[sacw] SACW #1 (23 August 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch No. 1
23 August 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

----------------------------------------

[1.] Pakistan: Musharraf's "sectarian" contradictions
[2.] How Hindu an India?
[3.] India: A convention organised in New Delhi gives expression to=20
widespread concerns about the communalisation of education
[4.] Indian PM's saffron yearnings

-----------------------------------------

#1.

The Friday Times
17-23 August 2001

MUSHARRAF'S "SECTARIAN" CONTRADICTIONS

Ejaz Haider
says sectarianism is not a new phenomenon but the differences are now=20
being perpetuated within the context of new local, regional and, in=20
certain respects, global forces
------------------------------------------------------------------------

It is amazing that General Musharraf should fail to see the=20
contradictions in what he is trying to achieve. He wants to=20
kick-start the economy, he wants social and political harmony and he=20
wants a modern, progressive Pakistan. Yet, he is doing everything=20
possible to negate what he propagates. His devolution plan is an=20
effort to put down political parties and move the country away from=20
the parliamentary democracy. His National Security Council and the=20
constitutional amendments he is planning are an attempt to strengthen=20
the president's office, institutionalise the role of the military and=20
in the process advance parochial interests. And his national security=20
policy continues to use the very elements he is raging against
------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Pervez Musharraf in his August 14 speech has banned two=20
sectarian parties, Lashkar-e Jhangvi (Sunni-Deobandi) and=20
Sipah-e-Mohammad (Shia). In the same breath he has also issued a=20
warning to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Tehreek-e-Ja'faria Pakistan,=20
Deobandi-Sunni and Shia, respectively. Is the measure likely to=20
address the sectarian problem?

Consider the background. Sectarianism and the violence related to it=20
are not new phenomena in Islam. In a denotative sense, sectarianism=20
merely refers to the existence of different sects or denominations=20
within the larger ambit of Islam. But its real dynamics neither=20
relate merely to semantics nor are they benign.

Sectarianism is the creation of historical and political processes,=20
often bloody, over the 1500-year march of Islam. Interestingly, while=20
sectarianism was almost never a product of religious thought, being=20
mostly political, the differences between the heterodoxies and the=20
orthodoxy have always been played out in the backdrop of religion.=20
This is important for understanding the rise and sustenance of=20
sectarianism in Islam. This is also one of the reasons for the=20
inability of Islam to develop a viable ecumenical movement to bridge=20
the differences within its various sects.

While the orthodoxy in Islam has no conception of a clerical order a=20
la Christianity, the heterodoxies, perhaps to perpetuate their=20
exclusivity, have always tended to weave themselves around a=20
hierarchy. Moreover, since the heterodoxies have never really been=20
able to challenge the orthodoxy, which has always looked at them as=20
heretic creeds, the breakaway essentialisms have only further tended=20
to withdraw into their exclusivistic cocoons for reasons both of=20
survival and sustenance. Unlike the orthodoxy in Islam, the=20
heterodoxies have in all cases sought to create hierarchical orders.=20
On the surface this difference might be overlooked as a manifestation=20
simply of doctrinal differences - wherever they exist - in reality it=20
was, and remains, a device for political, and in certain cases,=20
socioeconomic control within the heterodox creeds.

The rise of sectarianism in Pakistan, therefore, should not be viewed=20
as a new phenomenon. But while it is the manifestation of old=20
fault-lines, the phenomenon has been perpetrated and perpetuated=20
within the context of new local, regional and, in certain respects,=20
global forces. Two developments are essential to understanding the=20
bloody recrudescence of sectarianism: the Iranian revolution and the=20
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian revolution also gave a=20
modern, nationalist twist to the expression of Shi'ite sectarianism=20
and Tehran was seen by the Arab states of the Gulf and, indeed the=20
rest of the Arab world, especially Saudi Arabia, as trying to export=20
the revolution.

The Iran-Iraq war further fuelled the fears of traditional Arab=20
monarchies, which decided to extend full support to Iraq in the war.=20
This was matched by the orthodox (Sunni) response of contending=20
states like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, sectarianism -=20
involving non-state actors - has been actively supported by state=20
parties within a modern strategic milieu where nation-states have=20
fought each other, and continue to do so, for greater strategic space=20
and outreach. Afghanistan, and with it Pakistan, have provided the=20
playground for these contending essentialisms. It is in this region=20
that these forces have played their deadly game in a bewildering=20
combination of factors.

