[sacw] SACW (28 Sept. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire
27 September 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

[ Interruption Notice: SACW posts will be interrupted during period=20
28-30 Sept. 2001]

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#1. Pakistan after Enduring Freedom
#2. Terrorism: Theirs and Ours (Eqbal Ahmad)
#3. Web site of the Global Vigil for Peace (October 2, 2001)

________________________

#1.

Business Standard, September 27, 2001

Pakistan after Enduring Freedom

Bharat Bhushan

One might wonder what made General Pervez Musharraf so nervous while=20
addressing the Pakistani nation on television that he had to summon=20
almost every weapon in his arsenal. If he was at pains to show that=20
Prophet Mohammed was a strategic thinker - - aligning tactically=20
with the Jews one day and the Kafirs the next to protect Islam - -=20
he also took his anti-India rhetoric to new heights. However, the=20
answer to what was on the General's mind may lie in asking what this=20
region might look like once America's 'Operation Enduring Freedom'=20
gets under way.

If the anti-American and pro-Osama Bin Laden street demonstrations in=20
Pakistan are anything to go by, then it is quite possible that a new=20
dynamic may unfold in that country after the death-count in the war=20
against terrorism goes up. This is assuming, of course, that the=20
demonstrators did not have the tacit encouragement of a regime in a=20
negotiating mode with the US. But one is still be tempted to ask what=20
kind of Pakistan would emerge from this mess?

To satisfy American public opinion and keep his approval rating high,=20
President Bush might inflict exemplary damage on the terrorists and=20
their supporters. In the absence of clearly identified economic or=20
strategic targets, this would mean aiming for a death count which=20
is four to five times that of New York, Washington and Pennsylvania=20
put together - - say, roughly 25,000 to 35,000. Afghanistan alone can=20
not make up these numbers.

The war against terrorism, therefore, would have to move to other=20
countries. At that point, despite US disclaimers, the Islamic=20
fundamentalists in Pakistan will see this as a war against Islam. As=20
the anger of indigenous jehadis turns inwards, Pakistan would=20
witness intense internal strife. This must be General Musharraf's=20
worst nightmare as this can lead to his ouster - - not by the Islamic=20
fundamentalist mobs but by the army itself which will find its=20
policies targeted and its legitimacy eroding.

However, several factors militate against this alarmist scenario.=20
There is no force in Pakistan - - jehadi or non-jehadi - - which can=20
take on the Pakistan army which remains a highly disciplined and=20
cohesive force. There may be Islamic fundamentalists elements within=20
it but one does not know how deep the divisions are. It may not=20
split easily.

Even more importantly, as long as the compact between the Punjabis=20
and the Pakistan army continues, the country will not become=20
unstable. The Punjabis form nearly two-thirds of the population but=20
have disproportionately high representation in the army and its=20
officer corps. They, along with the army, see themselves as the real=20
repositories of Pakistani nationalism.

The only significant civilian strife that can take place in Pakistan=20
could be in the form of insurgency limited to its peripheral=20
sub-nationalities - - in the North West Frontier Province,=20
Balochistan and perhaps even in Sindh. These are the areas where=20
pro-Osama demonstrations have taken place recently. It is no accident=20
that no such agitation has taken place in Pakistan Punjab.

Another scenario could be that after the US operations in Afghanistan=20
are over, the angry indigenous jehadis of Pakistan are diverted=20
towards Kashmir by telling them that the real war against the=20
infidels lies there. This, of course, would be India's nightmare=20
scenario. However, this would present a danger to the rest of the=20
world too. Those fighting terrorism would eventually realise that the=20
concept of jehad is not limited by national boundaries and that the=20
international alliance against terrorism cannot sustain itself if it=20
is to fight only terrorism directed against America and not against=20
others.

Consider now a non-doomsday scenario. The US limits itself to=20
removing only the top leadership of the Taliban and destroying Osama=20
Bin Laden and his organisation. Once Mulla Omar and his immediate=20
coterie are gone, the other Taliban commanders are bought over - -=20
a well-established practice in the Afghan conflict. The deposed=20
Afghan King, Zahir Shah is brought back and with the help of the=20
international community a coalition government is put together which=20
represents not only the Uzbeks, the Tajiks and the Hazaras of the=20
Northern Alliance but also the Pushtoons through the remnants of the=20
Taliban.

