[sacw] SACW #2 (28 Nov. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #2
28 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Exclusion and Inclusion [ Keynote address to the SAHR conference=20
in Delhi (Amartya Sen)
#2. PAKISTAN'S CHOICE (Washington Post editorial)
#3. Newsweek Magazine on Junoon's [ Pakistani Rock Band] recent=20
concert in New York
#4. Book Review: It was Five Minutes Past Midnight in Bhopal, by=20
Dominique LaPierre and Javier Moro

________________________

#1.

Mainstream 28 November 2001
Exclusion and Inclusion

AMARTYA SEN

1. Introduction

The theme of this conference, "Including the Excluded", makes good=20
use of the relatively new idea of "exclusion" as a form of=20
deprivation. This is appropriate since the concept of exclusion has=20
proved to be a useful organisational idea. Many deprivations and=20
violations of human rights do indeed take the form of being excluded=20
from elementary entitlements that should be taken for granted, such=20
as access to the courts, or freedom of speech. The language of=20
exclusion is apt enough, and so is the versatility and reach of the=20
concept. We can usefully discuss a variety of exclusions, chosen from=20
very different areas, encompassing political, economic and social=20
fields.

South Asians for Human Rights have good reason to want this=20
versatility, since we have to be interested in various different=20
types of deprivation, varying from violation of civil and political=20
rights, on one side, to economic destitution and denial of health=20
care and education, on the other. We can be simultaneously interested=20
in political and civic exclusion and also in exclusion from economic=20
and social opportunities. There have been many battles in the past on=20
the correct domain of human rights -with some trying to confine the=20
chosen list to political liberty and civil rights, with others=20
arguing for concentrating instead only on right to employ-ment, food,=20
income, education and so on. Indeed, some international meetings,=20
such as the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 1993, have=20
ended up in some chaos precisely because of battles regarding=20
coverage. There is a foundational as well as a practical case for=20
taking an ecumenical rather than a divisive view of the right=20
coverage, and the concept of exclusion has enough versatility to=20
allow this. Exclusions of very different kinds can, alas, be found=20
plentifully in the countries in South Asia, and I would argue that it=20
is right that we should be able to say that, in one way or another,=20
we are interested in all the deprivations which can be remedied or=20
alleviated through societal change.

2. Exclusion versus Unfair Inclusion

HOWEVER, no conceptual convenience comes without some cost, and the=20
notion of exclusion is no exception. To see this, it may be useful to=20
begin by recalling that some of the classic concepts of injustice are=20
really concerned with "unfair inclusion" rather than exclusion. This=20
is spectacularly the case with the Marxian notion of "exploitation",=20
in which the problem consists in the labourer being firmly "included"=20
in a relation of production in which he or she receives less than is=20
due. Indeed, a great many problems of deprivation arise from=20
unfavourable terms of inclusion and adverse conditions for=20
participation, rather than what can be sensibly seen, without=20
straining the term, as a case of exclusion. For example, with bonded=20
labour, or with child labour in conditions of semi-slavery, or more=20
generally with deeply "unequal" terms of a participatory=20
relationship, the immediate focus is not on exclusion but on the=20
unfavourable nature of the inclusions involved.

This is not to deny that given the adaptability of the language of=20
exclusion, it is possible to adjust the rhetoric of "exclusion" to=20
cover "unfavourable inclusion" as well. Thus extended, "exclusion"=20
can include, say, "exclusion from equitable inclusion". The=20
plasticity of the language of exclusion easily permits this=20
rhetorical extension, in much the same way that Samuel Godwyn, the=20
movie Moghal, could get away with his innovative phrase in the=20
opposite direction: "include me out".

It is, however, good not to feel tempted to recast every human=20
deprivation in the language of "exclusion" through ad hoc=20
redefinitions. Some violations fit more easily into the format of=20
exclusion than do others. For example, being denied recourse to the=20
courts, or being stripped of freedom of speech, or being excluded=20
from medical care or health insurance, are straightforward examples=20
of exclusion in a way that sweated labour, or being subjected to=20
urban pollution or to global warming, cannot be. We need not discuss=20
every violation of human rights under every general heading, and on=20
this occasion, when we are concentrating on "including the excluded,"=20
it is right that our focus should be on those problems that fit=20
naturally under the general description of right violation through=20
exclusion.