Three factors are important here. The fissures were already present,=20
but they have deepened because of certain other developments within=20
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. In fact, the Shi'ite and Sunni=20
essentialisms could not have come to loggerheads in the way they have=20
in the past decade-and-half without these peculiar factors. The=20
second factor relates to political changes taking place within=20
Pakistan from the mid-1970s onwards. The third relates to the covert=20
war launched by the United States against the Soviet Union, a=20
conflict in which Pakistan was willing to act as a frontline state=20
for its own strategic ends.

The military dictator, General Ziaul Haq, sought to put down=20
political activity, where necessary, with brute force. By banning=20
political parties, he also paved the way for the emergence of=20
non-political groupings and forces. In the absence of political=20
parties, these forces anchored themselves in parochial interests like=20
ethnicity, tribalism and sectarianism. It is a widely acknowledged=20
fact now that the Zia regime actively supported the emergence of=20
these new centres of power to break the electoral hold of regular=20
political parties, especially the PPP.

Evidently, this approach provided an institutional base to religious=20
forces of varied hues. Since these new groupings were beholden to the=20
regime and locked with it in a patron-client relationship, and since=20
Zia had deliberately sought to blur the distinction between his=20
regime and the state itself, it was thought that they would remain=20
amenable to the state. Subsequent events, including Pakistan's=20
experience yet again with an imperfect democracy following Zia's=20
death, have shown this to be patently untrue. The paradox was that=20
while Zia sought to strengthen his power base, the emergence of these=20
new groupings and the reconfiguration of religio-political parties=20
have only worked towards eroding the writ of the state. And by=20
declaring Islam as the basis of the constitution, he managed to cut=20
off significant sections of Pakistani society - non-Muslims, women=20
and children - from the mainstream. Since the basis of his Islam was=20
the Hanafi fiqh, with strong overtones of the Deobandi school of=20
thought, he managed also to alienate the Shi'ite population of=20
Pakistan.

The regime also struck at both the judiciary and the press, making it=20
increasingly less likely for the civil society to challenge the=20
appropriation of the state by those who had no popular mandate to do=20
so. It is therefore no coincidence that the=20
Tehreek-e-Nifaz-Fiqh-Ja'faria - later re-christened as=20
Tehrik-e-Ja'faria Pakistan - the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and the MQM=20
all emerged during Zia's rule.

Zia may not have intended to deepen sectarian divisions, but his=20
policy of using a certain fiqh as the basis of legislation=20
predictably widened the chasm between the Shi'ite and the=20
Sunni-Deobandi sects. Politically, the strategy worked fine since it=20
precluded the emergence of a unified political opposition to the=20
regime. The regime fostered the growth of sectarianism in a number of=20
ways. At the domestic level, Zia's process of "Islamisation" created=20
among the Shia community a perception that the government was moving=20
towards the establishment of a Sunni Hannafi state. The most overt=20
expression of this came in 1980, when hundreds of activists of Imamia=20
Students Organisation (ISO), the Shi'ite student organisation, laid=20
siege to the Federal Secretariat in Islamabad, following the=20
promulgation of the Zakat and Ushr ordinance. This perception was to=20
persist for other reasons, too.

The promulgation of the Zakat and Usher Ordinance of 1979 also=20
contributed a great deal to the strengthening of the religious=20
establishment. The Zakat and Ushr committees were manned by the=20
clerics and since the state used these committees to award sinecures=20
to petty clerics, by becoming Ushr collectors in the rural areas, the=20
clerics managed to change their socioeconomic status. This work also=20
put them in touch with functionaries of the state at the district=20
administration and local government levels and generally made it=20
possible for them to wield power on the basis of those linkages.

Another major boost to the religious establishment came with the=20
government's decision to provide Zakat funds to the madaris=20
(seminaries). The process resulted in a mushroom growth of seminaries=20
of all denominations. Moreover, the induction of seminarians into=20
government service provided the clergy yet another prospect for=20
upward social mobility. The seminaries also fit neatly into a system=20
of recruitment and cadre-building for religio-political parties,=20
especially sect-based parties like the JUP and the JUI. Of these, the=20
Deobandi JUI has traditionally organised the madrassah system with=20
great acumen. These processes predictably had the deleterious effect=20
of undermining institutions of state and society. The regime also=20
opened up seminaries in the border belts of the NWFP and Balochistan=20
where religious cadres were imparted military training and sent=20
across into Afghanistan.

