE's backing, it is tipped to make gains=20
in the north and the east. But its future tactics are most likely to=20
be decided by the LTTE.
Among the noticeable trends in voter behaviour is the shift in the=20
urban, middle class sympathies towards the UNP. This is noticeable=20
among the provincial middle classes too. But in rural districts,=20
particularly among the peasantry, the PA's traditional voter base=20
appears virtually intact. The vote of the Tamil and Muslim=20
communities might go largely to the UNP, its allies and the Tamil=20
alliance. The Buddhist and Catholic clerical establishments are also=20
likely to be with the UNP.

In an evenly balanced contest, the party which manages to forge the=20
widest possible coalition will stand the best chance of forming the=20
next Government. The fact that the President has left a period of=20
over three weeks between the date of the election and the first=20
meeting of the new Parliament indicates the degree to which=20
post-election manipulation will become crucial in=20
Government-formation.

There is another scenario which cannot be ruled out: the likely=20
conflict between a PA-led Executive and a UNP-led Legislature. In the=20
event of the UNP, led by Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe, forming a majority=20
coalition, a PA President and a UNP Prime Minister will be required=20
to practice political and governmental cohabitation. Given the=20
extreme acrimony between the two, it will not be easy.

Sri Lanka today has a serious leadership crisis. It seems to have=20
failed to produce leaders with sustainable vision, prudence and=20
insight as well as intellectual conviction. Even those who possessed,=20
once upon a time, the promise of such qualities have become ordinary=20
politicians who see politics as the fine art of mastering the cunning=20
and deception in governance. This also applies to leaders who have=20
emerged from the traditional bourgeois-aristocratic ruling families=20
as well as the subordinate rural peasantry. After December 5, the=20
unfolding drama will be enacted by a set of politicians whose=20
clinical commitment to power can be matched only by their refusal to=20
read the writing on the wall.
(The writer teaches political science at the University of Colombo.)

_____

#4.

December 7, 2001
Frontline Column: Beyond the Obvious

Praful Bidwai

The perils of POTO

Draconian preventive detention laws such as POTO will brutalise=20
innocent people, violate human rights and debase our political=20
culture--without effectively countering terrorism.
****
The promulgation of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance is an=20
important black mark in the National Democratic Alliance's inglorious=20
record of misgovernance. POTO has produced consternation in India's=20
political and journalistic communities and raised serious questions=20
about the citizen's freedom, and the fairness of our law-and-order=20
and justice delivery systems. There is every reason why Parliament=20
must oppose POTO. The Rajya Sabha in particular must pass a=20
resolution to ensure that the Ordinance lapses or is defeated.

Why has POTO generated so much heat? The answer is not that we do not=20
need to fight terrorism, but rather that POTO is a remarkably=20
ill-conceived, draconian, and counter-productive instrument for doing=20
so. Like TADA--Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)=20
Act--, it will victimise innocent people through unwarranted=20
detention and harassment, promote irresponsible policing, and thus=20
damage the credibility of the legal system. This can only lead to=20
more discontent and aggravate the phenomenon of sub-state terrorism=20
which POTO is meant to fight. It is not the abuse of POTO but its=20
normal use that should worry all those who value freedom and oppose=20
terrorism.

To be fair, POTO is not an exact replica of TADA. In some respects,=20
it is a slight improvement on TADA. It does not cover "disruptive"=20
activities, which were left so ill-defined in TADA that striking=20
students or milkmen could be detained for months. POTO allows appeals=20
against rejection of bail to the High Court--TADA only permitted a=20
Supreme Court appeal--and reduces the victim's rigours beyond the=20
first year of detention. It reduces the period of detention without a=20
chargesheet, although 90 days is still far too long.
However, POTO is significantly worse than TADA insofar as its scope=20
extends beyond "terrorists" to "terrorist organisations" and their=20
supporters and sympathisers who by definition are not terrorists.=20
This is POTO's most egregious feature. POTO also empowers the=20
government to tap telephone and other communications and confiscate=20
the suspected "proceeds of terrorism". POTO severely punishes those=20
who may have information about terrorist activities but fail to=20
disclose it. This has damaging implications for the freedom of=20
expression. POTO is thus a harsh preventive detention law, which=20
reverses the burden of proof, and permits the harassment of anyone=20
the government considers undesirable.

