[sacw] SACW #1 (14 Oct. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
14 October 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Pakistani writer Sabiha Sumar says she fears the US and UK's air=20
strikes might be pushing her country to the brink of civil war.
#2. Stop the Attacks on Afghanistan! (South Asia Solidarity Group)
#3. It's not an abstract war between good and evil (Zoya Hasan)
#4. Who's interested in the voices of sanity? (Sakina Yusuf Khan)
#5. India: Congress govt in Kerala wields the axe against Kerala=20
Council for historical research + Interview with Prof. K.N. Panikkar
#6. India: The VHP and the Bajrang Dal launch a 'Trishul Diksha'=20
campaign in Rajasthan
#7. India: Punjab Terrorism: Truth Still Uncovered (Pritam Singh)

________________________

#1.

BBC News
Saturday, 13 October, 2001, 07:40 GMT 08:40 UK
War View: Are the air strikes wise?

Pakistani writer Sabiha Sumar says she fears the US and UK's air=20
strikes might be pushing her country to the brink of civil war.

Schools are closed and the traffic is thin on the otherwise busy city roads=
.
McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets are shut. There is an=20
ominous calm in Karachi. Roads leading to the US and the British=20
consulates are closed - large containers are parked across the roads.
The thirst for revenge is tinged with reason
I talked to several people from different walks of life about their=20
opinion on the US-led attacks in Afghanistan.
Although only a minority of people in Karachi are outright supporters=20
of Osama Bin Laden, a large majority are morally outraged by the=20
attacks on the Afghan people, who have nothing to do with al-Qaeda.
City mosques are witnessing record attendance of the faithful.

Demands for evidence

In essence, the message I heard was the same everywhere. The insult=20
to Islam and Muslims must be avenged.
The thirst for revenge is tinged with reason. Rafiq, a senior civil=20
servant and political activist argues that America failed to show the=20
Muslim people the evidence it claims to have against Osama. "Where is=20
the evidence?" He spreads his hands in disgust.
Intellectuals are aghast at the "monumental stupidity" of the United=20
States for playing into the hands of religious parties.
"Unfortunately, the war is being seen as a crusade against Islam and=20
the Taliban are exploiting it to the hilt", says Nausheen, a=20
successful lawyer with a multinational company.
All the work we did to stem the Islamisation of Pakistani society=20
over many years was swept overboard literally overnight

Fahmida

"The fundos have been immensely strengthened by the air strikes,"=20
says Mahmood who works for a Non-Government Organisation (NGO). "The=20
narrow space for intellectual work we have will now shrink into=20
virtually nothing."
"All the work we did", bemoans Fahmida, a woman activist, "to stem=20
the Islamisation of Pakistani society over many years was swept=20
overboard literally overnight."
Mufti Nizamuddin is a member of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islami (JUI). I=20
asked him for his opinion about the air strikes.
"It is in their hands to start the war but it is not in their hands to end =
it."

Growing backlash

The JUI has issued a fatwa declaring that "this war must be fought in=20
every Muslim home, everywhere". The Mufti makes especial reference to=20
Muslims in Britain.

Afghanistan will turn into an American graveyard
"We will take the war to every Muslim home in Britain and every=20
Muslim home in America. [President] Bush wants a crusade. We'll give=20
him Jihad."
"My husband loves Osama", said Afrosa, looking at her two children=20
playing in the garden. "The Americans deserved what they got and=20
deserve to get more."

Graveyard

Her husband, Khalid, is home early, having closed his printing shop=20
because business is "very slow" today.
"We are holding a protest demonstration in the evening", he declares.=20
"Afghanistan will turn into an American graveyard."
The emotional response is strikingly different to that when Iraq was=20
bombed about a decade ago. Then, Iraq was seen largely as the guilty=20
party for invading Kuwait.

