[sacw] SACW #1. (03 Oct. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
03 October 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

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#1. Pakistanis' self-assessment (M B Naqvi)
#2. Pakistan Peace Coalition Condemns Car Bomb Attack in Srinagar
#3. 'Islamabad should reciprocate'
#4. Important book : Making Enemies, Creating Conflict: Pakistan's=20
Crises of State & Society
#5. Chomsky Interview on War and Crime

________________________

#1.

The News International
Wednesday October 03, 2001

Pakistanis' self-assessment
by M B Naqvi
The writer is a well-known journalist and freelance columnist

It is about time that Pakistanis took stock of their situation,=20
making a dead reckoning. There is common realisation that military=20
captains of this ship have ran it aground: the captain today is=20
defending are not his own; he was left no option. Some sort of a=20
major corrective action is needed for which we all should examine=20
what has gone wrong.

The immediate provocation was the apparent crisis resulting from the=20
emerging signs of Islamabad's divergence from the Americans over the=20
fate of Taliban regime: Uncle Sam would like to see Northern=20
Alliance, with some help, defeat and replace Taliban. Pakistan has=20
warned of dire consequences if this were to happen. Having agreed to=20
"full cooperation" with the US - the only feasible thing to do - it=20
was a little odd for Pakistani leadership to later disagree with the=20
US knowing that the initiative is not with them and their opposition=20
is unlikely to be decisive. Perhaps it was damage limitation, a sort=20
of political rearguard action.

To be sure, Pakistan's failures or ineffectiveness characterise all=20
major fields of endeavour. Take Kashmir, the core issue that has=20
determined most policies since virtually the beginning. This=20
preoccupation has cost the country dear. The rise of the military's=20
influence and power in politics is largely the consequence of Kashmir=20
being called the main national cause. That democracy collapsed is not=20
unrelated to the rise of generals' prestige. The country has become=20
bankrupt largely because of Kashmir. Pakistan went nuclear chiefly=20
because of it. Pakistan continues to run the risk of being declared a=20
terrorist state; except for the post-September 11 weeks, it has been=20
badly isolated. The list goes on.

And yet Kashmir is still, 53 years on, firmly in Indian control. It=20
can now be asserted that following the thoughtless and rather=20
emotional decision to go nuclear, the old India-Pakistan dispute over=20
J&K State has been frozen dead. If the theory of deterrence works,=20
neither side can take a military initiative in any situation (for=20
fear of the other's nukes). And if it fails, a war would break out=20
and, on the basis of Pakistan's oft-repeated doctrine of first=20
strike, a nuclear exchange will ensue. That will render the Kashmir=20
issue irrelevant, beside much else. The outlook for 'Kashmir becoming=20
Pakistan' is bleak.

Pakistanis, as a nation-to-be, have been quite unlucky. They have=20
been, over 54 years, unable to evolve a consensus on what kind of=20
state they want to have. Constitution making has been a long and=20
frustrating affair; they are still divided over what kind of a=20
constitution will suit them. Democracy continues to elude. It broke=20
down in the first seven years and 140 million people have not been=20
able to put this humpty dumpty together since. A general is still=20
ruling them and if President George W Bush succeeds in stabilising=20
the presidency of General Pervez Musharraf, as he claims he wants to,=20
then they may have 10 more years of the general, as all US-supported=20
generals lasted 10 years at least.

In consequence Pakistanis have low self-esteem. Long before September=20
11 this year, carrying the green passport entitled one more to=20
hostile stares, suspicion and some unfriendly discrimination at all=20
airports and sometimes even in flights. During cold war Pakistanis=20
were contemptuously looked down upon as stooges of America. Few=20
sensitive Pakistanis can forget their experiences at international=20
conferences with third world representatives. Pakistanis low=20
self-esteem has many causes, ranging from what they made of the=20
opportunities provided by independence. Pakistan's instability was a=20
byword - made more conspicuous by India's stable political system=20
next door. Series of military coups, apart from rending national=20
unity and integrity, did not fail to diminish aware citizens.