In such a scenario, the US avoids an unnecessary blood bath and does=20
not go against Pakistani interests. Although Pakistan has been=20
harping on how it is against changing the government in Kabul, it=20
must be resigned to the fact by now that it has no choice but to=20
allow the the top Taliban leadership to be sacrificed. Having what=20
remains of the Taliban as part of a coalition government in Kabul=20
would at least allow it some strategic space in Afghanistan. Pakistan=20
would also be happy to see Osama Bin Laden being removed as he had=20
become a parallel influence to theirs on the Taliban.

The extreme votaries of radical Islam would perhaps continue to find=20
support in the Kandahar-Jalalabad-NWFP-Balochistan belt. The=20
establishments of the day in Afghanistan and Pakistan will have to=20
learn to deal with insurgents in their respective regions. The=20
militancy in Kashmir can also continue as before with the support of=20
the Punjabis and the Pakistan army.

All this, of course, would depend on how the emerging political=20
processes are managed by the main actors in the global war against=20
terrorism, including Pakistan and India. Only an ass or Nostradamus=20
would dare to predict the future.

_________

#2.

Terrorism: Theirs and Ours
By Eqbal Ahmad

(A Presentation at the University of Colorado, Boulder, October 12, 1998)

Eqbal Ahmad , Professor Emeritus of International Relations and=20
Middle Eastern Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst,=20
Massachusetts, also served as a managing editor of the quarterly Race=20
and Class. A prolific writer, his articles and essays have been=20
published in The Nation, Dawn (Pakistan), among several other=20
journals throughout the world. He died in 1999.

In the 1930s and 1940s, the Jewish underground in Palestine was=20
described a "terrorist." Then new things happened. By 1942, the=20
Holocaust was occurring, and a certain liberal sympathy with the=20
Jewish people had built up in the Western world. At that point, the=20
terrorists of Palestine, who were Zionists, suddenly started to be=20
described, by 1944-45, as "freedom fighters." At least two Israeli=20
Prime Ministers, including Menachem Begin, have actually, you can=20
find in the books and posters with their pictures, saying=20
"Terrorists, Reward This Much." The highest reward I have noted so=20
far was 100,000 British pounds on the head of Menachem Begin, the=20
terrorist. Then from 1969 to 1990 the PLO, the Palestine Liberation=20
Organization, occupied the center stage as the terrorist=20
organization. Yasir Arafat has been described repeatedly by the great=20
sage of American journalism, William Safire of the New York Times, as=20
the "Chief of Terrorism."

That"s Yasir Arafat. Now, on September 29, 1998, I was rather amused=20
to notice a picture of Yasir Arafat to the right of President Bill=20
Clinton. To his left is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.=20
Clinton is looking towards Arafat and Arafat is looking literally=20
like a meek mouse. Just a few years earlier he used to appear with=20
this very menacing look around him, with a gun appearing menacing=20
from his belt. You remember those pictures, and you remember the next=20
one.

In 1985, President Ronald Reagan received a group of bearded men.=20
These bearded men I was writing about in those days in The New Yorker=20
, actually did. They were very ferocious-looking bearded men with=20
turbans looking like they came from another century. President Reagan=20
received them in the White House. After receiving them he spoke to=20
the press. He pointed towards them, I'm sure some of you will recall=20
that moment, and said, "These are the moral equivalent of America's=20
founding fathers". These were the Afghan Mujahiddin. They were at the=20
time, guns in hand, battling the Evil Empire. They were the moral=20
equivalent of our founding fathers! In August 1998, another American=20
President ordered missile strikes from the American navy based in the=20
Indian Ocean to kill Osama Bin Laden and his men in the camps in=20
Afghanistan. I do not wish to embarrass you with the reminder that=20
Mr. Bin Laden, whom fifteen American missiles were fired to hit in=20
Afghanistan, was only a few years ago the moral equivalent of George=20
Washington and Thomas Jefferson! He got angry over the fact that he=20
has been demoted from "Moral Equivalent" of your "Founding Fathers".=20
So he is taking out his anger in different ways. I'll come back to=20
that subject more seriously in a moment. You see, why I have recalled=20
all these stories is to point out to you that the matter of terrorism=20
is rather complicated.