? Section 3(1) defines a terrorist as somebody with the "intent to=20
threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to=20
strike terror in the people....", who commits violent acts by "using=20
bombs or other explosive substances or .... other .... poisons," etc.=20
to cause death, injuries, or damage to, "property or ...supplies"...=20
to be used "for the defence of India or in connection with any other=20
purposes" (emphasis added). Although the phrasing is somewhat vague,=20
it at least requires that an act be committed, for which the sentence=20
would be death or life imprisonment.

However, POTO's Chapter III makes nonsense of this very requirement=20
by creating a new category, of "terrorist organisations", defined=20
merely as "listed in the [attached] Schedule." (Already, 23 groups=20
have been named). Such orgasnisations need not have committed or=20
participated in terrorist acts; it is enough that they "encourage"=20
terrorism or are "otherwise involved" in it.
Thus, the Central government can arbitrarily name any organisation=20
"terrorist"--for instance, because it promotes a "terrorist ideology"=20
(also arbitrarily defined). It can harass its members, sympathisers,=20
harbourers and so on. A "sympathiser"--by definition, not a=20
terrorist--can be sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. "Members" are=20
liable to be imprisoned for 10 years--whether they have engaged in=20
any violent act or not. Fund-raisers can be sentenced to 14 years'=20
imprisonment.

? The government can tap or intercept any communication, including=20
electronic, wireless, oral or other messages from anyone suspected of=20
indulging in a terrorist offence. A joint secretary to the government=20
serves as the "competent authority" for this non-judicial decision.=20
The intercepts are admissible as evidence in court. This provision=20
can easily become a charter for harassing and intimidating political=20
opponents.
? An officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police is empowered to=20
extract confessions from the accused and present them as evidence.=20
This provision not only has potential for abuse. It is itself=20
directly abusive. It perverts the fundamental premise that statements=20
recorded clandestinely, or in police custody under fear or duress,=20
must not be admitted as evidence.
? Reversing the burden of proof directly violates the=20
"innocent-until-proved-guilty" premise on which modern jurisprudence=20
rests. It is trivially true that some existing laws such as the=20
Income-Tax Act, Narcotics Act, or Sati (Prevention) Act also demand=20
proof of innocence. But that is no justification for POTO. The laws'=20
consequences are not comparable. For instance, if your bank account=20
shows an abnormally large deposit, you must explain its source to=20
income-tax officials. But you are not imprisoned or tortured till you=20
answer-as you are under POTO. Most laws provide remedies. POTO has=20
few: you are in the lockup before you know it. Once you are accused,=20
once arms are planted on you, or once your union, association,=20
organisation is branded, you can be bunged into jail.

? Sections 3(8) and 14 are particularly obnoxious. They punish anyone=20
who possesses information relevant to the possible commission of=20
terrorist acts, but "fails" to disclose it. This prescribes one=20
year's imprisonment for an act of omission, not commission---and=20
three years for non-cooperation with the interrogating officer. This=20
is abhorrent. In a situation where ordinary citizens hesitate to=20
appear as witnesses to crimes out of fear of police harassment, it is=20
unreasonable to demand that they suddenly trust the police. It is=20
frivolous to compare this provision to Section 39 of the Criminal=20
Procedure Code, which too mandates furnishing of information about=20
impending crimes. This Section has mercifully not been seriously=20
invoked for decades--like Section 377 IPC pertaining to homosexuality.

Sec 3(8) and 14 are liable to be used against journalists who in the=20
normal line of duty may interview a "terrorist" or terrorist=20
"sympathiser" without necessarily knowing their identity or criminal=20
plans. To demand that the journalist part with this information means=20
imposing unreasonable restrictions upon the freedom of expression.=20
This counterposes the right to information to an ill-defined "duty=20
to the nation." Yet, POTO empowers the police to extract information=20
from journalists. This is, potentially, extremely abusive. A=20
conscientious journalist, if s/he discovers that a terrorist act is=20
about to be committed, will want to alert not just the police, but=20
the larger public. The possibility of a clash between privileged=20
information (with the journalist) and knowledge available to the=20
police is extremely rare.

Writing a whole law on the basis of a rare, worst-case scenario risks=20
interfering with the media. In the present situation, where there is=20
suppression of the rights of association and collective action, such=20
provisions are likely to lead to censorship. Journalists wanting to=20
"play safe" will simply avoid certain beats. Publishers will restrict=20
reporters' activities to areas where they cannot be held liable under=20
POTO. The public will be the ultimate loser.

