[sacw] SACW (20 July 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire
20 July 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

----------------------------------------

[1.] Sri Lanka: Civil Society lacks an overall strategy
[2.] India-Pakistan: Hope Springs Eternal
[3.] India-Pakistan: And So To The Sticking Points
[4.] India-Pakistan: MB Naqvi on the recent official summit
[5.] Citizens Action Plan following the recent Pak India summit
[6.] Press Release: Agra summit was a victory of war mongers
[7.] Book review: On the Abyss- Pakistan After the Coup

-----------------------------------------

#1.

Daily News (Colombo)
Tuesday, 17 July 2001

CIVIL SOCIETY LACKS AN OVERALL STRATEGY
by Maria J. Stephan

In the wake of the political crisis in the country and seeming paralysis of
the peace process, there is an obvious need for civil society - NGOs,
students, teachers, trade unionists, business leaders, media members - to p=
ut
pressure on the political leadership. It is imperative that national
attention be refocused on the most pressing issues facing this nation - war
and the erosion of democracy. The alternative to strategic civil society
mobilization at this crucial time is an indefinite prolongation of the stat=
us
quo, and quite possibly a further deterioration.
Non-violent direct action, popularized by the Gandhi-led mass movements in
South Africa and India, consists of actions that aim to change a situation =
of
injustice or oppression through non-violent force and persuasion. For vario=
us
reasons, the civic movement in Sri Lanka has so far by and large failed to
employ direct action, preferring instead to rely on indirect, passive
approaches to conflict resolution. Mahatma Gandhi referred to popular
non-violent resistance as "war without violence" designed to mobilize a
people in order to end or prevent destructive behaviour.
In the Sri Lankan context, the continued fighting between government forces
and the LTTE constitutes the most egregious form of destructive behaviour
known to man. The economic, human, social, and moral costs of the internal
war have collectively created a culture of violence in Sri Lanka that today
extends its tentacles throughout society - to home life, interpersonal ties=
,
professional relationships, relationships to the environment, etc. etc. Can
the ordinary people afford to remain passive observers while war and
political opportunism destroys their future?
A nation-wide campaign of non-violent direct action must follow from a
carefully planned strategy whose goal is to pressurize the political
establishment to respond to the concrete demands of the people. These deman=
ds
must include the stoppage of war and a negotiated political settlement to t=
he
ethnic problem, including the drafting of a new constitution that reflects
the will of all the peoples of Sri Lanka. Civil society involvement in the
formal peace process, which includes the drafting of a new, more democratic
Sri Lankan constitution, must be part of the movement's demands. Obviously,
"the people" consist of Muslims, Tamils, Sinhalese, and all the other membe=
rs
of minority groups that lend Sri Lankan civil society its power in its
diversity.
For this reason there can be no "Tamil only" or "Sinhala-only" mass movemen=
t
for peace and democracy in a nation where ethnicity has been used repeatedl=
y
as a weapon of war - divided movements, like divided nations, inevitably
collapse in weakness. Division along ethnic, gender, linguistic, and
North-South lines are easily manipulated by opportunistic political leaders
and other parties interested in a continuation of the violent conflict -
civil society knows the identity of these parties. For too long the people =
of
Sri Lanka have been held hostage to those powerful, self-interested parties
whose strategy of "divide and rule" has promoted artificial societal
divisions and incited communal clashes.
A real "people power" movement, by contrast, has as its greatest strength i=
ts
ability to mobilize people of different races and creeds around a common ca=
ll
for change. Today, ending the fighting and transforming Sri Lanka's politic=
al
structures are an enlightened civil society's basic demands. How does "peop=
le
power" apply to the current political situation in Sri Lanka? Active non
violent campaigns rely on tactical "weapons" such as mass protests,
non-cooperation, civil disobedience, and fasting whose goal is to awaken th=
e
common humanity of all involved in a conflict, including one's opponents. I=
n
the current situation, the "opponent" is anyone contributing to a
prolongation of the war either through action or inaction.
Stalling tactics vis-a-vis the negotiation process, emphasis on a military
solution, suppression of civil society mobilization using disproportionate,
even illegal, "security" measures are today being used to silence the
ordinary people of this nation. The effectiveness of a people power movemen=
t
depends on the strategy that directs it; the non violent means must be
consistent with the desired ends. It is the task of the movement leaders to
select the appropriate methods and to mobilize people from different sector=
s
of society (NGOs, media, private sector, trade unions, farmers' collectives=
,
women's groups, religious groups) and train them in the ways of strategic n=
on