This is particularly important because some crucial "exclusions" have=20
received far less attention in public discussions than they deserve.=20
Indeed, in some cases, the contrary pull of the language of "unfair=20
inclusion" has made the penalty of exclusion far less visible than=20
the alternative of unfair inclusion. For example, it is easy to=20
organise a campaign in any Western country, especially in a=20
University campus, against products of sweated labour in developing=20
countries, but harder to get agitations for more employment and more=20
economic inclusion. The fact that distant people are interested even=20
in sweated labour far away from home is, of course, in itself a very=20
positive thing. It is constructive both because these protests can,=20
in many cases, actually improve the working conditions of the=20
labourers involved, and also because this type of involvement, with=20
people in one part of the world taking an immediate and graphic=20
interest in the predicament of people very far away, is a push in the=20
direction of global justice.

And yet there is also a downside in focusing on the unfair inclusion=20
issue, without at the same time addressing the problem of exclusion.=20
If the protesters are successful in merely shutting down those=20
production units, without helping the displaced labourers in any way=20
(indeed without taking any further interests in their lives and=20
survival), then the overall effect could well be to make things worse=20
rather than better for the newly excluded who were previously=20
unfairly included.

The basic conclusion is that we need to be aware of both types of=20
unfairness-unfair exclusion as well as unfair inclusion-and we need=20
not confound the two. As it happens, many of the more extreme cases=20
of human rights violations, such as denial of basic liberties,=20
torture, imprisonment without trial, depri-vation of the right to=20
vote, on one side, and starvation or comprehensive absence of medical=20
attention, on the other, can be well discussed within the format of=20
"exclusion". We must, however, make room also for those violations of=20
human rights, including bonded labour, sweated work, semi-slavery of=20
children, environment afflictions, etc., that are best seen as unfair=20
inclusion.

3. Congruence and Class

INDEED, we must also seize the empirical fact that there is often a=20
remarkable congruence of depriva-tions through various types of=20
exclusions and inclusions for the real underdogs of society. Some=20
South Asians are rich; must are not. Some are very well educated;=20
others are illiterate. Some lead easy lives of luxury; others are=20
made to work ceaseless in terrible conditions. Some are influential;=20
others lack clout altogether. Some have lawyers; other do not. Some=20
are treated with respect by the police; others are treated like dirt.=20
These disparate classifi-cations are separately relevant, but they=20
also work together. Indeed, that most remarkable fact is that, often=20
enough, the very same people are poor in income and wealth, suffer=20
from illiteracy, work hard in terrible conditions, have no clout=20
whatsoever, do without their own lawyers, and are kicked around by=20
the police.

The dividing line between "haves" and "have-nots" is not just a=20
rhetorical clich=E9 or an eloquent slogan, but, alas, a substantial=20
feature of the world in which we live. Concurrence of distinct=20
deprivations in the form of congruent exclusions is an overarching=20
feature of the state of human rights in South Asia. I shall not=20
discuss the implications of this congruence further today, though=20
perhaps I should mention that this is the principal subject of my=20
Nehru Lecture tomorrow under the title "Class in India". Instead, I=20
want specifically to discuss today an important class of deprivations=20
that receive relatively little attention, but has a massive reach,=20
cutting across classes. It also involves, simultaneously, unfair=20
inclusions as well as debilitating exclusions.

4. Identities and Identifications

I refer to the complex but profoundly consequential issue of our=20
freedom to choose how we see ourselves-our affiliations, our=20
associations, our identities. This is a field in which deprivation=20
does not typically kill (though it may also do that, as I shall=20
presently discuss), but which can stifle our voice, our independence,=20
and our ability to act as political citizens of a country-or the=20
world.

This issue has become particularly important in the context of the=20
present political crisis and confrontation, with its ramifications=20
becoming clearer since September 11, though the roots of the problem=20
go back much further. The right to see our identity as we choose=20
might look, superficially, to be such an abstract idea that it might=20
be tempting to think that I am wasting the time of this gathering of=20
practical people by discussing something so conceptual. But a=20
conceptual exclusion can have very profound effects in the way we see=20
each other. To give a simple example, to see the disaster of=20
September 11 as being caused by, say, people sheltered or harboured=20
by Afghans, places all people in Afghanistan in the same descrip-tive=20
category, and this can play a very important part in making it=20
acceptable for normal human beings with usual sensibilities-whether=20
in America or in Europe or even in South Asia-to accept that some=20
innocent people in that identified group may well have to die in an=20
operation that has to follow the killing of innocent Americans by=20
criminals harboured in Afghanistan. Of course, the innocent Afghans=20
are not taken in any way to be the target, but merely seen as=20
collaterally damaged Afghans, whose lives cannot be spared if Osama=20
bin Laden is to be caught or killed, and his organised terrorism is=20
to be ended. The gross imposition of the identity of Afghans does=20
not, of course, have any direct military value, but the civil=20
acceptance or the public indulgence of acts with brutal consequences=20
on an identified group can have momentous effects.