POTO represents an unhealthy, pathological, "big-stick" response to=20
the social disorders which underlie sub-state terrorism. It is based=20
upon the 173rd Report of the Law Commission--a body reduced to a pale=20
shadow of itself by members such as long-time swayamsevak N.M.=20
Ghatate whose sole claim to "scholarship" is that he has edited two=20
volumes of Atal Behari Vajpayee's speeches! This Report shows a=20
strong communal bias in emphasising dangers posed by "fundamentalist=20
terrorists" and "religious fundamentalists", selectively highlighting=20
the plight of "Hindu families" in communal disturbances, and in=20
drawing parallels between the 1993 Bombay blasts (although not the=20
Babri demolition) and activities of "Muslim militants". The=20
government has carried this communal bias into the Prevention of=20
Terrorism Bill 2000 (since dropped) and into POTO. POTO will be used=20
by the BJP to harass minorities, polarise religious communities, and=20
whip up hysteria to win votes, especially in Uttar Pradesh.
The government has learnt nothing from our dismal experience with=20
TADA, under which 76,036 people were detained under charges which=20
were often so flimsy that two-thirds were discharged by the courts as=20
the government could not even make out a prima facie case. The rate=20
of conviction under TADA was an appalling 0.9 percent. The law was=20
extensively used in Gujarat and Maharashtra against college students,=20
trade unionists and women's organisations--anyone considered=20
"inconvenient".

By 1995, TADA had become so discredited that no government could=20
think of extending or reviving it until the right-wing NDA came to=20
power. Exploiting the September 11 carnage and anti-"terrorist"=20
shibboleths, it deviously pushed through POTO rather than pilot a=20
Bill through Parliament. This corresponded to the hardening attitude=20
in sections of the Indian elite which have gung-ho approaches to=20
crime and social discontent. The government did not inform the=20
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs of the relevant=20
developments. The Committee has not even received a copy of the=20
Ordinance.
Draconian laws such as POTO are not just intrinsically obnoxious.=20
They overload and pervert the judicial system. They give the police=20
the option of not investigating crimes and painstakingly gathering=20
evidence. Mere suspects can be charged with "terrorism" and detained=20
for long, painful, years. This can only encourage irresponsible=20
behaviour on the part of a force which increasingly fails to bring=20
criminals to book in cases ranging from petty theft to obnoxious=20
killings--such as the Jessica Lall case, "Tandoor murder", or the BMW=20
scandal, to mention examples from the Capital alone.

The BJP is disingenuous to argue that there are preventive detention=20
acts in states ruled by the Congress--for instance, Maharashtra and=20
Karnataka--and therefore that party must not oppose POTO. Bad=20
preventive detention laws everywhere must go. However, it must be=20
noted that the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act 1999 is=20
meant to deal with "acts... with the objective of gaining pecuniary=20
benefits or an economic advantage". It doesn't have POTO's=20
broad-spectrum scope. The Act was brought into being by a Shiv=20
Sena-BJP government, although that's no excuse for the Congress-NCP=20
government to perpetuate it. It is also fallacious to argue that in=20
TADA's absence, Rajiv Gandhi's assassins would not have been=20
convicted. In reality, the Supreme Court acquitted all the 27 accused=20
under TADA, but contradictorily, upheld their testimony under police=20
custody as admissible evidence. Ultimately, four were convicted for=20
murder under Sec 302 of IPC.

Laws like TADA and POTO assault not only our rights as citizens, but=20
also our democratic sensibilities. We are asked to forget that=20
terrorism in Punjab was brought under control not through KPS Gill's=20
strong-arm methods, nor through torture, or by police squads moving=20
around in unnumbered jeeps, but through a political solution which=20
exposed the Khalistani terrorists as a bunch of extortionists and=20
rapists. If the Naga insurgency dies down, it will not be because of=20
the ruthless use of guns, but because of negotiations. Our existing=20
laws can adequately deal with terrorism without preventive detention.=20
But their enforcers are not up to the job. What we need to do is use=20
existing laws conscientiously to bring culprits to trial and=20
convincingly establish their guilt. That can create conditions=20
conducive to deterring serious crime and terrorism.

