[sacw] SACW #2 | 26 May 01

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch #2.
26 May 2001

----------------------------------

#1. India -Pakistan: The text of Vajpayee's letter to Musharraf
#2. India: The 'Vinayaka Chaturthi' Festival and Hindutva in Tamil=20
Nadu [Part I]

-----------------------------------

#1.

The text of Vajpayee's letter to Musharraf
>From India Abroad News Service
New Delhi, May 25 - The following is the text of the letter Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee has sent to Pakistani military ruler Pervez
Musharraf:
"Excellency,
"India has, through dialogue, consistently endeavored to build a
relationship of durable peace, stability and cooperative friendship with
Pakistan. Our common enemy is poverty. For the welfare of our peoples, ther=
e
is no other recourse but a pursuit of the path of reconciliation, of
engaging in productive dialogue and by building trust and confidence. I
invite you to walk this high road with us.
"When I visited Lahore in February 1999, with the objective of beginning a
new chapter in our bilateral relations, I had recorded at the
Minar-e-Pakistan that a 'stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan is in
India's interest'; that remains our conviction.
"We have to pick up the threads again, including renewing the Composite
Dialogue, so that we can put in place a stable structure of cooperation and
address all outstanding issues, including J&K.
"I have the pleasure to extend a most cordial invitation to Begum Musharraf
and you to visit India at your early convenience.
"Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
(A.B. Vajpayee)"
--India Abroad News Service

_____

#2.

EPW Special Articles
May 12, 2001

The 'Vinayaka Chaturthi' Festival and Hindutva in Tamil Nadu [Part I]

C J Fullerr

The principal annual festival of =91Vinayaka=92 or =91Ganesha=92 falls on t=
he=20
fourth day of the bright fortnight of =91Bhadrapada=92 (August-September). =
In=20
Tamil Nadu, =91Vinayaka Chaturthi=92
(as it is known) is very widely celebrated with special rituals in people=
=92s=20
homes, as well as at Vinayaka=92s temples and shrines. Until the 1980s,=20
though, there were no
large-scale public ceremonies and processions at the festival, as there=20
have been at Ganesha Chaturthi in Maharashtra since the late 19th century.

In Chennai (Madras) on Chaturthi day in 1983, a little group of Hindu=20
activists belonging to the Hindu Munnani (=91Hindu Front=92), Rashtriya=20
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) installed an image =AD or =91idol=92 =AD of Vi=
nayaka=20
in a public place near a temple in West Mambalam, a suburb in the=20
south-west of the city. A few
days later, they took their image in a procession for immersion in a temple=
=20
tank. One year later, images were set up in several other localities,=20
including Triplicane in the
centre of the city, and from this tiny beginning, the scale of public=20
Vinayaka Chaturthi celebrations expanded fairly rapidly in Chennai. In=20
1990, for the first but not the last
time, a procession of many tall images accompanied by thousands of Hindus=20
led to a bloody riot with Muslims near the Ice House mosque in Triplicane=20
[Geetha and
Rajadurai 1990; Pandian 1992]. Vinayaka Chaturthi remains a major public=20
festival in Chennai, but in the late 1980s and early 1990s its celebration=
=20
spread across Tamil
Nadu, to both urban and rural areas. Before the 1995 festival, the Hindu=20
Munnani=92s president plausibly claimed that immersion processions would ta=
ke=20
place in every
panchayat district in Tamil Nadu (The Hindu, June 28, 1995).

In almost every locality, the festival=92s principal initiators have been=20
activists belonging to the Hindu Munnani, RSS, BJP and other allied=20
organisations in the Sangh parivar.
The Hindu Munnani was founded in the early 1980s and rose to prominence=20
later in the decade. Accurate information about the structure of the=20
Munnani, and the caste and
class composition of its membership, is sparse, but it certainly draws=20
support from across the whole social spectrum [Fuller 1996:24-28, Pandian=20
1990].1 Alongside the
RSS, the Munnani has become the main militant Hindu nationalist or=20
communalist organisation in Tamil Nadu, closely linked to the BJP and=20
playing a politico-religious role
similar to the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) in north India, although the VHP=
=20
itself also has a presence in the state. In 1995-96, the Hindu Munnani=20
split internally, which
led to the emergence of a rival organisation, the =91Hindu Makkal Katchi=92=
=20
(=91Hindu People=92s Party=92). Since then, in various places including Che=
nnai,=20
there have been two
separate public festivals ending with processions on different days, but=20
its smaller rival has done little serious damage to the Munnani=92s strengt=
h.

