[sacw] SACW #1 (27 Nov. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1
27 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Nepal emergency declared (BBC)
- other related reports from Times of India & Nepali Times
#2. Two Articles on Pakistan in the context off the current situation=20
in Afghanistan (MB Naqvi)
#3. How The Ulama Murdered Their Flock (Farish A. Noor)
#4. Include Afghan women's voices at the Bonn conference (WLUML)
#5. Born into a family which firmly believed that India and Pakistan=20
shared a oneness of cultural identity. It never took me any effort to=20
realise that we have more in common than the conflict which seems so=20
pronounced. (Salima Hashmi)
#6. Symposium: Gender and the Built Environment , February 7 and 8,=20
2002 (Ahmedabad, India)

________________________

#1.
BBC News
Monday, 26 November, 2001, 15:10 GMT

Nepal emergency declared
The government is expected to boost its security forces

King Gyanendra of Nepal has declared a state of emergency after the=20
worst violence the country has seen since a Maoist revolt began six=20
years ago.
Clashes in the Mount Everest region of Nepal that started on Sunday=20
night have left more than 100 dead, most of them rebels, the=20
government says.
A BBC correspondent in the region says Nepal is in serious danger of=20
descending into outright civil war.
More than 1,850 people have been killed during the Maoist insurgency.
The rebels called off their ceasefire last week, saying the=20
government was blocking peace talks.

Civilians dead
Late on Sunday hundreds of rebels attacked government targets near=20
Mount Everest in the Solukhumbu district of Nepal, the government=20
says.
We have decided to recommend to his Majesty the King to impose a=20
state of emergency

Bijay Kumar Gachhadar
Water Resources Minister The precise number killed in the latest=20
clashes is not clear.

The government says that after five hours of fighting the rebels were repul=
sed.
Reports speak of more than 150 rebels killed as well as several=20
members of the security forces and some civilians.
The chief minister of Solukhumbu district is among those killed.

"All the communications channels with the northeastern troubled=20
Solukhumbu district are cut off, therefore it is getting difficult to=20
access the situation and the casualty figures," the AFP news agency=20
quotes a home ministry spokesman as saying.
On Friday the rebels carried out one of their heaviest attacks,=20
killing more than 40 members of the security forces in the west of=20
the country.
It was also the first time the rebels had attacked the Royal Nepalese=20
Army, rather than the police.

State of emergency

The emergency gives the government the power to curtail the press and=20
restrict rights of assembly.
The insurgency has claimed more than 1,850 lives so far
The police and army will also have much wider powers to deal with the rebel=
s.
The Nepalese authorities have also asked the government in the Indian=20
state of West Bengal to step up security to stop rebels crossing the=20
border to seek shelter.
Civil liberty groups say that the new law and proposed anti-terrorist=20
legislation pose the biggest threat to freedom in Nepal since=20
democracy was reintroduced 10 years ago.
Ministers insist that the new laws will only be used to curb Maoist activit=
ies.
The escalation of fighting is likely to do serious damage to Nepal's=20
tourist industry.
Tourism, an important foreign exchange earner, is usually at its peak=20
around this time of the year.

Government 'blocking peace talks'

The senior rebel leader, Prachanda, said the decision to end the=20
ceasefire had been taken because the government was blocking peace=20
talks aimed at ending the conflict.

The government denies this, and accuses the rebels of running away=20
from dialogue.
Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba came to power in July promising to=20
end the insurgency.
The two sides held their first substantive peace talks in August, but=20
these stalled two weeks ago over a rebel demand for elections for a=20
constituent assembly to pave the way for a new constitution.
Correspondents says the renewed attacks may indicate that a split has=20
developed between hawks and doves in the rebel ranks.

The Maoists stepped up their attacks after the massacre of the royal=20
family on 1 June - apparently by a family member.

o o o

Other related reports:

The Times of India
27 Nov 2001
Emergency in Nepal, civil liberties suspended
http://203.199.93.7/default.asp

The Times of India
27 Nov 2001
Will the Indian army be called?
SIDDHARTH SRIVASTAVA
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
http://203.199.93.7/articleshow.asp?art_id=3D154933941

Nepali Times #69 | 23-29 November 2001
Maoists Attack Army Base
For the first time in the six year Maoist insurgency, rebels have=20
killed Royal Nepal Army soldiers, escalating the conflict to a=20
serious new phase with grave consequences for the country's future.
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/ntimes/bnews.htm

Nepali Times #69 | 23-29 November 2001
$70,000,000
That's how much the army is spending over the next five years on=20
weapons upgrades. Who is going to pay for it?
BINOD BHATTARAI
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/ntimes/headline_1.htm

_____

#2.