Regrettably, the NDA's approach is just the opposite. Its government=20
has done all it could to discourage, ban and vindictively punish=20
dissent, whether on the Afghan war, WTO, or religious issues. Recent=20
attempts to deny permission for the holding of rallies in the Capital=20
bear testimony to this--as with a citizens' peace march on Oct 30,=20
Ram Raj's conversion-to-Buddhism rally on Nov 4, or the Centre-Left's=20
impressive Nov 6 mobilisation against a new round of talks at the=20
WTO. The growing official intolerance of dissent, like POTO, spells=20
serious trouble for our freedom and democracy. POTO must become a=20
litmus test. It must go in toto.--end--

_____

#5.

Red Pepper December 2001

Feminist Front

by Cassandra Balchin

A pretext for the current military action in Afghanistan is the need=20
to relieve its people -- especially women -- from Taliban tyranny.=20
Yet Washington continues to support many regimes, not only in Muslim=20
countries, that oppress women.

A New Great Game is being played in Afghanistan. But it carries the=20
modern era's politically correct trappings: we are told the bombing=20
of Afghanistan will liberate Afghan women from Taliban tyranny.

Washington's hypocrisy regarding women's status is as blatant as the=20
economic and political aims behind its military action are=20
transparent. Having ignored the appalling status of the vast majority=20
of Afghanistan's women during two decades of continuous conflict, the=20
mainstream media has finally discovered a great story. Now we all=20
know about the wholesale restrictions on their mobility, the=20
imposition of dress codes, and the denial of education, health care=20
and the right to work.

But Afghan women do not have a monopoly on oppression in the name of=20
religion. Under the Saudi interpretation of Muslim law, women can be=20
beheaded and lashed for a range of sexual "crimes", their mobility is=20
severely restricted, and they remain utterly excluded from the=20
political process. But the US State Department's report on US-Saudi=20
relations focuses on Saudi "cultural accommodation" that is allowing=20
US service women onto Saudi soil. The report states only that the US=20
"remains concerned about human rights conditions [and] systematic=20
discrimination against women and ethnic and religious minorities".

Yet it is willing to overlook the oppression of more than half the=20
Saudi population because their country has the world's largest oil=20
reserves, is the biggest US export market in the Middle East and is=20
central to holding together the fragile Arab and Muslim support for=20
the military action in Afghanistan.

Pakistani women know only too well the impact of being a US frontline=20
ally. When military dictator General Zia ul-Haq launched a programme=20
of "Islamisation" designed to terrorise society into political=20
submission in 1978, Washington turned a blind eye because it needed=20
his support for its covert war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.=20
Under new moral codes, women became the embodiment of evil and the=20
root cause of social disorder -- rather than the guns and heroin that=20
the Afghan campaign introduced into Pakistani society. There were=20
directives enforcing dress codes, and the notorious 1979 Zina=20
Ordinance -- under which rape is seen as fornication, so that raped=20
women can be prosecuted for commiting a sexual crime -- that still=20
stands today. Sex outside marriage is a penal offence liable to=20
severe punishment including stoning to death and lashing.

Organisations such as AGHS Legal Aid Cell and Shirkat Gah Women's=20
Resource Centre have said the law has worked to control women's=20
sexuality and autonomous decision-making. The general's legacy=20
continued even under Nawaz Sharif's supposedly democratic=20
dispensations in the 1990s. The Sharif governments went on to further=20
"Islamise" the penal code, making punishment of domestic violence=20
extremely difficult. With Washington again propping up an=20
undemocratic regime in Pakistan, the chances of repealing these=20
highly discriminatory laws have faded.

Strategically-located Tunisia , which hosts the world's largest Voice=20
of America (VoA) transmitter and is a partner in the longest unbroken=20
treaty relationship with the US, boasts a family code that regards=20
women as legal minors. Under the Moudawana, women lack legal capacity=20
to marry without a male guardian' permission, while courts can order=20
police to forcibly return a "disobedient" wife to her husband -- even=20
if she left him to escape domestic violence. An official committee=20
formed in 2000 to examine reform of the Moudawana included 20=20
religious scholars -- and one women's rights activist. However, it=20
never met, and following opposition from conservatives the government=20
put the National Plan for Integration of Women in Development on=20
indefinite hold.