Between 1991 and 1996, when the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam=20
(AIADMK) headed by Jayalalitha was in power, the Munnani broadly supported =
her
government and its promotion of brahmanical Hinduism, which virtually=20
amounted to a Tamil version of Hindutva [Fuller 1996: 22 and Geetha and=20
Jayanthi 1995: 261]. When
the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) under Karunanidhi returned to power in=
=20
1996, the de facto alliance between the government and the Munnani ended,=20
and in that
year, after violence at the festival in 1995, the government infuriated the=
=20
Munnani by diverting the processional route away from the Ice House mosque=
=20
in Triplicane. Yet the
DMK is no longer the party of militant anti-brahmanism which existed in the=
=20
1970s [Fuller 1999: 36-37 and Pandian 1994], and ideological differences=20
have not impeded an
alliance with the BJP =AD and hence indirectly with the Munnani =AD in plac=
e=20
since before the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. In 1999, Vinayaka Chaturthi=20
actually occurred during
these elections, so that its political implications were always prominent,=
=20
although this was almost equally true in 2000, because all politicians were=
=20
then looking ahead to
the state assembly elections due in 2001.

Because the BJP itself has never won very many votes in Tamil Nadu, some=20
commentators suppose that Hindu nationalism has had little impact there.=20
But they are
wrong.2 The BJP is well-organised and firmly entrenched in many areas of=20
Tamil Nadu, and more or less openly it has been allied with the state=92s=20
ruling party for much of
the last decade. Moreover and more importantly, popular acceptance of=20
Hindutva as an ideology or discourse, or more loosely as a set of ideas and=
=20
assumptions, cannot
be directly measured by voting figures, because the fortunes of political=20
parties rise and fall for reasons that are partly independent of=20
longer-term, underlying shifts in
people=92s attitudes. The public Vinayaka festival in Tamil Nadu was copied=
=20
from its counterpart in Maharashtra by the Hindu Munnani and it is another=
=20
successful example of
the Sangh parivar=92s =91appropriation of traditional Hindu rituals=92 in a=
dual=20
process that aims to =91nationalise=92 Hinduism and =91Hinduise=92 the nati=
on [Basu=20
et al 1993: 39-40].3 Thus
Vinayaka Chaturthi has become a vehicle to disseminate Hindutva ideology;=20
it has played a significant part in moving Hindu nationalism =91from the=20
margins of Indian society
to its centre stage=92 [Hansen 1999: 4] so as to =91normalise=92 it within =
Tamil=20
Nadu=92s religious-cum-political domain, and Geetha and Jayanthi=92s fear t=
hat=20
=91Hindutva ideas may
percolate into the common sense of the people of Tamil Nadu=92 (1995: 265)=
=20
has been at least partly realised.

Making and Installing the=20
Images

The primary data reported in this article were collected across Tamil Nadu=
=20
during the festivals in 1999 and 2000 by a team of researchers who all had=
=20
good local knowledge,
although practical limitations meant that the investigation had to be a=20
short-term one.4

The celebration of Vinayaka Chaturthi obviously depends in the first place=
=20
on the manufacture and supply of images of the god. Small images, usually=20
no more than one
foot high, as used for the traditional domestic festival, are made of=20
painted clay and are mass-produced for sale throughout the state. Some of=20
the larger images needed for
the public festival are also made of clay, but the majority are made of=20
papier mache finished with plaster of Paris, which makes them light and=20
easy to transport. Almost all
manufacture is in the hands of men belonging to communities of traditional=
=20
potters and idol- and statue-makers. Most of the larger images are three or=
=20
four feet high, but
taller ones of six, 10 or 15 feet are not unusual, especially in urban=20
areas. Very tall images are often made on site so that they do not have to=
=20
be transported, and in
Chennai in particular, some images have been more than 30 feet tall. For=20
many years, the maximum height was deliberately increased as a provocative=
=20
sign of the festival=92s
success. In the late 1990s, the government tried to restrict the height to=
=20
18 feet, although more effective in practice have been the limits imposed=20
by new railway and flyover
bridges across Chennai=92s main thoroughfares.

