[sacw] SACW #2 (9 Sept. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch No.2
9 September 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

----------------------------------------

[1.] Sri Lanka: Colombo's deal with JVP raises doubts (IPS report)
[2.] Pakistan Censors Newsweek Article Covering Controversial=20
Blasphemy Laws (CPJ)
[3.] Will an Indo-pak d=E9tente be wise? (M.B. Naqvi)
[4.] Kashmiri militants divide the sexes
[5.] Kashmir: Now non-Muslim women ordered to don bindi
[6.] India: Liberhan commission asks for Ayodhya records from VHP
[7.] India: Note on the Public Hearing to be held on 5th - 6th=20
October, 2001 in Lucknow
-----------------------------------------

#1.

Asia Times
September 8, 2001=20=09=20=20

Colombo's deal with Marxists raises doubts
By Feizal Samath
COLOMBO - Sri Lanka's ruling People's Alliance (PA) has cobbled=20
together a working arrangement with the country's Marxists, which=20
appears to salvage a tottering government but could create more woes=20
for the war- and drought-hit country.
"It is a good and positive agreement but the viability of the deal is=20
suspect, given the stringent conditions contained," said Jehan=20
Perera, media director at the National Peace Council (NPC), a=20
Norwegian-backed local peace group.
The PA coalition on Thursday praised its landmark deal - effective=20
till September 2002 - with the Marxist People's Liberation Front=20
(JVP), which also paves the way for national polls in one year under=20
a caretaker government. "This is a good agreement and wipes out=20
conspiratorial forces bent on overthrowing the government," said=20
Mangala Samaraweera, former minister and chief PA spokesman.
JVP spokesman Wimal Weerawansa said the pact ensured the defeat of=20
local and foreign forces bent on overthrowing the state and was aimed=20
at providing relief to the people.
Political analysts say that they believe the reference to foreign=20
forces was a shot at the United States and the International Monetary=20
Fund (IMF), which appear to be dismayed by the marriage between the=20
PA and the country's leading Marxist group. US Ambassador Ashley=20
Wills has vociferously denied newspaper reports that he was trying to=20
arrange an alliance between the ruling party and the main opposition=20
United National Party for a workable administration. Talks between=20
the country's two main protagonists collapsed last week, prompting=20
the PA to turn to the JVP and its 10 members of parliament for=20
support.
Under Wednesday's memorandum of understanding, in which the JVP has=20
promised the government the support of its MPs, the PA has agreed to=20
dissolve parliament within a year and hold national polls under a=20
caretaker regime while the Marxist group has promised to help sustain=20
a stable government. The government has also agreed to set up a=20
constitutional council and independent commissions dealing with the=20
public service, the judiciary, elections department and police by=20
October, while preparing legislation to create an independent media=20
commission within six months.
The agreement further ensures that steps would be taken to prevent=20
further price increases in essential food items such as rice, flour,=20
sugar, milk powder, and water, as well as fuel, electricity, and gas.
"If there are plans to privatize public or social property such as=20
water resources, banks, insurance ventures, the PA agrees to withhold=20
such action during the one-year period this MoU remains valid," the=20
memorandum said.
NPC's Perera said the provision on price control of essential foods=20
could throw the agreement off gear. "These economic conditions by the=20
JVP cannot be sustained by a battered economy," he said.
Sri Lanka's economy has been devastated by an 18-year-old Tamil=20
revolt for a separate state. In recent months, the economy has taken=20
a further beating through a prolonged drought that has led to=20
crippling power cuts and a water shortage, resulting in an=20
international appeal for drought relief for close to 1 million=20
affected people.
On July 24, Tamil rebels launched a daring attack on the country's=20
only international airport and neighboring military airbase,=20
destroying more than a dozen aircraft belonging to national carrier=20
Sri Lankan Airlines and the airforce. The attack reduced by half the=20
fleet of Sri Lankan Airlines, considerably cutting flights and=20
schedules. Foreign insurers also raised premiums on planes and ships=20
calling at Colombo.
Perera said it would be impossible not to raise prices or resort to=20
subsidies in a deflated economy. Prices of diesel and gas have risen=20
by nearly 100 percent in the past 18 months due to rising world=20
prices, which has set off a chain reaction in the cost of essential=20
goods.
Nawaz Rajabdeen, vice president of Sri Lanka's powerful Federation of=20
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FCCI), said moves to ensure good=20
governance and transparency were good in the pact, but there were=20
doubts as to the sincerity of the JVP regarding peace talks. "The JVP=20
stand has always been war and not peace. I don't think they will=20
change it now, although the agreement is vague on this issue," he=20
said, warning that the JVP and its 10 MPs were dictating terms to 109=20
MPs from the PA.
"There would be chaos, infighting, particularly since many ministers=20
will lose their jobs," he added. The cabinet is to be trimmed to 20=20
positions from a current 44.
Other demands by the JVP in the MoU include finding short-term=20
solutions for the country's small industry sector that has been=20
virtually wiped out by an economic slowdown and cheaper imports, and=20
halting construction on a costly presidential palace just outside the=20
capital. The agreement also puts a one-year moratorium on proposed=20
devolution of power, mainly to help minority Tamils, "unless a broad=20
consensus is reached through a wide-ranging dialogue" with a=20
cross-section of society. Political analysts said this effectively=20
scuttles the peace process in which Norway is trying to bring the=20
government and Tamil rebels to the negotiating table.
In recent weeks, several businessmen - individually and collectively=20
- have formed associations urging the government and the rebels to=20
re-start talks that were last held in 1995. The Norwegian-led effort=20
to bring the sides together since last year has been put on the=20
backburner as the PA struggled to retain power.
Nadeem Ul Haq, the IMF's representative in Colombo, was cautious in=20
his comments on the new alliance. While welcoming the good governance=20
provisions, including a reduced cabinet, he told reporters that good=20
governance also includes reducing the budget deficit and proceeding=20
with structural reforms. Sri Lanka received an IMF standby facility=20
of more than US$250 million earlier this year to implement key=20
economic reforms including selling off loss-making state enterprises=20
and reducing the budget deficit which has ballooned due to high war=20
spending and related costs.
Economists said it would be difficult to continue with the reforms=20
given the JVP demand for a freeze on the prices of essential goods.
The two sides agreed to set up a panel composed of priests from=20
different religions, trade union bosses, and representatives of the=20
business community and other professions to supervise the agreement.
(Inter Press Service)

