[sacw] SACW #2 (22 Nov. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #2
22 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Pakistan, "Pro-Taliban Elements" and Sectarian Strife (Yunas Samad)
#2. Taliban's retreat undercuts hardliners (Muddassir Rizvi)
#3. [2 reports on Bangladesh]
- In Bangladesh Fears of Talibanization (Sandip Roy)
- 200 raped in night of political terror, says paper (S. N. M. ABDI)
#4. India: "Veer" Savarkar: Brave by Half (Ram Puniyani)
#5. India: Personal law in all religions makes women the victims of=20
injustice. Any reform in this sphere becomes particularly complicated=20
if the religion is practised by a minority community. It is,=20
therefore, a promising development when the need for reforms is=20
voiced from within the community.

________________________

#1.

Merip Press Information Note

PAKISTAN, "PRO-TALIBAN ELEMENTS" AND SECTARIAN STRIFE
by Yunas Samad

(Yunas Samad teaches sociology at the University of Bradford, UK.)

PIN 76

November 16, 2001

In Western media coverage of Pakistan, political Islam and its jihadi=20
offshoots -- the "pro-Taliban elements" who pop up in reporting --=20
have become regrettably synonymous with Islam and Pakistani Muslims=20
in general. Pakistani Islamists, like their compatriots elsewhere, do=20
advocate for an Islamic state, and jihadi groups in Pakistan have=20
employed violence, most directed at other Pakistanis, in pursuit of=20
their goals. But Islam in Pakistan is considerably more complicated,=20
bound up as it is with languages, lineages, sects and local and=20
regional identifications. Most Pakistani Muslims adhere to the=20
quietist Sufi traditions which helped Islam spread to the=20
subcontinent. The small but influential modernist minority which=20
dominates the Pakistani state and civil society seeks to meld=20
scientific reason with religious piety. Both the modernist and the=20
Sufi traditions are hostile to Islamist attempts to create a=20
theocracy in Pakistan, though Pakistani state policies have been=20
instrumental in the rise of jihadi groups. As the Taliban in=20
neighboring Afghanistan lose their grip on power, an urgent question=20
for Pakistan is whether these groups -- and the sectarian strife they=20
have fueled -- will persist or melt away.

ANTI-SOVIET JIHAD

In the 1980s, two intersecting developments in Pakistan resulted in=20
the proliferation and expansion of jihadi Islam and groups seeking to=20
impose narrowly defined Islamic government by force. The first was=20
the US-Saudi-Pakistani effort to transform the Afghan resistance into=20
a jihad against the Soviet Union; the second was the Pakistani=20
state's use of Islam to maintain its legitimacy. With the Soviet=20
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, over 3 million refugees entered=20
Pakistan, and soon became the human resources for the CIA-backed=20
Afghan mujahideen. As the resistance campaign became more effective,=20
camps for the fighters were established in eastern Afghanistan. The=20
CIA provided weapons to the mujahideen, turning a blind eye to the=20
heroin production being used to supplement US funding. Up to 1984,=20
the CIA strategy was to simply keep the pot boiling. But after 1985,=20
the goal became explicitly to defeat the Soviets. The US provided=20
Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan resistance, gave the=20
go-ahead for raids into the Soviet republics of Central Asia and --=20
with the help of Pakistani and Saudi intelligence -- enlisted Muslims=20
from all over the world to participate in the Afghan war. Between=20
1982 and 1992, 35,000 Islamist radicals from 40 different countries=20
joined the jihad.

For propaganda purposes, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence=20
directorate (ISI) was keen that a Saudi prince enter the fray; the=20
nearest they got to that was Osama bin Laden. Saudi Arabia and other=20
Gulf states also poured funds into Pakistan, particularly into=20
regions bordering Afghanistan, to establish madrassas (religious=20
schools) to instruct students in rigid interpretations of Sunni=20
Islam. Nearly 2,500 new madrassas became breeding grounds for the=20
militants who were recruited first for the Afghan conflict and later=20
for the Pakistani military's proxy war in Kashmir. With the rise of=20
the Taliban, numerous training camps were set up inside Afghanistan=20
for Pakistanis, Chechens, Kashmiris, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Arabs seeking=20
to export the Afghan jihad to their home countries.

ISLAMIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION

Within Pakistan, the military regime of Zia ul Haq set in motion an=20
"Islamization" process that affected Muslims and non-Muslims alike.=20
Islamization -- or more precisely, the identification of the state's=20
version of Islam with the "true" Islam -- greatly intensified=20
patterns of religious discrimination that had begun under the=20
government of Zulfiqar Bhutto. Under Zia, Christians, Hindus,=20
Ahmadiyyas, Parsees and other religious minorities were excluded from=20
holding high office in government. Christians and Hindus were further=20
marginalized by the imposition of separate electorates: they can only=20
vote for candidates from their own religious communities, and cannot=20
vote for Muslim candidates. Sectarian Muslim groups have invoked=20
Zia's anti-blasphemy law to harass Christians, and the law has also=20
been exploited to gain unfair advantage over Christians in personal=20
rivalries and land disputes. To date, there has only been one case=20
where the anti-blasphemy law was used against a Muslim.

Islamization has also negatively affected Muslims. Though first=20
introduced as an ideological fig leaf for the junta, the long-term=20
consequence of Islamization was to politicize Islam in Pakistan and=20
reinforce the trend towards religious sectarianism. The state=20
ideology gave rise to institutional discrimination of Muslim=20
minorities, the Shias being the largest. Encouraged by Saudi Arabia=20
and Iraq, Sunni countries that wanted to isolate the revolutionary=20
Shiism of Iran, the targeting of Shias in Pakistan led to sectarian=20
conflict among different groups of Sunnis.

SECTARIAN SPLINTERING

Opposed to the Shias, particularly in the Punjab, stood a number of=20
heavily armed and dangerous sectarian Sunni splinter groups. These=20
groups are based locally but their collective influence spans a=20
crescent stretching from Sialkot to Fasilabad covering Gujranwala,=20
Sargodha and Jhang. Some of the organizations such as the Sipah-i=20
Sahba Pakistan (SSP) broke away from Jamiat-ul Ulama-i Islam (JUI),=20
part of the reformist Deobandi current which had previously been=20
apolitical. While the JUI advocated a generic concept of an Islamic=20
state, the SSP adhered to a much narrower view demanding that all=20
other sects be declared non-Muslim. On gaining its independence from=20
the JUI leadership, the SSP became involved in a protracted and=20
bloody struggle against Shias. In the western Punjabi district of=20
Jhang, where Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi founded the SSP, the large=20
landholders are Shia and the tenants are Sunni. This class antagonism=20
transformed into religious antipathy and spread to other parts of the=20
Punjab. Following fierce leadership conflicts in Maulana Haq Nawaz=20
Jhangvi and his successor were killed, a number of splinter=20
organizations emerged from the SSP. The Harkat-ul Ansar and the=20
Tanzeem-i Dawa are the largest of the nine groups that seceded. These=20
organizations have circulated a vast amount of sectarian literature,=20
valued in millions of rupees, inciting Sunnis against Shias,=20
Ahmadiyyas and Christians. The other major sectarian organization is=20
the Sunni Tehrik, a product of the Brelvi madrassas movement called=20
Zia-ul Quran, which has grown dramatically in Fasilabad and Jhang.=20
This group has been in the vanguard of anti-Christian incitement,=20
dramatized recently by the murder of 16 Christians in a church in=20
Bahawalpur on October 28. (Members of the SSP have been arrested in=20
connection with the attack.)

Though most of these organizations' energies have focused on=20
non-Muslims or those who were perceived to be non-Muslims, antipathy=20
toward minorities spilled over into inter-Sunni rivalry. The=20
inevitable consequence of sectarian ideas has been a bitter and=20
violent struggle between Sunnis and Shias and between the various=20
Sunni sects. Sectarian violence has become common, particularly in=20
the Punjab and major cities such as Lahore and Peshawar. Beginning in=20
the late 1990s, Pakistan suffered a intensified wave of=20
indiscriminate drive-by shootings, killings of party members,=20
bombings and political assassinations motivated by sectarian strife.=20
Attacks on mosque congregations with automatic weapons and grenades=20
-- reprised most recently when Sunni gunmen shot five praying Shias=20
in Karachi in October -- led to the posting of armed guards at prayer=20
times. Judges who had the courage to pass judgments against the=20
sectarian organizations have been murdered. The murder of a local=20
Deobandi leader in 1994 by a mob egged on by a rival Brelvi cleric=20
indicated the dangers of politicized Islam for Pakistan.

HALF-HEARTED RESTRICTIONS

Before General Pervez Musharraf seized power in a coup two years ago,=20
the Pakistani authorities adopted a half-hearted strategy of=20
encouraging dialogue between the different groups to reduce sectarian=20
tension and violence, as well as giving protection to religious=20
congregations by posting armed police (though for many years the=20
entreaties of Shia communities for police protection were met with=20
indifference or even hostility). Musharraf has tried to tame the=20
militant Islamist groups. Enforcing restrictions on the display of=20
weapons in public places, the state made unsuccessful attempts to=20
integrate madrassas into the state education system and curb their=20
political activities. In 1999, Musharraf banned two groups -- one=20
Sunni and one Shia -- and warned that other groups were being watched.