The conduct of the covert Afghan war and the manner in which certain=20
groups were backed by the ISI also served to deepen the sectarian=20
fault-line. This was also linked to the role of Saudi Arabia in the=20
Afghan war effort, with Riyadh matching every US dollar that came to=20
Pakistan and the Afghan resistance groups to fight the Soviet-backed=20
PDPA regime. The Saudi influence in Pakistan was a major factor in=20
deepening the sectarian fault-lines because Riyadh perceived Tehran=20
as attempting to export its Shi'ite revolution into Arab lands. So=20
significant was Riyadh to Islamabad, and such was its suspicion of=20
Tehran, that even Pakistan army had to ensure that no Shi'ite officer=20
was posted to its contingents on the Saudi soil.

There is overwhelming evidence that the Afghan war has contributed=20
massively towards creating a new religious militant cadre in Pakistan=20
and other Islamic countries, besides exacerbating centuries of=20
animosity between the Shi'ites and Sunnis. It is not surprising,=20
therefore, that the last decade has witnessed a major escalation in=20
sectarian tension - the rise in the number of sectarian killings and=20
armed sectarian groups - in Pakistan.

While the last decade has seen the emergence of various religious=20
militias, three organisations have been linked most prominently with=20
sectarian violence. These include: Sipah-i Mohammad Pakistan (SMP),=20
Sipah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan (SSP), and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). The SMP is=20
an offshoot of the Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ), the main=20
religio-political Shi'ite party in Pakistan, which came into being in=20
the 1980s. The TNFJ later renamed itself the Tehrik-e-Ja'faria=20
Pakistan (TFP). The SSP is a Sunni-Deobandi organisation and was=20
earlier called the Anjuman Sipah-e-Shahaba. At the doctrinal level=20
its cadres are affiliated with the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).=20
Politically, too, the SSP is affiliated with the JUI, but is=20
increasingly charting its own course by sending SSP candidates to=20
both the National Assembly and the Punjab Assembly. The LJ, by far=20
the most rabid anti-Shi'ite organisation and one that has no=20
political presence, is an offshoot of the SSP. However, the SSP now=20
claims no connection with the LJ, though intelligence reports=20
indicate to the contrary.

>From this very sketchy picture it should be clear that sectarianism=20
is the product of certain structural problems. It will be illogical=20
to think that without addressing those problems the issue can be=20
tackled in the long term. Banning certain groups may be symbolically=20
significant in terms of sending out a signal regarding the state's=20
resolve to tackle the issue but it needs to be followed up with an=20
attempt to address the causes of the phenomenon.

The state's readiness to use religion and make laws that may=20
correspond to sectarian differences, its attempt to discredit the=20
political process and, with that the political parties, its=20
reluctance to review its national security policy, the military's=20
inability to accept the primacy of civilian governments and its=20
attempt to localize politics, are some of the factors that have=20
contributed to the perpetuation of the phenomena of political=20
instability, religious bigotry and the latter's corollary,=20
sectarianism. While this military government may not be enamoured of=20
religious elements, its political gameplan is no different from=20
General Zia's.

It is amazing that General Musharraf should fail to see the=20
contradictions in what he is trying to achieve. He wants to=20
kick-start the economy, he wants social and political harmony and he=20
wants a modern, progressive Pakistan. Yet, he is doing everything=20
possible for this country to move away from the very ideals that he=20
seems to cherish. His devolution plan is an effort to put down=20
political parties and move the country away from parliamentary=20
democracy. His proposed National Security Council and the=20
constitutional amendments he is planning are an attempt to strengthen=20
the president's office, institutionalise the role of the military and=20
in the process advance parochial interests. His national security=20
policy continues to use the very elements he is raging against.

The point is not that he should or should not do certain things. He=20
can happily carry on with all that he is doing and accept the costs=20
if the benefits are genuinely perceived to outweigh them. But if that=20
is not the case, as is evident to some of us, then he should purge=20
himself of his contradictions.

_________

2.

Economist.com

HOW HINDU AN INDIA?
Aug 16th 2001 | Ahmedabad and Delhi
>From The Economist print edition
Reuters

Hindutva, the quest for Hindu-ness, is alive and well

MANJIT, candidate for a degree in computer science, believes that=20
Christians and Muslims are plotting to take over India by marrying=20
Hindu girls. This far-fetched notion is probably shared by hundreds=20
of the other young men carrying ritual daggers tucked into their=20
saffron sashes who turned out on August 13th for a rally staged by a=20
Hindu youth group in Ahmedabad, Gujarat's commercial capital. "Islam=20
is not of this culture," observed one speaker. Their cheers were=20
almost within earshot of a Muslim neighbourhood.