All the images are brightly painted, sometimes intricately and beautifully,=
=20
sometimes quickly and crudely. Although many images are made for retail=20
sale, a large
proportion are ordered in advance to specified designs. Many images are=20
ordinary representations of Vinayaka sitting or standing, often on a lotus=
=20
flower with a small rat,
the god=92s traditional vehicle, depicted at the base. The rat, however, ha=
s=20
become rather unpopular and a lot of images have Vinayaka on a large swan=20
or a lion instead.
Unconventional innovations are particularly common in Chennai, where=20
novelty is at a premium. Among the more striking examples in 1999 and 2000=
=20
were Vinayaka
represented as another god =AD such as Venkateswara, Narasimha or=20
half-Vinayaka and half-Hanuman =AD or even as the Maratha king Shivaji,=20
Shirdi Sai Baba, Atal Behari
Vajpayee or Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose (complete with spectacles). In 1999,=
=20
the images attracting the most attention were the =91Kargil Vinayakas=92,=20
depicting the god on a
field gun or tank in commemoration of India=92s recent victory over Pakista=
n=20
on the Kargil heights. The Kargil Vinayakas clearly reflected the=20
nationalistic militarism prominent
in BJP policy and ideology, but it should not be thought that everyone=20
either approved of them or took them too seriously. Thus when I went to=20
Kosapet, the main
manufacturing centre in Chennai, I found plenty of people who disliked all=
=20
novel representations of the god. The Kargil Vinayakas also caused=20
particular hilarity among the
craftsmen; Kargil, it seemed, was the fashion for 1999 and more people=20
appeared to find Vinayaka with a gun funny, rather than patriotic or sinist=
er.

In both urban and rural areas, only a small minority of images are actually=
=20
installed by Hindu Munnani or RSS units. Instead, most images are set up by=
=20
groups of local
residents, shopkeepers or businessmen, devotees of a Vinayaka temple, or=20
members of a voluntary association, political party branch, or local caste=
=20
organisation. Many of
these groups are made up of Munnani and Sangh parivar activists and=20
supporters, but not all of them are, as we shall see below. Sometimes a=20
group is represented by a
festival committee, which collects donations to pay for the image and cover=
=20
the festival=92s costs; allegations that some =91donors=92 (including non-H=
indus)=20
are forced to hand
over cash are often made and equally often denied. Well-organised groups,=20
especially if they are not Munnani supporters, tend to order their images=20
in advance from the
makers, but many others obtain theirs from the sizeable stocks commissioned=
=20
by the Munnani itself. In Madurai in 1999, for example, the Munnani had=20
images made in a
nearby village of potters and idol-makers, some to meet advance orders and=
=20
some for sale at several sites where it set up markets. In the end, around=
=20
70 images were sold
for installation in the city, but quite a few more never found buyers. In=20
2000, three weeks before the festival, the Munnani brought 10 craftsmen=20
from Kanchipuram who
manufactured about 150 images in a warehouse on the outskirts of Madurai.=20
The village potters complained about their loss of trade, but partly=20
because some of the
images made in the warehouse were sent to other towns, the Munnani could=20
not supply last-minute customers and the total sold in Madurai was only=20
slightly higher than in
1999. The effectiveness of the Munnani=92s manufacturing and distribution=20
system is indeed very variable. Thus for Coimbatore city and its vicinity,=
=20
the Munnani efficiently
supplied more than 300 images in both years. By contrast, for=20
Ramanathapuram town, it supplied 72 images from a site 200 miles away in=20
1999, but sold only 50 of them,
which led to an argument about payment for the rest; that in turn ruined=20
distribution in 2000 because nothing was properly organised and only 20=20
images were belatedly
obtained.
The asking price everywhere varied from 300 to 500 rupees for a three-feet=
=20
image, to 3,000 to 4,000 rupees for a six-feet one, to double that for a=20
10-feet one, although the
final amount always depended on what people were willing or able to pay.=20
The Munnani, however, also gives images away, usually on condition that=20
recipients promise to
buy them in future years. Thus for example, I came across an image beside a=
=20
small Vinayaka temple in a Madurai suburb. The temple had recently been=20
built by a local
group of auto-rickshaw drivers, and the Munnani gave them the image, on the=
=20
understanding that next year they and the families resident nearby would=20
buy one
themselves. This is common practice everywhere, for the Munnani=92s=20
overriding objective is to maximise the number of images installed, even if=
=20
it has to donate many of
them, and often the technique works well. But not always; in 2000, the=20
drivers just mentioned, collected 8,000 rupees and ordered a tall image,=20
but the Munnani supplied
only a small one, which the drivers rejected.