At one time, World Bank proclaimed Pakistan to be a 'model developing=20
country'. Well, one of its dictators celebrated a Decade of=20
Development. Insofar as the number of mills and factories,=20
irrespective of their efficiency and productivity, goes, a fair=20
number have been set up. Some agricultural growth is undeniable,=20
though a lot of it was dependent on subsidised imports of modern=20
inputs and machinery and of course weather. But look at the state of=20
the economy today. The first whiff of real competition saw some 50=20
percent or more of industrial units shut down. Today, with maximum=20
exports of $9 billion, Pakistan goes on importing up to $12 billion=20
worth of goods and services. It has to service an annual debt burden=20
of $6 to 7 billion plus some hidden expenditures. No wonder, the=20
country has been living on IMF bailouts and looks unable to get out=20
of this rut.

There were scenes of mass jubilation over the 'achievement' of=20
exploding six nuclear bombs in reply to India's five in May '98.=20
Nuclear weapons now need protection; Musharraf had had to seek=20
protection from the US in its likely campaign against Taliban. What a=20
contrast from the exultations of that year. Instead of being the=20
bedrock of Pakistan's prowess and security that should deter others,=20
the security of strategic assets has to be requested from outsiders.=20
Strategic assets, indeed! They can do nothing for Pakistan - in=20
Kashmir or in an accidental war. The mere upkeep of these useless=20
toys is sure to be costing a pretty penny. And to what end?

Pakistanis have paid for America's 1980s Islamic Jehad in Afghanistan=20
through the nose in the shape of heroin and gun culture, over two=20
million refugees who did not go back, a rich crop of armed Jehadi=20
militias and the whole politics having become topsy-turvy with a=20
dangerous symbiosis having developed between the Army and the=20
Jehadis. The religious Right has been given undue influence and=20
prestige by the Army-coordinated Jehad in Kashmir that can still lead=20
the country to be declared a terrorist state.

What can be conceded is that the US did reward Pakistan with the=20
authority to make and break governments in Kabul. Pakistan after=20
experimenting with two Islamic governments finally installed Taliban.=20
Their politics has made Taliban the betes noirs of the whole=20
civilised world. Within Pakistan except for the Rightwing, including=20
a part of secular Right, nobody loves Taliban. Let no one forget that=20
Pakistani people never gave all the religious (Islamic orthodox)=20
parties more than 8 percent of their vote in six general elections.=20
Taliban and the Mullahs were however the darlings of the Generals -=20
for use as instrument of pressure on India to force it to negotiate=20
which had been refusing to do so for 10 years and may yet go on being=20
blind to Kashmiris' human rights. Pakistan's prowess is irrelevant to=20
any worthwhile purpose.

The simple and obvious point is that the Taliban experiment has=20
proved to be even more of a grievous mistake. They have put Pakistan=20
itself in jeopardy. If Musharraf had refused cooperation with the US=20
- specifically aimed at Taliban - Pakistan would have been the first=20
objective of the US-led war against terrorism. Even otherwise, it was=20
mighty unwise to have done what Pakistan has been doing since 1973 in=20
Afghanistan. Pakistan is an unstable third world country with a=20
rickety economy. It had no business becoming one of the big boys in=20
the renewed Great Game. An imperial role sites ill on an aid-addicted=20
second rank third world country. If only, Musharraf would get off=20
this hook - telling the truth as it is.

_______

#2.

Pakistan Peace Coalition Condemns Car Bomb Attack in Srinagar

Pakistan Peace Coalition strongly condemns the killing of several=20
unarmed innocent people in the suicide car bomb attack and firing=20
around the Assembly building in Srinagar yesterday. This is an=20
unpardonable act, to say the least.

Such acts of naked terror only serve to undermine the struggle of the=20
people of Kashmir and embarrass the democratic credentials of the=20
Hurriyat Conference leadership. At a time when the whole world is=20
condemning terrorism of all kinds, including state terrorism, this=20
action by a group of militants against unarmed civilians, no matter=20
if a couple of those killed were soldiers and police men, can only=20
evoke widespread condemnation.

In a statement issued in Karachi and appearing in the local press=20
today, the chief of a militant group has publicly claimed=20
responsibility for the bomb explosion in Srinagar, which killed so=20
many people. In the present national and international context, it=20
puts Pakistan in a most embarrassing situation.