This time, the reactions are the opposite. In the eyes of the vast=20
majority in Karachi, Afghanistan committed no crime; and Osama bin=20
Laden is innocent until proven guilty.
The feeling of being wronged is intense. There is almost universal=20
belief that Pakistan was misled into believing that there would be no=20
military action, that the country was used cynically by the US and=20
Britain.
Predictably the growing backlash is increasingly threatening the=20
Musharraf presidency.
I could not avoid the conclusion that some fear that the US and=20
Britain by their unwise and ultimately counterproductive military=20
attack on Afghanistan may have brought Pakistan to the brink of civil=20
war.

_______

#2.

STOP THE ATTACKS ON AFGHANISTAN!
BUILD THE RESISTANCE TO BUSH AND BLAIR'S IMPERIALIST WAR!
a statement by South Asia Solidarity Group
13 October 2001

We condemn the U.S. attacks on the people of Afghanistan. Men, women,=20
and children are dying as villages are razed to the ground by earth=20
penetrating 'bunker-busting' bombs, cities attacked with cruise=20
missiles and the notorious cluster bombs dropped on rural areas.=20
While the American and British media are spreading panic about=20
potential anthrax attacks here, the people of Afghanistan face an=20
enemy which has not hesitated to use Depleted Uranium as a matter of=20
course in attacks on Iraq and the Balkans - leading to the deaths of=20
leukemia of thousands of children.

We in South Asia Solidarity Group express our continuing sympathies=20
with the families and friends of all those who have died and been=20
injured as a result of the horrific attacks on the World Trade Centre=20
on 11th September. But we must recognise that these deaths are now=20
being cynically used to justify an open-ended war against all those=20
the U.S. government considers may pose a threat to its interests.=20
Bush and Blair's war, which is now threatening to extend not only to=20
Afghanistan but to the people in a wide variety of countries in East=20
Asia, the Middle East and Africa, is an attempt to consolidate=20
America's economic and political stranglehold over these regions.

American policies - spreading terror
The reality is that the policies of the U.S. government in the both=20
the Middle East and Central Asia - as elsewhere in the world - have=20
had nothing to do with democracy and everything to do with furthering=20
its own economic and strategic interests. These have always been=20
determined by two guiding principles: maintaining control over oil=20
and the dollar reserves based on it; and closely linked to this its=20
support for Israel. To these ends, the U.S. has installed, backed and=20
sustained a whole range of repressive and anti-democratic rulers=20
(including, for many years, Saddam Hussein).

In Afghanistan, it was the U. S. which deliberately created Osama Bin=20
Laden (who is allegedly responsible for the September 11 attacks) and=20
the fundamentalist Taliban itself, after the Soviet invasion of=20
Afghanistan in 1979, with the CIA pumping in billions of dollars=20
worth of arms and ammunition via Pakistan to the mujahideen fighting=20
the Soviet Army. The former US Secretary of State, Zbigniew=20
Brezinski asks contemptuously, 'What was more important in the world=20
view of history? The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few=20
stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of=20
the Cold War?' Television footage shows Brezinski visiting=20
Afghanistan in this period and, with chilling cynicism, shouting=20
'Allah is with you' to urge on the Islamic fighters.
Now the US is playing the same game with the Northern Alliance -=20
hypocritically proclaiming them to be a 'democratic opposition' to=20
the Taliban when in reality for the people of Afghanistan there is=20
little to choose between the two - the Northern Alliance are only=20
marginally less repressively religious than the Taliban, and have=20
over the last year taken over the marketing of heroin on a large=20
scale, making a mockery of Blair's claim that this is also a war on=20
drugs.
This war is not about a clash of civilisations. It is not about the=20
West vs Islam although that how it is being portrayed. Liberals who=20
plead for more tolerance of 'non-western values' are missing the=20
point. Bin Laden and the Taliban are not being targetted because they=20
are Islamic fundamentalists or because they don't believe in=20
democratic values or even because they are believed to have committed=20
or supported terrorist acts. Beyond the immediate US imperative to=20
show that it is retaliating for the September 11 attacks, they are=20
being attacked because they are seen as threats to the consolidation=20
of US power at a time when capitalism is in crisis. This is also why=20
countries as diverse as Egypt and the Phillipines and Malaysia are=20
being labelled as part of the 'Islamic' world and threatened that the=20
war may spread to targets within them.=20=20=20=20=20=20
Anti-Muslim racism
The ideology of a 'clash of civilisations' which has been used to=20
justify US foreign policy since the early 1990s has also affected our=20
lives in Britain. It has fed into the racism experienced by people in=20
working class Asian communities in Britain, with Muslims increasingly=20
demonised as fanatical and violent over the last decade. In the wake=20
of the attacks, Home Secretary David Blunkett has promised to tighten=20
further the draconian asylum laws which have already destroyed so=20
many refugees' lives. Once again the British state is further=20
fuelling and legitimising racist attacks, branding refugees who have=20
come to Britain fleeing torture and persecution as terrorists and=20
criminals. The proposed introduction of ID cards would further erode=20
basic civil liberties in Britain and give the police a new pretext=20
for continuing racist harassment.