Some Gujaratis call their state "the laboratory". It is ruled by the=20
same Hindu-nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, that=20
governs India at the head of a 19-party coalition. In Gujarat,=20
though, it rules alone with a decisive majority. Nervous witnesses=20
suspect that the ranting of the Bajrang Dal, the group that staged=20
the rally, is the sort of rhetoric that the BJP would spread across=20
India if it dared.

The party has tried to lay such fears to rest during its three years=20
in power at the centre. But it cannot disavow the Bajrang Dal=20
entirely. Both belong to the "sangh pariwar", or "family of=20
associations", a term outsiders apply to a loose-knit family of=20
30-odd nationwide organisations that draw inspiration from the=20
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, the "national association of=20
volunteers"). That links India's reassuringly moderate prime=20
minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, to the hotheads of Bajrang Dal.

The opposition pointedly calls itself "secular", citing the=20
constitution, which bars the state from promoting any religion

The connection is the fulcrum of Indian politics. The opposition=20
pointedly calls itself "secular", citing the constitution, which bars=20
the state from promoting any religion. The BJP's ideologues maintain=20
that secularism as practised in India has denied equal treatment to=20
Hindus, who make up four-fifths of the population, and exposed Hindu=20
culture to such threats as conversion and Islamic fundamentalism. The=20
redress they seek worries minorities and, many fear, threatens=20
India's secular traditions. This struggle between secularism and=20
Hindutva (Hindu-ness) is India's main ideological conflict.

But the battle lines are fuzzy. Most of the BJP's coalition partners,=20
partly dependent on the votes of minorities, side with the=20
secularists. They have obliged the BJP to suspend its most=20
contentious proposals, such as building a temple in Ayodhya where a=20
mosque stood until it was torn down by Hindu zealots in 1992, and=20
replacing family law based on religion, which accommodates Muslim=20
traditions, with a uniform civil code for everyone. Its leaders are=20
practised at making Hindutva sound unobjectionable. The BJP's "core=20
belief is nationalism", says Narendra Modi, a general secretary of=20
the party. Madan Das Devi, a leader of the BJP's mother organisation,=20
the RSS, defines Hindutva as "a way of life which accepts that all=20
ways reach to one place, which is God". Who but a fanatic could=20
object to that?

But the RSS's Hindutva is not cuddly and has not been tamed. In=20
Delhi, the BJP is subtly promoting it in the arena where it may=20
matter most, education. Last November the National Council of=20
Educational Research and Training (NCERT) issued a curriculum=20
framework, which states can (but need not) use for their own schools.=20
The BJP's cultural agenda is packaged in appeals to patriotism. The=20
curriculum should be "rooted in [India's] indigenous tradition".=20
Because India is "the most ennobling experiment in spiritual=20
co-existence", it should stress values. Most of the BJP's allies see=20
nothing to object to. "If we feel confident about our history, we=20
should revive knowledge and pride in that heritage," says Jaya=20
Jaitly, a leader of the Samata Party, a coalition member.

To secularists, though, the curriculum framework marks a new front in=20
a Kulturkampf against pluralism and modernity. Arjun Dev, former head=20
of the NCERT's department of education in social sciences and=20
humanities, says the document is "designed to promote exclusivist,=20
chauvinist ideas". It demotes science and social concerns as a source=20
of values in favour of religion and warps the former by glorifying=20
Indian contributions to it. On August 6th education ministers from=20
nine opposition-ruled states demanded that the NCERT framework be=20
scrapped.

Critics fear that what begins with squabbles about education can fuel=20
the crudities of the Bajrang Dal. The group is often accused of=20
attacking members of minority groups, most recently a Catholic priest=20
in Maharashtra in revenge for the claimed killing of four RSS=20
activists in the north-east by Christians. Some of these allegations=20
may be wrong. But the Bajrang Dal does train some of its adherents in=20
the use of weapons. Its behaviour reveals what the well-oiled=20
rhetoric of the BJP hides: that Hindutva needs defence only if=20
non-Hindus are regarded as threats.

It is hard to say precisely how far India's elected leaders are=20
responsible for the excesses of the zealots. The sangh pariwar is a=20
disjointed beast. The mother organisation, the RSS, is dedicated to=20
"character building", mainly through 40,000 daily group exercise=20
sessions called shakhas, in which members in military-style khaki=20
shorts drill with sticks and salute a saffron flag.