On Chaturthi day, Vinayaka=92s images are installed in =91pandals=92 decora=
ted=20
with fronds and flowers, which are usually built on the roadside next to=20
temples, houses or shops,
or at prominent junctions. Pandals set up by Munnani supporters or units=20
are decorated with the Munnani=92s saffron flags, or those of the RSS or BJ=
P,=20
and it is these flags
which clearly identify pro-Munnani images. With variable success, the=20
Munnani quite often tries to force its flags on to independent groups as=20
well. Sometimes Munnani
activists deliberately place images close to mosques or churches. All=20
images, wherever positioned, are normally guarded round the clock by the=20
police. Often a
sound-system is set up, so that the nearby population can be subjected to=20
deafening film music and the occasional hymn; when this is done near a=20
mosque, trouble at the
time of prayers is the predictable outcome and has to be dealt with by the=
=20
police. Brief rituals of worship are normally carried out when the image is=
=20
installed and thereafter
twice a day until the immersion procession which concludes the festival; in=
=20
some cases, other religious and cultural events are also held.

The Hindu Munnani=92s goal of maximising the display of images in each=20
locality is well served by very tall images at prominent sites. In Chennai=
=20
since the late 1980s, what
might be called the festival=92s epicentre has been the Tiruvatiswaran temp=
le=20
in Triplicane; since their split, both the Munnani and Hindu Makkal Katchi=
=20
have erected near the
temple very tall images of the armed =91Victory (vetri) Vinayaka=92 (18 fee=
t in=20
2000, but as high as 33 feet in 1995) (The Hindu, August 29, 1995). In the=
=20
heart of Thyagaraya
Nagar (T Nagar), a large suburb in south-west Chennai where the festival=20
has long been celebrated on a grand scale, a huge image is built on a=20
trailer beside a main road;
in 2000, it was a 25-feet high display of Vinayaka with the =91Navagraha=92=
=20
(Nine planets). In other towns and cities, the tallest images are normally=
=20
around 12 feet high. Tall
images in prominent positions =AD like the 13-feet Vinayaka placed in=20
Coimbatore=92s central business area =AD make an extremely striking impress=
ion=20
that nobody could
overlook. On the other hand, because all the images together mean that more=
=20
and more of the public space can be claimed as Vinayaka=92s domain and henc=
e=20
as the
Hindus=92, three- or four-feet images scattered widely across quiet suburbs=
=20
and small villages proclaim Hindu ubiquity as much as tall ones standing at=
=20
major urban road
junctions. In places where Hindus are indisputably in the majority, the=20
god=92s multiple manifestation across the landscape can make a powerful=20
impact. Yet Vinayaka=92s
demonstrative effect is of course most provocative wherever Hindus are in=20
the minority, as in many parts of Tirunelveli, Tuticorin and Kanniyakumari=
=20
districts in the far south,
where the Munnani and its allies have made particular efforts to install=20
images and celebrate Vinayaka Chaturthi as ostentatiously as possible. Like=
=20
the saffron flags flying
over countless Hindu households during the Ayodhya campaign, the multitude=
=20
of Vinayaka images =91swamp(ed) individuals in their ubiquity, contriving a=
=20
sense of the
irresistible tide of Hindutva=92 [Basu et al 1993: 60].

Procession and Immersion

Hindu ubiquity is asserted in a dynamic, rather than static, form on the=20
festival=92s final day when Vinayaka=92s images are taken in procession for=
=20
immersion. In Chennai, the
procession always takes place on a Sunday to encourage participation; in=20
1999 and 2000, the Sunday fell six and nine days respectively after=20
Chaturthi day. In some other
places in 1999, the procession was also six days after Chaturthi, but in=20
most the interval was shorter; in 2000, the majority of processions=20
occurred on the first Sunday,
two days after Chaturthi. Nowhere in Tamil Nadu does the festival last 10=20
days, as in Maharashtra.

The ideal model for the processions is that all the images, singly or in=20
small groups, progressively join together until they flow like a river in=20
one big procession to the
immersion site. For shorter processions of a few miles lasting for a few=20
hours in most towns and cities, images are usually transported on cycle=AD =
or=20
hand-carts; on longer
ones lasting for most of a day (as in Chennai or rural southern Tamil=20
Nadu), the images go on small vans or other motorised vehicles.