As a result, as people of Asian and other Third World origin we are=20
all today under threat more than ever. Already in the wake of=20
September 11th an Afghan taxi driver has been left paralysed from the=20
neck down in West London while a 19 year old Asian woman was hit=20
repeatedly on the head with a baseball bat in Swindon. Many more such=20
racist attacks have gone unreported. We cannot remain silent - we=20
must come together to resist these attacks.=20=20=20=20

A war on the people, a war on democracy
Bush's 'war on terrorism' is terrifyingly open-ended - aimed at no=20
one country, state or organisation. Far from defending democracy,=20
such a war will spell the death of democracy for all those resisting=20
repressive regimes, state forces or the interests of global capital.=20
All resistance to state power will be potentially labelled as=20
'terrorist' and a legitimate target for repression and violence.

The war will have a devastating impact on people's lives across the=20
entire region of South Asia,
in particular in Pakistan, Kashmir and India.

America's arm-twisting of the authoritarian Pakistani government to=20
join the U.S-led 'alliance' in the face of massive popular opposition=20
in Pakistan is likely to plunge the country into an even deeper=20
crisis which may well lead to civil war or the Talibanisation of=20
Pakistan itself. Pakistan, whose economy has already been brought to=20
its knees by the IMF and World Bank, is now being made an offer of=20
aid and debt rescheduling it can't refuse. This is a stark=20
illustration of how, in a so-called 'free market' world, the=20
institutions of global capital are used to coerce Third World states=20
into supporting Western strategic and military goals, at a huge cost=20
to their own people.

Meanwhile the pro-U.S, pro-globalisation Hindu fascist parties=20
leading India's government are competing with Pakistan to offer all=20
possible help to Bush's project of destruction. At the same time the=20
government is intensifying communal attacks on India's own Muslim and=20
Christian minorities and using the 'war on terrorism' to legitimise=20
even greater repression in Kashmir and elsewhere. In Delhi at a=20
demonstration, people have been arrested for carrying anti-war=20
leaflets and charged with sedition.

South Asia Solidarity Group
c/o Londec, 299 Kentish Town Road, London NW5 2TJ
Tel. : 020 7424 9535 email : southasia@h...

______

#3.

The Times of India / 14 October 2001
It's not an abstract war between good and evil
Zoya Hasan

http://203.199.93.7/articleshow.asp?art_id=3D1133978458

______

#4.
The Times of India / 14 October 2001
Who's interested in the voices of sanity?
Sakina Yusuf Khan
http://203.199.93.7/articleshow.asp?art_id=3D585374649

______

#5.

Frontline | Volume 18 - Issue 21, Oct. 13 - 26, 2001

A shade of saffron
The Congress(I)-led government in Kerala wields the axe against a=20
nascent historical research institution.
R. KRISHNAKUMAR
in Thiruvananthapuram