The most zealous volunteers are to be found in the ranks of scores of=20
its daughter organisations, including the Vishwa Hindu Parishad=20
(World Hindu Council, of which the Bajrang Dal is the youth wing) and=20
a trade union. Each has its own charter, officers and sources of=20
funding. Normally, they rally round the BJP at election time; between=20
polls, relations between the party and its siblings can be bitter.=20
Political power has forced the party to make compromises that enrage=20
ideologues. The head of the RSS-linked trade union recently called=20
the finance minister a "criminal" for proposing labour-law=20
liberalisation.

Yet the sangh pariwar's fragmentation can be a strength. It operates=20
like an idealised version of the caste system: each component works=20
towards the same end but in its own way. One part need not assume=20
blame for what others do.

Secularists fear that BJP-ruled Gujarat represents the party's true=20
ideal. One of the most economically successful states, it is also one=20
of the most polarised. Human-rights activists say its government has=20
conducted or tolerated countless abuses of minorities, including=20
malicious textbooks (one describes Muslims, Christians and Parsis as=20
"foreigners") and an attempted survey of minority groups (ruled=20
unconstitutional). The police allegedly ignore attacks on minorities.=20
"A type of fascism is slowly emerging," says Father Cedric Prakash, a=20
human-rights campaigner. Gujarat's chief minister, Keshubhai Patel,=20
insists that his state is a laboratory only for tolerance and=20
economic success.

Gujarat's fraught atmosphere cannot be blamed entirely on the BJP.=20
The state's history of religious violence goes back decades: in=20
Ahmedabad, Hindus and Muslims have been quitting each other's=20
neighbourhoods since the mid-1980s. Some objectionable textbooks=20
predate the party's accession to power. But at least large-scale=20
rioting has declined since the BJP took over. The secularists hope=20
that the rest of India is too democratic and diverse to fall for the=20
blandishments of Hindutva. But no one is taking it for granted.

Copyright =A9 2001 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All=20
rights reserved.

_________

3.

Frontline
Aug. 18 - 31, 2001

SECULAR CHALLENGE

A MAJOR CONVENTION ORGANISED IN NEW DELHI GIVES EXPRESSION TO=20
WIDESPREAD CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMMUNALISATION OF EDUCATION UNDER THE=20
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT.

T.K. RAJALAKSHMI
in New Delhia

EDUCATION is an essential component of the state's ideological=20
apparatus in a class-based society. It acquires even more importance=20
when the state moves in the direction of fascism. The changes that=20
have been introduced by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National=20
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in the sphere of education have=20
given enough hints about the direction the Indian state is taking of=20
late. A cross-section of concerned people, including the Education=20
Ministers of nine States, was brought together in New Delhi by the=20
Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust (Sahmat) for a three-day convention from=20
August 4. The participants expressed concern over the communalisation=20
of education and the Union government's failure to take State=20
governments into confidence in matters relating to education.

BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT
At the convention organised by the Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust,=20
(from left) Members of Parliament Eduardo Faleiro and Shabana Azmi,=20
Chattisgarh Chief Minister Ajit Jogi and CPI(M) Polit Bureau member=20
Sitaram Yechury, with State Education Ministers C.P. Joshi=20
(Rajasthan), Ramachandra Purve (Bihar), Satyanarayana Sharma=20
(Chattisgarh) Chuba Chang (Nagaland) and H. Viswanath (Karnataka).

In October 1998, a State Education Ministers' conference in Kolkata=20
rejected the sectarian proposals made in a document prepared by Vidya=20
Bharati, an educational outfit run by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh=20
(RSS). In a move reminiscent of that, the Education Ministers who=20
participated in the New Delhi convention, all of them belonging to=20
States or Union Territories ruled by parties that are outside the=20
NDA, and leading academics demanded the withdrawal of the=20
controversial National Curriculum Framework for School Education=20
(NCF), which has been designed by the National Council for=20
Educational Research and Training (NCERT). The Ministers from West=20
Bengal, Pondicherry, Nagaland, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh,=20
Bihar, Karnataka and Rajasthan rejected the NCF which, they said, was=20
prepared without consulting State governments. They demanded that the=20
Central government initiate a process of consulting the States on=20
national education policy, convene a conference of Education=20
Ministers, and constitute a Central Advisory Board of Education. In a=20
joint statement, the Ministers and other participants demanded the=20
withdrawal of the University Grants Commission (UGC) circular=20
introducing "indigenous systems of knowledge" in university-level=20
courses. Among the other signatories were Congress Working Committee=20
member Arjun Singh, Communist Party of India general secretary A.B.=20
Bardhan, Communist Party of India (Marxist) Polit Bureau member=20
Sitaram Yechury, All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA)=20
general secretary Brinda Karat and Members of Parliament Eduardo=20
Faleiro, Mani Shankar Aiyar and Shabana Azmi.

