[sacw] SACW #2 (30 August 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch No.2
30 August 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

[ Interruption Notice: The SACW Posts will be interrupted between the=20
period 31st August to 7th of September 2001]

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[1.] MB Naqvi on the upcoming Musharraf - Vajpayee jaw jaw session=20
in New York

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#1.

MB Naqvi Column

Karachi August 29:

Although the origins of the Indian change of mind to utilise the New
York visit of Premier A. B. Vajpayee for another jaw jaw session with
Pakistani military strongman Gen. Pervez Musharraf are not known here,
the prospect has concentrated the minds of many commentators here. They
have begun warning both leaders to avoid another fiasco like Agra=92s.
While some are euphoric at the mere prospect of another meeting --- the
resumption of the much needed dialogue --- others are steeling
themselves to the inevitable failure.

Insofar as the incurable optimists are concerned, little need be said.
Given half a chance, they would daydream of a successful parleys even at
this preliminary stage. As for the equally incurable pessimists, who
always emphasise that the glass is half-empty, again there is nothing
much to say. They would always foretell failure. Wouldn=92t they?

There are however some who hold that both success and failures are
possible. For success in Indo-Pakistan talks they think the precondition
is a change in mind sets in the two ruling political classes. Unless
this happens, they think the two sides will go on talking at each others
and getting angrier and angrier. Look at what happened at Agra. The
Indians thought that faced with a parlous economy and recognising the
change in the international situation, Musharraf would noticeably
dilute, if not change, Pakistan=92s traditional stance of prior
satisfaction on Kashmir before agreeing to more trade, more regional
cooperation and true normalisation with India. They proved wrong.

There are three perceived circumstances that tend to harden South
Block=92s position on such talks: Pakistan is perceived in New Delhi as a
weak, rickety and accident prone state with an economy teetering on the
brink of collapse. That confers on India a position of strength to
negotiate from. Secondly, Pakistan is internationally isolated; India=92s
burgeoning quasi-alignment with the US leaves no scope for Pakistan to
go on resisting Indian wishes on Kashmir. Thirdly, there is the
ineffable mischief of nuclear weapons: it has conferred on India an
arrogance of power; feeling invincible, it is hard for India to be
flexible.

But as it happened, what Musharraf said and did in India during his July
visit was contrary to Indian government=92s expectations. There are
several grounds for his hanging tough: nuclear capability has also gone
to Pakistanis heads; they too think their defences behind the nuclear
shield are unassailable. Secondly, there is a perception that on Kashmir
India is inherently in a weaker position: Pakistan=92s demand --- self
determination for Kashmiris --- plus India human rights record add to
Pakistan=92s negotiating strength. Thirdly, Pakistan=92s regime is a
national security regime par excellence; it does not fully comprehend
the economic or even political weaknesses of Pakistan. At a pinch, it is
prepared to go on being a broken back state but would not bend before
India. It also seems to have other assessments of its situation, either
its own or given by others.

These mind sets, so long as they remain unaltered, are incapable of
compromise and mutual accommodation. It so happens that the two
governments comprise forces that thrive on Indo-Pak enmity, originating
in India=92s historic Hindu Muslim Problem; in basics both are communalist
in their outlook and purpose.

What conclusions follow from this analysis of only a few analysts in
Pakistan? The Valhalla of an Indo-Pakistan rapprochement --- even one
between the two sets of political elites --- is long way off. Some
Indians think that Mr. Vajpayee is a statesman, in contradistinction to
being a BJP politician, and that he wants to see his name go down in
history as someone who achieved an apparently impossible task. It is
hard to assess personal motivations. But circumstances don=92t seem to
support this kind of supposition. Those Pakistanis who went to Agra have
come back with the impression that Mr. Vajpayee=92s position in India=92s
power system is vulnerable and that he could be vetoed.

But say a few: ah! You are ignoring the special character of
India-Pakistan relations. They are capable of even causing a nuclear
war, at one extreme, and they can sustain even the closest of
friendships if only there is statesmanship to realise the latter
potential at the other end. They say look at the way that Indian public
opinion and even the media were euphoric by the mere fact of the summit;
the BJP government was indeed taken by surprise at the upsurge of the
feeling that desired friendship. But these people are basically
optimists who think that since a possible foundation exists, someone
will build on it. All you have to do is to ask them: please identify any
leader on either side who is ready to make even a minor sacrifice for
this end? They all think they are hard-boiled players of power game.

The conclusion of perceptive realists is that these two horses are being
taken to the water in pursuit of America=92s leadership role in Asia and
there is not much likelihood that the two will actually drink. If indeed
it is a command performance there should be no hope --- look at the way
the South Block was sure that India=92s PM would have so very little time
at his disposal in New York that a meeting with Musharraf in the lifts
or canteens of the UN building will be most unlikely. But then suddenly
he seems to have found several days in New York --- within days. Could
this change be attributed to the US being almighty?

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