In Chennai in the late 1980s, the number of images rose quickly and=20
although the total (like the size of the crowds) is always subject to=20
claims and counter-claims, by the
early 1990s, there were a few hundred tall images and probably around 5,000=
=20
three- or four-feet ones. By the end of the 1990s, the total number was=20
probably around 6,500.
In 1999 and 2000, there were 18 assembly points where a very tall image had=
=20
been installed. On the final day, all the images in the city were taken to=
=20
these points, from
where they eventually converged into three processions to the immersion=20
site on the beach, just east of Triplicane.5

Until 1992, images from all over the city joined to pass through=20
Triplicane, but since 1993, separate processions from the north and south=20
have only met the Triplicane one
at the beach. The single procession was divided into three to reduce the=20
threat of conflict in Triplicane, an area with a mixed population in which=
=20
some parts are visibly
dominated by Muslims. After leaving the Tiruvatiswaran temple, where (as=20
already mentioned) a very tall Vinayaka image is installed, the procession=
=20
goes near the Ice
House mosque. Outside this mosque, serious violence repeatedly erupted=20
between Hindus and Muslims in the early 1990s, although since 1996 heavy=20
policing and
diversions in the processional route have largely prevented trouble.6 In=20
2000, Rama Gopalan, the Hindu Munnani=92s state president, once again tried=
=20
to lead the procession
past the Ice House mosque instead of along the diversion ordered by the=20
police. He and his followers were quickly detained and the Munnani=92s=20
unsuccessful attempt to
provoke Muslims was not much more than a token gesture (The Hindu,=20
September 11, 2000). Yet it no doubt did remind people about Vinayaka=20
Chaturthi=92s troublesome
history in central Chennai.

Elsewhere, one unified procession to the immersion site is normal. For=20
example in Madurai, images in the city=92s north, south, east and west zone=
s=20
were taken to four
assembly points, and from there went in separate processions to a central=20
point to join images from the city centre. A unified procession then=20
circumambulated the old city
before reaching the immersion site in the river Vaigai. Similar=20
arrangements were made in other towns and cities, where immersion took=20
place in rivers, canals or lakes. In
Coimbatore, though, where several Hindus were murdered close to the=20
festival in 1997 and bombs were exploded a year later, tension between=20
Hindus and Muslims
remained high in 1999 and 2000. The Coimbatore police therefore refused to=
=20
allow different processions to unite, as the Hindu Munnani wanted, so that=
=20
all the images were
taken individually or in small groups to a lake outside the city.

For the mainly rural areas in south Tamil Nadu, the sea is often the place=
=20
for immersion. Images from different village sites come together at initial=
=20
assembly points, and as
the procession moves along, it may be swollen by more images before it=20
reaches the coast. Images from the small town of Arumuganeri and=20
surrounding villages were
taken to Tiruchendur, where they joined those from other places, to be=20
immersed beside the great seashore temple of Subrahmanya. In 1999 and 2000,=
=20
this procession
skirted the ancient Muslim port of Kayilpattinam, although there was=20
serious violence earlier in the 1990s when the procession actually entered=
=20
Kayalpattinam. In
Kanniyakumari district, where the festival was efficiently organised, 10=20
separate processions flowed across the countryside in 1999, six to the sea=
=20
and four to rivers, and in
2000 one more procession to a river was added. Altogether, these=20
processions took over 730 images (including small domestic ones) for=20
immersion in 1999 and 840 in
2000. Of the six seashore sites, three were very close to Catholic fishing=
=20
villages and one to a Muslim one.

It is an important feature of Vinayaka Chaturthi in Tamil Nadu that=20
Vinayaka is made to manifest himself not only in Chennai and other major=20
urban centres, but also in
small towns and villages, and on the way to immersion, the god moves=20
through the countryside as well as along city streets. Most literature on=20
festival processions and
religious communalism is about control over urban space, but rural cases=20
are probably under-reported, so that it is unclear whether Vinayaka=20
Chaturthi in Tamil Nadu is
unusual. In any case, our evidence shows that the Hindu Munnani and its=20
allies expend a lot of time and money in rural areas, as well as urban=20
ones, and their balanced,
comprehensive effort vitally contributes to successful promotion of the=20
festival as a dramatic expression of the Hindus=92 collective presence.