Terrorists change. The terrorist of yesterday is the hero of today,=20
and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today. This is a=20
serious matter of the constantly changing world of images in which we=20
have to keep our heads straight to know what is terrorism and what is=20
not. But more importantly, to know what causes it, and how to stop=20
it. The next point about our terrorism is that posture of=20
inconsistency necessarily evades definition. If you are not going to=20
be consistent, you're not going to define. I have examined at least=20
twenty official documents on terrorism. Not one defines the word. All=20
of them explain it, express it emotively, polemically, to arouse our=20
emotions rather than exercise our intelligence. I give you only one=20
example, which is representative. October 25, 1984. George Shultz,=20
then Secretary of State of the U.S., is speaking at the New York Park=20
Avenue Synagogue. It's a long speech on terrorism. In the State=20
Department Bulletin of seven single-spaced pages, there is not a=20
single definition of terrorism.

What we get is the following: Definition number one: "Terrorism is a=20
modern barbarism that we call terrorism." Definition number two is=20
even more brilliant: "Terrorism is a form of political violence."=20
Aren't you surprised? It is a form of political violence, says George=20
Shultz, Secretary of State of the U.S. Number three: "Terrorism is a=20
threat to Western civilization." Number four: "Terrorism is a menace=20
to Western moral values." Did you notice, does it tell you anything=20
other than arouse your emotions? This is typical. They don't define=20
terrorism because definitions involve a commitment to analysis,=20
comprehension and adherence to some norms of consistency. That's the=20
second characteristic of the official literature on terrorism.

The third characteristic is that the absence of definition does not=20
prevent officials from being globalistic. We may not define=20
terrorism, but it is a menace to the moral values of Western=20
civilization. It is a menace also to mankind. It's a menace to good=20
order. Therefore, you must stamp it out worldwide. Our reach has to=20
be global. You need a global reach to kill it. Anti-terrorist=20
policies therefore have to be global. Same speech of George Shultz:=20
"There is no question about our ability to use force where and when=20
it is needed to counter terrorism." There is no geographical limit.=20
On a single day the missiles hit Afghanistan and Sudan. Those two=20
countries are 2,300 miles apart, and they were hit by missiles=20
belonging to a country roughly 8,000 miles away. Reach is global.

A fourth characteristic: claims of power are not only globalist they=20
are also omniscient. We know where they are; therefore we know where=20
to hit. We have the means to know. We have the instruments of=20
knowledge. We are omniscient. Shultz: "We know the difference between=20
terrorists and freedom fighters, and as we look around, we have no=20
trouble telling one from the other."!!!!!! Only Osama Bin Laden=20
doesn't know that he was an ally one day and an enemy another. That's=20
very confusing for Osama Bin Laden. I'll come back to his story=20
towards the end. It's a real story. Five. The official approach=20
eschews causation. You don't look at causes of anybody becoming=20
terrorist. Cause? What cause? They ask us to be looking, to be=20
sympathetic to these people. Another example. The New York Times=20
December 18, 1985, reported that the foreign minister of Yugoslavia,=20
you remember the days when there was a Yugoslavia, requested the=20
Secretary of State of the U.S. to consider the causes of Palestinian=20
terrorism. The Secretary of State, George Shultz, and I am quoting=20
from the New York Times , "went a bit red in the face. He pounded the=20
table and told the visiting foreign minister, there is no connection=20
with any cause. Period." Why look for causes?