But the authorities are not prepared to actively disband the=20
sectarian organizations because they play a key role in the=20
government's strategy for Kashmir. Sunni sectarian groups recruit and=20
train militants who are sent across the border to fight Indian forces=20
in the ongoing low-intensity conflict. The emergence of private=20
religious armies, beyond the control of any authority, is the price=20
Islamabad is ready to pay for its Kashmir strategy. Until recently,=20
jihadi groups were protected by the Taliban, who saw them as lever of=20
influence on the Pakistani authorities. After a spate of violent=20
activity these groups would retreat into Afghanistan out of the reach=20
of the regime. Now, with the apparent collapse of the Taliban, jihadi=20
groups will not have such effective sanctuaries.

UNPREDICTABLE DISARRAY

After September 11 Pakistan became a key player in the US-led=20
alliance and dramatically reversed the previous decade's policy of=20
trying to influence Afghan politics through the Taliban. The policy=20
reversal immediately brought the state into conflict with jihadi=20
groups in Pakistan. Some leaders of sectarian organizations were=20
arrested, the pro-Taliban head of the ISI was removed and police=20
vigorously dispersed demonstrators in opposition to the war, killing=20
three on October 8. Curiously, the authorities have not stopped=20
Pakistani volunteers for the Taliban army as they crossed the border.=20
One speculates that the Musharraf regime is quite happy for the=20
US-backed Northern Alliance or US forces to assume responsibility for=20
killing Pakistani militants. In the short term, with the jihadi=20
groups and their Taliban patrons in disarray, sectarian violence will=20
decrease in Pakistan, despite calls by "pro-Taliban elements" for a=20
"black day" of country-wide protest over Musharraf's support for the=20
war on November 16.

However, the long term is more difficult to predict. The fall of=20
Kabul and Taliban strongholds is pushing the Taliban into the=20
mountains, including the near-autonomous tribal agencies in=20
Pakistan's border region, where they say they will mount guerrilla=20
operations against the Northern Alliance and such other forces as=20
eventually enter Afghanistan. A guerrilla campaign will produce a=20
number of problems for the Musharraf regime. Musharraf has already=20
come under great pressure from Washington to seal the highly porous=20
border. The regime will also be urged to take aggressive action=20
against the Taliban and their supporters, running the risk of=20
provoking a tribal revolt. If the war for Afghanistan drags on,=20
Pakistan's predicament vis-a-vis the jihadi organizations will=20
worsen. The Soviets once controlled all the urban centers of=20
Afghanistan, but still lost the war. If the Taliban enjoy similar=20
success against US-sponsored troops, the sectarian groups in Pakistan=20
will doubtless press on toward their domestic agenda.

When quoting from this PIN, please cite MERIP Press Information Note=20
76, "Pakistan, 'Pro-Taliban Elements' and Sectarian Strife," by Yunas=20
Samad, November 16, 2001.

______

#2.

