[sacw] SACW #2 (22 August 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch No. 2
22 August 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

----------------------------------------

[1.] India: Truth hijacked
[2.] India: Autonomy of scholarship and the state
[3.] India: Sanjib Baruah on the Naga conflict
[4.] India: A Short & Incomplete Guide To Khasi Cinema
[5.] India: The National Curriculum Framework is anti-constitutional

-----------------------------------------

#1.

The Hindustan Times
21 August 2001

Truth hijacked

A G Noorani

The nation has high expectations of the Commission of Inquiry, headed=20
by Justice M.S. Liberhan to probe into the demolition of the Babri=20
masjid on December 6, 1992. Hence the disquiet at the turn the=20
proceedings took since April 10 this year, when Union Home Minister=20
L.K. Advani made his maiden appearance before it. He was followed by=20
Minister for HRD Murli Manohar Joshi and Minister for Sports Uma=20
Bharati. All three witnessed the demolition. But their deposition,=20
widely publicised, was notable for strong expression of political=20
views rather than eyewitness testimony on the sordid act. One wishes=20
the commission had stopped them in their tracks.

The Evidence Act disallows expression of the opinion by witnesses=20
except in special cases. Evidence must concern 'facts'. 'Opinion' is=20
allowed only in specified cases by 'experts': for example on=20
handwriting.

It is not open to a witness to air his opinions, political or=20
religious. He can depose only to what he has heard or seen=20
personally. After the evidence is recorded, the counsel offers=20
'submissions' based on the record. No witness can offer submissions=20
from the witness box. Thus, Advani had no right to say that 'a de=20
jure temple' exists already at Ayodhya. That is an issue before the=20
special bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow trying the=20
civil suits on title to the site of the demolished mosque. It is not=20
an issue before the commission. Even if it was, such a submission=20
could be made only by a counsel.

True, the Act does not apply to Commissions of Inquiry. But it is=20
well-settled that their fundamentals do. Courts of law adjudicate;=20
commissions inquire as fact-finding bodies. The terms of reference of=20
the Liberhan Commission are of decisive relevance. It is required to=20
inquire into "(a) the sequence of events leading to, and all the=20
facts and circumstances relating to, the occurrences in the Ramjanma-=20
bhoomi-Babri masjid complex at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 involving=20
the destruction of the Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri masjid structure."

The point from which that 'sequence' began must be fixed with due=20
regard to the legal concepts of causation. It must be a sequence=20
'leading' to the event: the direct, proximate cause, not a remote=20
occurrence.

This expression was used by Justice M.C. Jain to travel way beyond=20
his remit, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Every commission is=20
asked to provide a sequence of events and state the facts and=20
circumstances leading to its main remit, be it a railway accident or=20
a riot. It is purely prefecture to the main task. He treated 1981 as=20
the cut-off date disregarding the test accepted universally by=20
jurists the world over-"proximity and rational connection".

The Liberhan Commission's limitations became clear from the next=20
remit on culpability "(b) The role played by the chief minister,=20
members of the council of ministers, officials of the government of=20
Uttar Pradesh and by individuals, concerned organisations and=20
agencies in, or in connection with, the destruction of the=20
Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri masjid structure." Another remit removes all=20
doubt: "(d) the sequence of events leading to, and all the facts and=20
circumstances relating to, the assault on media persons at Ayodhya=20
on December 6, 1992."

The three politicians used the commission to air their political=20
views regardless of its terms of reference. On April l, Advani=20
quoted from a certain Belgian publicist, whose writings are published=20
by the Sangh parivar's publishers, in support of his rathyatra of=20
1990.

The Supreme Court's judgment in the Ayodhya case rules out any=20
legislation designed to circumvent the suit on title. For a while,=20
the BJP seemed to have given up its 1989 demand that the issue be=20
resolved "by legislation", that is, majority vote. Advani revived it=20
on April 10: "The BJP has always been of the view that the issue=20
could be resolved through a negotiated settlement or a legislation.=20
Litigation is not the answer to the problem." The Liberhan=20
Commission is not required to propose solutions; only to ascertain=20
the facts.

On April 11, he went one better. "For the last 5l years, from 1950=20
to 200l, what stands there is a temple=8A first a de facto temple=8A and=20
today a temple both de facto and de jure. Prior to 1992, by virtue=20
of worship, it was a temple and the superstructure was a mosque."=20
This was both presumptuous and irrelevant from a witness. He=20
claimed, "you call it Indianness, Bharatiya or Hindutva. I view these=20
words as essentially synonymous".