[ Posted below are 2 articles (Marked A, B) by MB Naqvi for the 27 Nov 2001=
]

o o o

[A]

Afghanistan and emerging order

By MB Naqvi

No world order is a fixed thing. It goes on changing, generally
slightly, with major developments and Afghan War is one of those things
that are sure to make significant changes. Prognostication of how the
war will end and what would follow in Afghanistan is a hazardous
business. However, a few scenarios, mostly pessimistic, can be
visualised insofar as Asia is concerned.

As of now, whether or not the UN plays a dominant role in Afghanistan
some sort of a government would be hammered into shape as a result of
its ministrations. And it will certainly be advertised as a broad-based
and representative one. Here, some assumptions have to be necessarily
made. No matter what the exact composition of the next government, it
will be dominated by Northern Alliance which, in its turn, will be
subject to much internal dissension and mutual jealousies among powerful
warlords like Dostam, Fahim and others.

Further, Taliban are unlikely to disappear altogether from the Afghan
scene. Even after their government has been destroyed, there may remain
pockets in Pushtoon areas where armed groups would hold out, or will go
on losing and gaining them, thus preventing the nominal Kabul government
to be successful; resistance to that government will continue in many
places, particularly in the Pushtoon areas, where lawlessness might
become endemic. The law and order in the country as a whole is likely
to remain patchwork at best.

An important subject is what impact would the defeat and destruction of
Taliban regime shall have on the phenomena called Islamic Fundamentalism
--- or rather different extremist schools of Islam. Can it be destroyed
or even damaged, leading to the loss of its elan. The assumption being
made here is that nothing of the sort is likely to happen. On the
country, all extremist schools will be strengthened; they may become
even more paranoid and extreme. Other Taliban-like phenomena can go on
erupting throughout the Islamic world.

Hopefully, during initial years there would be a united Afghan state,
though the government in Kabul might not be stable or make its writ run
uniformly throughout the country. But two facts would surely
characterise that regime: First, Kabul would continue to be ruled by a
basically pro-American set of people who will do what would be in
harmony with America=92s larger political or economic purposes. Secondly,
the US military presence would be an outstanding factor affecting the
future of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This Americans presence in either country is unlikely to end soon,
though most Pakistanis would like it to disappear as early as possible.
So long as the Musharraf regime lasts --- and it is likely to last in
one form or another for a fair amount of time --- the opposition to
American presence would be kept contained. In Afghanistan, American
influence, based on its troops=92 presence, is not likely to be
constrained in the manner that it might be in Pakistan; Afghanistan,
despite is internal lawlessness, is likely to become a major staging
station for further advance into Tajikstan and Uzbekistan, in the first
instance, and later throughout central Asia --- and maybe in Russia
itself.

The Americans have gained many other advantages, beginning with the
fact that the BJP government in New Delhi is pining to be of greater use
to America=92s geopolitical purposes --- doubtless aiming to deflect
American attention and resources toward Kashmir=92s cross-border terrorism
and other bilateral matters, especially more investments. India is
likely to remain a notional or theoretical host of Americans, if
necessary of their troops; it would be a great prop for American grand
designs for Asia.

Then, China has no theoretical objection to War against Terrorism and,
after its admission into WTO, it is not likely to strenuously oppose the
American advance into Central Asia at this stage, though friction is
surely to arise later on account of agreed Pakistan-China joint ventures
on the Mekran coast (Gwadur port) and many other matters. Russia too has
its own interests that are seen to coincide with American opposition to
Islamic Extremism. But thanks to its economic and financial needs, it is
unlikely to offer any resistance to America=92s economic designs on
central Asian republics. The road to American investments in central
Asian republics is wide open --- for exploiting their hydrocarbons,
other minerals and possible contracts for infrastructure development and
equipment for armed forces=92 modernisation.