The participants included historians Romila Thapar, Irfan Habib, K.N.=20
Panikkar, Satish Chandra, K.M. Shrimali, Mushirul Hasan, D.N. Jha and=20
Suraj Bhan, economists Prabhat Patnaik and C.T. Kurien, former Vice-=20
Chancellor of the Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, Tirunelveli, V.=20
Vasanthi Devi, commentator and lawyer A.G. Noorani, Editor of=20
Communalism Combat Teesta Setalvad, and Anil Sadgopal of the Central=20
Institute of Education.

The convention condemned the Human Resource Development Ministry's=20
attempts to steamroll the educational system and fill research=20
institutions with persons with a certain ideological background.=20
Similar attempts were made in the past by Sangh Parivar ideologues=20
but they were not done so blatantly, the convention observed. It=20
alleged that in its pursuit of a single-point agenda, the NDA=20
government appeared least bothered about healthy criticism. The=20
participants pointed out with concern the "stifling silence" of the=20
BJP's partners in power over the HRD Ministry's moves to tamper with=20
the educational system. They reiterated the need to preserve the=20
federal polity and the secular character of the Indian republic by=20
resisting communal onslaughts on education and culture.

Prof. Irfan Habib, former Chairman of the Indian Council of=20
Historical Research, dwelt at length on the rewriting of history=20
being attempted by the Sangh Parivar. As part of the project, the=20
Parivar not only introduced Vedic nomenclature wherever possible but=20
tampered with the dates of historical texts in order to emphasise=20
their antiquity, he said. Official agencies promoted "new=20
discoveries" of Indian history in an attempt to establish the=20
antiquity of the Aryan civilisation and its superiority over other=20
civilisations, especially the Harappan civilisation. Much of these=20
discoveries lacked historical evidence, he explained. For instance,=20
it is claimed that humankind originally evolved in the upper=20
Saraswati region, that is, northern Haryana, and that India was the=20
original home of the Aryans and other Indo-Europeans, he explained.=20
In order to support the Sangh Parivar's claims it was necessary that=20
everything "Aryan" had to be dated to antiquity; therefore, according=20
to Prof. Habib, the Rg Veda is said to have been composed before 5000=20
B.C. and not circa 1500 B.C. It is claimed that bronze was "cast" in=20
India by 3700 B.C. and writing originated in India. According to=20
Habib, the Parivar refers to the Indus culture, which was officially=20
named the Harappan culture, as the Saraswati-Sindhu culture, a Vedic=20
nomenclature.

Habib said that given the low esteem that the Sangh Parivar had for=20
Asoka and Akbar, it was possible that the new NCERT textbooks would=20
reflect the biases. As an example for biased history writing, he=20
cited K.S. Lal's book Growth of Muslim Population in Medieval India=20
(1973) in which the author presents a picture of continuous decline=20
of the Indian population owing to massacres of Hindus by Muslims.=20
Lal, known for his ideological affinity to the RSS, does not give any=20
statistical evidence in support of his claim. In The Mughal Harem=20
(1988), Lal talks about the "immoral" ways of Muslims, ignoring the=20
fact that Hindu rulers and nobles too were polygamous. Habib also=20
cited P.N. Oak's claim in the early 1960s that the Taj Mahal and the=20
Red Fort were originally built by Hindus and were misappropriated by=20
Muslims later. There was a deliberate denial of Muslim culture, Habib=20
said.

RAJEEV BHATT
Members of the Students Federation of India and the Democratic Youth=20
Federation of India take out a rally in New Delhi on August 10=20
against the University Grants Commission's move to introduce=20
astrology courses in universities.

Like every individual, a country too needed an accurate memory of its=20
past, Habib observed. Unfortunately, according to him, not only=20
history was distorted but science was assaulted. The move to=20
introduce courses in astrology in about 30 universities was a case in=20
point, he said.

Suraj Bhan expressed concern over the attempts at the Aryanisation of=20
the Indus civilisation. He said chauvinistic nationalism and=20
regionalism had caused a perceptible decline in archaeological=20
perspectives and methods and institutional health and these posed a=20
real threat to the discipline of history. One of the reasons for the=20
attempt to identify the Vedic culture with the Indus civilisation was=20
to prove that the former was one of the oldest civilisations in the=20
world, at least as old as the Mesopotamian civilisation. The Vedic=20
culture was glorified because the Vedas were considered the "source=20
of Hindu social, political and economic institutions" and Hindu=20
culture was equated with Indian culture, he said.

