[sacw] SACW | 22 Dec. 00

[Harsh Kapoor]

SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WIRE
22 December 2000
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex)

#1. Pakistan: NRB: Theatre of the absurd
#2. Reaction to Asma Jahangir's Interview (posted in SACW 21 Dec. 00)
#3. New York Times on Pakistanis & Indians Make Moves for Less Strife
#4. Kashmir - Monologue to Dialogue
#5. Why does the RSS hate the idea of India ?
#6. India: Citizens Protest, "Disenfranchise Muslims statment" by Bombay
Fascist

--------

#1.

The Friday Times
22 December 2000

N.R.B.: THEATRE OF THE ABSURD

Ejaz Haider says that the NRB will reinforce its folly by demanding a
constitutional amendment for its devolution plan

Even as the military regime prepares to go ahead with the first phase of
local government elections on December 31, the devolution plan under which
the elections are being held has stumbled upon a major constitutional snag.

The plan, prepared by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) and
touted by Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf as the =ECbiggest
achievement of my government=EE, has already drawn much flak from political
parties and independent analysts. However, this latest development
threatens to unravel the plan.

The problem area, besides other weaknesses, relates to the
empowerment of district mayors. The plan gives mayors administrative
powers, including the subject of law and order. This, under the 1973
Constitution, is a provincial subject. Empowering district mayors (Nazims)
to exercise authority in this area would mean eliminating the role of the
provinces in respect of this subject.

This is how the plan envisages those powers:
14. The Zila Nazim will be the executive head of the district and the
administration and the police will be responsible to him. This will make
state functionaries and service providers accountable to the elected
representatives of the peoples.

This would essentially mean that the mayors would be directly
answerable to provincial governors, who are representatives of the federal
government and, according to article 101, nominees of the president. While
in the parliamentary set-up the president is required to consult the prime
minister on the nomination, in the present case the chief executive is the
sole authority to appoint governors.

The situation becomes more problematic if these powers are read in
conjunction with the external and internal recall-systems for the mayor. In
the case of external recall, even the chief minister of a province cannot
get rid of a mayor without the formal consent of the governor of the
province.

Interestingly, with its characteristic nonchalance, the NRB
initially proposed to overcome this problem through a presidential
ordinance. However, when it was told that this is far from an open-and-shut
case and would require an amendment in Chapter 2, Part 5 of the
Constitution =F1 the chapter deals with administrative relations between th=
e
provinces and the federation =F1 it was forced to engage some constitutiona=
l
experts to look into the issue.

But the issue of amending the Constitution itself is a thorny one.
While the Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the chief executive to amend
the Constitution, it categorically kept those areas that give to the
document its federal character out of bounds for any review, and therefore
any amendment.

This was not without reason, either. No amendment to the
Constitution can be allowed to work against the spirit of the document.
That, as jurists point out, would be inconsistent with the basic concept on
which the document is predicated.

The essence of the federation, as spelled out in the 1973
Constitution, relates to three lists of subjects: the federal list, the
concurrent list and the residual list. The concurrent list contains details
of provincial powers. It was in the federal spirit that the founding
fathers decided that the subjects contained in the residual list would
also, over a period of time, devolve in favour of the provinces rather than
the federation.

Lawyer Muhammad Shan Gul agrees the NRB has blundered but points a
way out: "The NRB seems to have ignored the presence of article 147 of the
Constitution. The article dispenses with the need for an amendment and also
provides the solution.

Article 147 reads: Powers of the Provinces to entrust functions to
the Federation: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the
Government of a province may, with the consent of the Federal Government,
entrust, either conditionally or unconditionally, to the Federal
Government, or to its officers, functions in relation to any matter to
which the executive authority of the provinces extends.

However, Gul's argument proffers one perspective on the issue. The
wordings of the article in fact make it clear that the present regime may
not use 147 to intervene into a provincial matter. It is clear that the act
of calling upon the federal government or any of its officers flows from
the province rather than the other way round. The reverse would indeed
expose the article to scrutiny as being inconsistent with the federal
spirit of the document of which it is a part.