With respect, the commission ought to have prevented Advani from=20
abusing its indulgence by treating the witness box as a public=20
platform. Uma Bharati said on April 11 that the mosque was a "symbol=20
of slavery and an insult to the nation". On May 14, Advani brought=20
in the Shah Bano case and attacked the Congress.

On June 13, his target was V.P. Singh (for withdrawing the ordinance=20
of 1990). The performance was repeated the next day and on June 20=20
("proud to be associated with the Ramjanmabhoomi movement").

It would be more pertinent for Advani to explain reports by=20
correspondents of two national dailies that he was "heard ordering=20
sealing of all entry points to prevent central forces from entering=20
the town. This was around 2 pm"-when the job was still incomplete.=20
Organiser of December 13, 1992, revealed "a strategy to confront the=20
Centre while avoiding a clash with the judiciary". It comprised=20
filing reassuring affidavits in the Supreme Court. And Advani and=20
Joshi "were asked to set out on yatras from Varanasi and Mathura".=20
It is but fair that they are asked to explain whether they=20
participated in a pre-planned "strategy".

On June 11, Joshi attacked V.P. Singh; on July 17, he advocated=20
legislation, and on July 18, he attacked P.V. Narasimha Rao for=20
trying to divide the sants. It was gross abuse of privilege.

The commission need not depend on witnesses to ascertain the=20
essential background. It is set out in official documents and court=20
records. In 1949, steps were afoot with official support to build a=20
temple dedicated to Ram by the side of the Babri masjid. The city=20
magistrate's note of October 10, 1949 shows how close the=20
authorities were to averting a tragedy of grave proportions: "I went=20
to the spot and inspected the site and enquired all about it in=20
detail. The mosque and the temple both are situated side by side and=20
both Hindus and Muslims performed their rites and religious=20
ceremonies. The Hindu public has put in this application with a view=20
to erect a descent (sic) and vishal temple instead of the small one=20
which exists at present. There is nothing in the way and permission=20
can safely be given as Hindu population is very keen to have a nice=20
temple at the place where Bhagwan Ramchandraji was born." The birth=20
place was at the Ram Chabutara near the mosque; not the mosque itself.

The FIR lodged by sub-inspector Ram Dube on December 23, 1949,=20
explains how the historic mosque became Advani's "de jure temple".=20
He recorded that "a group of 50-60 persons had entered the Babri=20
mosque after breaking the compound gate lock=8A and established therein=20
an idol of Shri Bhaguram=8A Hans Raj on duty asked them to defer but=20
they did not=8A Ram Das, Ram Shakti Das and 50-60 unidentified others=20
entered the mosque surreptitiously and spoiled its sanctity."

This was repeated in a radio message sent at 10.30 am that day by=20
the DM, K.K. Nayar, to the CM, Govind Ballabh Pant. The deputy=20
commissioner of Faizabad, J.N. Ugra, filed in court on April 24,=20
1950, a written statement on behalf of the state of Uttar Pradesh. It=20
said: "the property in suit is known as Babri masjid and it has been=20
for a long period in use as a mosque=8A It has not been in use as a=20
temple of Shri Ramchandraji=8A On the night of December 22, 1949, the=20
idols of Shri Ramchandraji were surreptitiously and wrongly put=20
inside it."

What is relevant-the documents or Advani's ipse dixit?

_________

2.

The Hindu
Wednesday, August 15, 2001

AUTONOMY OF SCHOLARSHIP AND THE STATE

By Itty Abraham & M.S.S. Pandian

THE RECENT decision by the Supreme Court to dismiss the PUCL writ=20
petition contesting the Government's move to put new restrictions on=20
international academic conferences is indeed a disappointment. The=20
Government order is a major setback for Indian academia, for=20
relations with our neighbours, and for Indian civil society more=20
generally.

The broad scope of these restrictions raises a number of important=20
issues. For instance, what is the meaning of the word=20
``semi-political''? Can we slice the topic of politics so finely that=20
we now have a spectrum, from full politics to semi-politics to=20
demi-politics and so on? Who carries the authority to pigeonhole=20
different themes as belonging to these different categories of=20
politics? The question of communalism is presumably any subject that=20
deals with Hindu-Muslim relations in particular and inter-community=20
activities more generally. Does this mean that the academic=20
discussion and debate of the history, sociology, politics of=20
communal relations is off limits? One can understand that conferences=20
that seek to exacerbate tension between communities are not in the=20
public interest. But we already have so many sources of such=20
tensions, from the Shiv Sena rag Saamna to the hit Bollywood film,=20
`Gadhar'. Is there no discrimination possible between these sources=20
of communal hatred? In fact, it is precisely through rigorous=20
academic conferences that we may acquire a more nuanced and informed=20
understanding of the causes of inter-communal relations. Not only=20
that, but academics are also sensitive to other examples of communal=20
relations, where groups have worked out ways of living together and=20
of addressing common problems within their own institutions, without=20
the intervention of the state. Should we not learn from these=20
examples and publicise them so that others may also copy these `best=20
practices'? That human right also falls under this category is an=20
important indicator of what lies below the surface.