Number six. The moral revulsion that we must feel against terrorism=20
is selective. We are to feel the terror of those groups, which are=20
officially disapproved. We are to applaud the terror of those groups=20
of whom officials do approve. Hence, President Reagan, "I am a=20
contra." He actually said that. We know the contras of Nicaragua were=20
anything, by any definition, but terrorists. The media, to move away=20
from the officials, heed the dominant view of terrorism. The dominant=20
approach also excludes from consideration, more importantly to me,=20
the terror of friendly governments. To that question I will return=20
because it excused among others the terror of Pinochet (who killed=20
one of my closest friends) and Orlando Letelier; and it excused the=20
terror of Zia-ul-Haq, who killed many of my friends in Pakistan. All=20
I want to tell you is that according to my ignorant calculations, the=20
ratio of people killed by the state terror of Zia-ul-Haq, Pinochet,=20
Argentinian, Brazilian, Indonesian type, versus the killing of the=20
PLO and other terrorist types is literally, conservatively, one to=20
one hundred thousand. That's the ratio. History unfortunately=20
recognizes and accords visibility to power and not to weakness.=20
Therefore, visibility has been accorded historically to dominant=20
groups. In our time, the time that began with this day, Columbus Day.=20
The time that begins with Columbus Day is a time of extraordinary=20
unrecorded holocausts. Great civilizations have been wiped out.

The Mayas, the Incas, the Aztecs, the American Indians, the Canadian=20
Indians were all wiped out. Their voices have not been heard, even to=20
this day fully. Now they are beginning to be heard, but not fully.=20
They are heard, yes, but only when the dominant power suffers, only=20
when resistance has a semblance of costing, of exacting a price. When=20
a Custer is killed or when a Gordon is besieged. That's when you know=20
that they were Indians fighting, Arabs fighting and dying. My last=20
point of this section: U.S. policy in the Cold War period has=20
sponsored terrorist regimes one after another. Somoza, Batista, all=20
kinds of tyrants have been America's friends. You know that. There=20
was a reason for that. I or you are not guilty. Nicaragua, contra.=20
Afghanistan, mujahiddin. El Salvador, etc. Now the second side.=20
You've suffered enough. So suffer more. There ain't much good on the=20
other side either. You shouldn't imagine that I have come to praise=20
the other side. But keep the balance in mind. Keep the imbalance in=20
mind and first ask ourselves, What is terrorism? Our first job should=20
be to define the damn thing, name it, give it a description of some=20
kind, other than "moral uivalent of founding fathers" or "a moral=20
outrage to Western civilization". I will stay with you with Webster's=20
Collegiate Dictionary: "Terror is an intense, overpowering fear." He=20
uses terrorizing, terrorism, "the use of terrorizing methods of=20
governing or resisting a government." This simple definition has one=20
great virtue, that of fairness. It's fair. It focuses on the use of=20
coercive violence, violence that is used illegally,=20
extra-constitutionally, to coerce. And this definition is correct=20
because it treats terror for what it is, whether the government or=20
private people commit it. Have you noticed something? Motivation is=20
left out of it. We're not talking about whether the cause is just or=20
unjust. We're talking about consensus, consent, absence of consent,=20
legality, absence of legality, constitutionality, absence of=20
constitutionality. Why do we keep motives out? Because motives=20
differ. Motives differ and make no difference. I have identified in=20
my work five types of terrorism. First, state terrorism. Second,=20
religious terrorism ; terrorism inspired by religion, Catholics=20
killing Protestants, Sunnis killing Shiites, Shiites killing Sunnis,=20
God, religion, sacred terror, you can call it if you wish. State,=20
church. Crime. Mafia. All kinds of crimes commit terror.

There is pathology. You're pathological. You're sick. You want the=20
attention of the whole world. You've got to kill a president. You=20
will. You terrorize. You hold up a bus. Fifth, there is political=20
terror of the private group; be they Indian, Vietnamese, Algerian,=20
Palestinian, Baader-Meinhof, the Red Brigade. Political terror of the=20
private group. Oppositional terror. Keep these five in mind. Keep in=20
mind one more thing. Sometimes these five can converge on each other.=20
You start with protest terror. You go crazy. You become pathological.=20
You continue. They converge. State terror can take the form of=20
private terror. For example, we're all familiar with the death squads=20
in Latin America or in Pakistan. Government has employed private=20
people to kill its opponents. It's not quite official. It's=20
privatized. Convergence. Or the political terrorist who goes crazy=20
and becomes pathological. Or the criminal who joins politics. In=20
Afghanistan, in Central America, the CIA employed in its covert=20
operations drug pushers. Drugs and guns often go together. Smuggling=20
of all things often go together. Of the five types of terror, the=20
focus is on only one, the least important in terms of cost to human=20
lives and human property [Political Terror of those who want to be=20
heard]. The highest cost is state terror. The second highest cost is=20
religious terror, although in the twentieth century religious terror=20
has, relatively speaking, declined. If you are looking historically,=20
massive costs. The next highest cost is crime. Next highest,=20
pathology. A Rand Corporation study by Brian Jenkins, for a ten-year=20
period up to 1988, showed 50% of terror was committed without any=20
political cause at all. No politics. Simply crime and pathology. So=20
the focus is on only one, the political terrorist, the PLO, the Bin=20
Laden, whoever you want to take. Why do they do it? What makes the=20
terrorist tick? I would like to knock them out quickly to you.