The Afghan example has other complexities of which we should not lose=20
sight, and its connection with internal changes in Pakistan is itself=20
an issue of importance. We must not oversimplify an intricate issue,=20
and yet it illustrates-however grossly-a general problem that is=20
central to the understanding (or interpretation) of conflicts in the=20
contemporary world, and the acceptance of brutalities and=20
inhuma-nities committed by different groups across the world.

It is of particular relevance to South Asia, and has been so for a=20
very long time. Many of us old enough to have lived through the=20
bloody 1940s can vividly remember how readily the pre-partition riots=20
drew on the newly divised identity contrasts, which transformed old=20
friends into new enemies and made murderers into putative comrades.=20
The carnage that followed had much to do with the imposition of a new=20
identity, unhampered by reasoned humanity or reflective choice.1

Similar butchery has been occurring more recently across the world in=20
Rwanda, Congo, Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere, under the spell of=20
newly imposed identities. For example, the dramatic amplification of=20
the alleged gravity of the dividing line between, say, the Hutus and=20
the Tutsis ("We Hutus have always hated the Tutsis"), with the=20
eschewal of other classificatory principles related to, say, class or=20
occupation or location, which cut right across the divisions between=20
the Hutus and Tutsis, can convert one of many co-existing dividing=20
lines into an explosive and confrontational division, with incediary=20
power.2 The imposition of an unreflected identity can kill like a=20
plague.3

5. Civilisations and Clashes

TO be involved with human rights, we have to pay more attention to=20
the way gross and allegedly pre-eminent identities are imposed on=20
people. A good starting point is to see the profound impact of the=20
idea of a "clash of civilisations", as develped by Samuel=20
Huntington.4 We can be classified according to many competing systems=20
of partitioning, each of which has far-reaching relevance in our=20
lives: nationa-lities, locations, classes, occupations, languages,=20
politics, and many others. While religious categories have received=20
much airing in recent yers, they cannot be presumed to obliterate=20
other distinctions, and even less taken to be the only relevant=20
system of classifying people across the globe.5 But the recently=20
championed civilisational classification, which is so often invoked=20
now with such profound effects on attitudes and politics, closely=20
follows religious divisions. Samuel Huntington contrasts Western=20
civilisation with "Islamic civilisation", "Hindu civilisation",=20
"Buddhist civilisation", etc., and while hybrid categories are=20
accommodated (such as "Sinic" or "Japanese" civilisation), the=20
alleged confrontations of religious differences are incorporated into=20
a carpentered vision of one dominant and hardened divisiness. By=20
categorising the population of the world into those belongong to "the=20
Islamic world", "the Christian world", "the Hindu world", "the=20
Buddhist world", etc., the divisive power of classifi-catory priority=20
is implicitly used to place people firmly inside a unique set of=20
rigid boxes. Other divisins (say, between the rich and the poor,=20
between members of different classes and occupations, between people=20
of different politics, between distinct nationalities and residential=20
locations, between language groups, etc.) are all submerged by this=20
allegedly pre-eminent way of seeing the differences between people.

The basic weakness of the thesis of "clash of civilisation" lies in=20
its programme of categorising people of the world according to the=20
one-allegedly commanding-system of classification. The deficiency of=20
the thesis, thus, begins well before we get to the point of asking=20
whether civilisations must clash-a question that is conceptually=20
parasitic on the cate-gorisation. No matter what answer we propose to=20
give to this question ("do civilisations clash?"), the form of the=20
query itself pushes us into a narrow, arbitrary and deceptive way of=20
thinking about the people of the world. And its power to befuddle can=20
trap not only those who would like to support the thesis (from=20
Islamic fundamentalists to Western supremacists), but also those who=20
would like to dispute it but respond within its prespecified terms of=20
reference.