Prof. K.N. Panikkar explained how the ideological apparatus of the=20
state was trying to project a new system of education that=20
uncritically privileged the indigenous and celebrated the religious.=20
The system of education in the post-Independence period, though=20
essentially elitist, respected the social plurality and cultural=20
diversity of the country, he said. That education was a subject in=20
the Concurrent List and not in the Central List was a reflection of=20
this diversity, he pointed out.

Panikkar said that a major compulsion behind the attempt to change=20
the content of education was to realise the communal objective of=20
creating a Hindu national identity and a sense of national pride. In=20
this context, Panikkar quoted an article written by NCERT Director=20
J.S. Rajput in the Journal of Value Education, which says: "A sense=20
of belonging must be developed in every individual learner by=20
focussing on India's contribution to world civilisation. It is high=20
time that India's contribution in areas like mathematics, sciences,=20
maritime, medicine, trade, architecture, sculpture, establishment of=20
institutions of learning was emphasised and made known to the=20
learners in order to develop a sense of belonging to the nation with=20
respect and an attachment to the past." Panikkar described the=20
discussion document that preceded the NCF as being full of unfettered=20
nostalgia and proffering an "indigenous" curriculum.

Pointing out that training in citizenship was an integral part of=20
value education in all countries, Panikkar said such education in the=20
Indian context should be rooted in secularism and democracy. However,=20
the NCF's prescription was totally devoid of such political content,=20
he said, and argued that it was a deliberate attempt to foster a=20
national identity derived from religious consciousness and not a=20
secular and composite consciousness. The UGC's Hinduism-oriented=20
courses and the kind of value education the NCERT sought to promote=20
were both part of the wider political project of the BJP-RSS combine,=20
he said.

The changes in the content of education, Panikkar said, were planned=20
in a context of the unfettered entry of transnational capital. He=20
warned that there were grand plans to privatise education and make it=20
serve the needs of capital. According to Panikkar, industrialists=20
Mukesh Ambani and Kumarmangalam Birla have prepared a report on=20
educational reforms (called the Birla-Ambani report), prescribing a=20
market-led and knowledge-driven economy. The state's role, if any,=20
was minimal in the industrialists' scheme of things, he said. He=20
noted that there was essentially a convergence of interests of=20
globalisation and communalisation in that both were opposed to=20
plurality.

Prof. Romila Thapar warned that those who refused to understand the=20
past ended up misunderstanding the present. She criticised the NDA=20
government for setting aside significant events in its obsession with=20
the "Vedic capsule". Absence of rational critical enquiry=20
characterised the policymakers in education today, she said. There=20
was no pedagogical relevance for either yogic consciousness or the=20
spiritual quotient. "These are frills and cannot form the core of=20
knowledge," she said. By giving a single definition to Indian culture=20
and society and by projecting it through the educational system, the=20
Sangh Parivar went fundamentally against the experience of both the=20
past and the present, she argued.

Romila Thapar felt that secularists and others had probably treated=20
the term 'secularism" casually but today there was a need to be=20
constantly alert because Indian society could survive only by=20
practising secularism. The education policy could not be held to=20
ransom by politicians and bureaucrats, she said, and demanded that=20
the names of those who had drafted the NCF be made public.=20
"Educational needs had to be professionally examined and=20
professionally worked out," she said. She emphasised that the=20
education policy should be based on a sensitive understanding of the=20
Centre-region interface because a single syllabus for the entire=20
nation would not work even in States with high literacy levels.=20
Schooling and curriculum should relate not only to local needs and=20
ethos but also to the wider needs of the country, she added.

Speaking on the impact of communalisation on institutions, Prof. C.T.=20
Kurien, Chairperson of the Madras Institute of Development Studies,=20
and Kapila Vatsayan, former Chairperson of the Indira Gandhi National=20
Centre for the Arts, stressed the need to recognise the principles of=20
diversity and democracy in educational institutions. A.G. Noorani=20
condemned the government's totalitarian outlook which, he said, was=20
reflected in its systematic attempt to pack all institutions,=20
including the judiciary, with "its own people".

Rooprekha Verma, former Vice-Chancellor of Lucknow University, said=20
the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), the student wing of=20
the BJP, had sought to pressure her into renaming the university=20
after RSS leader Balasaheb Deoras. Criticising the UGC's decision to=20
introduce astrology courses in universities, physicist T. Jayaraman=20
demanded that the list of experts who recommended this move be made=20
public. Vasanthi Devi said that history had become the greatest=20
casualty in the cyber age. The communalisation of history amounted to=20
the rejection of history, she said. Arjun Dev, former Head of the=20
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, NCERT, criticised the=20
undemocratic genesis and character of the NCF.