It is well known that the Government of India is enormously=20
sensitive to its international public image. Its dubious efforts to=20
prevent the issue of caste being brought up in the World Conference=20
on Racism is only the latest example of such sensitivities. As a=20
result, the Government's response to most forms of international=20
criticism-whether about violation of human rights or caste-based=20
discrimination-has traditionally been to sweep it under the carpet.=20
What one must question is the colonial mentality that suggests that=20
an airing of one's shortfalls leads to a decline in the nation's well=20
being. It could rather be the opposite. It is only a confident=20
nation that allows free expression on all matters, with the assurance=20
that the outcome will lead to a stronger public and greater=20
legitimacy for the state. The fragility of the Indian Union that is=20
implied by these restrictions flies in the face of the resilience and=20
popular strength of its democracy.

The Government's reasoning here is course independent of the=20
fundamental rights to speech and association guaranteed by the=20
Constitution. But one realises that the problem is structural when=20
one associates this latest rule with, for example, the difficulty in=20
passing a reasonable set of national laws that guarantee the public's=20
right to information, or, denying private radio stations the right to=20
produce news programmes. What is most troubling is the all-too-easy=20
recourse to invoking the sacred cow of national security when in=20
trouble and the even greater ease with which so many intellectuals=20
and commentators swallow this line.

There are actually very few things that really affect national=20
security. Selling certain kinds of national secrets is one, provided=20
these are really secrets. Where Indian armed forces are positioned,=20
the level of their ammunition stocks, the level of their morale-this=20
is information one may not want some enemy to know. Yet, as Tehelka=20
showed, these are things that are probably easy to find out in New=20
Delhi, provided one has some contacts and a little ready cash. There=20
are other things that affect the nation's security too, like=20
bankrupting the country through unwise or corrupt financial=20
practices, practices that cause enormous number of innocent people=20
to suffer and take years to repair. But a lot of things have nothing=20
to do with national security. It is extremely difficult to identify=20
national security concerns related to any international conference,=20
even those on human rights, most things to do with the Northeast and=20
nearly everything to do with religion. What we mean in practice by=20
national security are usually the activities of one or another=20
Government Ministry or agency which is keen not to have its=20
activities scrutinised by the public. Atomic Energy is of course the=20
easiest case in point. As long as national security is defined by the=20
same people who get to carry it out, its scope inevitably expands=20
until it reaches the present ridiculous extent.

The heavy-handed efforts of the present Government to prevent=20
dialogue from taking place across national boundaries are likewise=20
doomed to fail. Two obvious responses will take place. Those who=20
really have something subversive or seditious to say will find other=20
ways of getting their message across. The means are too many to=20
control. The other is that major academic conferences will no longer=20
be held in India. One can do the same conference in Bangladesh,=20
Nepal, or Sri Lanka, with no effort at all-the only difference being=20
the local audience. The real losers will be the students and junior=20
faculty who have the most to gain from attending these events. If=20
these restrictions continue, it might even reach the point when even=20
holding an international conference in India will become suspect.=20
There will be those who will wonder what political connections the=20
conference organisers had or what deals they struck in order to get=20
foreign participants in. The credibility of these conferences will=20
be suspect by default, the quality of their discussions=20
notwithstanding.

The power of the state over Indian academic institutions and=20
scholarship has derived both from ideological reasons and financial=20
ones. In the early days after Independence, there was little question=20
among politicians, bureaucrats and academics alike that the purpose=20
of social science scholarship was for national developmental needs.=20
Both the support given to fields like economics in particular and to=20
the setting up of institutions like the Delhi School of Economics=20
and the Institute of Economic Growth had this larger purpose in=20
mind. Agencies like the Planning Commission provided a convenient=20
channel both for policy ideas as well as for academics shuttling=20
between theoretical and applied pursuits. These conditions are no=20
longer true. In the present context, both ideological unanimity and=20
financial support have withered away. Except in the hard sciences,=20
and there too in some technology fields in particular, it is becoming=20
clearer that unless institutions are able to generate their own=20
sources of funds, they are likely to wither away through neglect.=20
Under the impact of neo-liberal policies and the excessive=20
politicisation of the advanced centres of learning under the present=20
Government, the contradiction between the excessive legal power of=20
the state over academic institutions and the shrinking resources and=20
support it provides them is stark and growing.