To talk about "the Islamic world" or "the Hindu world" or "the=20
Christian world" is already to reduce people into this one dimension.=20
Many opponents of the Huntington thesis (for example, those who argue=20
"the West is not battling against-or clashing with-the Islamic=20
world") get, in effect, diverted into sharing the same narrow=20
categorisation. When, for example, Prime Minister Blair gives his own=20
view of "the Islamic world"-a subject on which he has, it appears,=20
become an expert-he has already bought into this one-dimensional way=20
of seeing the people of the world. The same impoverished vision of=20
the world divided into boxes of civilisations is shared by those who=20
preach amity among civilisations and those who see them clashing.

This vision of unique categorisation is both a serious epistemic=20
mistake and is potentially a great ethical and political hazard, with=20
far-reaching consequences on human rights. People do see themselves=20
in very many different ways. A Bangladeshi Muslim is not only a=20
Muslim but also a Bengali and a Bangladeshi, not to mention the other=20
identities she may have connected with class, gender, occupation,=20
politics, taste, and so on. A Nepalese Hindu is not only a Hindu but=20
also has political and ethnic characteristics that have their own=20
relevance, along with other identities that make him what he is.

Landless labourers struggling against exploitative landlords have=20
things in common that cut across religious boundaries and even=20
national ones. Again, it could not be their only identity, but it is=20
one-sometimes even the dominant one. Poverty too can be a great=20
source of solidarity across other boundaries. The kind of division=20
highlighted by, say, the so-called "anti-globalisation" protesters=20
(which incidentally is one of the most globalised movements in the=20
world) tries to untie the underdogs of the world economy, cutting=20
right across religious or national or "civilisational" lines of=20
division. The multiplicity of categories works against rigid=20
separation and its incendiary implications.

At the root of unargued conflict lies a presumption -often implicitly=20
held rather than explicitly articulated-that the people of the world=20
can be uniquely categorised according to some singular and=20
overarching system of partitioning. This singularly divisive view=20
goes not only against the old-fashioned belief, which tends to be=20
ridiculed these days (not entirely without reason) as much too=20
soft-headed, that "we human beings are all much the same", but also=20
against the less discussed but much more plausible understanding that=20
we are diversely different. Indeed, I would argue that the main hope=20
of harmony in the contemporary world lies in the plurality of our=20
identities, which cut across each other and works against sharp=20
divisions around one single hardened line of impenetrable division.=20
Our shared humanity gets savagely challenged when the confrontation=20
is unified into one allegedly dominant system of classification; this=20
is much more divisive than the universe of plural and diverse=20
categorisations that shape the world in which we live. Plural=20
diversity can be a great unifier in a way a unique system of=20
overarching divisions is not.

6. Civilisational Innocence

IN focusing on this one way of dividing the people of the world, the=20
champions of the "clash of civilisations" cut many corners. For=20
example, in describing India as a "Hindu civilisation", Huntington's=20
exposition of the alleged "clash of civilisation" has to downplay the=20
fact that India has more Muslims (about 125 million-more than the=20
entire British and French populations put together) than any other=20
country in the world with the exception of Indonesia and Pakistan.=20
India may or may not be placed within the arbitrary definition of=20
"the Muslim world", but it is still the case that India has nearly as=20
many Muslim citizens as does Pakistan (and a great many more than=20
most countries in the so-called Muslim world). Also, it is impossible=20
to think of "the Indian civilisation" without taking note of the=20
major role of Muslim in the history of India. Indeed, it is futile to=20
try to have an understanding of the nature and range of Indian art,=20
literature, music or food without seeing the extensive interactions=20
across barriers of religious communities.

India, the classifiers of civilisations have to note (along with the=20
rewriters of Indian history under official patronage here), is not=20
just a "Hindu civilisation". Indeed, even the very feature of=20
secularism, of which many Indians are-rightly I think-proud, had firm=20
antecedents in the official pronouncements of two great emperors in=20
Indian history, the Buddhist emperor Ashoka and the Muslim emperor=20
Akbar. It is perhaps worth pausing a moment on Akbar for three=20
distinct reasons that relate to Huntington's strategy of=20
classification. First, given the delineating role that Huntington=20
sees of the special history of Western civilisation as a champion of=20
individual freedom and tolerance (as he puts it: "the West was West=20
well before it was modern"), it is perhaps worth mentioning that=20
right at the time Akbar was making his pronouncements on religious=20
tolerance (such as: no one "should be interfered with on account of=20
religion, and anyone is to be allowed to go over to a religion that=20
pleases him"),6 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake, for heresy, in=20
Campo dei Fiori in Rome. The present face of "the West" may be an=20
impressive one, but it is not something that has been there all along.