Turkey, whose commandos may now be joining US marines on the ground=20
in Afghanistan, and is the only Muslim member of Nato, is receiving a=20
$13 billion pat on the back from the IMF. No one mentions the fact=20
that its penal code continues to give virtual impunity for so-called=20
"honour killings" of female relatives or that in July its Ministry of=20
Heath reintroduced the notorious and degrading "virginity tests" for=20
girls studying in medical high schools.
In Egypt, Tunisia and Uzbekistan -- the latter now providing the US=20
with its closest land bases to Afghanistan -- systematic oppression=20
of an Islamist political opposition has been opportunistically=20
extended to all political opposition, including secular women's=20
groups, whose members have been harassed, beaten, prosecuted under=20
trumped-up charges and threatened with murder. Tunisian women=20
activists from the Association Tunisienne Des Femmes Democrats and=20
the National Council for Civil Liberties report impunity for domestic=20
violence; because of the political restrictions, independent women's=20
organisations cannot work freely to combat violence against women.

Last year in Uzbekistan, President Karimov introduced his own=20
"national ideology" -- an insane admixture of nationalism and=20
concessions to politico-religious extremists. Under Karimov, women's=20
literacy and labour rights have slipped and domestic violence is=20
endemic and tolerated -- to the extent that not one of the hundreds=20
of husbands whose persistent physical abuse has driven their wives to=20
ritual suicide by self-immolation has been convicted since 1990.

The US State Department notes that the US and Egypt have "shared=20
interests in regional security and stability". Who cares that the=20
1995 Egyptian demographic and health survey found that 97 per cent of=20
women who are married, or have been married, had been subjected to=20
female genital mutilation?

Afghan women cannot leave their homes. Egyptian women cannot keep=20
their bodies intact. Can one compare the situation facing Afghan=20
women with that facing women in other countries where the state also=20
condones their oppression in the name of religion? There cannot be=20
hierarchies in oppression. Women in different contexts experience=20
gender oppression differently -- but to each individual the hurt is=20
real
If we are to begin bombing every country that routinely oppresses=20
women, we should perhaps begin with the US itself, a country that has=20
stubbornly refused to sign every international human rights=20
convention. No more than Afghan women have a monopoly on oppression=20
within the Muslim world, women living in Muslim countries and=20
communities should not be characterised as the world's Grand Victims.=20
Until very recently, Irish women could not get a divorce; many Hindu=20
women still cannot. Most Latin American women cannot access safe=20
abortion. Educated Japanese women usually have to choose between=20
career and family.

Have we begun to examine how far the rights abuses suffered by Muslim=20
women are the result of the opportunistic manipulation of religion by=20
elites whose power has been sustained by the colonial legacy,=20
neo-colonialist economic dependency and the proxy wars of the Cold=20
War era?

And what about the men? Few have talked about the impact of the=20
Taliban on the lives of Afghan men. They, too, are forced to adhere=20
to dress codes, to pray publicly and to fight for the Taliban.=20
Forcibly conscripted Afghans have the "choice" of being shot, running=20
away and not being able to protect their families or deserting to the=20
opposition -- and die fighting for them. What of the little boys who=20
went to the madrassahs (Islamic schools) to become good Muslims and=20
find themselves in the terror of boot camp training as Taliban cannon=20
fodder? Do they want to be there any more than Afghan girls want to=20
stay away from school?

We have to be wary of the appropriation of feminist arguments=20
concerning women's victimisation in Afghanistan and dismiss current=20
propaganda that positions military action as the great liberator. The=20
"solution" to the oppression of Afghanistan's women under the Taliban=20
"baddies" is neither the Northern Alliance "goodies" nor the=20
replacement of the fundamentalists' oppressive transnational movement=20
with an oppressive US-led transnational capitalism under a compliant=20
"government of national unity". All Afghan people, men and women,=20
must be allowed to determine their own future and their own=20
definitions of oppression and liberation.

Cassandra Balchin works for Women Living Under Muslim Laws. The=20
opinions of the author are her own.

_____

#6.

Time December 3, 2001 Vol. 158 No. 24
About Face for Afghan Women
An inside look at how women fared under Taliban oppression and what=20
the future holds for them now=20
BY RICHARD LACAYO
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,185651,00.html

Time December 3, 2001 Vol. 158 No. 24
Parlika's Passion: Kabul feminists come out of the shadows
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101011203-185691,00.html

Time.com
Kabul Unveiled
John Stanmeyer's Photo essay on Aghan women
http://www.time.com/time/photoessays/afghanwomen/

_____

#7.