In the past, criticism has failed to make the NDA government rethink=20
its policy decisions in the matter of education. It remains to be=20
seen whether the Sahmat convention will effect a change in the trend.

Copyrights =A9 2001, Frontline.

_________

4.

The Hindu
Wednesday, August 22, 2001
Editorial

THE PM'S SAFFRON YEARNINGS

TRUE TO HIS habit of flaunting his ``swayamsevak'' credentials and=20
harking back to the Hindutva ideology whenever the exigencies -=20
whether political or personal - warranted it, the Prime Minister, Mr.=20
Atal Behari Vajpayee, has yet again regrettably eulogised the RSS and=20
echoed its anti-minority sentiments by questioning the bona fides of=20
the Christian missionaries. The blatantly unapologetic display of his=20
Hindutva identity this time round is to be seen in the context of the=20
forthcoming Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh where the BJP is=20
hopelessly placed and desperately wanting to keep the Sangh Parivar=20
cadre in good humour. As for the points Mr. Vajpayee has made about=20
the RSS, his drawing a parallel between criminal proceedings against=20
the Sangh activists (for their alleged involvement in the conspiracy=20
to assassinate Gandhiji) and those against the INA cadres is=20
outrageous and an insult to the sacrifices the latter had made for=20
the cause of national freedom. To depict the RSS as an apolitical,=20
socio-cultural outfit that is dedicated to public service - which is=20
what the Prime Minister's remarks amount to - is patently farcial, if=20
not ridiculous. The stark fact that the Sangh stands for a socially=20
pernicious exclusivist communal platform cannot be wished away or=20
obliterated by resorting to such deceptive portrayals.

Particularly worrisome against the backdrop of recent attacks on=20
religious minorities and their places of worship is Mr. Vajpayee's=20
disapproval of the ``conversion motive'' behind the community service=20
of Christian missionaries. Although one could perceive an anxiety on=20
his part to sound reasonable, as when he entered the caveat ``some''=20
(of the missionaries) and when he `conceded' the right of those=20
organisations to carry on such work, his insinuation is obvious. A=20
high-decibel campaign was orchestrated by the Sangh Parivar in the=20
wake of the ghastly killing of the Australian missionary, Graham=20
Staines, and his two sons in Orissa (1999) against what they called=20
``induced'' and ``forced'' conversions, with Mr. Vajpayee himself=20
calling for a ``national debate'', in an insensitive attempt to=20
deflect the focus from the hate campaign they had been running=20
systematically against the minority community as part of a gameplan=20
to make quick progress on the Hindutva agenda. Less than a year ago,=20
the RSS chief, Mr. K. S. Sudarshan, had rather provocatively called=20
for an ``indigenisation of the church'' and declared that the=20
minority communities could have a ``sense of belonging'' only when=20
they integrated themselves with the ``culture of the land (read the=20
Hindu culture)''. Of course, the official BJP leadership was=20
compelled to distance itself from such an outrageous proposition=20
because of pressure from non-Sangh Parivar partners of the ruling=20
coalition.

In fact, the Prime Minister's latest aspersion on the Christian=20
missionaries, coming as it does in what appears to be a sequential=20
anti-minority campaign, lends further credence to the view that the=20
BJP in power as the head of the coalition is only playing its=20
scripted part, with the Sangh Parivar, especially the RSS, and the=20
other outfits such as the VHP and the Bajrang Dal executing their=20
respective roles in the grand Hindutva design. While Mr. Vajpayee and=20
the Home Minister, Mr. L. K. Advani, do off and on intone, dutifully=20
and in a ritualistic fashion, the Government's commitment to=20
upholding the country's secularist and pluralist traditions, they=20
very often betray their majoritarian bias by suggesting, through a=20
partisan and distorted representation of facts, that the minorities=20
were setting themselves up for trouble because of their=20
proselytisation or ``conspiratorial'' activities. What the BJP's real=20
designs are, become clear in the Centre's carefully-crafted plan to=20
saffronise the education system across the country. It is time the=20
seriousness of the threat, implied in the insidious game the BJP is=20
playing out (in tandem with other outfits of the Sangh Parivar), to=20
the country's secular and pluralistic fabric is realised by the=20
articulate sections of public opinion, particularly the non-Parivar=20
political leadership which sustains the Vajpayee regime.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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