violence. Protest marches with an explicit political demand (like an
immediate restart to Norwegian-facilitated negotiations or an easing of
restrictions to free movement, including the economic boycott in the north
east), consumer boycotts, work stoppages, sit-ins, and public demonstration=
s
in unauthorized areas (such as so-called "high security zones") are example=
s
of non violent tools of popular resistance.
It must be emphasized that the goal of a people power campaign in Sri Lanka
would not be to everthrow the government or to resort to violence in the
demand for peace - such an approach would only strengthen the culture of
violence in this country without accomplishing the desired goal of reformin=
g
Sri Lankan social and political culture. To cite Gandhi, "There is a cause
for which I am prepared to die, but no cause for which I am prepared to
kill." The power of a non violent movement lies in its "mass" character - a=
nd
in the profound commitment of its members to non violence, which
automatically guarantees the non violent resistors the moral high ground (a=
nd
the sympathy of the international community) when faced with potential
violence.
Effective leadership and a dedicated disciplined following of people from
civil society trained in non violent resistance are the sine qua non of an
effective people power movement. The leadership must embody the message and
character of the Sri Lankan peace with justice movement while reflecting th=
e
diversity of society. One obvious source of leadership, based on their
"mixed" composition, is the interfaith groups of religious leaders (priests=
,
monks, nuns) who have already assumed a strong leadership role at the
grassroots level. The Inter-religious Peace Foundation (IRPF) and the
Inter-religious Alliance for National Unity (IRAFNU) are two active groups
whose leaders are well-respected not only in their own faith communities, b=
ut
in the other faith communities as well.
These religious leaders have worked in conflict zones to promote inter-ethn=
ic
harmony, have universally condemned human right violations committed by all
parties to the conflict, and have been outspoken advocates of the victims o=
f
the war. They have already been highly successful in their mobilization
efforts at the community, professional and political levels and are perhaps
the best embodiment of a "counter-culture" that embraces diversity and
pluralism - the foundations of a healthy democracy. A Sri Lankan satyagraha
movement spearheaded by these religious leaders is one possibility. Another
possibility involves a civil society-private sector partnership whereby
influential business leaders work with influential civil society leaders to
organize the strategic basis of the mass campaign.
Following from the need to amass a large grass roots following, measures ar=
e
already being taken by active civil society groups to prepare the way for a=
n
effective mass peace movement. The Peoples' Peace Front, (PPF) a coalition =
of
120 peace, human rights, and development organizations (NGOs, trade unions,
teachers, peace artists, journalists, missing soldiers organizations, women=
s'
groups, etc.) formed in 1999, is working hard to mobilize a powerful
independent and national people's movement whose goal is to pressurize the
conflict parties to restart negotiations and make concrete steps toward a
meaningful peace with justice. The PPF is currently conducting a series of
networking seminars in eight regions around the island whose goal is to
strengthen the inter-ethnic peace constituency and promote a nation-wide
anti-war movement.
The PPF's heretofore inability to sustain cooperation with civil society
groups in the North has been a significant obstacle to achieving a true
nation-wide campaign, and the PPF is working to improve its outreach effort=
s
in the North and East. There will be no Sri Lankan people power movement,
after all, without intense North-South cooperation! With the help of
charismatic religious leadership and intensified North-South coordination,
these local empowerment initiatives could serve as the backbone of an
organized, strategic direct action movement.
Active non-violence is positive, creative, imaginative and healing - its
potential for democratizing the country and transforming the culture of
violence in Sri Lanka into one of peace is very great. Given the current
political leadership's preoccupation with power play and the inevitable
stalemate in the peace process, it is up to the people of this nation to
demand change. Consequences, in the form of non-violent acts of resistance
including civil disobedience, would follow from conflict parties'
unwillingness to respond meaningfully, and in a timely manner, to this
demand. The time has come for civil society to rise up and show the rest of
the world that people power is the greatest force for change in Sri Lanka. =
Is
civil society courageous enough to take the fate of this nation back into i=
ts
hands?
(Maria J. Stephan is a graduate student from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy (Boston, USA) and an intern at the National Peace Council of Sri
Lanka. She is a specialist in conflict resolution and international securit=
y
studies and has come to Sri Lanka to study the cultural roots of the confli=
ct
and the capacity of civil society to mobilize for peace with justice.)