HISTORY SOCIETY RAJMAS COLLEGE
D.U. FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY
call upon you to RESIST THE SLAUGHTER OF HISTORY

PROF. ROMILA THAPAR
PROF. SATISH CHANDRA
PROF. ARJUN DEV
TALKS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A DISCUSSION

DISCUSSANT: DILIP SIMEON

MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 11:00 AM
AUDITORIUM / LAWN RAMJAS COLLEGE
RAJMAS COLLEGE, Delhi University, Delhi [India]

_____

#8.

The Village Voice Week of November 28 - December 4, 2001

Millions of Refugees Deepen a Nation's Ecological Woes
Pakistan's Environmental Nightmare
by Michael Kamber

http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0148/kamber.php

_____

#9.

RELEASE PREVIEW:
"Mahasweta Devi: Witness, Advocate, Writer" brings us face-to-face with one
of the most celebrated writers in India. This video provides an intimate
view of the author's daily life set in the context of her tireless pursuit
of justice for India's tribal poor. She reads from her highly acclaimed
writing and discusses its relevance for social change.

Mahasweta comes to life as an ordinary person in extraordinary settings,
fighting back through literature while surrounded by nationalist,
patriarchal and capitalist violence. The author's winning and macabre humor
shines throughout, providing needed inspiration to a life of constant and
successful struggle.

She reads from her stories, recounting the grim tale that led to her
founding of the Denotified and Nomadic Tribes Rights Action Group - one of
the most important organizations fighting for the rights of India's poor an=
d
oppressed indigenous population. This informal documentary about the life
and work of Mahasweta Devi introduces an Indian icon to a new generation of
international readers.

This video is an excellent aid to teaching Mahasweta's stories in
undergraduate and postgraduate courses. More than that it is an exemplary
introduction to world literature, international human rights, and the pligh=
t
of aboriginal peoples everywhere.

Director Shashwati Talukdar has been producing short films and videos sinc=
e
1994. Primarily a maker of experimental and narrative works, this video
marks her entrance into the documentary genre.

Executive Producer Henry Schwarz has been teaching, researching and writing
about India for over 12 years. This project brings critical understanding
of social and literary issues together with artistic ingenuity in a fresh
and informative way.
Audiences in India have hailed this documentary as "utterly true to the
spirit of the subject," and "entertaining and informative - everyone should
see this." The 30 minute video is available now in NTSC or PAL versions fo=
r
screening in the US or abroad.

Tapes are available at the following rates:
Individual: For $30 we will send you a copy of the tape.
Institution: For $150 we will send you a copy of the tape and provide
teaching materials, a bibliography of relevant publications, and informatio=
n
on various ways in which to support Mahasweta and her projects. This will
include all of the above for library circulation.

We encourage you to ask your libraries to purchase this video to be used fo=
r
a variety of educational purposes.

Kindly make checks payable to: Mahasweta Devi Film Fund

Mail to:
Henry Schwarz, 4215 NE 85th St., Seattle, WA 98115 [USA]
206.523.6891 (ph); 206.523.6940 (fax); schwarzh@g...

for more information:
www.georgetown.edu/departments/pjp/dnt-rag

______

#10.

The Afghan crisis: Impact on South Asia

As the US military continues its presence in Afghanistan and the
surrounding countries, and as the UN sponsored negotiations get under way,
the conflicts in Afghanistan are far from resolving themselves. What are
the implications of the events in Afghanistan on the future of South Asia?
What are the prospects of peace and security? What are the aims of the
different players that are engaged in Afghanistan?
It is extremely urgent that people all over and especially people of South
Asia reflect on what these events are revealing, and carry out extensive
discussion on what role they may play in ensuring peace, security and
prosperity.

With this in mind the Indian Progressive Study Group and South Asian Women
Activists of Los Angeles is holding a discussion meeting.

Date: Sunday, December 9
Time: 3 - 5pm.
Location: Women's Club of Hollywood
1749 N. La Brea Avenue, Hollywood, CA 90046. [USA]
(free parking in the lot).

A partial list of TOPICS

War in Afghanistan: Whither South Asia
Conflicts in Afghanistan: Power struggles and the role of the US .
The dimension of US foreign engagements: facts, myths and lessons
Globalization or Clash of Civilizations?

For more information/directions etc. please contact
Shonali Phone: 323-655-1276; Email: ipsg@j...
Khanum Phone: 323-293-9032; Email: khanumshaikh@h...

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