It is true that in their heart of hearts, there would be resentment in
China and also in Russia. American advance is largely, in current terms,
at the expense of China and, to a smaller extent, Russia. Notionally,
the scope for Chinese activities, economic and political, has shrunk by
the ongoing political advance of the US in what used to be the Soviets=92
backyard. Russians are now economically (and politically) at sixes and
sevens. The communist ideology has disappeared and no replacement has
yet been found. Men like Kissenger thought that Russian nationalism,
with its innate aggressive and expansionist tendencies, would become a
dominant force. Well, it has not done so --- not yet, at any rate. So
far, economic decline and anarchic conditions have prevented Russian
nationalism to claim any significant victory. But should economic
stabilisation take place, it would have a fair chance of succeeding ---
mostly by default. But then, it will have to be militaristic like any
other Fascism.

While discontent may continue to grow at the grassroots in most
countries that would come under American influence --- with governments
deciding major policies which keep them in step with the US and which in
some fashion promote American economic interests --- things on surface
might not give any indication of what is going on inside. This ferment
would also be helped by the growth of globalisation under WTO and World
Bank group. The latter's contradiction creates strong resentment among
the poor and the unemployed and the perennially deprived sections. The
reason is that the growth of globalisation promotes prosperity in a
relatively small section of each underdeveloped society --- though it is
also true of developed countries but these are not under discussion ---
while resentment among the poor and the unemployed is sure to go on
being aggravated by this disparity. Pakistan is likely to be a typical
example of this whole process.

This characteristic impact of globalisation on individual economies,
especially in underdeveloped countries, is replicated at the global
level: it promotes prosperity in some countries while leaving other
(underdeveloped) economies out in the cold. Much of the opposition to
WTO and American geo-political overlordship, represented by the trend
sketched here, is likely to combine and may add fuel to the fire of
anti-Americanism. Should there be economic or other setbacks to other
major economic-power centres, a precondition would then be created for
them to exploit the general disenchantment against America and its
policies, particularly in populous Asia, to challenge the American
supremacy dominated and this unipolarity of the world. In this possible
contest decisive battles are likely to be fought in Asia.

o o o

[B]

Karachi Nov 26:

Self-appointed President of Pakistan had himself declared on the record
in New York and the official spokesman has informed the public now that
the President has decided to remain in office well beyond --- in fact
indefinitely --- the proposed polls for National and Provincial
Assemblies in October 2002. What has been widely noted is that neither
he nor his government has said how this feat is to be achieved? By
elections the world understands, and Pakistanis are entitled to hope,
that (a) these (polls) will be free and fair; (b) the Assemblies will
have all the powers, privileges and functions that were enshrined in the
constitution; and (c) the constitution not only will have been restored
before or with the polls, it will not be distorted out of shape and
democratic purpose by arbitrary amendments.

Thereby hang many tales, past and present. There is a long history of
authoritarian rule by military dictators. Earlier their coups d'etat
used to break and abrogate whatever constitution was in force. Then came
a crafty general called Ziaul Haq who made water and fire coexist: He
freed himself from the constraints of a constitution completely --- that
its framers called Permanent Constitution and had laid down a specific
provision of death punishment for the adventurer who tried to subvert or
abrogate it --- and yet kept it alive. His formula was to keep it in
"abeyance" --- whatever that meant. Poor people of Pakistan had no
choice but to entertain the illusion of the constitution being alive,
although the obvious reality is that, like virginity, a constitution
dies the moment it is successfully violated. Gen. Musharraf has repeated
the Ziaul Haq trick and he has also not abrogated the constitution,
although he broke it. He too has kept it in suspension, with the
pretense that it is not dead.

Zia managed to rule for 11 years. He had got himself elected in 1984 as
a President through a fraudulent referendum and kept his Martial Law ---
that most lawless 'law' --- in force along with a nominated National
Assembly until the latter was bullied to pass a package of amendments
that conferred on the President the power to kill all the elected
Assemblies at his discretion alongwith other powers to oversee (and
countermand) the working of all government departments. Once these
powers were his, he graciously restored the constitution and a
'democracy' if also shackled by his Eighth Amendment and lifted his
Martial Law. It was this shackled democracy that Gen. Musharraf killed
in October 1999 in the aftermath of Kargil operations.