______

#2.

***News from the Committee to Protect Journalists***

[For Immediate Release]

PAKISTAN CENSORS NEWSWEEK ARTICLE COVERING CONTROVERSIAL BLASPHEMY LAWS

New York, September 4, 2001---The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
condemns the decision of Pakistani censors to order the removal of an
article from the September 3 edition of Newsweek as a condition of the
magazine's distribution in the country.

The censored article, titled "Talking is Dangerous," highlights the
prosecution of Shaikh Mohammed Younus, a professor recently sentenced to
death under Pakistan's controversial blasphemy laws for allegedly insulting
Islam's prophet, Mohammad.

"By censoring an article that spotlights threats to free speech in Pakistan=
,
authorities only bolster their country's reputation for intolerance," said
CPJ executive director Ann Cooper. "Directly or indirectly, Pakistan's
blasphemy laws are increasingly used to curb the press."

Last week, customs officials blocked distribution of the magazine and
referred the matter to the government's Press Information Department. On
September 1, press department officials ordered Newsweek's local
distributor, Liberty Books, to remove the article before circulating copies
of the magazine, according to international wire reports.

Local journalists said that Newsweek, which normally begins circulating on
Tuesdays, did not appear until Sunday, September 2, after the article had
been ripped out.

***Blasphemy laws used to suppress the media***
On January 29, police in Peshawar, Northwest Frontier Province, shut down
the offices of The Frontier Post after the newspaper published a letter to
the editor titled "Why Muslims Hate Jews," which included derogatory
references to the prophet Mohammad.

Though the newspaper repeatedly apologized for publishing the letter, which
management said was included by mistake, seven employees face blasphemy
charges. The Frontier Post was forced to suspend publication until June 26,
when it was relaunched from the eastern city of Lahore.

On June 3, police in Abbottabad sealed the offices of Mohasib, a local
Urdu-language daily, and brought blasphemy charges against journalists at
the paper. The charges arose from a May 29 article that contested the view
of certain Muslim clerics that a beardless man cannot be a good Muslim and
criticized the exploitation of religious faith for personal gain. Jamil
Yousaf, the free-lance journalist who wrote the article, also faces
blasphemy charges for the piece.