In this changed context, what is required is a debate both over the=20
appropriate role of the state in relation to determining the=20
direction and content of scholarly research and the question of a=20
contemporary rationale for social science scholarship. The first is=20
easier to address-given the constitutional right to free speech and=20
assembly and structural conditions that see the state selectively=20
withdrawing from the field of higher education-the state has no=20
standing for censoring the free flow of knowledge. The latter=20
question is more complex. Responses could range from liberal=20
definitions of a good society to the need to generate new ideas to=20
renew society and respond to social demands. Perhaps most important,=20
however, is the need for critical perspectives on the state and=20
society that are unconstrained by fashion or fear. Even as we agree=20
that the second issue needs far more sustained attention and=20
discussion, we must also be clear that the legitimate voices in that=20
debate are the community of social scientists, not the state.

(The writers are, respectively, Program Director, Social Science=20
Research Council, New York, and Fellow, Madras Institute of=20
Development Studies, Chennai. The views expressed are of the writers=20
and not of the institutions they belong to.)

_________

3.

http://www.tehelka.com/aspsite/rightstory.asp?id1=3Dliterary+review&id2=3Dr=
eviews&id3=3DINTERVIEWS&id4=3D20000624759&fname=3Dlr081001barua1%2Ehtm

The decision of the government to extend the cease-fire to cover=20
areas outside Nagaland, triggered a violent response in the=20
neighboring states of Assam and Manipur, leading to massive political=20
unrest and mass protests. The recent developments have highlighted=20
the fact that there are no easy solutions to the Naga problem.=20
Sitting in his apartment in New York, North-East expert and author of=20
the book, India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality=20
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), Sanjib Baruah speaks to=20
Abhik Siddiqui about the Naga conflict, the peace process and the=20
failure of the Indian postcolonial state to adequately address the=20
problems facing the people of the North-East. Born in Assam, and=20
educated in Guwahati, New Delhi and Chicago, he is currently chair of=20
the Political Science program at Bard College in the US.

What do you think led to the failure of talks between the NSCN (I-M)=20
and the Government of India held in Amsterdam?
The failure of the Amsterdam talks between the NSCN (I-M) and the=20
Government --after the government changed its position on the=20
territorial jurisdiction of the cease-fire -- is not surprising. Of=20
course, the mood in Nagaland has been quite upbeat since 1997 because=20
of the cease-fire. But it has to be recognized that what we have is=20
nothing more than a cease-fire and the potential for starting the=20
peace process. The fact that in four years we have not been able to=20
go beyond the cease-fire is not very good news. And now the whole=20
process nearly unraveled as a result of different interpretations on=20
whether the cease-fire would extend to areas outside of Nagaland or=20
not. Obviously that cannot be very encouraging.

"Manipur is one of the oldest kingdoms of southern Asia. You simply=20
cannot lop off the four hill districts of Manipur and make them part=20
of Nagaland"

The geographical extension of the cease-fire has elicited a very=20
strong reaction from the neighboring states of Assam and Manipur. The=20
people of Manipur in particular reacted very strongly. Why is there=20
such a negative response? Also, how does such a response affect the=20
prospect of a
peaceful resolution of the Naga conflict in the future?
The positive side of the story is that people feel that the=20
Government of India and the NSCN(I-M) are willing to work out=20
compromises on how to end the Naga conflict. But the fear is that if=20
the Naga rebels are willing to give up their basic demand for=20
independence, they would do so only if some major concession is made=20
by the Government on some other issue. And the most likely candidate=20
is the Naga concept of Nagalim- or the demand for a greater Nagaland;=20
the debate on the territorial jurisdiction of the ceasefire certainly=20
has this sub-text. The trouble is that while Naga nationalism has=20
achieved an impressive level of unity among Nagas, the land where=20
Nagas live is not at all a neatly bounded piece of real estate that=20
can be marked off as Nagalim. Peoples, cultures and polities of the=20
region have overlapped enormously.

Historically, the overlap between some the Nagas and the Manipuris=20
have been so strong that Sir James Johnstone, a nineteenth century=20
colonial official, even speculated that, like the Manchus of China,=20
the Meities may have been Nagas who adopted Manipuri civilization.=20
Manipur is one of the oldest kingdoms of southern Asia. You simply=20
cannot lop off the four hill districts of Manipur and make them part=20
of Nagaland. The voice of the Manipuris as well as that of a large=20
number of other people has to be heard for any peace agreement with=20
the Nagas to be sustainable.