Musharraf has ruled all by himself, even without the nominal
participation of other members of the Army, and has kept the supposed
Permanent Constitution in abeyance or suspension. He got his
constitution-breaking takeover 'endorsed' by the apex court of the
country under the infamous doctrine of state necessity which, if relied
upon, can sanction a weekly rape of democracy by a succession of
dictators. In any case, this has happened four times in 50 years and
each time the Supreme Court of Pakistan found that staging a coup d'etat
to overthrow government(s) established under a proper constitution was
the right course to adopt --- in the 'given situation'. However, this
time the SC did two other things apparently on its own authority: it
sanctified the para constitutional act of the Chief of Pakistan Army
Staff provided it ended within three years with the elections of the
National and Provincial Assemblies and the restoration of the
constitutional rule. Secondly, the general was authorised to amend the
constitution the way he thought necessary in order to implement the
reforms he thinks are necessary.

Pakistanis thus have this Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads:
what constitutional amendments he will think necessary in his own
wisdom? Deadline for the restoration of the constitution and hopefully
democracy is less than a year away. But they do not know which or what
constitution will be restored. No one knows how far reaching the new
constitutional amendments will be. Eighth Amendment, way back in 1985,
had rendered the constitution of a parliamentary governance Presidential
in effect. There is the added reason for worry: Gen. Musharraf's style
is quite unsettling.

As befits a tough commando --- and with the delicacy of a rhinoceros ---
has non-chalantly circumscribed the scope of that democracy and
constitution to be restored in October next year by laying down that 'he
has decided to remain the President long after the elections' --- in
fact indefinitely. He does not wish to take any chances, of course. But
what was the need to discredit and devalue that civilian set up? No
doubt he hopes to make his wish to go on ruling the country as President
--- necessarily all powerful and who is able to ignore what the
Assemblies say and do --- a part of the constitution. But how and in
what terminology and with what collateral damage and benefits to others
associated with him.

There are so many other uncertainties for Pakistanis that the general in
command is in no hurry to remove. Will he also go on being the COAS?
What precisely will he do about human freedoms of the citizens and so
forth? Will he permit all parties and politicians to freely participate
in the polls? Will the parties not be put in any straitjacket? What
about Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto? Any qualifications for candidates
in an election? After all Zia had made a laughing stock of Pakistanis by
laying down ridiculously vague and impractical qualifications for
candidates with the cunning intent of being able to dismiss them if they
do not behave or toe his line.

_____

#3.

For New Straits Times:
? November 2001
Comment:

How The Ulama Murdered Their Flock
By Farish A. Noor.

One of the most harrowing stories that have emerged from the debacle=20
in Afghanistan comes from a young Pakistani boy who is now a prisoner=20
of the Northern Alliance in the northern stronghold of Mazar-e=20
Sherif. Locked up in a dingy cell with several other hapless=20
prisoners, the youth told his captors that he had only joined the=20
Taliban a few days before the American-led bombing of Afghanistan,=20
and that he had been sent straight to the front line by the Mullahs=20
of his madrasah to fight in the name of Islam.

The war, he was told, was a jihad in defence of Islam and the outcome=20
was bound to be a victory for Muslims. Barely able to hold a gun=20
properly he was sent to fight against the battle-hardened Uzbek and=20
Tajik troops of the Northern Alliance- who soon made cannon fodder of=20
his unit. While many others were gunned down or blown to oblivion, he=20
was one of the few who was captured.

His fate now hangs in the balance, but it is more than likely that=20
his end will be a bloody one. The Northern Alliance has little=20
sympathy for such surrogate soldiers of God, and after the ferocity=20
meted out by the Taliban against their opponents in places like=20
Mazar-e Sherif it is more than likely that no quarter will be given.=20
No trial or appeal will be offered to their Pakistani and Arab=20
prisoners, whom they regard as foreign mercenaries who came to=20
conquer their homeland.

The saddest thing about the plight of these unfortunate Pakistani=20
captives is that theirs is not an isolated story. The soil of=20
Afghanistan will not be the only place in the world where the blood=20
of young Pakistani boys have been spilt. Elsewhere- in remote and=20
desolate battlefields in Kashmir, Chechnya, Xinchiang, the Moluccas-=20
thousands of young Muslim men have also met an early death at the=20
hands of their enemies, thanks in part to the encouragement given to=20
them by their Mullahs and Imams.