The article removed from Newsweek concluded prophetically that, "In Pakista=
n
these days, free speech is a dangerous thing."

For more information on press conditions in Pakistan, visit the CPJ Web sit=
e
at <www.cpj.org>. CPJ is a New York-based, nonpartisan, nonprofit
organization of journalists that works to defend press freedom worldwide.

=3D=3D
Committee to Protect Journalists
330 Seventh Avenue -- 12th floor
New York, NY 10001
phone: 212-465-1004
fax: 212-465-9568
e-mail: info@c...
http://www.cpj.org

______

#3.

The Daily Star (Bangladesh)
9 September 2001
Plain words

Will an Indo-pak d=E9tente be wise?

M B Naqvi, writes from Karachi
By their very nature they are fomenters of instability, mistrust and=20
tension. So long as these weapons are there, the prospects of peace=20
and de-escalation of tensions and economically productive political=20
cooperation will continue to recede. So a d=E9tente, while it may be=20
necessary, has to be handled with extreme care: it should be made a=20
first step toward peace, reconciliation and friendship. Without this=20
latter aim, a d=E9tente will be dangerous and maybe a self-defeating=20
exercise.

FOREIGN Minister Abdus Sattar asserts that Pakistan never promised=20
not to raise Kashmir at the international forums and added without=20
Kashmir issue being resolved in accordance with the wishes of=20
Kashmiris, normal peaceful and good neighbourly relations between=20
India and Pakistan cannot be established. India's junior Foreign=20
Minister Omar Abdullah said with Pakistan raising Kashmir issue at=20
Durban and elsewhere and linking normalisation with the Kashmir=20
solution, he doubted whether New York's Musharraf-Vajpayee meeting=20
will take place at all or will produce any positive result, if it did=20
take place.

That is the sort of things being said by the two Foreign Offices.=20
That is their idea of the conducive atmosphere for the New York's=20
Sept 25 next meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly=20
session. Can it be said that these 'contributions' confirm what the=20
Indian columnist Kuldip Nayar has disclosed and which has been=20
reinforced by several Pakistani newsmen: that the two heads of=20
governments seem to have some channel(s) of communication between=20
them and that the two Foreign Offices were not involved. If so, it is=20
an interesting development. It is a conspiracy theory. It assumes a=20
third party in some way mediating between Messrs Pervez Musharraf and=20
A B Vajpayee to obvious effect.

This is freely being assumed by many in this country. But there is=20
not much agreement on the identity of this party. Some say it is the=20
US experts of the region who somehow are master minding this dialogue=20
process despite the extra rigid official position. Others say it is=20
track II diplomacy. Authoritative Indians have denied any 'foreign=20
pressure' and emphasise local statesmanship. There are no=20
authoritative Pakistani comments on this subject so far. How the=20
painful and ill-tempered travel from Agra to New York is to be=20
explained with so much evident ill will on both sides, not to mention=20
the absence of results at Agra?

Whatever the answer to this query and whether or not there is a third=20
party, how can the outcome of another Summit be different from the=20
previous one if the actual governments in both countries continue to=20
believe, act and propagate their hardline stances? Suppose Mr.=20
Vajpayee's personal statesmanship succeeds and a modus operandi is=20
agreed upon. Can that agreement necessarily some compromise stick in=20
either country? Will the two Summiteers who are so clearly unable to=20
make their governments help create a friendly and expectant=20
atmosphere for their upcoming meet be able to sell that agreement?=20
Who will popularise it, if indeed it will be the effort of just two=20
men? Insofar as it can be adjudged here, the bulk of Indian opinion=20
i.e. of its political class and the security community no one is=20
ready to make any concessions to a Pakistan that is neither=20
militarily very strong nor is its economy in a shape to sustain a=20
conflict. Opinion in Pakistan, even among moderates, requires a=20
Kashmir solution that is substantially different from today's status=20
of Kashmir. A concession of some substance not being available, the=20
outlook can only be bleak. Which is what the two Foreign Offices=20
reflect today. But then what was all the ballyhoo about in Lahore in=20
'99 or even at Agra? As some assert that there appeared to be=20
reasonable grounds for expecting a breakthrough between Nawaz Sharif=20
and Vajpayee then. But the basis for that belief rests on the=20
assumption that the US is almighty and that a solution that its=20
experts suggest is sure to find buyers in the top echelons of the two=20
governments.