Do you think the decision to extend the cease-fire was taken without=20
consultation with people of the neighboring states?
The opposition to the extension of the ceasefire was loud and clear.=20
Elected politicians as well as leaders of civil society--primarily in=20
Manipur, but in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh as well -- expressed=20
their opposition to the extension of the cease-fire. The fact that=20
decision-makers in New Delhi did not anticipate the intensity of the=20
Manipuri opposition, tells you something about our style of policy=20
making: decisions are sometimes made with utter disregard for the=20
opinions and sentiments of peoples who would be most affected by them.
What did you make of the role of Prime Minister's special emissary K=20
Padmanabhaiah. Do you think such meetings and back-door diplomacy can=20
help resolve the Naga conflict in the future?
I have not followed the talks closely enough to evaluate=20
Padmanabhaiah's role or to compare his skills as a negotiator to that=20
of his predecessor Swaraj Kaushal. But I think you are right in=20
raising questions about the way in which we are going about seeking=20
to end the Naga conflict. A more comprehensive set of talks- say on=20
the model of a round-table conference, involving not only rebel=20
groups, but also representative segments of political and civil=20
society of all affected states are more likely to achieve a=20
sustainable peace than separate deals with rebel outfits. Of course,=20
it is unlikely in the present climate. Muivah or any other rebel=20
leader will jump at the idea. But it makes sense to have such a=20
comprehensive peace settlement as a long-term policy goal.

"The virtues of federalism may not give us a short cut to resolving=20
the Naga issue. After all, as the controversy over Nagalim shows,=20
basic issues involving the very constitution of the units of our=20
federation are far from resolved in
the North-East"

What has been the traditional role of human rights and other activist=20
groups operating in Nagaland? Do you think the concerns and issues=20
raised by them have been addressed by the government?
I am skeptical of the role that human rights organizations can play=20
in situations where conflicts reach the level of an internal war. In=20
India, whether it is in the context of conflicts in the North-East or=20
in the context of Kashmir or Punjab, most Indians regard human rights
organizations as either naive, or sympathizers of insurgents who=20
opportunistically speak the language of human rights. That is, of=20
course, unfortunate. But India is not unique in that sense. I don't=20
see human rights organizations playing a significant role in crisis=20
situations. But, as I said before, representative segments of=20
political and as well as civil society- mainstream as well as rebel -=20
have to be taken into confidence in order to achieve a sustainable=20
peace in Nagaland and the rest of the North-East.

The NSCN(1-M) has been adamant from the very beginning about the=20
inclusion of other rebel groups in the negotiations. Do you think=20
this kind of attitude calls into question the legitimacy of future=20
dialogue?
Mr Muivah and Mr Khaplang are rivals. So he objects to the Government=20
negotiating with Mr Khaplang. But such objections should be seen in=20
the context of the existing model of peace negotiations: seeking a=20
deal, say like chief ministership in exchange for giving up the=20
demand for independence. But I don't think that such a narrowly=20
construed goal can bring sustainable peace.

In your book, India Against Itself, you write about the need to=20
rethink federalism in the Indian context. Do you think the resolution=20
of the Naga issue is possible within the existing framework of a=20
strong centralized Indian federal state?
Yes, I believe that India has a very weak form of federalism. For the=20
world's most diverse country, with the world's second largest=20
population, we need a very radical form of federalism in order to=20
resolve our conflicts in humane ways, or to achieve economic=20
development in an era of globalization. But the virtues of federalism=20
may not give us a short cut to resolving the Naga issue. After all,=20
as the controversy over Nagalim shows, basic issues involving the=20
very constitution of the units of our federation are far from=20
resolved in the North-East. While state reorganization may have=20
formed viable political units in large parts of India, all our major=20
conflict-ridden regions---Kashmir, Punjab and the Northeast---are=20
places where the neat formulae of linguistic states have not been=20
able to form emotionally plausible units. Such issues have to be=20
first settled through peace settlements.

How closely is Assams's own future linked to insurgency movements in=20
Manipur and Nagaland, and what role can the people of Assam play in=20
the political resolution of these conflicts?
There were complex symbiotic relations between many people of the=20
North-East. One should not romanticize some notion of a=20
non-conflictual past, nor should one look at everything through rigid=20
ethnic lenses. It is clear that counter-insurgency campaigns or=20
economic development alone cannot resolve these conflicts. A dialogue=20
among the peoples that takes an honest look at the past and seeks to=20
design a common future has to be a central plank of any attempt at=20
arriving at a sustainable peaceful solution in the Northeast.

_________

4.