________

2.

Far Eastern Economic Review
July 26, 2001

INDIA-PAKISTAN
Hope Springs Eternal
The first Indo-Pakistani summit in more than two years collapses over=20
Kashmir, but a ray of hope remains around the goodwill that the=20
meeting built between the leaders of both countries
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Ahmed Rashid/LAHORE and WASHINGTON

Issue cover-dated July 26, 2001
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE 54 YEARS of enmity that include three wars and countless=20
deaths, no summit has generated hopes of peace among the peoples of=20
India and Pakistan as high as mid-July's three days of talks in Agra,=20
India, between Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and=20
Pakistan's President Pervaiz Musharraf.

So when the nail-biting suspense ended with the collapse of the=20
summit at the last moment, disappointment was huge. Musharraf, his=20
face dark with fury, left for home. A draft joint declaration was=20
abandoned in tatters. Prophets of doomsday scenarios for the=20
Subcontinent could say, "I told you so." Even the gods appeared angry=20
as an earthquake and storms hit Pakistan and parts of India. "The two=20
leaders were clearly not prepared for a failure of this kind," said=20
Shekar Gupta, chief editor of the Indian Express.

But amid the debris some hope remained. It centred on agreements on=20
future contacts formulated before the row over the wording of the=20
final statement. These agreements, though not laid out in any final=20
communique, apparently stood and may provide a framework for resuming=20
the peace process through dialogue. Of course this was a lot less=20
than both sides sought. But expectations of what might be achieved=20
grew unrealistically as the summit ran over its original two-day=20
schedule before foundering over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

In the aftermath, both sides struggled to keep rhetoric under control=20
and avoid a tit-for-tat blame game. Indian spokeswoman Nirupama Rao=20
told a press conference that while "the commencement of the process=20
and the beginning of a journey have taken place, the destination of=20
an agreed joint statement has not been reached." Said Pakistani=20
spokesman Maj.-Gen. Rashid Qureshi: "The ice has been broken and=20
there is goodwill between the two peoples."

Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said the talks broke=20
down after India wanted the summit document to state that=20
"cross-border terrorism"--the euphemism for Pakistan-based militants=20
fighting in Kashmir--was unacceptable and must cease. Pakistan holds=20
that they are freedom fighters. But Singh said India hoped to keep=20
talking. "We will pick up the threads from the visit of the president=20
of Pakistan. We will unceasingly endeavour to realize our vision of a=20
relationship of peace, friendship and cooperation with Pakistan," he=20
told reporters. Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar was even more=20
upbeat, saying that "the two leaders had a meeting of minds" and "the=20
existing goodwill can, and will, achieve mutually desired results."=20
He added: "It is only appropriate that time should be given to a=20
mutually acceptable formulation."

Both leaders are to meet again at the United Nations in September.=20
Vajpayee at the summit accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan later=20
this year. According to Pakistani officials and Indian press reports,=20
both sides agreed to annual summits and bi-annual meetings of their=20
foreign ministers to discuss three issues--peace and security,=20
narcotics and Kashmir. "It may be a disappointment but not a=20
disaster. I hope the substance will survive the disagreement over=20
language," says Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan's ambassador to Washington.

Outside the region the biggest disappointment was bound to be found=20
in Washington, which is widely expected to step up its efforts to=20
keep Indo-Pakistani relations from deteriorating again. Contrary to=20
speculation in Pakistan and India, the United States did not directly=20
pressure New Delhi to call the summit or try to micro-manage the=20
build-up to the talks. Instead, the Bush administration went out of=20
its way to convince visiting Indian officials since January that it=20
wants India as a partner in its global and Asian strategy,=20
particularly in dealing with China. But, as U.S. officials also=20
stressed, New Delhi's bedevilled relations with Pakistan would limit=20
how far India could become a true global ally of the U.S.

The summit fell apart as the U.S. is preparing to use a presidential=20
waiver to lift sanctions imposed on India for its 1998 nuclear tests.=20
Similar U.S. sanctions on Pakistan will not be lifted so fast. "In=20
just a few months we have made extraordinary progress with India in=20
defining our common interests in many fields--counter-terrorism,=20
defence, trade, investment--and reducing tensions with Pakistan will=20
enhance that," says a State Department official. "The administration=20
and Congress want to lift sanctions on India by the end of July."=20
India meanwhile is preparing a list of U.S. weapons systems it wants=20
to buy once sanctions are lifted--the first time that India would=20
enter the U.S. arms market in 40 years.

Pakistan's problems with the U.S., meanwhile, centre on Afghanistan.=20
"We cannot do Pakistan any favour because of its continued support to=20
the Taliban in Afghanistan who back terrorism. And Pakistan has few=20
friends left in Congress,'' says a National Security Council=20
official. In addition, Islamabad is covered by several layers of=20
sanctions--imposed in retaliation for Musharraf's October 1999=20
coup--that cannot be lifted before elections are held.

The summit's sad end was welcomed by Hindu hardliners in India and=20
Islamic extremists in Pakistan and Kashmir. Should the Kashmir=20
conflict intensify, moderates such as Vajpayee and Musharraf, who=20
both made concessions during the talks, could be marginalized. A=20
total of 90 Kashmiri militants, soldiers and civilians were killed=20
during the talks and 139 in the nine days before them. Sayed=20
Salahuddin, head of the Pakistan-based Hizbul Mujaihideen, the=20
largest group fighting Indian rule in Kashmir, told reporters: "The=20
Indian leadership cannot be trusted and this is what we have been=20
telling Pakistani leaders. Jihad [holy war] is the only solution."

But even if their leaders were not invited to the summit, many=20
Kashmiris want an end to the territory's 12-year-old conflict that=20
has cost 60,000 lives. "The time has come for a negotiated=20
settlement," Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, the most revered religious leader=20
in Indian Kashmir, said on July 11. "It's very clear everybody wants=20
an end to the killing and destruction." In a confidence-building=20
measure announced on the first day of the summit, India said it was=20
withdrawing 20,000 of its 200,000 troops in Kashmir.