[...]
THE Kerala government's decision has been criticised by prominent=20
historians and social activists. Several well-known historians,=20
including Irfan Habib, R.S. Sharma, Satish Chandra, K.M. Shrimali,=20
D.N. Jha, Sumit Sarkar, Tanika Sarkar, Mushirul Hassan and Arjun Dev,=20
issued a joint statement, urging the government to reconsider its=20
decision. They said: "The production of historical research on=20
scientific and unbiased lines is a very important task today. This is=20
especially so for all State governments that do not subscribe to the=20
anti-secular measures taken by the present BJP government at the=20
Centre in the realm of education and research." The historians said=20
that much was expected of the newly established Council. "No one can=20
be convinced by the argument that its functions can be performed by=20
the newly established Gazetteer Department. While no one can have any=20
quarrel with the proposal to prepare and publish new editions of=20
District Gazetteers, this work cannot possibly encompass the larger=20
cause of promoting research in the history of Kerala as well as=20
general history... We are also surprised that such a step should be=20
taken when the Congress leadership itself has been highlighting the=20
threat of saffronisation and stressing the need to foster the proper=20
projection of history to our people."

Full Text of above article at: http://www.flonnet.com/fl1821/18210890.htm

O O O O

'A right-wing ploy' - Interview with K.N. Panikkar.
Excerpts from an interview that Dr. K.N. Panikkar, who was the=20
Chairman of the Kerala Council for Historical Research, gave R.=20
Krishnakumar:
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1821/18210900.htm

______

#6.

Frontline, Volume 18 - Issue 21, Oct. 13 - 26, 2001]

Communal calculations
The VHP and the Bajrang Dal launch a 'Trishul Diksha' campaign in=20
Rajasthan, disrupting the peace.
T.K. RAJALAKSHMI
in Bhilwara
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1821/18210380.htm

______

#7.

Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay, India) October 6, 2001

Punjab Terrorism: Truth Still Uncovered
Pritam Singh

Terrorism in Punjab: Understanding Grassroots Reality by Harish K=20
Puri, Paramjit Singh Judge, Jagrup Singh Sekhon; Har-Anand=20
Publications, New Delhi, 1999; pp 200, Rs 395.

This study should be welcomed for the authors' effort in collecting=20
empirical data on some aspects of the most violent conflict in Punjab=20
since the 1947 partition. The Sikh militant movement of the 1980s,=20
the subject of this study, can also be considered by most criteria as=20
the most powerful armed opposition movement against established state=20
power in Punjab since the last 200 years. The representation of this=20
movement by the mainstream media in India focused on only one aspect=20
of this movement: the objective of creating a Sikh state Khalistan in=20
Punjab. This one - dimensional representation of the movement by the=20
Indian media can be ascribed partly to ignorance, partly to sectarian=20
biases of varying degrees embedded in the ideological make-up of most=20
Indian journalists and partly to the political objectives of the=20
Indian state reflected through this representation.1 The authors of=20
this study claim: "The ground reality was different from the social=20
construction of the struggle by the political elite, the definition=20
given to it by the government of India and the interpretations by=20
academics attuned to value distance from the people" (Preface). In=20
challenging the social construction of the struggle by the elite, the=20
authors have made a valuable contribution. However, their expectation=20
of capturing 'the ground reality' without any element of construction=20
is theoretically na=EFve.
This study has focused on one aspect of the Sikh militant movement, i=20
e, terrorism. By interviewing several people in some villages of the=20
Amritsar and Gurdaspur districts, the authors have tried to collect=20
information about who the 'terrorists' were, what their motivations=20
were, how the state dealt with them and who opposed them. The=20
question of who supported them, however, is not dealt with. Some=20
interesting and useful case studies of those who opposed the=20
'terrorists' are provided but none for those who supported them. This=20
is close to what the statisticians call 'the omitted variable bias'=20
in the data collected and the conclusions arrived at. This study was=20
conducted after the majority of the 'terrorists' were liquidated and=20
some were arrested in the early 1990s; it reports responses to a=20
collapsed movement. Contra factually, one can argue that a similar=20
group of respondents might have given a very different response had=20
the study been done in a period of the rise of the movement. Whether=20
the truth about a movement can be captured by studying it in its=20
period of rise or decline cannot be answered straightaway. It is,=20
however, sensible to argue that both phases of any movement should be=20
studied in order to provide a balanced understanding of the movement.=20
The claims made about a movement by studying it in only one of the=20
two main phases must be qualified. The authors make merely a passing=20
reference to "the likelihood of time sequence variations in=20
responses" (p 33) and do not reflect sufficiently on this vital=20
aspect in examining the data critically. This inadequate reflection,=20
on an inherent bias in their data, results in their failure to=20
acknowledge the necessary limitations of their conclusions.