A SHORT AND INCOMPLETE GUIDE TO KHASI CINEMA
an essay by
Daisy Hasan & Tarun Bhartiya

The imaginary is that which tends to become real
--Andr=E9 Breton

1989 or 1991. Pomu Das is not quite sure of the dates. But he remembers the
story...
Grand Hotel. Calcutta. A video trade conference organized by Bambino/ Magnu=
m
video distributors. Pomu Das, a small town video parlour wallah and
representative for the Northeast is having a tough time describing the plac=
e
he comes from. Is it Ceylon? Oh Shillong - that beautiful place where
'tribals' dwell. "Do they wear clothes there?", an NRI type character
lecherously quips. Pomu Das a second generation Shillong Bengali wedded to
Mrs. Marjina Kurbah, a Khasi, can barely fulminate his disagreement.
It is none other than Mithun Da who rushes to his rescue. "Arre kya Dada ap=
ka
picture victure nahin banta kya? Ek picture toh banao phir maloom ho ga ...
Khasi expose hoga...( "Arre Dada don't you make films? Make a picture-then
Khasis will get exposed...")
Except that highlighting a people in the Bollywoodian mould, as suggested =
by
Mithun Da and embarked upon by Pomu Das with Ka Mon Ba Jwat, ( roughly
translated as the determination to overcome obstacles) is an idea that evok=
es
ridicule from the 'obscure' peoples themselves-
"Khasi film!!! Ki beit ne... Pagal hai kya?"
To many, the phrase 'Khasi film' brings only one kind of endeavor to mind.
Manik Rytong. This 1984 national award winning film directed by Ardhendu
Bhattacharya and, more importantly, produced by Rishan Rapsang, one of the
few indigenous entrepreneurs, relates an ancient and popular legend about =
a
young woman forced into marriage with the Syiem or chief even though she
loves Manik, the flutist. She eventually chooses the funeral pyre of her
lover over the luxuries of the palace.
Classic national award winning fare. Especially if it is the first film
produced in a 'marginal' language highlighting 'marginal' myths.
As Rapsang admits, " we had two ideas-Manik Rytong and Tirot Singh." Tirot
Singh being an anti-British war hero. Manik Rytong proved to be the more
appealing of the two. It could avoid the controversy that biographical film=
s
tend to stir. It was at the same time a subject easy to identify with and
project as a defining mythological landmark a community could point to with
pride Perhaps this is why our queries into Khasi films met with either a
self assured "Manik Rytong" or an embarrassed 'Ka Mon Ba Jwat'.
The embarrassment is about being unable to reconcile oneself to the Bombaiy=
a
idiom in which Pomu Das chooses to image Shillong. The embarrassment is als=
o
about Sonu Nigam's poor rendition of Khasi lyrics. The embarrassment is
eventually about finding secret longings for things 'Indian' in the
spotlight that has so long focussed on graffitti like
We are Khasis by blood. Indians by accident.
This accident occurs everyday in the street life of Shillong. It occurs in
its newly founded Cricket tournaments and Khasi songs, thinly disguised in
bombaiya tunes, blaring out of its taxis. Herein, perhaps, lurks the danger
of a numerically insignificant community getting absorbed in a Pan-Indian
homogeneity. A fact that, in our politically correct moments, we would also
possibly lament. But the sheer unembarrassed cinematic kitsch of KMBJ
explodes this monochromatic cultural pessimism. For Pomu Das then, making t=
he
Khasi block buster, with an impossible all-india-release ambition lurking
within its larger than life posters, was more about leaving a stamp on a
society that simultaneously absorbs and alienates the 'outsider'.
Mithun Da's exhortations corroborated Pomu Das's intuition. The script was
not a problem. Pomu Das, who carries childhood memories of 'mainland' film
crews coming to town , and evenings spent at Anjali cinema hall could just
dip his mug into this rich vat of memory and extract possible plots. The
story simulates the ephemeral trajectory of the masala movie with all the
elements of love, lust and longing intact. It therefore projects an
uncomplicated view of things with occasional concessions to local flavors.
These local touches are what give KBJW its punch. Like khun ka ksew (son of=
a
dog) a pungent abuse spewed back and forth by the town's riff-raff, the kin=
d
who saw the film more than once, and got hooked onto the Filmi Father's
favorite crutch. The plot of KMBJ hinges around constants like the village
boy, the sick mother, the haughty rich girl and her class conscious father.
All this against Shillong's locations which came largely free.
The funds were procured by mortgaging land and the director came in the for=
m
of a son, Pradeep Kurbah. Pradeep brings to KMBJ the unique inflexions of
the masala movie because of his prolonged stint in the Bombay film industry=
.
Last heard of, Pradeep was part the Raju Chacha crew and managed to transpo=
rt
the filmi (hot) dog back home to Pomu Das.
Technically, therefore, the film follows contemporary trends in commercial
movie making. It boasts of a refinement rarely seen in commercial films fro=
m
the region which often content themselves with unimaginative technique than=
ks
to shoestring budgets.
Pomu Das however thought he had it all worked out. Armed with an assurance
from the then government that matters of entertainment tax could be
negotiated, once he managed to finish the film, Pomu Das wasn't making any
compromises. The film crew came from Bombay as did the choreographer and t=
he
expensive HMI lights. Common (film) sense might baulk at such extravagance.
But for Pomu Das this do or die venture was about making the 'ultimate' Kha=
si
blockbuster. The one that would leave its stamp in the collective memory of
the town as the 'exiled' insider's emphatic parting shot.
When the locations didn't come free, like the time the crew landed in Bomba=
y
for the desi phareng (foreign) locale, the guerilla producer duped the Bomb=
ay
Municipal Corporation, (which charges 65000 per shift) and shot freely with=
in
the city. The trespassing camera was concealed inside a vehicle and the cr=
ew
drove away with Bombay's magic hour beaches.
With the film in the cans (with minor over budgeting of just 10 lakhs,
amounting to a total cost of 42 lakhs) Pomu Das was finally the small town
Movie Mughal. But life in the films is never a 'bed of roses'. The governme=
nt
went back on its assurance. "Yeh log pehla samja ki yeh fool hai...yeh
picture victure kuch nahin banaiga..."( the government thought I am a fool.=
I
would never make the film.)=20
Despite the fact that the theatres demanded thrice the amount they normally
charge for screenings, Pomu Das managed a three month, 'house full' runnin=
g
of the film in 1998, braving extortionate rentals and a sabotaged
soundtrack. This last hit where it hurts, Pomu Das having trekked all the w=
ay
to Bombay for the dubbing and mixing of the soundtrack.
It is now almost three years since KMBJ was released... Some claim to have
watched it ten to fifteen times. Some hum the songs. Some still feel
embarrassed at having enjoyed it's pulp. Some who missed the initial run of
KMBJ or want to relive the experience still throng the town's non-toxic
video parlours in search of VHS/VCDs of the film But Pomu Das is zealously
guarding the film from video pirates. He wants a re-release hoping that the
government will come around despite a growing suspicion that the obstacles
are intentional and have something to do with the complicated nature of his
roots.
No state or national award, therefore, seems to be in sight for our auteur
although a Garo video film, having acquired a state award, was recently
honored with a television broadcast. Exemption from the entertainment tax
also seems elusive but Pomu Das shrugs off the tragic hero's mantle.
Khasi picture kyon banaya...hum bola apna dekhne ka liya banaya... hum toh
picture daily dekhta hai...kabhi kabhi raat mein neend khulne se dekha ta
hai...hum toh film bana diya...yeh toh khatam nahin hoga... ( I made the fi=
lm
for my own pleasure. I watch it during sleepless nights. The film is made. =
No
one can change that.) Khun ka ksew!