The failure was all the more disappointing because in four meetings=20
lasting nearly eight hours in total, both leaders got on well and=20
came so close to agreement. Initially India was determined to stay=20
within the confines of "a composite dialogue" agreed in 1998, but in=20
which Kashmir is only one of eight issues for discussion. India also=20
wanted Musharraf to pledge to curb cross-border terrorism.

Pakistan wanted new terminology altogether, with Indian=20
acknowledgement that Kashmir was the "core issue" between the two=20
countries. "We cannot deny that there are vast differences between=20
us," Vajpayee told Musharraf in their first private meeting,=20
according to a text released by New Delhi. "We are willing to address=20
these differences and move forward," but "let no one think that India=20
does not have the resolve, strength or stamina to continue resisting=20
terrorism."

LEADERS SHOULD BUILD
In an early sign of problems at the talks, Musharraf told Indian=20
newspaper editors on July 16: "I keep talking of Kashmir, you keep=20
talking of cross-border terrorism . . . We can't even agree on what=20
to call it--a problem, a dispute or an issue.'' But hours later a=20
text was agreed by him and Vajpayee, after both made major=20
concessions. Then, according to Pakistani officials and Indian media=20
reports, hardline Indian ministers objected to the language and sent=20
the text back twice to the Pakistani delegation requesting=20
amendments, which ultimately the Pakistanis refused.

The summit failure highlighted the political problems for both=20
leaders. India's ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party,=20
which dominates the federal coalition, was routed in state elections=20
in May and faces more state contests in January. If defeated, an=20
ailing Vajpayee might have to call mid-term elections and hand the=20
BJP leadership to hardliners. Pakistan's regime is isolated=20
internationally as it grapples with what some Western commentators=20
have dubbed "a failing state."

The summit, however, gave both leaders plenty of media coverage and=20
photo opportunities--a walk around the Taj Mahal by Musharraf and his=20
wife, exotic meals and concerts. It was the first summit in the=20
region played out live on satellite TV. Its closing hope is that both=20
leaders can build on their bonhomie, not allowing hardliners in both=20
their camps to push them further aside and leave only more bloodshed=20
in Kashmir.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DEAL BREAKER

India says Kashmir, its only Muslim-majority state, is an integral=20
part of the nation and is not for negotiation. Many ordinary Indians=20
believe allowing it to leave the union would represent a failure of=20
the very principle of India as a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and=20
multi-religious society.

________

3.

The Telegraph
19 July 2001

AND SO TO THE STICKING POINTS
BY ACHIN VANAIK

Even those who carried the lowest hopes and expectations of what the=20
Agra summit would bring have to be disappointed by the outcome. No=20
declaration or joint statement, let alone working groups to carry on=20
detailed issue-wise discussions; only the commitment to meet again at=20
another forthcoming summit. In short, the step forward in bilateral=20
relations has turned out to be much smaller than earlier anticipated.

But the fact that it is, all said and done, a step forward must not=20
be obscured or dismissed as of no consequence. And we must be on our=20
toes because this process of reconciliation that has begun remains=20
fragile. Already the pattern of "blaming the other" side for the=20
failure to arrive at a common agreement or statement at the summit=20
has taken shape.

This form of posturing is being indulged in by the mainstream of the=20
media and by the security establishments in both countries, including=20
by the two governments. The only consolation is that the governments=20
are carrying out this exercise rather more politely than elsewhere=20
and that parallel to this, they are also both stressing that the=20
process of dialogue and the efforts for reconciliation will continue=20
and build upon whatever was achieved in the discussions in Agra.

But this attitude of "blaming the other" must not go on for too long=20
or become too strident. It needs to cool down and die out so that a=20
proper atmosphere can again be constructed for future discussions. In=20
reality, the responsibility for the disappointing final outcome is=20
shared between both governments, tho- ugh not necessarily in equal=20
proportion.

We need to apportion carefully this blame and we must do so as=20
objectively as possible. This requires stepping out of the "official=20
frameworks" of analysis, argument and judgment which are assiduously=20
peddled by both governments and by most members of the wider security=20
and media establishments of both countries. It is not a coincidence=20
that those who have been most seriously and consistently committed to=20
promoting better relations and friendship between India and Pakistan=20
(civil society groups and individuals engaged in what has come to be=20
called "Track Three diplomacy") have been precisely those who have=20
also most consistently criticized and been sceptical of their own=20
government=92s claims and posturings.

Understanding the basic reasons for the Agra impasse (which go beyond=20
issues of media manipulation and pressure from "internal" hardliners)=20
is necessary if we are to have a chance of avoiding its future=20
repetition. The alternative to institutionalizing a process of=20
constant dialogue is a worsening spiral of hostility and its=20
ever-present accompaniment =97 the threat of war.