That so many men could have lost their lives for such futile and=20
(ultimately) self-defeating causes is a sad reflection of the=20
intellectual and moral bankruptcy of the Ulama who have grown so=20
powerful in the Muslim world today. Unable to address political and=20
economic problems with rational arguments and concrete solutions, the=20
Ulamas' response has been to speak the language of holy war against=20
the enemies of Islam- both real and imagined- instead. Their narrow=20
mindset and their hateful polemics against all that they consider=20
un-Islamic have inspired thousands of frustrated, illiterate and=20
unemployed young men who felt the need for something bigger in their=20
lives. Into this moral and social vacuum the Ulama have poured their=20
bile and venom, sweetened by the vow of heavenly reward in paradise.

The deaths of so many young men has also been one of the biggest=20
losses to the Muslim world. Had they been given other alternatives to=20
choose from, these young boys could have aspired for something=20
better. Most of them dreamt of a simple life of comfort and peace-=20
like millions of others in the world. To claim that all of them were=20
hateful of the West would be a gross exaggeration, considering the=20
fact that in terms of their lifestyle they wanted the same things=20
that youth anywhere else in the world crave for.

But the institutional breakdown of their societies- aggravated by=20
decades of corruption, abuse of power and a culture of routinised=20
oppression by both political and religious elites- have left them=20
with little choice. It is in the absence of genuine political and=20
economic alternatives that the honeyed promises of the Ulama appeared=20
as a panacea to their miserable condition.

While the young men died for causes that they themselves seldom=20
understood or really believed in, it was the Mullahs who stood to=20
gain the most. Like armchair generals who think of their warriors as=20
chess pieces, these 'defenders of the faith' were quite willing to=20
lay the lives of other young men before the altar of sacrifice.=20
Motivated by an infernal logic which sees the death of others as=20
'collateral damage' in the war between light and darkness, they were=20
prepared to ask of others what they themselves refused to give.

The Ulama and Mullahs have often been described as the 'new clergy'=20
in Islam- A supreme irony to say the least, when anyone who=20
understands anything about Islam will tell you that it is a=20
democratic creed and way of life where no-one is given the right or=20
authority to stand as an intermediary between the believer and God.

But like many other clerics, the Ulama also think of themselves as=20
shepherds and their followers as their flock, to be guarded and=20
herded around as they see fit. The sad fate that lies in store for=20
the unfortunate Pakistani and Arab wretches who were drafted by their=20
Mullahs into the ranks of the Taliban sums up the brutal truth that=20
none of us can avoid: In the end it is the shepherd who leads his=20
flock to the slaughter.

_____

#4.

Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001
To: brahimi@u...
From: WLUML <wluml@w...>
Cc: khossain@c..., manstett.hchr@u..., Hstenman.hchr@u...
Subject: Include Afghan women's voices at the Bonn conference

Lakhdar Brahimi
Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan
Fax: +1 212 963 0616
Email: brahimi@u...

26th November 2001

Urgent need to include representatives of Women's Organisations and=20
Civil Society Organisations in the Bonn conference, November 2001.

Dear Mr. Brahimi,

Since 1984 the international solidarity network Women Living Under=20
Muslim Laws links women in dozens of countries that have experienced=20
armed conflict.

Our long-standing experience tells us that for the sake of building=20
peace in Afghanistan and for the sake of its long-term stability, it=20
is vital that representatives of Afghan women and Afghan civil=20
society are included in national and international discussions=20
concerning the current situation and the future of Afghanistan.

If the Bonn conference mainly includes representatives of armed=20
factions in Afghanistan, the United Nations and the international=20
community risks endorsing violence as the only legitimate and=20
effective means for people to participate in the shaping of their=20
country's future. Placing the future of Afghanistan in the hands of=20
male leaders, many of whom who are responsible for war crimes and=20
sweeping human rights abuses, does not offer hope for peace and=20
stability in the region.