Further doubts emerge about the precision and robustness of the data=20
and the results when we learn that the respondents in the villages=20
were selected on the basis of their willingness to talk and this=20
willingness was secured through the contacts of the authors'=20
colleagues and students (p 30). The authors do not show any awareness=20
of the structural weakness of this method of selecting a sample. It=20
is highly likely that the responses, which form the data of this=20
study, share certain characteristics simply due to the unavoidable=20
like-mindedness of the group of respondents selected in the manner=20
described above.

The crux of the argument of this study is that the terrorist movement=20
in Punjab was not an ideologically coherent movement for Khalistan;=20
the less well-off Jat Sikhs were the major recruiting group in the=20
movement. This caste group generated several characteristics of the=20
movement of which the dominant one was faction fighting over material=20
(land, property) and non-material (honour, vendetta) issues relating=20
to rural society. According to Puri et al, the movement collapsed=20
because of two main factors: one, the disillusionment of the Jat=20
Sikhs with the movement because of the misdeeds of the 'terrorists'=20
and two, the brutality of the state repression led by a Jat Sikh=20
police officer (KPS Gill). This overall view of the study, perhaps,=20
lends it a coherence which the study itself lacks.

Probing Ambiguities

The book contains several bits of interesting information; the=20
problem lies with the overall architecture of the book in using this=20
information. The major weakness of the work is lack of critical=20
reflection on the concepts employed and the survey data collected.=20
The review of the literature on the theories of terrorism is=20
completed in one and a half pages by giving references to a few works=20
on terrorism (pp 12-14). A theoretical review must engage with the=20
arguments of competing paradigms and out of this engagement must=20
emerge the theoretical framework and the research design of the=20
project undertaken. Since this exercise is not done adequately by the=20
authors of this study, there is hardly any link between the=20
theoretical literature on the subject and the quick survey of some=20
studies on Punjabi terrorism. Discussion on the relative merits or=20
demerits of using the adjective 'terrorist', 'militant' or=20
'extremist' to characterise the armed Sikh groups is completed in one=20
paragraph (p 54). After having decided abruptly in favour of the=20
adjective 'terrorist', the authors move on to title Table II as=20
'Recruitment of Militants' (p 55) and section 2 on the following page=20
is titled as 'Life Span of a Militant' without explaining why=20
'militant' is now being used as a term of reference after having=20
rejected its usage only a page earlier. They revert back to the usage=20
of 'terrorist' (p 57) without any explanation. This is symptomatic of=20
either carelessness or of ambiguity in their conceptualisation of a=20
very contestable term. It would have been perfectly appropriate to=20
stick honestly to this intellectual ambiguity because this could have=20
been construed as reflective of the ambiguity of the material social=20
and political reality.

The authors present very interesting data on the caste=20
characteristics of the militants/terrorists but reach less=20
interesting conclusions. "264 out of 323, i e, 81.73 per cent were=20
Jat Sikhs by caste. The closest other caste to which 7.42 per cent of=20
them belonged was that of mazhbi (scheduled caste) Sikhs. Two per=20
cent were from ramagarhia (carpenter) caste, and a smaller number=20
from kumhar, nai, jheer and chhimba castes, and, Christian dalits;=20
all those belonging to the backward castes constituted 7 per cent of=20
the total. Interestingly, two of them were Hindus too" (p 59). This=20
data shows a wide cross-section of Punjabi rural society being=20
represented in the militant ranks but the authors point out only the=20
predominance of the Jat Sikhs. There are several reasons why the=20
emphasis on the predominance of Jat Sikhs in the militant ranks does=20
not bring much interesting insight either into militant politics=20
specifically or Punjabi politics generally. The Jat Sikhs constitute=20
the overwhelming majority (over two- thirds) of the Sikh population=20
which the authors also acknowledge. What is not highlighted is that=20
the Jat Sikhs dominate all political formations in contemporary=20
Punjab (Congress, Akalis, Communists) except Hindutva organisations=20
(BJP, Shiv Sena) and BSP for obvious reasons. Though the dominance of=20
the Jat Sikhs in Punjabi politics (like the dominance of the Marathas=20
in Maharashtra and the Reddys in Andhra Pradesh) deserves more=20
academic attention than it has attracted so far; it is not a=20
distinguishing feature of the Punjabi militants when compared to=20
Punjabi Congress people, Punjabi Akalis and Punjabi Communists.=20
Consequently, focusing on the socio-cultural behaviour patterns of=20
the Jat Sikhs to explain the differences among the Sikh militants',=20
which this study attempts, becomes a seriously flawed exercise.