It is instructive to recall that this article created a controversy
in 1989 when the then Sindh government requested army action in the
province under article 147. The army argued that it would only accept the
call under article 245, which deals with Functions of Armed Forces,
including acting in aid of civil power. However, the Sindh government did
not want to call in the army under 245 because that would have wrested the
powers away from the province and vested them in a federal force.

Another way out could be to make the mayors subordinate to the
chief minister of the province. However, sources say the NRB bosses are not
amenable to this suggestion and say that this would strike at the root of
the devolution plan by weakening the office of the district mayor. It is
amazing that while the district mayor=EDs subordination to the provincial
chief minister is considered a weakening of his office, the plan works
towards his subordination to the governor=EDs office.

This would make no sense unless the authors of the plan were
deliberately attempting to undermine the provincial authority. In an
article in TFT, this scribe wrote: "The plan essentially seeks to create a
presidential system of government without really saying so" This is the
fine print and this is what makes other issues in the plan ( which people
were asked to debate ) irrelevant. If one were to decide to debate the
merits and de-merits of the plan, then the first issue that immediately
presents itself is the constitutional impropriety of the central government
delving into an area that belongs to the provincial domain.

What has happened to the plan was bound to happen. The NRB
chairman, Lt-Gen (Retd) Tanvir Naqvi, is reported to have said that he
would tide this over through an amendment. He should reconsider his opinion=
.

The plan already strikes at the concept of provincial autonomy. In
a federal system, local government is not the preserve of the federal
government. Federal intervention into municipal structures, which
essentially bypasses the provinces, will only undermine provincial
authority and, consequently, autonomy. This has been a thorny issue
throughout the history of Pakistan. The smaller federating units have never
been happy with constitutional arrangements that were/are perceived to
devolve power towards the centre. In the last year they have again become
vocal on the issue.
As things stand, the regime has landed itself in an unsavoury
situation. It invested in a plan that was based on a faulty premise. Now,
it faces the inevitable. It cannot go ahead with elections without an
amendment. And it will be imprudent for it to make that amendment because
that would create a political and constitutional crisis.

For the NRB to press for an amendment would only amount to
reinforcing its folly. At best it should have dealt with centre-province
relations. Funnily, it proposes to do that now after having made a hash of
provincial autonomy through its devolution plan. What power-sharing formula
would it work out with the provinces if it goes ahead and gets around this
issue through an amendment is anybody=EDs guess.

_____

#2.

[Note from SACW compilers: The reference by Asma Jahangir in her interview
to Z A Bhutto not being corrupt was probably meant in the sense of his not
having pocketed pots of money, in comparision to people like Nawaz Sharif,
but Wasim Ghani contests this .... .]

Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2000 23:29:38 -0500
From: "Wasim"
Subject: VOICE OF IGNORANCE

I was appalled to read Asma Jehangir's interview entitled, "Voice of
Conscience" in your dispatch today (20 December 00) in which she said that
Mr Bhutto was not corrupt. Coming from a former chair of the Human Rights
Commission, her statement is indeed mystifying. How can Ms Jahangir
exonerate Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who had the party's ideologue, Mr.
J.A.Rahim, arrested and tortured. Mr. Rahim remained for several years a
prisoner of Mr. Bhutto's government. Mr. J.A.Rahim was in late sixties
when he fell out of Mr. Bhutto's favour for criticising his
government's policies and practices which were openly corrupt. Mr. Bhutto,
with the aid of one of his ministers had Mr. Rahim tortured (his hair was
pulled out, and was visciously beaten, damaging his kidneys) and raped.
This is information is a matter of public record: Mr. J.A. Rahim spoke
about his torture on Pakistani television when he was set free
after Bhutto's fall from power. Pakistani newspapers of the time also
extensively carried the story of Mr. Rahim's torture. Ms. Asma Jahangir is
old enough to remember all this and yet she has the temerity to say that
Bhutto was not corrupt. Was it not under Mr. Bhutto's government that
Pakistani industries were nationalised and eventually 'vandalised' by
corrupt party officials and friends. Some of those industrial units and
business simply collapsed due to the massive pilfering of resources. Is
Ms. Jahangir asking us to believe that the autocratic Mr. Bhutto was
unaware of the robbery of Pakistan's resources under his own government.
Not likely. Mr. Bhutto allowed it to happen because he stood to gain from
it both financially and politically.=20=20=20=20