Asia Times (Bangkok)
November 22, 2001

TALIBAN'S RETREAT UNDERCUTS HARDLINERS

By Muddassir Rizvi

ISLAMABAD - The sudden "strategic retreat" of the Taliban militia=20
last week, which allowed the opposition Northern Alliance to simply=20
walk into the Afghan capital Kabul and other Afghan cities and take=20
control of the war-ravaged country, has changed the minds and=20
attitudes of many about the courage and determination of the=20
fundamentalists, now seen as being blown "out of proportion".
It is now fast becoming obvious that the Taliban retreat has=20
completely dampened the fervor over the so-called jihad that had=20
gripped Pakistan in the wake of events after the September 11 terror=20
attacks in the American cities and subsequent war ambitions by=20
Washington. "The Taliban retreat is demoralizing for their supporters=20
throughout the Islamic world," said Mauladad, a member of the=20
right-wing Jamaat-i-Islami party. "I have started to wonder if the=20
Taliban claims of resistance were as hollow as those of [Iraqi=20
President] Saddam Hussein," he added.
The quick decline of the Taliban from the Afghan political scene has=20
also quieted the right-wing religious parties and extremist Islamic=20
groups, which had harshly criticized the military government of=20
President General Pervez Musharraf for supporting Washington and had=20
vowed to topple it through street force. After staging violent=20
countrywide protest rallies and successful pro-Taliban strikes, the=20
religious parties are now resorting to non-violent ways of protest=20
directed at the government.
Their pro-Taliban jihad calls have been converted into more political=20
anti-government rhetoric. They are now resorting to issuing press=20
statements to condemn the government for what they call "debacle" of=20
its Afghan policy that allowed the Northern Alliance - which Pakistan=20
is wary of - to be at the helms of affairs in Kabul.
"The Taliban retreat is a strategic move. They are now preparing to=20
wage a long guerrilla-style war" was the half-hearted comment by=20
Munawwar Hassan, the acting chief of Jamaat-i-Islami. "The Afghan=20
policy of the military government has given Afghanistan to a=20
pro-Indian government," he added. He believes that a Northern=20
Alliance-dominated administration in Afghanistan is a pro-Indian one=20
because New Delhi favors the alliance and is suspicious of the=20
Taliban while, in contrast, rival Pakistan is closer to the=20
Pashtun-dominated Taliban and is wary of the Northern Alliance which=20
is made up largely of non-Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan.
For its part, the Council for the Defense of Afghanistan and Pakistan=20
- the umbrella organization of 22 religious parties and jihadist=20
groups formed after September 11 - is finding it difficult to face=20
the public. While some of its leaders have called for an immediate=20
halt to American bombardment now that the Taliban have fallen, the=20
sting and bitterness of their calls are all but gone. The religious=20
parties that make up the council are now trying to find their place=20
in the country's mainstream politics at a time when their traditional=20
patrons - the Pakistani military - is taking practical steps toward=20
its moderate transformation as it attempts to gain greater=20
acceptability by the world community.
Most of these religious parties had idealized Taliban rule in=20
neighboring Afghanistan and had in the past demanded a Taliban-like=20
Islamic system in Pakistan. But after the collapse of their source of=20
inspiration in the past week, these parties are now looking for more=20
"politically correct" options to ensure their political role in the=20
post-Taliban scenario.
Now, the council says, it plans to send delegations of leading=20
religious scholars to countries in the region to seek their support=20
for peaceful and permanent settlement of the long-standing Afghan=20
crisis. "The leading religious scholars of Pakistan as well as some=20
eminent religious scholars from Arab countries would visit the=20
neighboring countries of Afghanistan and other regional states to=20
seek help for resolving the Afghan imbroglio," said a member of the=20
council.
However, it has also decided to continue its half-hearted opposition=20
to the military government's cooperation with Washington, maintaining=20
that the Taliban's fall in Afghanistan is temporary and their retreat=20
well thought out.
However, many fail to see logic in claims by religious parties and=20
the Taliban themselves that their withdrawal was strategic - although=20
at the same time, some say it was the rational thing to do to stop=20
the aerial bombardment and fight an unequal battle against the=20
world's only superpower.
"Now it appears that its [Taliban militia's] military strength was=20
more of an inflated balloon than real firepower with any policy,=20
strategy or tactical depth," said an editorial comment in=20
Islamabad-based English language daily The News this week.
"They [Taliban] could have proven a force to be reckoned with if the=20
American troops were on the ground, but they were just helpless to=20
aerial attacks which were also causing massive civilian casualties,"=20
said an expert on Afghan affairs who works with government-run=20
Institute of Strategic Studies, seeking anonymity. "If they had=20
continued with their stubbornness, there would have been massive=20
defections within their ranks and they would have lost even the=20
support, however small, of the Pashtun-speaking populace as they were=20
the ones being killed in the bombings," he added.
Already, there have been press reports that Pashtun tribes along=20
Pakistan's border with Afghanistan are annoyed with the way Taliban=20
ran off the scene. They are now worried about their men who had gone=20
inside Afghanistan in the last two months to fight alongside the=20
student militia. "We demanded of the government it take action=20
against all those who instigated our children to join jihad," said a=20
statement by the relatives of jihadists, whose whereabouts are now=20
not known.
Some jihadists who have safely returned to their homes after the=20
Taliban's fall say that the student militia sent the foreign=20
volunteers to intensely fought frontlines. "A majority of Pakistanis=20
had been sent to Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz to reinforce the Taliban=20
frontlines, which were getting weaker as a result Northern Alliance=20
push and American bombing. But we were still in a position to=20
continue the defense of these cities when the Taliban leadership=20
decided to pull back," one jihadist who returned to his home in Hangu=20
town in the North West Frontier Province was quoted as saying by a=20
domestic news agency.
Hangu was the site of violent pro-Taliban protests and has so far=20
received 19 bodies of Pakistani fighters killed in recent fighting in=20
Afghanistan.
Even the Tehrik Nifaz Shariat Mohammadi (Movement for the Enforcement=20
of Islamic Law), which mobilized 15,000 armed men for the war in=20
Afghanistan, has blamed the Taliban for their "irresponsible=20
attitude".
"There is no turning back in jihad. Either you achieve martyrdom or=20
victory. The Taliban could have and should have continued their fight=20
until the last drop of blood as they had been promising," argued=20
Ahmer Ghazi, a worker of the Tehreek group, whose chief Sufi Mohammad=20
returned to Pakistan from Afghanistan earlier this week along with=20
hundreds of supporters.
A Pashtun by race and a former Pakistani naval officer, Ali Khan=20
himself was considering joining the war in support of what he called=20
his "Pashtun brethren" against the US-led attacks against Afghanistan=20
and any foreign invasion thereafter. "My heart is still with the=20
Taliban and I worry about their safety, but I, like so many other=20
people, am disappointed the way they decided to retreat. What was the=20
point of defending if they had to walk out? They could have simply=20
stepped down in the first place to avoid the killing of hundreds of=20
innocent people in American bombing," Ali Khan said.
But amid the sense of gloom gripping the religious right, the=20
government is in a jubilant mood, celebrating its gains in the Afghan=20
gamble. "Pakistan has earned a lot on the diplomatic front. Now the=20
country is on the road to economic progress, as it is working on debt=20
relief, budgetary support and market access programs," Musharraf told=20
the governors of district governments on Monday.
(Inter Press Service)