Second, Akbar remained a Muslim, but with distinctly heterodox=20
political, social and even religious beliefs, and with a=20
well-articulated preference for "the pursuit of reason", rather than=20
"reliance on tradition".7 If a Muslim is a homogeneous entity, with=20
no distinct political, social or doctrinal identity, then Akbar could=20
not be fitted into the same box as most of the others. In contrast it=20
is worth recollecting in this context that even though Akbar's=20
political secularism and religious heterodoxy had supporters as well=20
as detractors among influential Muslim groups in Delhi and Agra, yet=20
when he died in 1605, the Islamic theologian Abdul Haq, who had been=20
critical of Akbar for many of his beliefs and pronouncements, had to=20
conclude that despite his "innovations", Akbar had remained a good=20
Muslim.8 This is not puzzling at all if one's religion is not taken=20
to be one's all-enveloping identity, but it would evidently puzzle=20
some contemporary commentators keen on one dimension only-both=20
fundamentalists and anti-fundamentalists.

The third issue is merely an incidental point of history. When Akbar=20
arranged his multi-religious symposia in Agra, the invitees included=20
not only Hindu and Muslim expositors of different schools, they also=20
included Christians, Jews, Parsees, Jains and, according to Abul Fazl=20
(Akbar's intellectual ally), even the followers of "Charvaka"-one of=20
the Indian schools of atheistic thinking that had flourished from=20
around the sixth century BC. It is hard to reconcile this spectacular=20
plurality with Huntington's monocultural and uni-religious view of=20
India as "Hindu civilisation", even if we were to ignore the great=20
Muslim role in India altogether.

7. Freedom, Rights and Responsibility

HUNTINGTON'S civilisational innocence would not be a serious problem=20
had his analysis not given his civilisational categories a uniquely=20
dominant-and domineering-position in classifying the people of the=20
world. That is where the central difficulty lies. The basic issue, I=20
would argue, is the need to recognise the plurality of our=20
identities, and also the fact that, as responsible human beings, we=20
have to choose ("through reason," as Akbar would argue), rather than=20
inertly "discover", what priorities to give to our diverse=20
associations and affiliations. In contrast, the theorists of=20
inescapable "clashes" try, in effect, to deny strenuously, or to=20
ignore implicitly, the relevance of multiple principles of=20
classification and, related to that, the need for us all to take=20
decisional responsibilities about our priorities.

Our religious or civilisational identity may well be very important,=20
but it is one membership among many. The question we have to ask is=20
not, say, whether Islam (or Hinduism or Christianity) is a=20
peace-loving religion or a combative one ("tell us which it is?"),=20
which is Blair's point of entry into this issue. Rather, it is: how a=20
religious Muslim (or Hindu or Christian) combines his or her=20
religious beliefs or practices with other commitments and values, and=20
other features of personal identity. To see the religious -or in=20
Huntington's sense "civilisational"-affiliation as an all-engulfing=20
identity is itself an appalling mistake. There have been fierce=20
warriors as well as great champions of peace among devoted members of=20
each religion, and rather than asking which one is the true believer=20
and which one a mere imposter, we should accept that one's religious=20
faith does not in itself resolve all the decisions we have to take in=20
our lives, including those concerning our political and social=20
priorities and the corresponding issues of conduct and action. Both=20
the proponents of peace and tolerance and the patrons of war and=20
intolerance can belong to the same religion, and may be (in their own=20
ways, true believers), without this being seen as a contradiction.=20
The domain of one's religious identity does not vanquish all other=20
aspects of one's understanding and affiliation.