How can Ms. Asma Jahangir protect the prime minister whose protege was the
criminal, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the notorious chief minister of the
largest Pakistani province, Punjab (Ms.Jahangir lives in Punjab ). Surely
Ms. Jahangir has not forgotten how people were publicly paraded naked for
opposing Khar; or that he had numerour women kidnapped so that he could
rape them. And has Ms. Jahangir also forgotten how Mr. Khar hounded and
terrorised a famour singer from Punjab to the extent that she had to leave
Punjab.=20=20=20

But on a much more serious scale, is the upholder of human rights and
democracy unaware of Mr. Bhutto's refusal to let the democratically
elected Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman of East Pakistan become the prime minister
of Pakistan, a position he wanted for himself. And did he not publicly
lend his approval to the brutal military action in East Pakistan It was
Bhutto's greed for power and money that made him find an accomodation with
the Pakistan Military. After coming to power, Mr. Bhutto became the first
civilian martial law administrator of Pakistan (no other prime minister
has stooped so low). After becoming the martial law administrator, Mr.
Bhutto sent the army to suppress the Baluchis. Thousands were killed
during that operation. Why did Mr. Bhutto do that? To remain in power with
the help of the military. A clean man indeed! Ms. Jahangir then has the
nerve to compare him to an honest and selfless man like Liaquat Ali Khan?
If any apology is due more than anyone else Ms Benazir Bhutto should make
an apology for her father's crimes. Ms.Jahangir should apologise for
trying to mislead people. And Mr Mati-ur-Rahman should go over Asma
Jehangir's comments carefully and change the title of his interview to
"Voice of Ignorance."=20=20

Wasim Ghani (in Toronto)

______

#3.

The New York Times
December 21, 2000

Pakistanis and Indians Make Moves for Less Strife

By BARRY BEARAK

NEW DELHI, Dec. 20 =97 In a rare run of encouraging news in one of the
world's most discouraging conflicts, India and Pakistan announced steps
today to reduce tensions along their de facto border in divided Kashmir.

Full text at ; http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/21/world/21KASH.html

______

#4.

Himal South Asian
December 2000

KASHMIR - Monologue to Dialogue

by Tapan K. Bose

The declaration of a unilateral ceasefire during the month of Ramzan
(November 29-December 28) by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has
given a new lease of life to the failing peace process in Kashmir. This
unilateral move has been hailed by many in India and abroad as the first
positive step in the direction of peace after the collapse of the August
2000 peace initiative of the Hizbul Mujahideen, which had also declared a
unilateral ceasefire. Initially, Pakistan had dismissed Vajpayee's
declaration as a 'ploy', and the Hizbul Mujahideen and other jehadist
groups who operate from sanctuaries inside Pakistan not only rejected
the Indian offer, but stepped up their military operations in the Valley.
Almost a week after the Indian declara-tion, however, on 2 December, in a
sudden change of stance Islamabad declared that it had ordered its armed
forces on the line of control to exercise "maximum restraint" to
"strengthen and stabilise" the ceasefire in "occupied Kashmir".