______

#3.

Alternet.org

IN BANGLADESH FEARS OF TALIBANIZATION

Sandip Roy, Pacific News Service (USA)
November 20, 2001

The festival of the Goddess Durga in October is normally the high=20
point of the Bengali Hindu cultural calendar. But this year, for=20
thousands of Hindu families in Bangladesh there was no festival and=20
no rejoicing. Instead, gangs of Islamic extremists torched their=20
homes, raped women, poisoned ponds and attacked temples.

At first, many explained the savagery as a post-electoral revenge=20
spree. Hindus in Muslim-majority Bangladesh typically support the=20
Awami League party, which lost in October's national elections. But=20
the scale and ferocity of the recent violence -- which has affected=20
some 4 million people, according to the popular daily newspaper=20
Janakantho -- is raising the specter of Talibanization in a country=20
usually regarded as a moderate Muslim land.

The new Bangladeshi government under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia has=20
deployed police and paramilitary forces, mostly in cities, to quell=20
the violence. But rural areas have seen the most horrific attacks.=20
Many villages can be reached only by boat or on foot, and information=20
is slow to leak out. Bangladeshi newspapers are beginning to reveal=20
the scope of the attacks:

* Nearly 200 women, ranging in age from 8 to 70, were raped in one=20
night in Char Fashion in Bhola.

* The Faizal Vahini, an extremist Islamic group, ordered minorities=20
in Rauzan and Rangunia to pay a monthly "tax" in order to be allowed=20
to stay in their ancestral homes.

* Gopal Krishna Muhuri, a veteran freedom fighter and college=20
principal, was shot to death at his home in Chittagong while reading=20
a newspaper.

* Some 15,000 Hindus took refuge in the village of Ramshil after=20
their homes were destroyed and the women abducted and raped.

The severity of the Hindu-Muslim violence has baffled many, for the=20
roots of the modern nation of Bangladesh lie in language and culture,=20
not religion. When the British left India in 1947, they carved out=20
two Muslim-majority chunks in India's northwest and east: Pakistan=20
and East Pakistan. In 1971, after a bloody civil war to defend=20
Bengali language and culture, Bangladesh was born out of East=20
Pakistan.

Yet according to Dhiman Chowdhury, president of the Human Rights=20
Congress for Bangladesh Minorities, tolerance for religious=20
minorities has been on a downward slide in Bangladesh. In 1947, some=20
35 percent of the population was Hindu. Today it is a mere 10 percent=20
and dropping. "These attacks are designed to displace minorities and=20
evict them out of Bangladesh. It is a systematic and planned=20
annihilation," Chowdhury said.

An elderly Bangladeshi Hindu relief agency worker, who did not want=20
his name revealed, supported Chowdhury's allegations. At some of the=20
towns affected by the recent violence, villagers told him the threats=20
were quite plain. "If you want to stay in Bangladesh, become Muslim.=20
Otherwise you had better leave," he said. The hidden agenda,=20
according to the relief worker, was to seize the land and property of=20
the fleeing Hindus.

Tinku Ali Ishtiaq, a Bangladeshi-born community activist who now=20
lives in Berkeley, Calif., agreed. "The attack on Hindus are really=20
opportunistic, fueled by land-grabbing desires and condoned by the=20
government." Ishtiaq claimed that the government, which is the=20
largest employer in Bangladesh, has systematically purged Hindus from=20
positions of authority in all institutions under its control, such as=20
universities and the army.