In other words there is, it is assumed, a certain via media on=20
Kashmir not quite a neat solution with which both sides can live with=20
if the two governments are willing to be cooperative and are ready to=20
moderate their maximalist positions. It is being supposed that=20
American experts have sketched out this middle path and that both=20
Nawaz and Vajpayee had bought it. That was what the Lahore process=20
was all about except for a d=E9

tente on the nuclear weapons and perhaps also the missiles. If this=20
set of assumptions has any validity, then there is hope of success at=20
New York or later. For, the process through which Nawaz had accepted=20
the statesmanship of Vajpayee would also make Musharraf do the same.=20
Basic military and economic situation of this country, relative to=20
India, can only be worse than what it was two years ago. Indeed many=20
believe that just as Nawaz was on board vis-=E0-vis Kargil, Musharraf=20
should have been or would be forced to be of the same general view on=20
all Kashmir-related issues as Nawaz had come to be. Similar causes=20
should produce similar effects and consequences.

But there is a separate basis for suspecting that the supposed=20
Vajpayee statesmanship concerns the nuclear d=E9tente rather than=20
Kashmir or other matters. On this there is near consensus among the=20
Bomb loving security thinkers of India as well as of Pakistan; both=20
want a strictly limited understanding on nuclear-related matters=20
again thanks to American good offices and their expertise. A series=20
of agreements can easily be expected if Musharraf drops his Kashmir=20
first talks only and not a solution insistence or India concedes=20
separate talks on Kashmir to go on endlessly while the much desired=20
on both sides d=E9tente is worked out and is put in place.

It should be clearly noted that Pakistani hardliners are just as much=20
anxious to have this d=E9tente on the nuclear subjects, as distinct=20
from friendship with India, as are the Indians. It is only a small=20
peace lobby which is suspicious of this enthusiasm for d=E9tente. What=20
these peaceniks want is a thoroughgoing and profound people-to-people=20
(at grassroots level) reconciliation of the kind that France and=20
Germany agreed to formalise in 1963. Even this wholly inadequate=20
thing the d=E9tente over nuclear weapons will require a Herculean=20
effort to implement and sustain. This is because of the level of=20
present ill-will and mistrust on both sides which the nuclear weapons=20
will go on increasing. If such an effort is to be mounted, and it=20
should be mounted, the goal had better be higher and more=20
comprehensive so that all real problems of the common Pakistanis and=20
Indians can be tackled cooperatively in a more conducive political=20
atmosphere. Their real argument is that the kind of nuclear d=E9tente=20
that the two governments are likely to agree on is, even if it=20
initially succeeds, will make the nuclear weapons permanent in South=20
Asia. By their very nature they are fomenters of instability,=20
mistrust and tension. So long as these weapons are there, the=20
prospects of peace and de-escalation of tensions and economically=20
productive political cooperation will continue to recede. So a=20
d=E9tente, while it may be necessary, has to be handled with extreme=20
care: it should be made a first step toward peace, reconciliation and=20
friendship. Without this latter aim, a d=E9tente will be dangerous and=20
maybe a self-defeating exercise.

Naqvi is a noted columnist in Pakistan.

_________

#4.

BBC News
Thursday, 6 September, 2001, 16:13 GMT 17:13 UK

Kashmiri militants divide the sexes

Kashmiri women have been ordered to wear the veil

A little known militant group in Indian-administered Kashmir has=20
issued an order that men and women should be segregated on public=20
buses.

The Lashkar-e-Jabbar militant group has asked bus operators to set=20
aside half the number of seats on board for women passengers.

It should be mandatory for men and women not to sit together

Lashkar-e-Jabbar leader Irfan Jameel Members of the Lashkar-e-Jabbar=20
were accused of throwing acid on women last month to enforce an=20
Islamic dress code.

The incident led to the panic buying of veils by Kashmiri women to=20
meet the 1 September deadline - which has since been extended to 10=20
September.

New demand

In its latest order - reported in a local newspaper, the=20
Urdu-language Al-Safa News - the militant group has said that male=20
and female passengers should sit separately on buses.

"It should be mandatory for men and women not to sit together, but to=20
travel on separate seats," Lashkar-e-Jabbar leader Irfan Jameel told=20
the newspaper.