(Daisy Hasan and Tarun Bhartiya are members of the splitENDS media co-op.
splitENDS is engaged in a long - term documentation of Shillong's urbanity.=
)

_______

5.

Tehelka.com

'The National Curriculum Framework is anti-constitutional'

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance=20
(NDA) government has many
firsts to its credit, although according to experts what
has really demonised the whole process is the way
in which the Human Resource Development (HRD) Ministry has been=20
unabashedly trying to inject the
saffron agenda onto the educational set-up and the academic research=20
system of the country. In this context, Dr Anil Sadgopal,=20
educationist and professor at the Delhi University, tells Rinku Pegu=20
about the dangers the Hindutva agenda poses as a regressive
force not just culturally, but also as a deterrent in shaping of the=20
mindset of future generations.
Dr Sadgopal emphasises that keeping in mind the
pluralistic tradition of our multicultural country, the founders of=20
the Constitutional did not ever give
sole authority to the Centre to deliberate on the
issue education. Excerpts
New Delhi, August 20

Why do you think the saffron agenda that the HRD Ministry is seeking=20
to implement poses a danger to our education system?
The core issue here is that the agenda itself and the way it is being=20
implemented is anti-constitutional. To begin with, the National=20
Curriculum Framework for School Education was drafted by the Union=20
HRD Ministry without any consultation with the state governments=20
despite education being a concurrent subject under the Constitution.=20
In deliberately denying the role of religion other than Hinduism, the=20
curriculum is not only communal but it also denies the plurality of=20
Indian culture and tradition.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The portrayal of the Aryans as the indigenous people of India again=20
reinforces the Hindutva myth that all, barring the Hindus, are=20
foreigners"
------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the Hindutva ideology, in which it is being sought to be=20
implemented, there is just no space for non-Brahmanical,=20
non-patriarchal and non-hierarchical ideas. This means that the=20
Hindutva world-view rejects entirely the possibility of gender and=20
class analysis. And in this rejection lies the violation of the=20
Indian Constitution, which guarantees equality of all Indians=20
irrespective of gender and caste and race.