Chowdhury and others worry that some of the coalition partners of the=20
new Bangladeshi government, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Islam=20
Unity Council, have pro-Taliban sympathies. During the 1971 war of=20
independence from Pakistan, the Jamaat sided with Pakistan and formed=20
paramilitary death squads that attacked supporters of independence.=20
Now two members of the Jamaat are in the cabinet.

Chowdhury fears that parties like Jamaat and Islamic Unity Council=20
seek a rigid Islamic nationhood under the strict Islamic Sharia law,=20
which the Taliban used as the basis of government. He pointed to a=20
number of Islamic schools, or madrasas, that preach a message of=20
intolerance towards unbelievers. Chowdhury says terrorists from=20
Harkat-ul-Mjuaheddin, which is allied to Al Qaeda, were found in the=20
forests near the Bangladesh-Burma border.

Ishtiaq traces the growth of Islamic fundamentalism to an outpouring=20
of Saudi Arabian money to the Bangladeshi government, mosques and=20
some political groups in the '70s and '80s. But while Islamic=20
fundamentalism has been growing, Ishtaiq does not think the country=20
is about to fall into the hands of Islamic extremists. Even in the=20
recent elections, parties like Jamaat only managed to come into the=20
government as junior partners of a coalition.

"Their support is rather limited," Ishtiaq said. "But many of their=20
cadres are well-trained, so they can make a lot of noise." A source=20
at the Bangladesh Embassy agreed, saying, "There is not the slightest=20
danger of Talibanization in Bangladesh. Parties like the Jamaat have=20
been in Parliament earlier and the other Islamic parties are quite=20
insignificant."

But other observers say that even if Bangladesh does not go the way=20
of Afghanistan, the hands of fundamentalists in the recent killings=20
and looting is obvious. The government's delayed response and=20
attempts to play down the incidents will embolden extremists, claims=20
a Hindu immigrant from Bangladesh who has lived in the United States=20
for over 20 years. "The bottom line is that terrible things have=20
happened that should not happen in any civilized state among people=20
with a conscience."

PNS Associate Editor Sandip Roy (sandiproy@h...) is host of=20
"Upfront" -- the Pacific News Service weekly radio program on KALW-FM=20
San Francisco.=20

o o o o

[Another article on the above is posted below]

South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)
Wednesday, November 21, 2001

200 RAPED IN NIGHT OF POLITICAL TERROR, SAYS PAPER

By S. N. M. ABDI in Calcutta

At least 200 Hindu women in Bangladesh were raped in a single night=20
of terror unleashed by hardline Islamic groups sharing power with new=20
Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, according to an independent=20
investigation.

The week-long probe was conducted by reporters from Dhaka's premier=20
English newspaper, the Daily Star, and the harrowing tales of=20
depravity have shocked Bangladeshi society.

Attacks on the minority Hindu community, which constitutes barely 10=20
per cent of Bangladesh's 130 million population, started after the=20
defeat of Sheikh Hasina Wajed's Awami League Party in the October 1=20
elections.

The perpetrators allegedly were members of Jamat-e-Islami and Islam=20
Oikya Jote, two hardline Islamic constituents of Begum Zia's=20
Government, who accused the Hindus of voting for the Awami League.

During the probe, the Star team visited Annada Parashad, one of the=20
worst-affected Hindu villages in Bhola district, where rape victims=20
ranged in age from eight to 70.

Annada Parashad's male population was driven out of the village on=20
October 3 by armed gangs shouting anti-Hindu slogans. Once cleared of=20
men, the women were systematically raped.

A girl, 13, was gang-raped by nine men and many mothers were raped in=20
front of their young children.

Among the victims was a woman, 36, whose left leg was amputated after=20
an accident a few years ago. The rapists took away her crutches.

The newspaper criticised the failure of the Begum Zia Government to=20
arrest the criminals. But the Government said no arrests had been=20
made because victims refused to identify their attackers.

"The local administration shut its eyes during the premeditated=20
mayhem and is now doing everything to cover up its misdeeds," the=20
Star wrote.

It wrote that Hindu families in remote areas were now sending their=20
young women to live in the relative safety of Dhaka.

Analysts said the Awami League's claim that it had the entire Hindu=20
community's support had made them more vulnerable to attacks after=20
the party's defeat.

Last Saturday, the Hindu principal of a private college in the port=20
city of Chittagong was brutally murdered. Home Minister Altaf=20
Chowdhury has vowed to track down and punish the killers.

Ms Sheikh Hasina has criticised the Government for failing to bring=20
the campaign of anti-Hindu violence under control. She also has urged=20
Hindus to retaliate.

"Terrorist groups have been perpetrating killings, torture, rape and=20
looting since Begum Zia came to power," she said.

Although Islam was declared the state religion in the 1980s, the=20
constitution guarantees equal rights to all Bangladeshis irrespective=20
of their faith.