The group is also said to have issued a warning to a well-known=20
female correspondent working for the Star News channel, Barkha Dutt.

Similar militant drives in the past have failed

"The group has placed a complete ban on Barkha Dutt's entry into=20
Kashmir," Mr Jameel told Al-Safa News.

She has been asked to "desist from her actions", but no further=20
details have been disclosed.

Ms Dutt has often reported for her channel from Kashmir and is a=20
familiar face on Indian television, having risen to prominence during=20
the Kargil conflict in 1999.

The Lashkar-e-Jabbar's violent campaign has been criticised by=20
leading militant groups, including the Hizbul Mujahideen and=20
Lashkar-e-Toyeba.

Another group, the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, has supported the veil=20
campaign, but a spokesman said acid attacks on women were un-Islamic.

A senior separatist leader, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, has appealed to=20
the Lashkar-e-Jabbar to propagate the veil campaign through=20
persuasion rather than force.

Conservative campaign

But the campaign has received support from a prominent hardline=20
women's organisation - the Dukhtaran-e-Millat (Daughters of the=20
Faith).

The Dukhtaran-e-Millat itself launched a campaign to force women in=20
Srinagar to wear the veil over a decade ago.

Its activists threw paint on women who refused to comply, but the=20
campaign was short-lived.

Islamic militants have tried to enforce conservative standards=20
several times in the past few years.

In one incident, girls wearing tight trousers were shot at, and=20
beauty salon owners and cable operators have been similarly targeted.

At one point militants also banned the wearing of jeans by men.

But the BBC's Srinagar correspondent, Altaf Hussain, says the impact=20
of such campaigns has been short-lived.

_________

#5.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 09, 2001
THE TIMES OF INDIA

Now non-Muslim women ordered to don bindi

SRINAGAR: Close on the heels of issuing a diktat to Muslim women to=20
wear burqa (veil), militant outfit Lashker-e-Jabbar, on Saturday=20
asked non-Muslim women living in Kashmir to apply "bindi" on their=20
foreheads.
In a brief statement issued here on Saturday, the militant outfit=20
asked Hindu women to apply bindi on their foreheads and Sikh women to=20
wear saffron-coloured duppatas.
Ignoring the criticism of its move to enforce Islamic dress code for=20
Muslim women, Lashker-e-Jabbar, a lesser known militant outfit which=20
made its mark in Kashmir only last month when it launched the burqa=20
drive, asked Hindu and Sikh "sisters" to have some identification=20
marks to avoid any action proposed by it against Muslim women who are=20
without veils.
Lashker-e-Jabbar also confirmed a directive to the transporters to=20
reserve 50 per cent seats in their vehicles for women to discourage=20
traveling of men and women together in one seat.
Meanwhile, the deadline set by the outfit for Muslim women to wear=20
burqa is due to expire on Monday next. The deadline was extended on=20
September 1 by 10 days by the outfit following request by like-minded=20
and radical women's organisation, Dukhtaran-e-Milatj (Daughters of=20
Faith).
( PTI )

_______

#6.

Liberhan commission asks for Ayodhya records from VHP

by Rezaul H. Laskar, Indo-Asian News Service

New Delhi, Aug 30 (IANS) A judicial commission probing the razing of the
Babri mosque Thursday took exception to the demeanour of a Vishwa Hindu
Parishad (VHP) leader and asked it to produce all records relating to the
event in three weeks.

The commission's directive came in the face of stonewalling tactics by VHP
president Vishnu Hari Dalmia, who likened the December 1992 demolition of
the mosque in Ayodhya to a "festival."

The commission headed by M.S. Liberhan gave notice to the VHP to provide
within three weeks all records or resolutions taken on Ayodhya, "actions
carried out and actions proposed" as well as negotiations with other groups
or organizations and their results.

The commission took adverse note of the behaviour of Dalmia, who responded
to most questions put to him by saying, "I cannot remember" or "I cannot
recall."

Liberhan said it was the "pious duty" of the VHP to place all records,
including those "remotely connected" to the Ayodhya movement, before the
commission within three weeks.

Earlier, the commission's counsel Anupam Gupta accused Dalmia of
"comprehensive amnesia" and "selective knowledge" on the events leading to
the demolition of the mosque although he had "effusive knowledge" on certai=
n
aspects of the issue.

He said the commission was constrained to ask for records because Dalmia wa=
s
not responding to questions.