In general, the immersion ritual tends to be perfunctory and the images are=
=20
dropped almost unceremoniously into the water. In some places, however,=20
such as Tiruchendur,
the ritual was done more carefully and elaborately. Moreover, the Munnani=20
has reacted to criticism about excessively casual disposal, so that in 2000=
=20
more effort was made
to immerse images in a dignified manner in some localities, such as=20
Kanniyakumari district. Elsewhere, as in Madurai, exhortations from Munnani=
=20
leaders were ignored by
all the young men enjoying themselves tipping images into the river.

Everywhere, though, the procession is a more important event than the=20
immersion, and every procession attracts large crowds of men, women and=20
children as spectators =AD
not all of them supporters of the Munnani, as its spokesmen like to claim.=
=20
The procession is also the part of the festival most likely to provoke=20
serious trouble for two
related and familiar reasons. First, as already mentioned for Triplicane,=20
the route often goes past mosques or churches, or crosses Muslim or=20
Christian areas; secondly,
the vast majority of people walking in the processions are young men, who=20
are expected by everyone, including themselves, to cause trouble. Thus in=20
the processions,
aggressive horseplay =AD for example, men drenching each other in coloured=
=20
liquids or staging mock fights =AD is commonplace and often veers on the ed=
ge=20
of spilling into the
watching crowds. A significant minority of men also get drunk before they=20
join a procession. In 1999 and 2000, all processions were policed extremely=
=20
heavily, but the
police also required Munnani and Sangh parivar officials, who were neatly=20
dressed in white and wore rosettes, to maintain order in the far larger=20
crowd of dye-stained youths
with orange headbands whom they accompanied. Vinayaka Chaturthi processions=
=20
rarely contained more than a few =91respectable=92 men apart from the=20
organising officials
and rarely any women; an exception was in Dindigul in 2000, where many=20
women fully participated and took part in protests against police control=20
of the procession. Hence
almost all the processions, tilting precariously between aggressive=20
exuberance and incipient violence, were very masculine events, and the=20
young men in them were
assigned to the stereotypical category of =91rowdies=92 with uneducated,=20
low-caste, lower-class, slum-dwelling backgrounds.7 All over India, at=20
least since colonial times,
better-off citizens, as well as officials, politicians and policemen, have=
=20
assumed that rowdies and the urban poor in general are predisposed to riot=
=20
during religious
processions.8 It is no different in contemporary Tamil Nadu, except that=20
rowdies now inhabit both urban and rural areas.

Although the slogans vary slightly, the Hindu Munnani issues instructions=20
about what should be shouted at all processions. Calls for Hindu unity are=
=20
common and one
frequently heard chant is =91This country is a Hindu country! It=92s the Hi=
ndu=20
people=92s own country!=929 Most prevalent of all is =91Om Kali! Jai Kali!=
=20
Bharatmata ki jai!=92 In other words,
while proclaiming victory in Hindi to =91Mother India=92 =AD unambiguously=
=20
understood as Bharat, Hindu India =AD it is supremely violent Kali who is=20
invoked and praised. Munnani
activists say Kali=92s name inspires courage in them, but almost all slogan=
s=20
are plainly intended, too, to be aggressively Hindu and they are understood=
=20
as such by Muslims
and Christians, who hear them most vigorously yelled out when a procession=
=20
passes a mosque or church.

In 1999 and 2000, the policing of Vinayaka Chaturthi processions was=20
extremely tight. Furthermore in 2000, more so than in 1999, sometimes=20
because BJP leaders
persuaded or coerced Munnani leaders into cooperating with the state=20
bureaucracy and police, agreement was often reached about the level of=20
regulation, especially in
sensitive areas; the fracas in Triplicane near the Ice House mosque was=20
actually an exceptional case. Wherever tension between Hindus and Muslims=20
or Christians ran
high, such as Coimbatore and Dindigul, the police made the organisers=20
abandon any attempt to take large, unitary processions on routes that might=
=20
provoke trouble. In the
rural south of the state, some immersion sites have been selected because=20
they adjoin Muslim or Christian settlements, although this does not always=
=20
cause trouble; thus
in Tuticorin, Catholic fishermen actually immerse the images from their=20
boats. In some sites of earlier violence too, such as Kayalpattinam, local=
=20
Hindus and Muslims have
agreed to arrangements which avoid trouble. Yet active cooperation by=20
non-Hindus is very unusual at the festival; it is mainly because the DMK=20
government supported by
its BJP ally used its power effectively that communal violence was almost=20
completely prevented at the festival in 1999 and 2000.