But allegations of discrimination against minorities are common in the coun=
try.

______

#5.

Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001
From: R.R.Punyani

"VEER" SAVARKAR: BRAVE BY HALF

Ram Puniyani

The film on Savarkar is due to be released shortly. The film even before
its release has created lot of ripples of excitement. It may be probably
the first major venture eulogizing the pioneer of Hindutva ideology. One
is aware that any objective discussion on Savarkar is filled with lot of
emotional outbursts as he has been iconized amongst sections of population
as the brave freedom fighter. He also gets the prefix of 'Swatantrya Veer'
(Brave warrior for Freedom), which is only half true.
One needs to look at the trajectory of his life to understand this
transition from anti-British revolutionary to the ideologue of Hindutva.
Savarkar's life underwent major transition during his confinement in
Andamans. He was a changed man after the period of his jail life. He was a
committed anti-British revolutionary prior to his deportment to Andamans
but later he never associated with any thing even remotely sounding as
anti-British.
He had gone to study law in London and for his anti-British stance he was
denied the barrister-ship. In England Savarkar formed 'Free Indian
Society' committed to overthrowing British rule in India. That time he
rejected the British proposal to give the undertaking not to participate
in politics. His group had learnt the art of bomb making from a Russian
revolutionary in Paris. One member of the group killed a top-ranking
official in India office (London) and was sentenced to death. For
involvement in this and for another charges on him in Indian courts,
Savarkar was arrested, sentenced and was to undergo life imprisonment. He
was deported from England. The ship carrying him stopped at Marseilles,
where he jumped into the sea and swam to the shore to claim asylum on
French soil. He was captured back and was transported to Andamans for
life imprisonment.
The conditions in Andman jail were very painful and he was tortured
severely. It seems that conditions of jail life broke his spirits.
Incidentally from 1920 Indian National Congress was asking for his
unconditional release, but due to reasons best known to him Savarkar
preferred to give a written undertaking to get released from the jail, "I
hereby acknowledge that I had a fair trial and just sentence. I heartily
abhor methods of violence resorted to in days gone by and I feel myself
duty bound to uphold law and constitution (British, added) to the best of
my powers and am willing to make the 'reform' a success in so far as I may
be allowed to do so in future" (from facsimile of Savarkar's letter to
British authorities, Frontline, April 7, 1995. Pg. 94). The reforms he is
referring to here are the Montague Chelmsford proposals of 1919, which did
not satisfy the nationalist movement's demands.
In response to this, as a trade off, the British Government released him
under the condition that he will stay in Ratnagiri district in Bombay
province and will seek permission of the government to leave the district.
Also that he will not engage in any public or private political activities
without the consent of the government. The period of conditions lasted
till 1937, when the Congress ministry was sworn in. Subsequent to this he
assumed the office of the President of Hindu Mahasabha. This aspect of his
total surrender is totally hidden by the Hindutva forces, they confer on
him the epithet of 'Veer (brave) Savarkar'.
Why did British government release him? How is it that after his release
the track of his politics totally changed and he came to adorn the mantle
of ideologue Hindu Rashtra? How is it that later he never undertook any
anti British agitation? How is it that he never joined and supported the
major movements of those times like Quit India movement? How is it that
instead of being the part of freedom struggle, he chose to help the
British in recruiting Indians for their army? One can have ones' own
inferences but his compromise with British hides lot of messages about the
nature of his politics from then on. He did emerge as the undisputed
leader of Hindu Mahasabha.
In most of the times, post-1937, his politics was the polar opposite of
National movement led by Gandhi and 'no support to Congress move' was his
basic dictum. This can be best exemplified in the 1942 Quit India
movement, when Gandhi gave the call for the people to leave the government
jobs. Instead Savarkar issued the edict "I issue this definite
instruction to all Hindu Sanghathanists in general holding any post or
position of vantage in the government services, should stick to them and
continue to perform their regular duties". (Quoted in A G Noorani
Frontline, Dec. 1, 1995). Also working committee had passed a resolution
on August 31, 1942 asking all Mahasabhaites to remain at their jobs.
Savarkar does have the 'honor' of brewing Brahminical Hinduism with
nationalism, and he was the first exponent of the doctrine of Hindutva.
Savarkar's initial anti-British struggles were very impressive but after
assuming the role of the proponent of Hindutva his major energies were
channelised in strengthening the politics of hate, formation of communal
Hindu Mahasabha and helping RSS from distance.
Savarkar's work `Hindutva: Who is Hindu' (1923) became and remains the
basic text defining this political concept. With the simultaneous rise of
Muslim communalism, in due course most of the Hindu consolidations took
place by showing the fear of Muslims. This nationalism consolidated itself
on the ground of the 'threatening other', but this threatening other was
not the British imperialist colonizers whose rule the country was
suffering but was the `Muslim'.
As an aside we should note here that Savarkar's anti-British struggles and
anti-British activities totally ceased after his release by the British,
and from then on all his guns were to be targeted against the Muslims.
Savarkar argued (later on this became the ideological base of most of the
Hindutva organizations) "the Aryans who settled in India at the dawn of
history already formed a nation, now embodied in the Hindus.... Hindus are
bound together not only by the tie of the love they bear to a common
fatherland and by the common blood that courses through their veins and
keeps our hearts throbbing and our affection warm but also by the tie of
the common homage we pay to our great civilization, our Hindu
culture."(Hindutva, Page108)
Thus Hindutva according to him rests on three pillars: geographical unity,
racial features and common culture. He further went on to elaborate the
criterion for who is Hindu? According to him all those who regard this
land as their fatherland and holy-land are the only ones who are Hindu and
thereby the people to whom this land belongs. This led to the automatic
interpretation that the Christians and the Muslims, whose holy places are
in Jerusalem and Mecca are not on par with the `Hindus' who 'own' this
country. Initiating the theorizing of the `doubting of patriotism of
Muslim's', Savarkar states, "but besides culture the tie of common
holy-land has at times proved stronger than the claims of a motherland.
Look at Mohammedans: Mecca to them is a sterner reality than Delhi or
Agra."
Savarkar's politics was rival to Gandhian politics. Gandhi - the
representative of Indian Nationalism was branded by Savarkar as
conciliator and appeaser of Muslims. Savarkar propounded that struggle for
supremacy would begin after British left and that the Christians and
Muslims were the real enemies who could be defeated only by "Hindutva". He
maintained that this land belonged to Hindus and so by implication Muslims
with Hold Land in Mecca and Christians with Holy land in Jerusalem cannot
have equal status to `Hindus'.
It is also worth remembering, that murderer of Gandhi, Godse was his
ardent follower. Savarkar himself was the co-accused in Gandhi murder, but
was let off as Godse took the whole responsibility of this murder totally
on his own self.