Earlier, Dalmia likened the destruction of the mosque to a festival. Asked
if he visited Ayodhya on April 11, 1992, on the occasion of Ram Navami
festival, he said: "Unlikely, but I do not remember."

Then he added: "I do not remember any other festival except the one held on
December 6, 1992." Asked to elaborate, he replied: "It's well known to
everybody."

Asked if the razing of the mosque could be equated with festivals, Dalmia
replied: "We can't equate it. Yet for us it was a festival."

Responding to questions whether VHP leaders had taken steps to prevent the
raising of inflammatory slogans before the mosque was torn down, Dalmia
said: "In such a big crowd, no steps could have been taken."

Dalmia's deposition also included a lively debate on how the government
should act on matters that affect minority communities.

"The majority (community's) decision has to be enforced, and such things ar=
e
happening in Islamic countries where people of other religions are not
allowed to stay honourably and follow their own religion," Dalmia said. He
was responding to a question whether the government should implement demand=
s
of the majority community irrespective of its constitutional obligations.

"In every democratic country, majority rule has been accepted. Even in
(Indian) Parliament decisions are taken by majority."

-Indo-Asian News Service
_______

#7

Date : Thu, 30 Aug 2001 10:44:13 +0530

BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE PUBLIC HEARING TO BE HELD ON 5th and 6th=20
OCTOBER, 2001 IN LUCKNOW

In Uttar Pradesh the past few years have seen a tremendous increase=20
in the atrocities committed on the poor, landless and dalits. With=20
increasing awareness among the poor and dalits about their rights,=20
resistance to the old feudal order has grown. These atrocities have=20
to be seen as the inevitable backlash orchrestrated by the ruling=20
feudal forces in the villages and tacitly supported by the Govt. They=20
have started a systematic campaign to dispossess the poor of their=20
land, which is often the only source of their livelihood, implicating=20
them in false cases and use the state machinery to torture them in=20
the name of recovery of loans. The growing caste divide in UP has=20
seen to it that these battle lines between the rich and poor are=20
drawn along caste lines with most of the oppressed poor belonging to=20
the scheduled castes and tribes. We document here briefly the various=20
categories of these atrocities which describe this attack.

a) Dispossession of Land

Farming being the main source of livelihood in most villages, land=20
ownership is a major step towards a reliable and steady source of=20
income and hence self respect. Way back in the 70's under the 20=20
point "Garibi Hatao" programme initiated by Indira Gandhi surplus=20
land which had been given to the Gram Sabha was distributed to the=20
landless mostly dalits. These 'Pattas' were given along with the=20
'Kisan Bahis' (Joth Bahi) which confirmed their ownership of these=20
'Pattas'. However, these 'Pattas' were given under various categories=20
- like 'Aasami Pattas; Bhumidhari Pattas etc. Among these, in the=20
case of Aasami Pattas the Government retained the right to take back=20
these Pattas when required since these had only been leased out to=20
the cultivators. In the rest of the cases the cultivators retained=20
ownership rights including rights of inheritance. In 1985 and 1995,=20
the then State Government announced through a G.O. that as an=20
extension of the Zamidari Abolition Act of 1950, those landless=20
labourers who had been continuously cultivating this land for a=20
period of more than 10 years would be automatically granted ownership=20
rights. (This order however was not implemented on the ground.) Now=20
after having cultivated this land for more than 20 years, the local=20
administration in reacquiring these 'Pattas' on a large scale on the=20
plea that these had only been leased out temporarily to the=20
cultivators. Often with the connivance of the local landlords these=20
acquired lands find their way back to the very same landlords from=20
whom this surplus was taken away. The Govt. has maintained a studied=20
silence in this regard. To protest this illegal takeover a writ was=20
filed in the Allahabad High Court as a PIL by the Ghadkshestra=20
Mazdoor Sanghathan on the grounds that:

=DC This was an uprooting of large number of peasants from their=20
small belongings at the instance of local feudal lords.

=DC Since the time of possession these cultivators has been=20
cultivating these lands and as of today they were in possession of=20
these lands.

=DC They had Kisan Bahi as proof of their possessions.

=DC That being landless farmers there lands were the only source of=20
their livelihood.