The summit highlighted three fundamental "sticking points". It was=20
the failure to even temporarily paper over these through appropriate=20
words that prevented the signing of a formal agreement/ declaration=20
or even a joint statement. These were the centrality of the Kashmir=20
issue to bilateral relations, references to the=20
involvement/aspirations of the Kashmiri people and the issue of=20
cross-border terrorism. The fact that all the three problem areas are=20
related to Kashmir is testimony enough to the centrality of the=20
Kashmir issue. It is therefore pointless and disingenuous of Jaswant=20
Singh to claim as he did in a post-summit press conference that while=20
Kashmir is an issue, it is not the only issue, nor the core issue.

It is the core issue bedevilling India-Pakistan relations and must be=20
recognized as such. In so far as nuclearization makes Kashmir a=20
potential flashpoint for a nuclear exchange (which it does), it is=20
absurd to pretend that this is not so. But nuclearization has also=20
radically changed the framework of bilateral relations and therefore=20
of prospective negotiations. The threat it poses is so profound and=20
new that even though it is intimately connected to the Kashmir issue,=20
it also takes on an autonomy of its own. The two countries have to=20
move towards discussion here even if they can't agree on "talks about=20
talks" regarding anything else. It is revealing that neither side=20
exhibited sufficient awareness of this essential autonomy and urgency=20
of the nuclear issue.

The Indian side just went on and on about Pakistan's "unifocal" chant=20
of Kashmir and how India in contrast had a broader view covering a=20
large range of issues in which nuclear risk reduction and related=20
concerns were one. But then both governments, defending their=20
acquisition of nuclear weapons, have a common interest in=20
soft-pedalling the matter lest the "danger" it represents be=20
"exaggerated". After all, the region is now supposed to have become=20
nuclearly "safer" despite the need to put in place risk=20
reduction/safety measures.

Since both governments have a common interest in covering up the=20
de-stabilizing threat caused by the arrival of nuclear weapons, this=20
will not be a "sticking point" regarding the initiation of serious=20
dialogue between the two sides now, or in the future. The pressure to=20
treat not just nuclear safety, but disarmament, seriously, has to=20
come from the outside public.

In the event, both sides did finally agree that addressing the=20
"Kashmir issue" was basic to improving bilateral relations. The=20
problem lay with the trade-off for what is still seen by the Indian=20
side as a "concession" (namely, putting Kashmir on the agenda) and=20
not as a reality that must be openly and forcefully acknowledged=20
regardless of trade-offs. Thus the Indian side demanded a reciprocal=20
"concession" from the Pakistani delegation.

It is here that the old mindsets of the two countries and their=20
security establishments ultimately triumphed. The Indians raised the=20
issue of cross-border terrorism and the Pakistanis countered by=20
raising the issue of the Kashmiri people's aspirations/involvement,=20
which India promptly rejected. If Pakistan does not give such short=20
shrift to the Kashmiris, it nonetheless excludes the option of=20
Kashmiri independence and will not countenance any diminution of its=20
control over "Azad Kashmir".

In short, both sides continue to use Kashmir as basically an arena=20
for their respective manipulations and are most certainly not putting=20
the suffering of the Kashmiri people (on both sides of the line of=20
control) at the heart of their political concerns. On the issue of=20
cross-border terrorism, it is self-righteous and hypocritical of=20
India to only talk of this while denying the reality of its own state=20
terrorism and repression of civilians in the valley and opposing=20
public scrutiny and condemnation of its own behaviour.

It is self-righteous and hypocritical of the Pakistan government to=20
pretend that the fanatical jihadi organizations are "freedom=20
fighters" for a worthy cause when they have long forfeited public=20
support in the valley and when their goal (a governing Islamic order)=20
is deeply undemocratic and their methods violent and reprehensible.=20
Moreover, everybody knows that these jihadis are crucially dependent=20
on Inter-Services Intelligence support.

Behind the failure to arrive at an agreed declaration in Agra lie the=20
ugly mindsets of the two governments and their large supporting=20
choruses outside. If the next summit is to move forward to some=20
agreement, then ideally it should come about through a mutual=20
self-evaluation and attempts to break away from these mindsets. But=20
this is hardly likely =97 elite nationalism in both countries is far=20
too belligerent, communal and self-serving.

We will probably have to settle for the hope that more skilful=20
diplomacy, a greater sense of urgency on the part of the two=20
governments, and stronger public pressure/sentiment, can all combine=20
to produce another modest step forward. Maintaining this momentum may=20
then eventually lead to that self-questioning which alone can end the=20
self-righteous hypocrisies of both governments and much of their=20
elite backing. That alone will bring about the conditions in which a=20
lasting, because just, peace for all, including Kashmiris, might be=20
forged.

The author has recently co-authored the book, South Asia on a Short=20
Fuse: Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament

________

4.