While the film and the present projection of Savarkar is going on, one has
also to assess his role in second half of his life. An honest assessment
of our past will show us the different versions of Nationalism and their
political stance. The present hysteria of paying blind obeisance to
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar should not come in the way of objectively
assessing his changed role in later part of his life.

(The writer works for EKTA, Committee for Communal Amity, Mumbai)

______

#4.

The Telegraph (India) 22 November 2001
Editorial

VOICES WITHIN=20

Personal law in all religions makes women the victims of injustice.=20
Any reform in this sphere becomes particularly complicated if the=20
religion is practised by a minority community. It is, therefore, a=20
promising development when the need for reforms is voiced from within=20
the community. The recent Supreme Court verdict in favour of=20
maintenance being provided to divorced Muslim women beyond the=20
three-month iddat period has found resonances within such defenders=20
of the shariat as the All India Muslim Personal Law Board. This is,=20
of course, not the first time the need for adapting Islam to changing=20
times is being voiced. There exists a long tradition of reformist=20
expression on the issues of verbal talaq and divorced women's=20
maintenance within the community, particularly among women. Public=20
hearings of Muslim women conducted all over the country by the=20
national commission for women have also repeatedly proved this sort=20
of critical awareness. But any concrete legal and social change=20
concerning these issues remains slow and hindered by conflicts=20
between the judiciary and the traditional keepers of the shariat. The=20
Supreme Court and several high courts have repeatedly attempted to=20
place civil law above personal law. Last year, the Calcutta high=20
court had ruled, on a revision petition filed by a woman deserted by=20
her husband, that Muslim women are eligible for maintenance till they=20
remarry.

Rulings by the judiciary and changes in the law are important=20
landmarks in social progress. But the political manipulation of the=20
relationship between minority sentiments and majoritarian=20
interventions has always complicated the cause of equality and=20
uniformity within minority communities in India, in spite of=20
articulate dissent from Muslim and Christian women on the issues of=20
marriage, divorce, maintenance and inheritance. In the specific case=20
of maintenance, the reversal of the Shah Bano judgment by the Muslim=20
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, endorsed the=20
setting apart of Muslim women from the Criminal Procedure Code,=20
forcing them to look towards their family or the wakf boards for=20
maintenance after divorce. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board is=20
respectful of the divine nature of the shariat. But in reopening=20
debate on maintenance it is not only initiating a less complex=20
relationship with the judiciary and with civil society, but also=20
looking at the issue of gendered injustice all over again.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996. To=20
subscribe send a blank
message to: <act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.