First, the need to be heard. Imagine, we are dealing with a minority=20
group, the political, private terrorist. First, the need to be heard.=20
Normally, and there are exceptions, there is an effort to be heard,=20
to get your grievances heard by people. They're not hearing it. A=20
minority acts. The majority applauds. The Palestinians, for example,=20
the super terrorists of our time, were dispossessed in 1948. From=20
1948 to 1968 they went to every court in the world. They knocked at=20
every door in the world. They were told that they became dispossessed=20
because some radio told them to go away-an Arab radio, which was a=20
lie. Nobody was listening to the truth. Finally, they invented a new=20
form of terror, literally their invention: the airplane hijacking.=20
Between 1968 and 1975 they pulled the world up by its ears. They=20
dragged us out and said, Listen, Listen. We listened. We still=20
haven't done them justice, but at least we all know. Even the=20
Israelis acknowledge. Remember Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel,=20
saying in 1970, "There are no Palestinians." They do not exist. They=20
damn well exist now. W e are cheating them at Oslo. At least there=20
are some people to cheat now. We can't just push them out. The need=20
to be heard is essential. One motivation there. Mix of anger and=20
helplessness produces an urge to strike out. You are angry. You are=20
feeling helpless. You want retribution. You want to wreak retributive=20
justice. The experience of violence by a stronger party has=20
historically turned victims into terrorists. Battered children are=20
known to become abusive parents and violent adults. You know that.=20
That's what happens to peoples and nations. When they are battered,=20
they hit back. State terror very often breeds collective terror. Do=20
you recall the fact that the Jews were never terrorists? By and large=20
Jews were not known to commit terror except during and after the=20
Holocaust. Most studies show that the majority of members of the=20
worst terrorist groups in Israel or in Palestine, the Stern and the=20
Irgun gangs, were people who were immigrants from the most=20
anti-Semitic countries of Eastern Europe and Germany. Similarly, the=20
young Shiites of Lebanon or the lestinians from the refugee camps are=20
battered people. They become very violent.

The ghettos are violent internally. They become violent externally=20
when there is a clear, identifiable external target, an enemy where=20
you can say, "Yes, this one did it to me". Then they can strike back.=20
Example is a bad thing. Example spreads. There was a highly=20
publicized Beirut hijacking of the TWA plane. After that hijacking,=20
there were hijacking attempts at nine different American airports.=20
Pathological groups or individuals modeling on the others. Even more=20
serious are examples set by governments. When governments engage in=20
terror, they set very large examples. When they engage in supporting=20
terror, they engage in other sets of examples. Absence of=20
revolutionary ideology is central to victim terrorism.=20
Revolutionaries do not commit unthinking terror. Those of you who are=20
familiar with revolutionary theory know the debates, the disputes,=20
the quarrels, the fights within revolutionary groups of Europe, the=20
fight between anarchists and Marxists, for example. But the Marxists=20
have always argued that revolutionary terror, if ever engaged in,=20
must be sociologically and psychologically selective. Don't hijack a=20
plane. Don't hold hostages. Don't kill children, for God's sake. Have=20
you recalled also that the great revolutions, the Chinese, the=20
Vietnamese, the Algerian, the Cuban, never engaged in hijacking type=20
of terrorism? They did engage in terrorism, but it was highly=20
selective, highly sociological, still deplorable, but there was an=20
organized, highly limited, selective character to it. So absence of=20
revolutionary ideology that begins more or less in the post-World War=20
II period has been central to this phenomenon.