What is the particular aim of the saffron agenda?
In the Hindutva world-view, the Hindu culture is a "pure culture"=20
without any outside influences. Through this they want to undermine,=20
for example, the role of the Buddha, deny the dialectics between=20
Hindu and Buddhist thought and the consequent rise of Pali=20
literature. In terms of language, this denial serves to flag Sanskrit=20
as the oldest language of India. And in order to establish that=20
Aryans were the original people of India and not migrants, the=20
Hindutva forces refuse to regard tribals as "Adivasis" (literally,=20
original dwellers) but refer to them as "Vanavasis" (forest dwellers).

The portrayal of the Aryans as the indigenous people of India again=20
reinforces the Hindutva myth that all, barring the Hindus, are=20
foreigners. However, in the process the Hindutva forces would succeed=20
in conveying that Hinduism is a static and inert religion devoid of=20
any dynamic energy. And this, to my mind, is anti-Hindu. It should be=20
mentioned to give legitimacy to the Hindutva belief that Aryans were=20
the indigenous people. Efforts are also now being made to re-engineer=20
the Harappan culture as the Vedic culture. Towards this purpose, the=20
twin disciplines of History and Archaeology are being sought to be=20
doctored through coercion.
Do you see a convergence of the saffron agenda with globalisation?
The Framework surprisingly talks of duties as a citizen rather than=20
educating the child about one's rights. Emphasising fundamental=20
duties in lieu of fundamental rights assumes significance in the=20
context of globalisation. Here it serves the government eminently to=20
put duty before rights so that there is no questioning about the=20
government's policies, which are then accepted without opposition.=20
Then again, we see the aggressive promotion of the concept of the=20
National Open School as an alternative to school education. Should=20
children aged between six and 14 be left to themselves and learn on=20
their own? What will be the quality of such education? I guess it=20
will only be adequate enough to turn them into low-wage factory=20
workers, without any prospects of improvement.

But the Framework does talk about imparting education in Information=20
Technology (IT).
Do not get misled by the inclusion of so-called modern subjects into=20
the education system. Look at the primary education scenario in=20
India? Two-thirds of girls in India are out of schools. Many schools=20
do not even have basic infrastructure like blackboards and chalks. So=20
does it warrant imparting training in IT or making primary education=20
available for only a select majority? Clearly, the government's=20
priority is lopsided. Under the proposed system, those who can afford=20
to get education will be IT-literate and by that effect, the number=20
will be limited to only 20 per cent. The rest will be denied even=20
basic education. This is bound to create a big social divide designed=20
to keep the poor out of the agenda of education.

After all, the government has to take a macro view and not act as if=20
it is the representative of only a privilege few. Seen carefully, the=20
Hindutva agenda can be analysed in terms of adherence to the=20
discredited age-old view that education is the domain of the upper=20
caste, while the poor children of lower castes should be condemned to=20
menial or low-paid jobs.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
In my opinion, value education is aimed
actually at those 80 per cent of school children
who will be denied the IT training
------------------------------------------------------------------------

What is this controversy over value education?
The essence of value education as prescribed by the Framework is to=20
come from religion. The Hindu religion will be the main source of=20
values as all other religions according to the Hindutva view are=20
peripheral or derivatives of Hinduism. The values interestingly, do=20
not talk of Dharma or of human rights. But conveniently, Hinduism is=20
reflected as being necessary for reinforcing the Hindutva view that=20
the Aryans were the indigenous people and what better way than to=20
have entire education system based on the ancient Bharatiya tradition=20
to show it as one long continuous culture.

In my opinion, value education is aimed actually at those 80 per cent=20
of school children who will be denied the IT training. This in turn=20
will inculcate values like cleanliness, punctuality and good conduct=20
within these 80 per cent so that after their eighth standard these=20
students would qualify to become good industrial workers for the=20
various MNCs that have and will set up shop in India. Nothing better=20
will be offered to them.

In this context, the de-emphasis of the Social Sciences should be=20
treated as continuation of the government's policy to create=20
low-skilled workers, which then can be supplied endlessly to the=20
MNCs. Otherwise, no progressive democratic country can afford to=20
neglect the Social Sciences as a distinct discipline worthy of=20
pursuing. For a child to develop its aptitude to the fullest, it is=20
important that one grows up in an environment that fosters=20
multiplicity of ideas rather than a single majoritarian view that=20
generates conformism.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996. Dispatch
archive from 1998 can be accessed at
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/act/messages/ . To subscribe send a blank
message to: <act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.

--=20