M.B. NAQVI ON THE AGRA SUMMIT

[Karachi, July 19]
It is still reaction time to the failure of Agra Summit. Pakistan=20
press is full of it. All reactions could be predicted with a fair=20
degree of accuracy because they conform to the stereo types=20
associated with various groups or schools of though have.

The loudest chorus is coming from the hardline supporters of the=20
military regime; they are exulting over the firm and bold stance of=20
their hero at Agra: President General Pervez Musharraf. The=20
telecasting of the breakfast press briefing of the Indian editors and=20
columnists by Musharraf to rebut Indian Info Minister Sushma Swaraj=20
has done its intended job: Pakistani David is so much stronger than=20
the Indian Goliath--in image, for his supporters.

Parliamentary opposition parties and many smaller political groups=20
and parties emphasise the non-representative character of Pakistani=20
interlocutors at Agra; this is seen as an important cause of the=20
Summit=92s failure. It is only fair to add that none of these parties=20
is opposed to arriving at a modus operandi with India on the basis of=20
Shimla accord and Lahore Declaration. On the need for normal friendly=20
relations with India, indeed rapprochement with it, there is a fair=20
amount of consensus among all major parties and groups from right to=20
left.

The only exception is the ruling establishment and the Jihadis. At=20
least one religious party is for rapprochement with India; it is the=20
JUI (Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam) of Maulana Fazlur Rahman who is better=20
known, rather inaccurately, as the mentor of Taliban. Another major=20
religious party, JI (Jamat-e-Islami), simultaneously supports a very=20
hardline and is also ready to cut a deal with India, as exemplified=20
by its chief=92s 1999 and 2000 roles when he played a part in=20
persuading Hizbul Mujahedeen to offer a unilateral ceasefire to=20
India. All other religious parties and groups eat out of government=92s=20
hand on the India policy, though posing as tough-minded.

What will the establishment do? It is hard to tell. It has a narrow=20
base in popular support, the media, especially the Urdu press. This=20
raucous and massive support has been available to all governments in=20
the past and has been of no avail to any of them. Common folks in=20
their own scruttble wisdom have learnt to discriminate between the=20
few independent voices and the paid pipers. Orchestrated and massive=20
propaganda has failed time and again to help any government in the=20
past, though non-democratic governments have no option but to rely on=20
propaganda to stay in office.

Present government=92s source of power do not depend on what the press=20
or TV says. So long as these sources go on sustaining it, it will=20
last, irrespective of how many approve or disapprove it. But the=20
establishment as a whole feels today to be under siege. Who is=20
pressing down on it? The first is the twin-faced factor of the=20
economy tottering on the very edge of insolvency that is being kept=20
afloat by IMF. This makes IMF and World Bank group as the arbiters of=20
Pakistan=92s fate. And who controls these multilateral agencies? Who=20
but the US?

Secondly, the US is the sole superpower. It has ineffable influence=20
in, and on, the ruling establishment. It so happens that the US=20
Administration is unhappy with its proteges and friends in foisting=20
Taliban on Afghanistan and not doing enough to get Osama bin Laden=20
deliver to them. They are also hindering the immediate plans of the=20
US vis-=E0-vis India by keeping up the insurgency in Kashmir, not to=20
mention the nuclear proliferation issue. It is the US that seems to=20
have brought the two big and unruly horses to Jamuna river at Agra.=20
But these horse merely sniffed the water and did not drink. So what=20
will Uncle Sam do?

He is likely to nudge the two governments harder, perhaps amounting=20
to pushing, if not shoving. If the US is not really a paper tiger, it=20
will strive towards making them actually to arrive at some compromise=20
solution to their various problems. In this Pakistan is far more=20
vulnerable; its ability to resist American pressure, on the whole, is=20
quite small, smaller than India=92s. Even otherwise Uncle Sam is in the=20
stage of courting India. Therefore the burden of concession-making=20
will be greater on Pakistan. That is the assessment of most analysts.

Moreover the state of the economy leaves not much room for=20
manoeuvring for Islamabad. It has to move quickly to lighten its=20
burdens. Military-led establishment learns economic facts with great=20
difficulty. But economic facts have a way of their own to teach even=20
dence students --after a time. But none of this requires=20
statesmanship; only modest amount of realistic effort to marry=20
desired objectives with current reality.

That is a good basis to keep the hope alive.

________

5.

[17 JULY, 2001, MESSAGE FROM SONIA JABBAR A KEY FIGURE IN THE=20
MOVEMENT IN INDIA FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND ACTIVE IN=20
INDIA-PAKISTAN-KASHMIR PEACE INITIATIVES]
oooooooooooooo

Dear Friends,

So...everyone's feeling disappointed with the official summit. At=20
least here in Delhi there's a visible pall of gloom. But, as we all=20
know this to be a very non-productive and useless state let's snap=20
out of it and channel our energies into better things.

First of all who says there was no joint declaration?