=DC That the procedure laid down for cancellation had not been=20
followed. No reports had been given by Tehsildar, Lekhpal etc. which=20
could be the basis for cancellation. No notice was given and=20
cancellation can only be under the Sec. 196 of the U.P.Z.A and A. R.=20
Act which was not followed.

=DC A stay order was obtained from the High Court on 21.1.200 against=20
this ongoing eviction (only for the applicants from Saharanpur).

b) Recovery of Loans

Loans of varying amounts were sanctioned in the 80's under various=20
schemes like IRDP, to small and marginal farmers. These loans carried=20
subsidies of Rs. 3000/- for loan of Rs. 10000/- and Rs. 6000/- for=20
Rs. 12000/- to Rs. 20000/-. The two major issues relating to this are=20
cases of fraud and discrimination in the recovery of loans.

Fraud though legion is difficult to prove. The poor and illiterate=20
have been easy marks for the nexus between middlemen, traders and=20
banks. The most glaring cases are those where the persons have=20
'discovered' that they have loans pending against them only when=20
recovery is initiated. They unfortunately have no way to prove that=20
they neither applied for, nor got any loan. Often they have=20
unwittingly put their thumb impression on a piece of paper. More=20
blatantly a smudged thumb print is used a 'proof' of their having=20
taken a loan. Even for those who applied for loans a majority=20
received 50% or less than the sanctioned amount. The sanctioned=20
subsidy is invariably taken away by the middlemen and sometimes by=20
the bank authorities themselves. Since the money is given to start=20
some small business it is never given to the applicant directly.=20
Rather a trader is identified who would provide the necessary=20
material, equivalent to the sanctioned cash. This translates in most=20
cases to the trader pocketing part of the money for giving fake bills=20
and paying the necessary sales tax.

The bigger problem relates to the fraud and discrimination related to=20
loan recovery. While for loans of higher amount (typically above the=20
price of a tractor - and hence concerning the relatively wealthy=20
farmers) the banks initiate the process of loan recovery. In case of=20
default by these rich farmers a court case is filed and the due legal=20
process is followed. Given the many legal loopholes and also 'Benami'=20
transfers of land and property often these court procedures yield=20
nothing to the Bank other than a declaration of insolvency of the=20
debtor. A public notice declaring this insolvency and condemning=20
this behaviour is put up at various public places. However for the=20
poor who got these small loans under IRDP or special component plan=20
(which were given without guarantees) the action taken is radically=20
different. After the banks fail to recover the money they send these=20
cases to the Tehsil Office which adds a further 10% of the loan=20
amount to cover recovery costs to the defaulters pending amount. For=20
the actual process of loan recovery these tehsils have appointed=20
seasonal 'Amins' who are supposed to collect this money from the=20
defaulters. The 'Amins' get 10% of the recovery amount as their fees.=20
In this job they are supported by the local police if required. The=20
Tehsil also runs 'Revenue Jails' where defaulters are arrested and=20
jailed for 15 days at a stretch, and when they are released the costs=20
towards keeping them in jail is added to their pending loans.

The ground reality of this 'recovery of loans' takes the form of=20
beatings, threats and arrests. There are reported cases of people=20
being killed due to merciless beatings by the Amins and his goons. In=20
Jaunpur a person was beaten mercilessly by the Amin since he was=20
unable to pay Rs. 3000/- (he had taken a loan of Rs. 7000/-. out of=20
which he had paid back Rs. 4000/-). He succumbed to his injuries and=20
following a mass protest and a sustained campaign by the villagers=20
the Govt. was forced to file charges against the Amin. In=20
Shahjahanpur also a defaulter was beaten up and jailed (in one of=20
these revenue jails) where he subsequently succumbed to his injuries.

More often the threat of beatings and being 'jailed' is sufficient to=20
make people part with, whatever little they have in cash or kind. The=20
Amin collects this money livestock or even household goods which he=20
pockets personally. Thus with no receipts to show for these 'forced=20
payments' many of the poor have paid back a substaintial portion of=20
their loan and yet on paper the default amount remains unchanged.=20
These beatings, threats and arrests in the name of loan recovery are=20
in sharp contrast to the 'legal mode' of recovery followed in the=20
case of big defaulters. Given the nexus that exists between the=20
feudal land mafia and the Amins 'loan recovery' is also used as an=20
excuse to grab the small pieces of land and livestock that are in the=20
possession of the poor. Thus even with documents showing that they=20
have repaid the loan, there are cases where the land belonging to the=20
poor are auctioned at cheap rates to recover loans. Invariably the=20
land is bought by the local feudal land lords.