Experience from countries such as Sierra Leone amply demonstrate the=20
mistake of excluding progressive civil society from international=20
post-conflict negotiations. In the case of Afghanistan and its=20
location in a highly volatile and nuclearised region, the stakes are=20
too high for the international community to sponsor a process that=20
runs such a risk of a return to violence.

The Afghan women are organised, and cannot be dismissed as mere=20
'victims'. The survival of their families and communities against=20
seemingly impossible odds and in a context of 20 years of conflict=20
bears testimony to their strength. If the organisers of the Bonn=20
conference have trouble contacting Afghan women's groups,=20
international feminist groups will gladly provide them with a=20
comprehensive list of all Afghan women's organizations and community=20
leaders. For example:

- Afghan Women Educational Center
- Afghan Women's Lawyers Association
- Afghan Women's Network
- NEGAR-Support of Women of Afghanistan
- Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA)
- Women's Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan

Afghan women cannot be excluded from the talks about the future of=20
their country on the grounds of 'tradition'. In Afghanistan itself=20
they have participated in Loya Jirgas in the past and there have been=20
elected women leaders in other Muslim countries such as Indonesia,=20
Pakistan, Turkey, and Bangladesh-all populous Muslim countries.

The icon of the oppressed Afghan woman has been frequently used to=20
mobilise support for the military action in Afghanistan. But we are=20
troubled that now the US-led coalition's apparent aim has been=20
achieved, concern for Afghan women and their right to participate in=20
public life may evaporate.

Afghan women and other civil society organisations have formulated=20
their concerns and are willing to share these with the international=20
community. It is time the international community listened.

Women Living Under Muslim Laws therefore urges you to ensure that the=20
voice of Afghan women is heard at the Bonn conference and that=20
representatives of Afghan women and Afghan civil society are actively=20
included in the talks.

Yours sincerely,

WLUML [Women Living Under Muslim Laws] International Coordination=20
Office, London, UK

<:-<:-<:<:-<:-<:

Please see the 'Living Draft' formulated on 2 November 2001 by a=20
group of women activists and scholars from Afghanistan, the Middle=20
East and other countries having experienced war, armed conflict and=20
revolution.=20
www.wluml.org/english/new-archives/wtc/afghan-women/231101-living-draft.htm=
=20
Please also see the 'Declaration of the Essential Rights of Afghan=20
Women' from June 2000 that demonstrates Afghan women's long-standing=20
commitment to the rebuilding of their country and the relevant=20
application of international law. With this declaration, Afghan women=20
affirm and demand for themselves the rights that were guaranteed to=20
them under the 1977 Afghan Constitution as well as those from=20
numerous international conventions.=20
www.wluml.org/english/new-archives/wtc/afghan-women/declaration-06-00.htm

<:-<:-<:<:-<:-<:

Kamal Hossain UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan Fax: +880 29564953=20
Email: khossain@c...

Carolyn McAskie Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator Office for the=20
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Fax: +1 212 963 1312

Karen Hughes Counsel to the President of the United States Fax: +1 202 456 =
2983

The office of Hina Jilani, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights=20
Defenders Martine Anstett Email: manstett.hchr@u...

The office of Asma Jahangir, UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial=20
Killings Henrik Stenman Email: Hstenman.hchr@u...

WLUML-international solidarity network
Email: wluml@w... | WWW: www.wluml.org

_____

#5.