My final question is-These conditions have existed for a long time.=20
But why then this flurry of private political terrorism? Why now so=20
much of it and so visible? The answer is modern technology. You have=20
a cause. You can communicate it through radio and television. They=20
will all come swarming if you have taken an aircraft and are holding=20
150 Americans hostage. They will all hear your cause. You have a=20
modern weapon through which you can shoot a mile away. They can't=20
reach you. And you have the modern means of communicating. When you=20
put together the cause, the instrument of coercion and the instrument=20
of communication, politics is made. A new kind of politics becomes=20
possible. To this challenge rulers from one country after another=20
have been responding with traditional methods. The traditional method=20
of shooting it out, whether it's missiles or some other means. The=20
Israelis are very proud of it. The Americans are very proud of it.=20
The French became very proud of it. Now the Pakistanis are very proud=20
of it. The Pakistanis say, "Our commandos are the best." Frankly, it=20
won't work.

A central problem of our time are the political minds, rooted in the=20
past, and modern times, producing new realities. Therefore in=20
conclusion, what is my recommendation to America? Quickly. First,=20
avoid extremes of double standards. If you're going to practice=20
double standards, you will be paid with double standards. Don't use=20
it. Don't condone Israeli terror, Pakistani terror, Nicaraguan=20
terror, El Salvadoran terror, on the one hand, and then complain=20
about Afghan terror or Palestinian terror. It doesn't work. Try to be=20
even-handed. A superpower cannot promote terror in one place and=20
reasonably expect to discourage terrorism in another place. It won't=20
work in this shrunken world. Do not condone the terror of your=20
allies. Condemn them. Fight them. Punish them. Please eschew, avoid=20
covert operations and low-intensity warfare. These are breeding=20
grounds of terror and drugs. Violence and drugs are bred there. The=20
structure of covert operations, I've made a film about it, which has=20
been very popular in Europe, called Dealing with the Demon ..

I have shown that wherever covert operations have been, there has=20
been the central drug problem. That has been also the center of the=20
drug trade. Because the structure of covert operations, Afghanistan,=20
Vietnam, Nicaragua, Central America, is very hospitable to drug=20
trade. Avoid it. Give it up. It doesn't help. Please focus on causes=20
and help ameliorate causes. Try to look at causes and solve problems.=20
Do not centrate on military solutions. Do not seek military=20
solutions. Terrorism is a political problem. Seek political=20
solutions. Diplomacy works. Take the example of the last attack on=20
Bin Laden. You don't know what you're attacking. They say they know,=20
but they don't know. They were trying to kill Qadaffi. They killed=20
his four-year-old daughter. The poor baby hadn't done anything.=20
Qadaffi is still alive. They tried to kill Saddam Hussein. They=20
killed Laila Bin Attar, a prominent artist, an innocent woman. They=20
tried to kill Bin Laden and his men. Not one but twenty-five other=20
people died. They tried to destroy a chemical factory in Sudan. Now=20
they are admitting that they destroyed an innocent factory, one-half=20
of the production of medicine in Sudan has been destroyed, not a=20
chemical factory. You don't know. You think you know. Four of your=20
missiles fell in Pakistan. One was slightly damaged. Two were totally=20
damaged. One was totally intact. For ten years the American=20
government has kept an embargo on Pakistan because Pakistan is=20
trying, stupidly, to build nuclear weapons and missiles. So we have a=20
technology embargo on my country. One of the missiles was intact.=20
What do you think a Pakistani official told the Washington Post? He=20
said it was a gift from Allah. We wanted U.S. technology. Now we have=20
got the technology, and our scientists are examining this missile=20
very carefully. It fell into the wrong hands. So don't do that. Look=20
for political solutions. Do not look for military solutions. They=20
cause more problems than they solve. Please help reinforce,=20
strengthen the framework of international law. There was a criminal=20
court in Rome. Why didn't they go to it first to get their warrant=20
against Bin Laden, if they have some evidence? Get a warrant, then go=20
after him. Internationally. Enforce the U.N. Enforce the=20
International Court of Justice, this unilateralism makes us look very=20
stupid and them relatively smaller. Q&A The question here is that I=20
mentioned that I would go somewhat into the story of Bin Laden, the=20
Saudi in Afghanistan and didn't do so, could I go into some detail?=20
The point about Bin Laden would be roughly the same as the point=20
between Sheikh Abdul Rahman, who was accused and convicted of=20
encouraging the blowing up of the World Trade Center in New York=20
City. The New Yorker did a long story on him. It's the same as that=20
of Aimal Kansi, the Pakistani Baluch who was also convicted of the=20
murder of two CIA agents.