A potentially fruitful area of enquiry would have been to probe=20
further the aspect of Punjabi Hindu presence amongst the Sikh=20
militants which Puri et al. rightly call 'interesting' but do not=20
follow up. This is an aspect of Punjab militancy which remains hugely=20
understudied. There is some interesting information on Roshan Lal=20
Bairagi, the first known Punjabi Hindu turned Sikh 'terrorist',=20
provided by the left-wing magazine Link: "Bairagis are a Hindu=20
Brahmin sect. This particular Hindu sect has closest links with=20
Sikhism. They are generally poor. Some villages in Amritsar district=20
have one or more Bairagi families each. Traditionally, they earn=20
their living by doing daily labour occasionally, begging and=20
performing religious ceremonies, including in Sikh families."2 Some=20
of the other Punjabi Hindus whose names were reported in the media=20
for having joined the ranks of Sikh terrorists were Pardeep Kumar=20
(Sher Singh Sher after baptism), Rakesh Kumar (new Sikh name Ranjit=20
Singh Pappu, killed 1992), Balwant Rai (Gurdit Singh Gullu killed=20
1992), Ashok Kumar Billa, Ramesh Lal (Kabul Singh), Vikas Pandit=20
(killed), Vishnu Dutt (killed) and his brother Prem Kumar (Panthjit=20
Singh), Sarwan Kumar (Palwinder Singh, killed) and his brother Ashok=20
Kumar (Sukhwinder Singh, killed), K C Sharma (killed), Sushil Kumar=20
(killed), Sham Sunder Shastri (Ranjit Singh Bittu, killed 1992), Bhai=20
Des Raj Desa Salem Tabri (killed 1992), Tarsem Raj ('escaped' police=20
custody 1992) and Ram Sarup Pandit (Surjit Singh killed 1992).3

It is difficult to say much regarding some Punjabi Hindus' turn=20
towards Sikh militancy on the basis of the limited information=20
available of these individuals. Had the authors done in-depth case=20
studies of the two Punjabi Hindus in their sample, that might have=20
yielded some refreshing information on the question of Punjabi Hindu=20
participation in the Sikh militant movement. If we place this aspect=20
into the larger context of Hindu-Sikh relations in Punjab, we can=20
move closer to solving this apparent paradox. An overwhelming=20
majority of members of the Punjabi Hindu community have genuine and=20
deep reverence for the Sikh Gurus and the gurdwaras, especially the=20
Golden Temple. Similarly it will be difficult to find a Sikh who does=20
not have deep religious respect for the Hindu Gods and the temples.=20
Despite differences in some religious practices/beliefs, the Punjabi=20
Hindus and the Sikhs share a common universe of feelings. They=20
understand and empathise with each others' collective 'structure of=20
sentiments' (to borrow Raymond Williams' term).

Shared Sorrows
Though the media did not adequately report it, a large number of=20
Punjabi Hindus were as emotionally injured at the destruction caused=20
by the army action at the Golden Temple as were the Sikhs. It is not=20
unreasonable to argue that many young Punjabi Hindus, especially in=20
the rural areas where they are more imbued with the Sikh ethos than=20
the urban Hindus, shared their Sikh friends' sense of anger and=20
revenge against the 'Delhi Durbar' for the destruction of the Akal=20
Takhat and other acts of sacrilege. To the Punjabi youth, the Sikh=20
militants' actions of armed attacks at targets belonging to the=20
'Delhi Durbar' seemed an act of retrieval of self-dignity against the=20
humiliation inflicted by 'Indira's Delhi'. The act of some Punjabi=20
Hindus joining the ranks of Sikh militants was an act of identifying=20
with the Sikh militants' bravery and courage - the values admired and=20
emulated by Punjabi youth.