The Government of Pakistan has done well in condemning the attack,=20
calling it an act of terrorism. While expressing our sympathy with=20
the families of the victims, we call upon the Government to take=20
immediate action against those responsible for this pointless act of=20
violence which has nothing to do with the struggle of the people of=20
Kashmir.

Karachi - 2nd October 2001

_______

#3.

The Times of India
3 October 2001

'Islamabad should reciprocate'
BY BHASKAR ROY

TIMES NEWS NETWORK

NEW DELHI: Former Pakistani finance minister Mubashir Hasan has=20
termed India's unilateral removal of visa and trade restrictions as a=20
major step towards normalisation of ties and feels Islamabad should=20
reciprocate the gesture.

On a visit here to meet some senior Indian politicians as part of an=20
effort to restart the peace process, Hasan told The Times of India=20
on Monday that it was important for both sides to sit across the=20
table and address the issue of terrorism.

"India and Pakistan must sit together and create conditions so that=20
terrorism is not nurtured," he said. "I think both countries are=20
keen to do that." Describing the tension in the aftermath of the=20
terrorist attacks in the US as a "temporary phase", he said there=20
was strong support among the Pakistani people for a peace initiative.

Hasan, who had discussed the situation with former Prime Minister I=20
K Gujral, was hopeful about the resumption of talks. "Forces which=20
are moving the two countries nearer are much too great for any=20
government to stop," he said.

Hasan felt that had there been any opposition from the peoples, the=20
governments would not have agreed to hold the summit meetings. "You=20
do not find people in the bazaars or on the campuses who say that=20
the conflict should go on."

Asked whether the proposed American campaign against terrorist=20
elements in Afghanistan had radically altered the situation, the=20
veteran politician said, "No genuine basis exists for aggravation of=20
tension between the two countries."

_______

#4.

Making Enemies, Creating Conflict: Pakistan's Crises of State and Society
Edited by Zia Mian and Iftikhar Ahmad

(Mashal Books, Lahore, 1997 )
English: Rs. 200 + postage

Also available in Urdu: DUSHMAN KI TALAASH
Urdu Ed: Zia Mian, Iftikhar Ahmed, Tr: Hasan Abidi
Urdu: Rs. 150 + postage

Available from:
Mashal Books=20
RB-5, Awami Complex, Usman Block,=20
New Garden Town, Lahore 54600, Pakistan.
Phone / Fax: 92 - 42 - 586 6859
E-mail: mashbks@b...
http://www.mashalbooks.com/order.html

_______

#5.

Noam Chomsky on War and Crime

Interview with Michael Albert, 9-30-01, edited.

(1) There has been an immense movement of troops and extreme use of
military rhetoric, up to comments about terminating governments, etc.
Yet, now there appears to be considerable restraint...what happened?

>From the first days after the attack, the Bush administration has=20
been warned by NATO leaders, specialists on the region, and=20
presumably its own intelligence agencies (not to speak of many people=20
like you and me) that if they react with a massive assault that kills=20
many innocent people, they will be fulfilling the ardent wishes of=20
bin Laden and others like him. That would be true -- perhaps even=20
more so -- if they happen to kill bin Laden, still without having=20
provided credible evidence of his involvement in the crimes of Sept.=20
11. He would then be perceived as a martyr even among the enormous=20
majority of Muslims who deplore those crimes, as bin Laden himself=20
has done, for what it is worth, denying any involvement in the crimes=20
or even knowledge of them, and with reference to these attacks,=20
condemning "the killing of innocent women, children, and other=20
humans" as an act that "Islam strictly forbids...even in the course=20
of a battle" (BBC, Sept. 29). His voice will continue to resound on=20
tens of thousands of cassettes already circulating throughout the=20
Muslim world, and in many interviews, including the last few days.=20
An assault that kills innocent Afghans would be virtually a call for=20
new recruits to the horrendous cause of the bin Laden network and=20
other graduates of the terrorist networks set up by the CIA and its=20
associates 20 years ago to fight a Holy War against the Russians,=20
meanwhile following their own agenda.

The message appears to have finally gotten through to the Bush=20
administration, which has -- wisely from their point of view --=20
chosen to follow a different course.