The Times of India
NOVEMBER 26, 2001
GUEST COLUMN/SALIMA HASHMI

'For me the bond never snapped'
I was privileged. Born into a family which firmly believed that India=20
and Pakistan shared a oneness of cultural identity. It never took me=20
any effort to realise that we have more in common than the conflict=20
which seems so pronounced.
For me the bond never snapped. I was born in Delhi and some of my=20
earliest memories are of the city. I still remember as a=20
three-year-old, how scared I was of pushing my little sister's pram=20
over the slope in Lodi Gardens. Years later, when we were visiting=20
from Lahore, I went back to Lodi Gardens and realised the slope=20
wasn't really steep. There's a vivid memory of a birthday party in a=20
garden. It could be at our Prithviraj Road or the Lodi Road house.=20
These were the two places we lived in Delhi, as my father was in the=20
Army.
Shimla is also a beautiful part of my childhood memory. Very vivid.=20
Once, I was crying, so my father got me cream cracker biscuits, which=20
were very dry, I hated them. One look at them and I started crying=20
even louder. India is a part of my childhood and the bond can only=20
grow stronger with age.
I was cut off from India for a while when studying abroad, then I got=20
married. When my children were growing up in the '80s, the rhetoric=20
on both sides was very high and we didn't have any relatives in=20
India. So I decided to bring them over for it was important that they=20
understand the reality. The first time they came here, my=20
five-year-old daughter looked at the Delhi airport and said with=20
disgust: "But this is just like Pakistan." I knew my purpose was=20
achieved. The moment they landed here, they realised there is hardly=20
any difference between the two countries. This is what my father=20
always talked about: the hunger, the pain, the dreams that the people=20
of the region share.
But there is a great difference in the perception of the two=20
generations. During my time, people were more hostile. Pakistan was a=20
new nation and people were not confident about their own identity, so=20
the insecurities were much more. Besides, the violence of partition=20
was like an open wound.
Today's generation has moved on. If our governments don't work at=20
cross purposes, then people are waiting to share. There was so much=20
hope before the Agra summit. Everyone was talking about a solution=20
and praying for it. This generation clearly has a better chance of=20
building bridges.
One also misses out on so much. Whether it is your best friends at=20
your daughter's wedding, or the latest issue of India Today.=20
Everytime I come here, people back home give me a long list of books=20
to be taken back.
If only travelling between the two countries were made easy, who=20
would want to holiday in America or Europe? Once when I had come to=20
India with a group of 40 art students and visited Agra, one of the=20
girls thanked me for giving her an opportunity to see the Taj Mahal.
(Pakistan-based painter Salima Hashmi is the daughter of Urdu's best=20
known poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz. She spoke to Mohua Chatterjee)

_____

#6.

A Symposium Organized by:

Women Architects Forum
In association with
Center for Environmental Planning and Technology,
Ahmedabad and Environmental Planning Collaborative, Ahmedabad [India]

February 7 and 8, 2002

Gender and the Built Environment

Aim
The broad aim of this symposium is to explore the gender perspective=20
in architecture, urban design and planning and to examine the role of=20
women as both consumers and creators of the built environment,=20
particularly in the South Asian context.

Background
Women''s movements across the world have been among the most salient=20
features of the 20th century. These movements have generated changes=20
in social patterns, roles and lifestyles, in short, transformed=20
identities.

If we ask ourselves what some of these changes have been even in our=20
immediate environment over the past ten years in India (since the=20
first Women Architects Meet in 1991), we may note that there is now=20
33% reservation for women in local governments, departments of=20
women=EDs studies flourish in many universities and women have begun to=20
occupy positions in the bureaucracy and in political life.=20
Specifically, in the field of architectural education, 50% of the=20
students are now girls and there are more women on the faculty and=20
more women planners in the field than ever before. It is our hope=20
that this symposium will generate a debate on how women=EDs needs may=20
be better addressed and their capacities tapped in shaping to the=20
built environment.

Thematic Concerns
Our basic underlying assumption is that the appropriation of space is=20
a political act and that therefore, access to space is fundamentally=20
related to status and power.

Spatial arrangements in a society reflect and reinforce the nature of=20
gender, race, caste and class relations. At various levels, from the=20
city to the dwelling, the ideals and reality of the relationship=20
between men and women is expressed in built form. Cultural rules=20
govern the use of space and codes regulate behavior between genders.=20
For example: A woman=EDs place (so they say) is in the home, yet a=20
design brief for a home rarely includes a space that the woman can=20
call her own. Similarly, though it is women and children who are the=20
primary users of public transport, yet even small innovations in=20
design, which would make buses, trains, stations and bus stops more=20
woman and child friendly are rarely considered. Urban public spaces=20
specifically allocated for growing children are woefully lacking in=20
our cities.