In trying to understand the motivations of Punjabi youth for joining=20
the militant movement, the authors have noted a critical fact about=20
their data: "In a majority of empirical studies the standard pattern=20
is to interview the participants in the movement. In the present=20
study this was not feasible. Most of the terrorists were dead" (p=20
27). However, they have not drawn the implications of this data=20
limitation in making conclusions about the motivations of the=20
terrorists. The claims made in this study about understanding the=20
motivations of the 'terrorists' must, therefore, remain questionable.

Some of the promising aims of the study stated in the beginning are=20
half abandoned by the end. One of the stated aims of the study was=20
the collection of data on "the cases of individual or group=20
resistance against the terrorists and/or the police and the character=20
of armed or passive resistance" (p 23). Though some useful=20
information is provided on the resistance to the 'terrorists', the=20
study is silent on armed or passive resistance offered by ordinary=20
people against the police and other wings of the security forces. It=20
was common knowledge in rural areas of Punjab that one of the forms=20
of passive resistance resorted to by farmers was to switch off tube=20
wells or deliberately stop the electric supply to the tube wells to=20
deny the use of water to the members of the security forces.=20
Deliberate rumours were spread about poisoning of the food 'offered'=20
to the security forces so as to prevent the security forces from=20
demanding food. It is well known that due to such rumours, the=20
security forces were officially barred from accepting food from the=20
public after Operation Blue Star. The open and, sometimes, veiled=20
hostility of the rural population to the security forces was=20
especially demoralising for the armed forces because they knew that=20
the villagers in the border areas had actively cooperated with the=20
army during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak conflicts.

The authors of this study deserve praise for giving attention to=20
aspects of 'passive resistance' and 'weapons of the weak' which have=20
remained largely neglected in the study of violent political=20
conflicts in Punjab. Their contribution would have been even more=20
fruitful had they not dealt with these aspects in an evidently=20
one-sided fashion. It is hoped that they will overcome this weakness=20
in a future work and would explore the potential richness of this=20
line of research on the 'weapons of the weak' in civil society -=20
state conflicts in Punjab.4

Puri, Judge and Sekhon deserve appreciation for not succumbing to the=20
obnoxious discourse of 'unity and integrity of the country' in=20
examining Punjabi terrorism. This discourse has sharpened sectarian=20
divisions in India by feeding chauvinist tendencies among the=20
majority Hindu population and creating insecurity and alienation=20
among the minorities. The authors of the study are right in pointing=20
out that the government of India overplayed the Khalistani dimension=20
in the Sikh militant movement. A large number of Sikh youth took to=20
arms out of revenge against the attack on the Golden Temple rather=20
than out of any ideological commitment to Khalistan. The Khalistani=20
elements in the movement tried to steer the anger of Sikh youth=20
towards the ideological perspective of Khalistan. It suited the=20
political designs of the Congress Party to overproject the Khalistani=20
dimension for whipping up Hindu nationalist sentiments for electoral=20
purposes. The BJP was obviously more than happy that the Congress=20
Party was preparing the ideological base for strengthening Hindutva=20
sentiments amongst the Hindu population in the country in general and=20
in Hindi-speaking north India in particular.