Effective policing does not turn Vinayaka Chaturthi processions into=20
peaceful religious events like ordinary temple festival processions,=20
however, because they are normally
still raucously aggressive outings that are deliberately designed to make=20
the Hindu presence felt everywhere. Both the installation of large Vinayaka=
=20
images and the
processions which follow are plainly about dominating the =91public arenas=
=92,=20
in Freitag=92s phrase, =91in which community (is) expressed and redefined=20
through collective activities
in public spaces=92 (1989: 6). Of course, this does not mean that all Hindu=
s=20
actually form a single social group with the same interests and ideology,=20
whether in north India in
the 1920s [Freitag 1989: 297-98 and Gooptu 1997] or in Tamil Nadu today,=20
for this Hindu =91community=92 is a primarily an ideological construct (as =
we=20
shall see in more detail
below). More specifically too, the Munnani leadership plainly does not=20
share much in common with the rowdies who throng to the Vinayaka Chaturthi=
=20
processions and get a
real chance, at least for a few hours, to take over the public space in=20
which they are usually marginalised for their own enjoyment and=20
self-manifestation [Hansen 1999:
213]. Yet the Munnani also draws political strength from the noisy,=20
aggressive style of young men by combining it with the leadership=92s sense=
=20
of management; the Munnani
uses the festival dually, much like the Shiv Sena in Mumbai, =91as a field=
=20
for demonstrating its ability to manage the city (or other locale), and to=
=20
appear as an alternative
power=92 [Heuze 1995: 242].

Although the young men=92s support is wanted and needed, Munnani leaders kn=
ow=20
that noisy and aggressive public events are completely unattractive to most=
=20
Tamil women
with some self-respect, and that very few women will ever join the=20
processions if there is any risk of violence.10 The Munnani has therefore=20
sought to attract women by
organising religious and cultural events during Vinayaka Chaturthi,=20
although unlike the RSS it has no women=92s wing. Particularly popular is=20
=91tiruvilakku puja=92 (=91holy lamp
worship=92), when large groups of women, often accompanied by their=20
daughters, collectively worship their household oil lamps in front of a=20
Vinayaka image. In Madurai, the
Munnani organised a lamp worship for the first time in 2000; it was=20
attended by about 100 adult women and was led by a devotional singer and=20
her group. Our evidence
suggests that throughout Tamil Nadu, women=92s involvement in Vinayaka=20
Chaturthi rose considerably in 2000, especially through participation in=20
lamp-worshipping rituals.
The Sangh parivar has been promoting these in the state for quite a long=20
time, and as Geetha and Jayanthi observe, such rituals persuade women to=20
see themselves as full
participants in the Hindu movement and also erase boundaries between=20
private and public spaces, so that Hindutva can become =91a matter of great=
=20
personal concern for
=91ordinarily religious=92 Hindu women (1995: 247).

Independent Festival=20
Celebrations

Despite the leading role of the Hindu Munnani and its Sangh parivar allies,=
=20
they do not completely monopolise the public festival, because other groups=
=20
also set up large
images, take them in procession and otherwise celebrate Vinayaka Chaturthi.

Our evidence from several towns and cities in 2000 suggests that=20
independent public celebrations of Vinayaka Chaturthi not controlled by the=
=20
Munnani are most prevalent in
some northern areas of Tamil Nadu. Thus in Vellore, the Hindu organisations=
=20
are very weak and the festival celebrations were mainly in the hands of DMK=
=20
and AIADMK
party committees, which only a few RSS members were able to join. The=20
committees set up 48 tall images and when they were taken in procession for=
=20
immersion, RSS
activists put up their saffron flags and handed out headbands to young men=
=20
on the streets, but people took little notice of them and RSS influence was=
=20
minimal. In Salem,
the Munnani and RSS played a bigger role than in Vellore, but they=20
controlled only one out of three processions. In Erode, although the=20
Munnani has organised the public
festival since 1989, about one-third of the town=92s 48 images were set up =
by=20
independent groups which resented Munnani attempts to impose centralised=20
control. In the twin
towns of Bhavani and Kumarapalaiyam, near Erode, however, it was similar to=
=20
Vellore, because the Munnani played no role and the festival was mainly run=
=20
by local
voluntary associations. Furthermore, in the surrounding rural areas, no=20
public festival with processions was held at all.11

[ The remaining part of the above article continues in SACW Disptach #3 -=
=20
26 May 2001]

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