On the 12th of July 2001, representatives of nearly 300 organisations=20
and groups from India and Pakistan representing thousands of people=20
at the grassroots, came together, exchanged ideas, debated fiercely=20
and finally hammered out a joint declaration in which we identified=20
and arrived at an agreement on three major areas of concern:=20
Democracy, Nuclear Weapons, and Kashmir.

Unlike the two governments, the Pakistan-India People's Solidarity=20
Conference had prepared a Draft Declaration which was circulated=20
before the actual meeting took place. Most of the differences were=20
thus worked out and a broad consensus was reached before the meet so=20
the meet itself was relatively smooth sailing.

Now what?

Well, we have a brilliant document on our hands which has been=20
endorsed by a number of eminent people: two Nobel Peace Prize=20
Laureates=97 HH Dalai Lama and Jose Ramos Horta of East Timor; Cora=20
Weiss, President of the Hague Appeal for Peace and the International=20
Peace Bureau, and the spiritual leader, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar. In fact=20
Jose Ramos Horta, after reading the Draft Declaration called it " a=20
very constructive and balanced document that could be easily endorsed=20
and implemented by peoples and leaders of the region."

We believe that these are extraordinary times which require=20
extraordinary actions. Let us not sit back and allow our leaders to=20
squander this opportunity. We would like to propose a plan of action=20
which could work fantastically if, and only if, there is a desire and=20
willamong all of us to work hard for peace.

The idea is to launch a massive signature campaign endorsing the=20
resolutions of the Pakistan-India People's Solidarity Conference.=20
This would mean getting the endorsements of groups and NGOs that were=20
left out of the earlier email effort, as many of our friends and=20
colleagues can only be contacted through the post. It would also mean=20
that each endorsing organisation would commit to collecting x number=20
of signatures. Finally, we would gather at the Wagah Border on=20
14th/15th August and present the wishes and desires of (hopefully)=20
hundreds of thousands of Indians and Pakistanis to both our=20
governments.

Because the Declaration is a fairly simple, yet comprehensive=20
document, the act of getting someone to endorse it means a chance to=20
educate the person on some of the key issues of our times. So, we're=20
not simply asking people to blindly sign on a piece of paper for=20
peace, but providing an opportunity to engage seriously and even=20
debate these issues. In the end, if they sign, then great! But even=20
if they don't, we've had a chance the introduce this perspective to=20
the person.

I think we can make a kind of dossier when we approach people for=20
signatures: Declaration, letters of support from eminent persons,=20
plus a list of endorsing organisations. Naturally, some groups will=20
also have to take the responsibilty of translating these into=20
regional languages. I'm enclosing an attachment of the final=20
Declaration=97 sorry, some of you have received this hundreds of=20
times=97I will send the texts of the letters of support , and the list=20
of endorsing orgs. later. The actual signature campaign will have to=20
be carried out quite carefully, as carefully as a survey with each=20
page numbered and accounted for since there will be many=20
organisations in many parts of the country involved.

Because we have less than a month to go we need to get to work=20
immediately. Groups and individuals who are Delhi-based, please come=20
to a planning meet on Thursday 19th July, at the Indian Social=20
Institute at 6 pm. Please spread the word. Groups who are based=20
elsewhere would perhaps like to organise planning meets in their=20
cities and towns, but you'll need to act fast. Please email any=20
suggestions you may have.

Cheers!
sonia

________

6.

Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2001 13:09:34 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Agra summit was a victory of war mongers

COUNCIL OF ADVOCATES INTERNATIONAL
Toronto (press release)
.A golden opportunity of indo-pak friendship has been lost due to=20
adamant attitude of the both parties.The failure of Agra summit is=20
very disappointing for common masses in South Asia.This was expressed=20
by Hamid Bashani, secretary general of the council of advocates=20
international.He said =ECIndia and Pakistan are under strong influence=20
of rigid and monolithic notions of territorial sovereignty and do not=20
want to change their traditional positions.The history of failed=20
peace moves proves that religious fundamentalist and war mongers=20
dictate the governments in both countries. He noted that Kashmir=20
issue has become a dangerous tool in the hands of Hindu and Muslim=20
fundamentalist forces and they use it repeatedly to derail peace=20
moves in the sub-continent.Those forces have created a false=20
impression that no government in India could stay in office if it=20
agreed to change the line of control in any substantial way,and no=20
government can survive in Pakistan if it accept the LOC as permanent.=20
He appealed to The government of both countries to come out of the=20
influence of small pressure groups, militants and handful of=20
warmongers and take some bold step to achieve the lasting=20
peace.Kashmir issue is the question of the right of self=20
determination of the people of The state of Jammu and Kahmir and can=20
only be addressed in this context.The right of self determination is=20
a democratic right and can be exercised only through a democratic=20
process.India as a recognized democratic country holds more=20
responsibility toward a democratic right than Pakistan.India must=20
address this issue democratically and should not let the religious=20
forces to polarize the sub-continent on the basis of religion delay=20
in peaceful settlement of the issues between both country would=20
strengthen the forces of destruction.