While this is not the occasion to discuss it, this issue relates also=20
to the public policy of placing children in faith-based schools,=20
where the knowledge of "one's own culture" may sometimes come with a=20
severe reduction of educational opportunities that could help=20
informed choice on how to live. The purpose of education is not only=20
to inform a child about different cultures in the world (including=20
the one to which his or her family may, in one way or another,=20
belong), but also to help the cultivation of reasoning and the=20
exercise of freedom in later life. Something very important is lost=20
if the doors of choice are firmly shut on the face of young children,=20
on the misguided belief that tradition makes choice unnecessary.9

You may think I am talking about Madrassas in Pakistan, or religious=20
schools here, but I am actually talking about also Britain. Such has=20
been the state of confusion about identities, and the force of the=20
implicit belief, that a person has no choice over priorities=20
regarding her identity, that nothing particularly wrong is seen in=20
the lack of choice for children in the new dispensation regarding=20
"faith-based schools" (Muslim or Hindu or Christian) in the new=20
multi-ethnic Britain. The human right that is lost in this is, of=20
course, the children's having a broad education that prepares her to=20
choose, rather than just follow.

8. Concluding Remarks

PIERRE BOURDIEU has argued, in a different context (but relevantly=20
for the present discussion as well), that an official classification=20
can create categories that would not, but for that social=20
identification, have much substance. As he puts it, a socially=20
devised categorisation can end up "producing a difference when none=20
existed", and "social magic can transform people by telling them that=20
they are different". Indeed, "the social world constitutes=20
differences by the mere fact of designing them".10 When that problem=20
is compounded with the loss of all categories other than one-be it=20
civilisation or religion or anything else-we have a remarkable=20
violation of the human right to see oneself through one's own eyes.=20
We are included in just one category, and the other categories are=20
simply blasted out of existing (with many of us in it).

The principal problem with the perspective of "clash of=20
civilisations" does not lie in the unargued presumption that there=20
must be such clashes (which is a subsequent and a parasitic issue).=20
It lies rather in the partitioning of people of the world allegedly=20
in a uniquely profound way-into distinct civilisations (whether or=20
not they clash). This simplistic categori-sation produces a deeply=20
misleading understanding of the people across the world and the=20
diverse relations between them, and it also has the effect of=20
magnifying a particular type of distinction-a preordained=20
inclusion-eliminating all others. It is not surprising that=20
fundamentalists-Muslim or Hindu or Western supremacist or=20
whatever-would like this way of thinking about the world, but such=20
has been the power of confounded and confused thinking that even=20
those whose instincts should go entirely against this way of=20
diminishing human rights beings seem to fall comprehensively into=20
this trap. Wars are fought in its name, and human identities are also=20
vanquished by the sheer power of dominating classification.

To defend ourselves we have to assert our right to choose the=20
priorities over our multiple associations, affiliations and=20
identities. We have to decide what importance, if any, to attach to=20
each. Our religious beliefs or identities, whether chosen or simply=20
inherited, cannot be asked to take over our entire life and all our=20
reflective decisions. When a choice exists, to deny its existence is=20
not only a scientific failure, but also a denial of a basic human=20
right, which in turn also leads to ethical dereliction, since it=20
allows a denial of responsibility that goes inescapably with the=20
exercise of choice.

To focus just on the grand religious classification is not only to=20
miss other significant concerns and ideas that move people, it also=20
has the effect of lessening the importance of other priorities by=20
artificially magnifying the voice of religious authority. The Islamic=20
religious minorities are then treated as the ex officio spokesmen for=20
the so-called "Islamic world", even though a great many Muslims have=20
profound differences with what is proposed by one Mullah or another.=20
The same would apply to Hindu or Christian religious leaders' being=20
seen as the spokespeople for their respective "flocks". The singular=20
classification not only makes provisional distinctions into rigidly=20
inflexible barriers, it also gives a commanding voice to the=20
"establishment" figures in those categories, while others are=20
silenced and muffled. We have to fight for the human rights that are=20
denied in this, with intellectual clarity as well as political=20
determination. Very few things are as important in the contemporary=20
world-not least in South Asia.