Historically, decision-making and the practice of architecture,=20
planning, urban policy, geography, etc. have been male dominated.=20
Since the 1970s increased attention has been focused on gender issues=20
in fields such as the social sciences, politics, management and=20
cultural studies. However, in the disciplines connected with the=20
built environment, ideas and theories continue to remain=20
male-dominated. Today, women are better represented in urban planning=20
as well as in housing policy groups. Therefore, we need to put in=20
place systems in the building industry and urban planning policy that=20
are more gender sensitive, for instance, employing women as skilled=20
labor, providing facilities to ease heavy manual labor and providing=20
on-site cr=CBches. Similarly, the new building by-laws being introduced=20
for fire or earthquake safety could also include provision for=20
wheel-chair/baby carriage access in all public buildings, exits=20
fitted with panic hardware (also a boon to women with infants or=20
handicapped persons), and public toilets which allow wheelchair=20
access and additional counter space.

In conclusion, we find it necessary to draw attention to a serious=20
lacuna that presentations and discussions at this symposium may=20
attempt to fill. We have indicated above that the changes generated=20
by the women=EDs movement have resulted in fairly large numbers of=20
women beginning to function within the disciplines/professions of=20
architecture and planning. However, the systematic=20
changes/innovations that may have been expected to result from this=20
have not done so. This is possibly because women have on the whole=20
continued to function within the male-dominated=20
disciplinary/professional system on the terms already set by that=20
system. If fundamental change is to occur, therefore, it becomes=20
imperative to theorize a gender perspective into the discipline that=20
trains professionals. In order to do so, it may be useful to explore=20
the possibility of lateral relationships between feminist=20
theorizations of the built environment and its other radical=20
political theorizations. It may also be beneficial to draw upon the=20
theoretical developments across other disciplines like sociology,=20
political science, cultural studies and anthropology.

In light of the above, we invite papers from professionals/academics=20
in all relevant fields to generate a cross-disciplinary discourse to=20
initiate much needed changes in the systems and processes that create=20
and consume the built environment. While presentations from all=20
regions are welcome, the symposium will focus on India and South=20
Asia. We also hope to publish the proceedings.
Themes for the Sessions (these may change as papers
come in):
Day 1:
1) Building by-laws and planning policies
2) Gender and the public realm
3) Gender and the appropriation of private space
4) Gender and the building industry
Day 2:
1) Theorizing gender into the built environment
2) Curriculum and pedagogy
3) Education and faculty development
4) Relationship with other theoretical perspectives
and academic disciplines.

Follow-up Activities:
The findings of the symposium will be of value to academicians,=20
theorists, practitioners, government policy makers and NGOs. The=20
Center for Environmental Planning and Technology is a premier=20
educational institute in India. It includes Schools of Architecture,=20
Planning, Building technology etc. It could take the lead in=20
developing a theoretical angle relating to gender and the built=20
environment to be incorporated in design education in the country.=20
The Women Architects=ED Forums=ED broad and continuing aim is to work=20
towards the empowerment of women professionals to make a positive and=20
consistent contribution to the field in terms of practice, research=20
and education. The symposium will help generate awareness on gender=20
issues in government and private spheres. It will create a=20
professional network at the South Asia level for an ongoing sustained=20
dialogue. The document published at the end of the symposium will=20
disseminate its findings to the broader academic and professional=20
world in South Asia.=20

Paper abstracts should reach by November 15, 2001
Acceptance will be conveyed by December 3, 2001

Registration Fee: Rs. 500 (Demand Drafts only),
Students: Rs. 200
Draft should be made out to the Center for Environmental Planning and=20
Technology.

Organizing Committee:

Ms. Madhavi Desai, Architect, Archicrafts and Faculty,
CEPT, Ahmedabad
Ms. Manu Agrawal, Student, School of Planning, CEPT,
Ahmedabad
Ms. Malini Doshi, Architect, Saransh Architect,
Ahmedabad
Dr. Darshini Mahadevia, Architect-Planner, School of
Planning, CEPT, Ahmedabad
Ms. Ismet Khambatta, Architect-Urban Designer, HCPDPM,
Ahmedabad
Ms. Nivedita D=EDLima, Urban Designer, EPC, Ahmedabad
Ms. Gita Shah, Architect-Planner, GIDC, Gandhinagar
Ms. Parul Jhaveri, Architect, Abhikram, Ahmedabad

Please send registration forms and paper abstracts to:
Madhavi Desai
Convener
Symposium: Gender and the Built Environment
Center for Environmental Planning and Technology
Navrangpura, Ahmedabad: 380 009
India
Fax: 91-79-6302075
E-Mail: mmdesai@i...
Registration Form

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