However, "restraint" seems to me a questionable word. On Sept. 16,=20
the New York Times reported that "Washington has also demanded [from=20
Pakistan] a cutoff of fuel supplies,...and the elimination of truck=20
convoys that provide much of the food and other supplies to=20
Afghanistan's civilian population." Remarkably, that report elicited=20
no detectable reaction in the West, a grim reminder of the nature of=20
the Western civilization that leaders and intellectual elites claim=20
to uphold. In the following days, those demands were implemented.=20
On Sept. 27, the same correspondent reported that officials in=20
Pakistan "said today that they would not relent in their decision to=20
seal off the country's 1,400-mile border with Afghanistan, a move=20
requested by the Bush administration because, the officials said,=20
they wanted to be sure that none of Mr. bin Laden's men were hiding=20
among the huge tide of refugees" (John Burns, Islamabad). "The threat=20
of military strikes forced the removal of international aid workers,=20
crippling assistance programs"; refugees reaching Pakistan "after=20
arduous journeys from Afghanistan are describing scenes of=20
desperation and fear at home as the threat of American-led military=20
attacks turns their long-running misery into a potential catastrophe"=20
(Douglas Frantz, New York Times, Sept. 30). "The country was on a=20
lifeline," one evacuated aid worker reports, "and we just cut the=20
line" (John Sifton, NYT Magazine, Sept. 30).

According to the world's leading newspaper, then, Washington acted at=20
once to ensure the death and suffering of enormous numbers of Aghans,=20
millions of them already on the brink of starvation, and demanded=20
that Pakistan take part in this campaign by cutting off the limited=20
sustenance that was keeping them alive. That is the exact meaning of=20
the words just quoted, and many others like them.

Huge numbers of miserable people have been fleeing to the borders in=20
terror, after Washington's threat to bomb the shreds of existence=20
remaining in Afghanistan, and to convert the Northern Alliance into=20
a heavily armed military force that will, perhaps, be unleashed to=20
renew the atrocities that tore the country apart and led much of the=20
population to welcome the Taliban when they drove out the murderous=20
warring factions that
Washington and Moscow now hope to exploit for their own purposes.=20
When they reach the sealed borders, refugees are trapped to die in=20
silence. Only a trickle can escape through remote mountain passes.=20
How many have already succumbed we cannot guess. Within a few weeks=20
the harsh winter will arrive. There are some reporters and aid=20
workers in the refugee camps across the borders. What they describe=20
is horrifying enough, but they know, and we know, that they are=20
seeing the lucky ones, the few who were able to escape -- and who=20
express their hopes that ''even the cruel Americans must feel some=20
pity for our ruined country,'' and relent in this savage silent=20
genocide (Boston Globe, Sept. 27, p. 1).

We should also bear in mind that there has been nothing to stop=20
massive food drops to the people imprisoned within the country that=20
is once again being cruelly tortured.

Whatever policies are adopted from this point on, a humanitarian=20
catastrophe has already taken place, with worse to come. Perhaps the=20
most apt description was given by the wonderful and courageous Indian=20
writer and activist Arundhati Roy, referring to Operation Infinite=20
Justice proclaimed by the Bush Administration: "Witness the infinite=20
justice of the new century. Civilians starving to death while they're=20
waiting to be killed" (Guardian, Sept. 29).

(2) The UN has indicated that the threat of starvation in Afghanistan is
enormous. International criticism on this score has grown and now the
U.S. and Britain are talking about providing food aid to ward off
hunger. Are they caving in to dissent in fact, or only in appearance?
What is their motivation? What will be the scale and impact of their
efforts?

The UN estimates that some 7-8 million are at risk of imminent=20
starvation. The NY Times reports in a small item (Sept. 25) that=20
nearly six million Afghans depend on food aid from the UN, as well as=20
3.5 million in refugee camps outside, many of whom fled just before=20
the borders were sealed. The item reported that some food is being=20
sent, to the camps outside Afghanistan. Planners and commentators=20
surely realize that they must do something to present themselves as=20
humanitarians seeking to avert the awesome tragedy that unfolded at=20
once after the threat of bombing and military attack, and the sealing=20
of the borders they demanded. "Experts also urge the United States=20
to improve its image by increasing aid to Afghan refugees, as well as=20
by helping to rebuild the economy" (Christian Science Monitor, Sept.=20
28). Even without PR specialists to instruct them, administration=20
officials must comprehend that they should send some food to the=20
refugees who made it across the border, and at least talk about air=20
drop of food to starving people within: in order "to save lives" but=20
also to "help the effort to find terror groups inside Afghanistan"=20
(Boston Globe, Sept. 27, quoting a Pentagon official, who describes=20
this as "winning the hearts and minds of the people"). The New York=20
Times editors picked up the same theme the following day, 12 days=20
after the journal reported that the murderous operations were being=20
put into effect.