Let me see if I can be very short on this. Jihad, which has been=20
translated a thousand times as "holy war," is not quite just that.=20
Jihad is an Arabic word that means, "to struggle." It could be=20
struggle by violence or struggle by non-violent means. There are two=20
forms, the small jihad and the big jihad. The small jihad involves=20
violence. The big jihad involves the struggles with self. Those are=20
the concepts. The reason I mention it is that in Islamic history,=20
jihad as an international violent phenomenon had disappeared in the=20
last four hundred years, for all practical purposes. It was revived=20
suddenly with American help in the 1980s. When the Soviet Union=20
intervened in Afghanistan, Zia ul-Haq, the military dictator of=20
Pakistan, which borders on Afghanistan, saw an opportunity and=20
launched a jihad there against godless communism. The U.S. saw a=20
God-sent opportunity to mobilize one billion Muslims against what=20
Reagan called the Evil Empire. Money started pouring in. CIA agents=20
starting going all over the Muslim world recruiting people to fight=20
in the great jihad. Bin Laden was one of the early prize recruits. He=20
was not only an Arab. He was also a Saudi. He was not only a Saudi.=20
He was also a multimillionaire, willing to put his own money into the=20
matter. Bin Laden went around recruiting people for the jihad against=20
communism. I first met him in 1986. He was recommended to me by an=20
American official of whom I do not know whether he was or was not an=20
agent. I was talking to him and said, "Who are the Arabs here who=20
would be very interesting?" By here I meant in Afghanistan and=20
Pakistan He said, "You must meet Osama." I went to see Osama. There=20
he was, rich, bringing in recruits from Algeria, from Sudan, from=20
Egypt, just like Sheikh Abdul Rahman. This fellow was an ally. He=20
remained an ally. He turns at a particular moment. In 1990 the U.S.=20
goes into Saudi Arabia with forces. Saudi Arabia is the holy place of=20
Muslims, Mecca and Medina. There had never been foreign troops there.=20
In 1990, during the Gulf War, they went in, in the name of helping=20
Saudi Arabia defeat Saddam Hussein. Osama Bin Laden remained quiet.=20
Saddam was defeated, but the American troops stayed on in the land of=20
the kaba (the sacred site of Islam in Mecca), foreign troops. He=20
wrote letter after letter saying, Why are you here? Get out! You came=20
to help but you have stayed on. Finally he started a jihad against=20
the other occupiers. His mission is to get American troops out of=20
Saudi Arabia. His earlier mission was to get Russian troops out of=20
Afghanistan. See what I was saying earlier about covert operations? A=20
second point to be made about him is these are tribal people, people=20
who are really tribal. Being a millionaire doesn't matter. Their code=20
of ethics is tribal. The tribal code of ethics consists of two words:=20
loyalty and revenge. You are my friend. You keep your word. I am=20
loyal to you. You break your word, I go on my path of revenge. For=20
him, America has broken its word. The loyal friend has betrayed. The=20
one to whom you swore blood loyalty has betrayed you. They're going=20
to go for you. They're going to do a lot more. These are the chickens=20
of the Afghanistan war coming home to roost. This is why I said to=20
stop covert operations. There is a price attached to those that the=20
American people cannot calculate and Kissinger type of people do not=20
know, don't have the history to know.

______

#3. The web site of the Global Vigil for Peace (October 2, 2001) is=20
now functional
You can access it at : http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/vigil/.

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