FOOTNOTES

1. I have discussed this issue in Reason before Identity, 1998=20
Romanes Lecture (Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999);=20
and in "The Smallness Thrust upon Us", The Little Magazine, 2001.
2. See Shaharyar M. Khan, The Shallow Graves of Rwanda, with a=20
Foreword by Mary Robinson (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000).
3. This is discussed more fully in "Other People", Annual Lecture of=20
the British Academy, 2000 (to be published by the Academy; shorter=20
version already published in The New Republic, December 2000), and in=20
"The Smallness Thrust upon Us", The Little Magazine, 2001.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remarking=20
of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
5. I have discussed this and related issues in my 1998 Romanes=20
Lecture at Oxford, published as: Reason before Identity (Oxford:=20
Oxford University Press, 1999).
6. Translation in Vincent Smith, Akbar: The Great Mogul (Oxford:=20
Clarendon Press, 1917), p. 257.
7. See Irfan Habib, ed., Akbar and His India (Delhi and New York:=20
Oxford University Press, 1997) for a set of fine essays investigating=20
the beliefs and policies of Akbar as well as the intellectual=20
influences that led him to his heterodox position.
8. See Iqtidar Alam Khan, "Akbar's Personality Traits and World=20
Outlook: A Critical Reappraisal", in Irfan Habib, Akbar and His=20
India, p. 78.
9. I have discussed this issue in "Other People" (2000).
10. Pierre Bourdieu, Socially in Question (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 160-1.

_____

#2.

The Washington Post
Tuesday, November 27, 2001; Page A12
Editorial

PAKISTAN'S CHOICE
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19474-2001Nov26.html

TWO MONTHS ago, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf made the right
choice in the war on terrorism. In a televised address, he pledged his
"full support" for the United States, including use of Pakistan's
airspace, intelligence and airfields. Though he wavered when he called for
an ill-advised interruption to America's bombing campaign during Ramadan,
Mr. Musharraf has broadly stuck to his position, facing down anti-American
demonstrations and jailing prominent clerics who support the Taliban.
Yesterday the Musharraf government followed up by launching a hunt inside
Afghanistan for al Qaeda leaders, but as the Afghan campaign enters its
dangerous endgame, there is a risk that Pakistan will falter. Mr.
Musharraf needs to explain to his country that support for the war against
terrorism is not just a favor to the United States but also is in
Pakistan's own interests. And the Bush administration must continue to
bolster Mr. Musharraf's position with aid and market access.

In the past few days, Pakistan has differed publicly with the United
States on two issues. Mr. Musharraf's government has sought the
repatriation of pro-Taliban Pakistani fighters in Afghanistan; the United
States is in no hurry to see this happen, perhaps because it doubts that
Pakistan will make good on its promises of prosecuting the fighters in its
courts. Second, the Musharraf government has expressed doubts about the
efforts to broker a post-Taliban regime that open in Bonn today. In
Pakistan's view, the conference involves insufficient representation of
Afghanistan's southern Pashtun people, who are traditionally Pakistan's
clients.

Up to a point, Pakistan's arguments are reasonable: All governments seek
jurisdiction over their own citizens, and a political settlement in
Afghanistan will be impossible without Pashtun participation. But
Pakistan's political elites do not squarely acknowledge that their
countrymen in Afghanistan are guilty of siding with fundamentalist
terrorists, and that prosecuting them in domestic courts for violation of
border regulations (as the Pakistani government is suggesting) might not
be enough to prevent them from wreaking further destruction. Equally,
Pakistan's leaders still seem to want to control the balance of power in
Afghanistan. But Pashtun dominance of a future Afghan government seems as
unlikely to yield stability as Pashtun exclusion. Three in five Afghans
are non-Pashtun, and other regional powers -- Iran, Russia, India -- will
not accept a Pashtun monopoly.

Pakistan's leaders have long nurtured enmity with India and have tolerated
fundamentalist terrorists in Indian-ruled Kashmir. Because of this enmity
with India, Pakistan has feared encirclement by hostile countries, and so
has sought to subjugate or destabilize Afghanistan. Both halves of this
policy have fed an underworld of fundamentalist violence within Pakistan.
Mr. Musharraf's decision to side with the United States in the war against
terrorism provides an opportunity to break with this destructive pattern.
But that will mean clamping down on Pakistan's domestic terrorists,
despite their popular following. And it will mean putting stability in
Afghanistan ahead of ambitions to control the country.

=A9 2001 The Washington Post Company

_____

#3.

Newsweek Magazine on Junoon's recent concert in New York

http://www.msnbc.com/news/661455.asp

_____

#4.

Far Eastern Economic Review
November 29, 2001

INREVIEW: BOOKS
Poison In the Night
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Shailaja Neelakantan
------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was Five Minutes Past Midnight in Bhopal, by Dominique LaPierre=20
and Javier Moro, Full Circle. 250 rupees ($5.20)
AT FIVE PAST MIDNIGHT in Bhopal, India, on December 2, 1984, a Union=20
Carbide plant leaked a noxious chemical into the winter air. The=20
wind, blowing from the north, swept deadly methyl isocyanate across=20
the slums of the city, killing between 20,000 and 30,000 people and=20
poisoning as many as 500,000. It was the world's worst industrial=20
disaster, and in much of the world it has already been forgotten.