On the scale of aid, one can only hope that it is enormous, or the=20
human tragedy may be immense in a few weeks. If the government is=20
sensible, there will be at least a show of the "massive air drops"=20
that officials mention, but have still not carried out, not for lack=20
of means, two weeks after the report that borders are to be sealed to=20
prevent most food from entering.

(3) International legal institutions would likely ratify efforts to
arrest and try bin Laden and others, supposing guilt could be shown,
including the use of force. Why does the U.S. avoid this recourse? Is it
only a matter of not wishing to legitimate an approach that could be
used, as well, against our acts of terrorism, or are other factors at
play?

Much of the world has been asking the US to provide some evidence to=20
link bin Laden to the crime, and if such evidence could be provided,=20
it would not be difficult to rally enormous support for an=20
international effort, under the rubric of the UN, to apprehend and=20
try him and his collaborators. However, that is no simple matter.=20
Even if bin Laden and his network are involved in the crimes of 9-11,=20
it may be hard to produce credible evidence. As the CIA surely knows=20
very well, having nurtured these organizations and monitored them=20
very closely for 20 years, they are diffuse, decentralized,=20
non-hierarchic structures, probably with little communication or=20
direct guidance. And for all we know, most of the perpetrators may=20
have (perished) in their awful missions.

In the background there are other minefields that planners must step=20
through with care. To quote Roy again, "The Taliban's response to US=20
demands for the extradition of Bin Laden has been=20
uncharacteristically reasonable: produce the evidence, then we'll=20
hand him over. President Bush's response is that the demand is=20
non-negotiable'." She also adds one of the many reasons why this=20
framework is unacceptable to Washington: "While talks are on for the=20
extradition of CEOs can India put in a side request for the=20
extradition of Warren Anderson of the US? He was the chairman of=20
Union Carbide, responsible for the Bhopal gas leak that killed 16,000=20
people in 1984. We have collated the necessary evidence. It's all in=20
the files. Could we have him, please?"

Such comparisons elicit frenzied tantrums at the extremist fringes of=20
Western opinion, some of them called "the left." But for Westerners=20
who have retained their sanity and moral integrity, and for many of=20
the traditional victims, they are meaningful and instructive.=20
Government leaders presumably understand that.

The single example that Roy mentions is only the beginning, of=20
course; and it is one of the lesser examples, not only because of the=20
scale of the atrocity, but because it was not explicitly a crime of=20
state. Suppose Iran were to request the extradition of high=20
officials of the Carter and Reagan administrations, refusing to=20
present the ample evidence of the crimes they were implementing --=20
and it surely exists. Or suppose Nicaragua were to demand the=20
extradition of the newly-appointed ambassador to the UN, a man whose=20
record includes his service as "proconsul" (as he was often called)=20
in the virtual fiefdom of Honduras, where he surely was aware of the=20
atrocities of the state terrorists he was supporting; and more=20
significantly, includes his duties as local overseer of the terrorist=20
war, launched from Honduran bases, for which the US was condemned by=20
the World Court and the Security Council (in a resolution the US=20
vetoed). Would the US agree to extradite them? Would the request even=20
elicit ridicule?

We needn't invent examples. The Haitian government has been asking=20
the US to extradite Emmanuel Constant, one of the most brutal of the=20
paramilitary leaders while the (first) Bush and Clinton=20
administrations (contrary to many illusions) were lending tacit=20
support to the ruling junta and its rich constituency. Constant was=20
tried in absentia in Haiti and sentenced to life in prison for his=20
role in massacres. Has he been extradited? Does the matter evoke=20
any detectable mainstream concern? To be sure, there are good=20
reasons: extradition might lead to exposure of links that could be=20
embarrassing in Washington. And after all, he was a leading figure=20
in the slaughter of only about 5000 people -- relative to population,=20
a few hundred thousand in the US.