99-howard street-1515,Toronto Ontario m4x1k1 Canada
Telephone 416-9291029.Fax 416-9291471
E-mail-bashani2000@y...

________

7.

Book Review
Name of the Book: On the Abyss - Pakistan After the Coup
Publisher: Harper Collins, New Delhi
Year: 2000
Pages: 280
Price: Rs. 195
Reviewed by: Yoginder Sikand

After what is widely believed to have been a failed summit at Agra,=20
Indo-Pakistani relations are back to square one. It is not that much=20
was expected from the talks in any case. Both Musharraf and Vajpayee=20
have their own domestic constituencies to pander to, and neither=20
would have been willing to brook any compromise on Kashmir, the=20
single most crucial hurdle in the path of normalising relations=20
between the two countries.
As the essays included in this book stress, Musharraf,=20
despite being the military ruler of his country, is faced with=20
tremendous odds that seriously constrain the freedom that he can=20
exercise in attempting to inch towards better relations with India.=20
The noted Pakistani critic, Tariq Ali opines in his contribution that=20
the dominance of the Punjabi feudal and bureaucratic elite, as well=20
as the Islamist right-wing and the army, stand in the way of any=20
moves to improve relations with India. Pakistani nationalism has=20
sought to define itself in opposition to India ( a mirror opposite=20
of Indian nationalism, particularly of the Hindutva variety), and=20
thus moves to befriend India are generally viewed as compromising on=20
not just Pakistani sovereignty and independence but, more crucially,=20
on the very identity of the nation itself. Ali insists that a=20
European Union-style South Asian Federation might actually hold the=20
key to the seemingly hopeless quest for peace in South Asia.
Peace in South Asia is a must for the economic development of=20
both India and Pakistan, says S.Akbar Zaidi, former professor of=20
economics at the University of Karachi, in his essay. He cites facts=20
and figures to show how highly skewed the income distribution pattern=20
in Pakistan is (India, with its probably worse mass destitution,=20
hardly fares better, though), in terms of class, region and=20
ethnicity. He sees little hope for Musharraf in being able to stem=20
the surging tide, warning that unless inequalities are redressed,=20
civil war is certain, which might well take the form of ethnic=20
conflict or religious radicalism. On the political front, he insists=20
that as long as the army, the feudal lords and the bureaucracy=20
continue to enjoy untrammeled powers, there is little hope for a=20
genuine democracy to take root in the country. With the=20
liberalisation of the Pakistani economy, however, Zaidi opines, the=20
country seems to be moving even further away from participatory=20
democratic structures as income inequalities further widen, a point=20
that is also made by veteran Pakistani journalist, Shahid-ur-Rahman=20
in his aptly titled essay, 'Who Owns Pakistan?'. Little wonder, then,=20
as Aziz Siddiqui, join director of Pakistan=92s Human Rights=92=20
Commission, writes, Pakistanis, in general, do not seem to have=20
responded negatively to the General=92s coup, believing that it can=20
hardly be worse than the civilian regimes that they have hitherto=20
been subjected to.
Possibly the most formidable barrier to improving=20
Indo-Pakistan relations is the enormous clout that the religious=20
right-wing enjoys in both India and Pakistan. Khaled Ahmed,=20
consulting editor for the Lahore-based 'Friday Times', makes an=20
interesting analysis of the growth of militant Islamist groups in=20
Pakistan, which are in the forefront of what they see as a 'jihad'=20
against India. He argues that the Pakistani state has actively=20
cultivated such groups to shore up its sagging legitimacy, and to=20
pursue its goals in Kashmir. The collapse of civil society=20
institutions, the failure of the Pakistani state in such crucial=20
areas as medical and edeucational provision, and the influence of=20
assertive Islamic movements abroad, in addition to a host of other=20
factors, have made for the alarming rise of militant Islamist groups=20
and a culture of violence that has wreaked havoc not just in Kashmir,=20
but also inside Pakistan itself, with Shia-Sunni and intra-Sunni=20
conflicts now assuming menacing proportions. Ahmed insists that one=20
of the critical tasks facing Musharraf is to seriously attempt to=20
reign in the militants. Never has the time been more appropriate for=20
a more liberal and tolerant understanding of Islam, and, if one may=20
add, of Hinduism as well.
While acknowledging that Pakistan has to take serious=20
measures to solve its own problems, Jason Burke, former South Asia=20
correspondent of the London-based 'Observer', writes that being the=20
bigger of the two countries, India must show sympathy and needs to=20
find the necessary compassion and generosity to understand the=20
dilemma that Pakistan faces. Likewise, Mani Shankar Aiyar also=20
insists that dialogue is indeed the only way out of the impasse in=20
Indo-Pakistan ties. But, as the collapsed Agra summit so clearly=20
suggests, a dialogue of the deaf can no longer do.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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