Carbide said it was sabotage. But it was obvious that poor safety=20
conditions and dangerous cost-cutting measures led to the tragedy at=20
the plant the company had deemed "as inoffensive as a chocolate=20
factory." Carbide never apologized.

The U.S. has yet to extradite to India Carbide's then chairman Warren=20
Anderson. Meanwhile, the company paid a measly $470 million in=20
compensation, on the condition the Indian government press no further=20
legal charges, and very little of that money reached the victims.=20
Seventeen years later, women still give birth to diseased and=20
deformed babies and 160,000 people are still awaiting treatment.

It was Five Minutes Past Midnight in Bhopal, written by Frenchman=20
Dominique LaPierre and Spaniard Javier Moro, uses novelistic and=20
journalistic techniques to tell the story of the tragedy through the=20
experiences of a young girl, Padmini and her family, who lived in=20
Bhopal at the time.

The book opens in the southern state of Orissa where black aphid=20
insects have devastated the crop on a small piece of land owned by=20
Padmini's family. This misfortune, the authors say, was just one tiny=20
episode in a tragedy affecting the entire world. The black aphids=20
were among 850,000 varieties of insects that had been devastating=20
crops for centuries.

For decades, companies and laboratories around the world had been=20
looking for the perfect pesticide that would exterminate these=20
insects. The authors say that scientists realized in the mid-1960s=20
that only the chemical industry could come up with an effective=20
pesticide, and this is where Union Carbide makes its entrance in the=20
book. Carbide played a major role in the two world wars, was a huge=20
global presence and with 14 factories in India was a well-known name=20
to millions of Indians as well.

LaPierre and Moro alternate between accounts of Carbide's growing=20
involvement in the pesticide industry and the progression of=20
Padmini's life. Her family, not knowing what lies ahead, moves to=20
Bhopal after the crops are destroyed. They become part of the=20
itinerant labour force that is building a railway line there, and=20
live in Bhopal for many years. It is on the night of Padmini's=20
wedding that the deadly gas leak occurs. She's half blinded and falls=20
unconscious in a stampede and is mistaken for dead. As she's about to=20
be cremated a volunteer notices Padmini's hand moving and she is=20
saved. But her father perishes.

The authors have talked to a variety of people, including a local=20
journalist, Rajkumar Keswani, whose painstaking and prescient reports=20
of security breaches in the Carbide plant went largely ignored.=20
Keswani managed to obtain a copy of a 1982 report on the Bhopal plant=20
that itemized roughly a hundred breaches of operational and safety=20
regulations

LaPierre and Moro have tracked down interesting sources, but=20
unfortunately, the novelistic turns the book takes are not that=20
successful. "Novelizing" the tragedy could have exposed its human=20
dimensions powerfully, but here melodrama and orientalism glamorize=20
the victims.

The incongruous cover art--a photo of a beaming, bejewelled=20
girl--betrays the authors' eye for the exotic. The book is packed=20
with orientalist descriptions, purple prose and unfortunate=20
metaphors. The authors never fail to refer to their characters as=20
Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or Christian. There are long non sequiturs about=20
beggars, pimps and lepers. And completely egregious details of=20
decadent soirees held by Bhopal's former royalty.

It is hardly surprising then that the book has become a runaway=20
bestseller in Europe. Oliver Stone is planning to film the novel,=20
with Penelope Cruz--of all people--playing Padmini. This is all=20
familiar terrain for LaPierre, whose City of Joy, also set in India=20
in Calcutta, was made into a maudlin film starring Patrick Swayze.

Meanwhile, no court of law ever passed judgment on Union Carbide. The=20
book quotes a Carbide defence lawyer who argued that an American=20
court was not competent to assess the value of a human life in the=20
Third World: "How can one determine the damage inflicted on people=20
who live in shacks?"

If nothing else, at least It was Five Past Midnight in Bhopal brings=20
the tragedy to centre stage again. Bhopal should not be forgotten.

Copyright =A92001 Review Publishing Company Limited, Hong Kong. All=20
rights reserved.

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