That is only the barest beginning. The doors are better left closed,=20
just as it is best to maintain the impressive silence that has=20
reigned since the appointment of a leading figure in managing the=20
operations condemned as ism by the highest existing=20
international bodies -- to lead a "war on ism." Even Jonathan=20
Swift would be speechless.

That may be the reason why administration publicity experts preferred=20
the ambiguous term "war" to the more explicit term "crime" -- "crime=20
against humanity" as Robert Fisk, Mary Robinson, and others have=20
accurately depicted it. There are established procedures for dealing=20
with crimes, however horrendous. They require evidence, and=20
adherence to the principle that "those who are guilty of these acts"=20
be held accountable once evidence is produced, but not others (Pope=20
John Paul II, NYT Sept. 24). Not, for example, the unknown numbers=20
of miserable people starving to death in at the sealed borders=20
of Afghanistan, though in this case too we are speaking of crimes=20
against humanity.

(4) The war on terror was first undertaken by Reagan, as a substitute
for the cold war -- that is, as a vehicle for scaring the public and
thus marshalling support for programs contrary to the public's interest
-- foreign campaigns, war spending in general, surveillance, and so on.
Now we are seeing a larger and more aggressive attempt to move in the
same direction. Does the problem that we are the world's foremost source
of attacks on civilians auger complications for carrying through this
effort? Can the effort be sustained without, in fact, a shooting war?

The Reagan administration came into office 20 years ago declaring=20
that its leading concern would be to eradicate the plague of=20
international terrorism, a cancer that is destroying civilization.=20
They cured the plague by establishing an international terrorist=20
network of extraordinary scale, with consequences that are -- or=20
should be -- well-known: in Central America, the Middle East, Africa,=20
Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. At the same time they used the=20
pretexts, as you say, to carry out programs that were of considerable=20
harm to the domestic population, not to speak of others. Did they=20
carry out a "shooting war"? The number of corpses they left in their=20
wake around the world is impressive, but technically, they did not=20
usually fire the guns, apart from transparent PR exercises like the=20
bombing of Libya, the first crime of war in history that was timed=20
precisely for prime time TV, no small trick considering the=20
complexity of the operation and the refusal of continental European=20
countries to collaborate. The torture, mutilation, rape, and=20
massacre were carried out through intermediaries.

Even if we exclude the huge but unmentionable component of terrorism=20
that traces back to terrorist states, our own surely included, the=20
terrorist plague is very real, very dangerous, and truly terrifying.=20
There are ways to react that are likely to increase the threat to=20
ourselves and others; there are ample precedents for more sane and=20
honorable methods, which we've discussed before. They are not in the=20
least obscure, but are scarcely discussed. Those are the basic=20
choices.

(5) If the Taliban falls and bin Laden or someone they claim is
responsible is captured or killed, what next? What happens to
Afghanistan? What happens more broadly in other regions?

The sensible administration plan would be to pursue the ongoing=20
program of silent genocide, combined with humanitarian gestures to=20
arouse the applause of the usual chorus who are called upon to sing=20
the praises of the noble leaders who are dedicated to "principles and=20
values" for the first time in history and are leading the world to a=20
"new era" of idealism and commitment to "ending inhumanity"=20
everywhere. The administration might also try to convert the=20
Northern Alliance into a viable force, and may try to bring in other=20
warlords hostile to it, like Washington's former favorite Gulbudin=20
Hekmatyar, now in Iran. Presumably British and US commandos will=20
undertake missions within Afghanistan, along with selective bombing,=20
but scaled down so as not to recruit new forces for the cause of the=20
radical Islamists.

US campaigns should not be too casually compared to the failed=20
Russian invasion of the 1980s. The Russians were facing a major army=20
of perhaps 100,000 men or more, organized, trained and heavily armed=20
by the CIA and its associates. The US is facing a ragtag force in a=20
country that has already been virtually destroyed by 20 years of=20
horror, for which we bear no slight share of responsibility. The=20
Taliban forces, such as they are, might quickly collapse except for a=20
small hard core. And one would expect that the surviving population=20
would welcome an invading force if it is not too visibly associated=20
with the murderous gangs that tore the country to shreds before the=20
Taliban takeover. At this point, many people would be likely to=20
welcome Genghis Khan.