The authors, however, make an error when, in their zeal to emphasise=20
the non-ideological motivations of the Sikh terrorists, they=20
obfuscate the most vile aspect of the terrorist movement, viz, the=20
Khalistani designs behind the murderous attacks on politically=20
uninvolved Hindus for just being Hindus. The authors' attempt to=20
demonstrate that the terrorists violence 'was not so much=20
discriminatory in its consequence' (p 163) misses the central feature=20
of the Khalistani inspired terrorist violence - namely that the Sikhs=20
who were attacked were not attacked just for being Sikhs; they were=20
attacked because they were political opponents, or were rich (for=20
extortion), they were members of the security forces, police=20
relatives and informers. In contrast, the Hindus were attacked=20
primarily for being Hindus. One of the consequences of this=20
discriminatory and targeted violence was that the Sikhs and Hindus=20
perceived the purpose and aims of this violence differently. The=20
authors make a mistake again when they fail to highlight the=20
anti-Sikh stance of the terrorism of state security forces,=20
especially the CRP and BSF.

The section on some Punjabi Leftists activists' resistance to=20
terrorists focuses on the determination of Punjabi Leftists but also=20
hints at the trap into which the Punjabi Left entangled themselves.=20
The Punjabi Left's alliance with the state led to a situation where,=20
"the state police provided them (the Leftists) a large number of=20
sophisticated weapons including Light Machine Guns (LMGs) and AK 47s=20
and special security guards=8AThey had no problem in getting ammunition=20
from local police station" (p 178). It is not surprising that the=20
Punjabi Left came to be perceived in the villages as fighting "the=20
state's proxy war against secessionism" (p 182). The role of the CPI=20
was most deplorable (p 123). One can only hope that the Punjabi=20
Leftists will draw appropriate lessons both from the admirable fight=20
of its cadre against Khalistani sectarianism and the shameless=20
cuddling up to the police by a section of its leadership. The=20
anti-establishment reputation which the Punjabi Left once enjoyed,=20
has been dealt a terrible blow by the Left's close alliance with the=20
police in the 1980s and 1990s.5

If, despite several criticisms of this study, I have welcomed it, it=20
is because the authors have put in hard labour in collecting data on=20
a subject that needs many more studies than have been done so far.=20
This study is far from a balanced account of the recent violent=20
history of Punjab but it is a contribution, however flawed, in the=20
right direction. Punjabi people need to reckon with the terrible=20
turmoil they have gone through. To forgive may be wise and desirable=20
for reconciliation but to forget will be folly. What we need is=20
documentation and debate to uncover the truth which lies beneath=20
layers and layers of falsification, distortion and disinformation.

Notes

1 For my critique of mainstream Indian media's reporting of the=20
Punjab conflict, see 'AIR and Doordarshan Coverage of Punjab After=20
the Army Action', EPW, September 8, 1984; 'Punjab and the Government=20
Media', EPW, January 12, 1985 and 'Role of Media' in Amrik Singh=20
(ed), Punjab in Indian Politics, Ajanta Publishers, Delhi, 1985.

2 March 22, 1987. The Link profile is reproduced in Satyapal=20
Dang, Genesis of Terrorism: An Analytical Study of Punjab Terrorists,=20
Patriot Publishers, Delhi, 1989, pp 102-04. Dang's study is weak in=20
analysis but has a very useful collection of mainly English language=20
media's profiles of 32 'hardcore terrorists and several other=20
terrorists'.

3 The information about the first 10 in this list is from India=20
Today March 31, 1992, pp 74-77 and about the remaining six is from=20
the British Punjabi weekly Des Pardes, March 13 and 20, June 19 and=20
July 31 (all 1992). See also Sunday (June 21-27 , 1992) for the=20
police explanations of Punjabi Hindu youth joining the Sikh militants.

4 Mukulika Bannerjee in her paper 'Feeding Grass to the Lions:=20
Khudai Khidmatgars and the Akali Agitation' (unpublished) draws=20
attention to the richness of non-violent traditions among the Pathans=20
and the Sikhs - the two communities stereotypically projected as=20
violent. In her The Pathan Unarmed, OUP, 2001, Bannerjee describes=20
vividly the Pathan leader Badshah Khan's admiration for the Sikh=20
leader Baba Kharak Singh's steely resolve to pursue non-violent modes=20
of resistance.

5 I have examined the role of the Left in the Punjab conflict=20
in 'Marxism, Indian State and Punjab', International Journal of=20
Punjab Studies, Vol 4, No 2, July-December 1997, pp 237-50.

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