c) Cases of Direct Police Atrocities on the Dalits and Landless=20
in convenience with Feudal Land Lords

Three major incidents in Barabanki, Fatehpur and Aligarh illustrate=20
the pattern retaliation by the upper castes to put down the growing=20
assertion among the Dalits. In Barabanki a pond where the fishing=20
rights were always taken by the upper castes was for the first time=20
bought by the Dalits in an open Govt. auction. However they were=20
'warned' by the upper castes to not try and fish in this pond which=20
they claimed traditionally belonged to the upper castes. Defying this=20
warning, the Dalit youth went fishing since they had legally bought=20
this right. This was perceived by the upper castes as a direct threat=20
to their hegemony and a challenge to their superiority. A group of=20
armed upper caste men attacked these Dalit boys and beat them up=20
mercilessly. As if this was not enough, they then poured acid over=20
six Dalits. One boy lost his eyes and the others were severely burnt.=20
The local Thana refused file an FIR and later after much pressure and=20
a public hue and cry (including newspaper reports) a distorted FIR=20
was filed. The culprits are yet to be brought to book and meanwhile=20
the whole Dalit community remains traumatised after the event.

In Aligarh in Jehrana village it started as a minor incident=20
involving two cyclists one a Dalit and the other an upper caste.=20
After colliding with each other they had a minor Scuffle after which=20
they went home. Soon after, a mob of upper caste men descended on the=20
Dalit hamlets and began to indiscriminately beat everybody. The=20
reason : how dare a Dalit youth raise his hand against an upper=20
caste. Many persons including women and children were grievously=20
injured. No police action has been initiated on the perpetrators of=20
this crime.

In Fatehpur also it started as a simple matter of a Dalit woman=20
trying to get a complaint lodged with the local 'Numbardar' of her=20
son being beaten up by upper castes. On his refusal to lodge the FIR=20
she went to the S.P. who then directed her to the C.O. police. This=20
C.O. investigated the matter and found the woman's allegation to be=20
true. Fearing police action the upper castes tried to coerce this=20
woman to withdraw her complaint. One her refusal to do so,=20
retaliation was immediate. In the evening a group of armed goons=20
descended on these Dalits working in the fields and beat them up=20
mercilessly. Four people lost their lives and many others were maimed=20
for life. All this for the refusal of this woman to withdraw an FIR=20
against an upper caste person.

All these incidents not only reflect the barbarity of upper caste=20
reaction to an assertion of Dalit rights, they also illustrate the=20
tacit role of the state (as represented by the local administration)=20
in supporting these acts. Most of these incidents go unreported=20
unless the outrage is so big that it cannot be ignored inspite of all=20
efforts to suppress it by the state.

The role of the State in unfortunately not limited to only=20
suppressing such facts and thus supporting the upper castes. In=20
Mirzapur and Sonbhadra, huge land holdings are in the control of=20
erstwhile Rajas who still exert enormous influence in that region. In=20
many places their writ runs large and their word is law. To counter=20
the rising aspirations of the Dalits and landless, these local feudal=20
lords have discovered a unique way to terrorise the population. In=20
connivance with local police, any Dalit struggle is labelled as=20
'Naxalite Activity' and the leaders as belonging to some banned=20
Naxalite Organisation. This helps them to use the draconian=20
anti-terrorist laws with impunity. 16 Dalits were killed three months=20
ago in police firing and conveniently labelled as Naxalites. Dalits=20
are routinely killed individually or jailed under anti-terrorist laws=20
which severely limits their recourse to the judicial process. Often=20
people killed and labelled as 'area-commander' of a Naxalite group=20
later turn out to be innocent villagers. The 'Naxalite' label has=20
come in handy for these people to suppress all genuine democratic=20
aspirations of the oppressed.

Probably nothing illustrates the glaring difference between words and=20
deeds of the U.P. Government, than their asking the sanitation=20
workers to carry night soil on their heads as part of their jobs.=20
This inspite of a Supreme Court ruling banning this inhuman practice=20
as inhuman and derogatory to all human sensibilities.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996. Dispatch
archive from 1998 can be accessed at
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/act/messages/ . To subscribe send a blank
message to: <act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.