What next? Expatriate Afghans and, apparently, some internal=20
elements who are not part of the Taliban inner circle have been=20
calling for a UN effort to establish some kind of transition=20
government, a process that might succeed in reconstructing something=20
viable from the wreckage, if provided with very substantial=20
reconstruction aid, channelled through independent sources like the=20
UN or credible NGOs. That much should be the minimal responsibility=20
of those who have turned this impoverished country into a land of=20
terror, desperation, corpses, and mutilated victims. That could=20
happen, but not without very substantial popular efforts in the rich=20
and powerful societies. For the present, any such course has been=20
ruled out by the Bush administration, which has announced that it=20
will not be engaged in "nation building" -- or, it seems, an effort=20
that would be far more honorable and humane: substantial support,=20
without interference, for "nation building" by others who might=20
actually achieve some success in the enterprise. But current refusal=20
to consider this decent course is not graven in stone.

What happens in other regions depends on internal factors, on the=20
policies of foreign actors (the US primary among them, for obvious=20
reasons), and the way matters proceed in Afghanistan. One can say=20
little with much confidence, but for many of the possible courses it=20
is possible to make some reasonable assessments about the likely=20
outcome -- and there are a great many possibilities, too many to try=20
to review in brief comments.

(6) What do you believe should be the role and priority of social
activists concerned about justice at this time? Should we curb our
criticisms, as some have claimed, or is this, instead, a time for
renewed and enlarged efforts, not only because it is a crisis regarding
which we can attempt to have a very important positive impact, but also
because large sectors of the public are actually far more receptive than
usual to discussion and exploration, even it other sectors are
intransigently hostile?

It depends on what these social activists are trying to achieve. If=20
their goal is to escalate the cycle of violence and to increase the=20
likelihood of further atrocities like that of Sept. 11 -- and,=20
regrettably, even worse ones with which much of the world is all too=20
familiar -- then they should certainly curb their analysis and=20
criticisms, refuse to think, and cut back their involvement in the=20
very serious issues in which they have been engaged. The same advice=20
is warranted if they want to help the most reactionary and regressive=20
elements of the political-economic power system to implement plans=20
that will be of great harm to the general population here and in much=20
of the world, and may even threaten human survival. If, on the=20
contrary, the goal of social activists is to reduce the likelihood of=20
further atrocities, and to advance hopes for freedom, human rights,=20
and democracy, then they should follow the opposite course. They=20
should intensify their efforts to inquire into the background factors=20
that lie behind these and other crimes and devote themselves with=20
even more energy to the just causes to which they have already been=20
committed. They should listen when the Bishop of the southern=20
Mexican city of San Cristobal de las Casas, who has seen his share of=20
misery and oppression, urges Northamericans to "reflect on why they=20
are so hated" after the US "has generated so much violence to protect=20
its economic interests" (Marion Lloyd, Mexico City, Boston Globe,=20
Sept. 30). It is surely more comforting to listen to the words of=20
liberal commentators who assure us that "They hate us because we=20
champion a `new world order' of capitalism, individualism, secularism=20
and democracy that should be the norm everywhere" (Ronald Steel, New=20
York Times, Sept. 14). More comforting, but not more wise, if we=20
care about what lies ahead.

The opportunities are surely there. The shock of the horrendous=20
crimes has already opened elite sectors to reflection of a kind that=20
would have been hard to imagine not long ago, and among the general=20
public that is even more true. Of course, there will be those who=20
demand silent obedience. We expect that from the ultra-right, and=20
anyone with a little familiarity with history will expect it from=20
some left intellectuals as well, perhaps in an even more virulent=20
form. But it is important not to be intimidated by hysterical=20
ranting and lies and to keep as closely as one can to the course of=20
truth and honesty and concern for the human consequences of what one=20
does, or fails to do. All truisms, but worth bearing in mind.

Beyond the truisms, we turn to specific questions, for inquiry and for acti=
on.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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--=20