Dawn of Karachi linked Islamabad's shift to the US Assistant Secretary of
State Karl Inderfurth's reported statement in New Delhi urging "Pakistan
and Mujahideen organisations to positively reciprocate Indian prime
minister's ceasefire offer". Earlier, India's Defence Minister, George
Fernandes had indicated that New Delhi's unilateral ceasefire was a
response to 'suggestions' from certain 'quarters'. Obviously, it was US
pressure on India and Pakistan that led to a breakthrough in the
India-Pakistan deadlock. But how does one now move from this stage of
unilateral statements and counter-statements to dialogue? It is obvious
that the two parties have to face each other across a
table, and the sooner that happens the better for the survival of the
current peace initiative. While the combined pressure of the US government
and the IMF has succeeded in bringing the two warring governments this far,
this will not be enough to take them to the next necessary stage.

A 'Camp David' style peace pro-cess cannot work here in South Asia as it
has not in West Asia. An antiseptic exercise in 'conflict resolution' that
does not challenge or question the status quo is bound to be stillborn. The
hallmark of the Clinton Administration's policy of 'waging peace' in West
Asia has been not to disturb the status quo (for example, to ignore the
fundamental issues of Palestinian displacement and
Jewish settlements). The fact is that the status quo always privileges the
strong, and as we watch the Camp David agreement disintegrate we must
examine the fundamentals of the new push for peace initiative in South
Asia, one in which the Americans seem at least to
have an indirect role.

To recapitulate recent history: Official talks between India and Pakistan,
which were resumed after a gap of four years in 1998, stalled once again in
November of that year. In February 1999, Vajpayee took a bus ride to Lahore
to kick-start dialogue, and this resulted in the Lahore Declaration and an
accom-panying buildup of hyperbole in the Indian media about how it was the
harbinger of a new era of peace, friendship and
cooperation. The fact that Musharraf and the other armed forces chiefs
boycotted the Lahore event was noted, but not given due consideration.
Within three months, in May 1999, came the letdown, the "stab in the back".
Pakistani forces crossed the line of control in Kargil and started
bombarding the Srinagar-Leh highway from the ridgeline.

In hindsight, it is clear that the Lahore Declaration, significant in
itself, was mainly a statement of intent not translated into policy. This
was why bureaucrats on both sides continued to drag their feet on pressing
bilateral matters even after its signing. It is also true that Sharif was
caught completely unawares by Vajpayee's acceptance of the invitation to
visit Lahore by the inaugural bus from Delhi, which was the result of an
off-hand remark during an interview Sharif had given to an Indian
journalist. This unorthodox, almost Simon Perez-like initiative on the part
of Vajpayee was hailed as a bold and statesman-like step, particularly
after the November 1998 round of secretary-level dialogue had failed (see
box). [Box being posted in a subsequent dispatch]

The Indian government was baffled by the attack on Kargil, and its
military was unprepared. The fear of a nuclear confronta-tion increased as
the fighting escalated, and international pressure mounted on the two
capitals to end the hostilities. But how could the Vajpayee government talk
to a Pakistan it was accusing of betrayal? So South Block decided to make a
distinction between the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif and the
Pakistani military. Pervez Musharraf was identified as the real villain and
Sharif a weak but reluctant friend. The latter was temporarily absolved of
the crime of 'back stabbing'. What seemed a good stratagem back then
unfortunately boomeranged when Sharif's government was overthrown and the
"rogue general" became Chief Executive of Pakistan.

The State Department has been advising New Delhi to retract from its
position of not talking with Islamabad's military government. But the
problem is not so much the military government as its Chief Executive.
During and after the Kargil war, Vajpayee's government projected the
General as the villain who wrecked the 'Lahore Agreement'. Through the
ill-advised release of the Kargil Tapes as "living proof" of the General's
direct involvement in the operation, the New Delhi authorities
not only compromised India's 'intelligence assets', but the unfortunate
personalisation of Indo-Pakistan relationship led to a cul de sac in
India-Pakistan relations.

The terms of the unilateral ceasefire indicate that Vajpayee is still not
willing to talk to Musharraf. If this refusal was based on a principled
objection to military regimes, then New Delhi should not be cosying up to
the junta in Yangoon either. Vajpayee's offer of talks is limited to the
militants and others from the India-held Jammu and Kashmir. His refusal to
talk to those in Pakistan-held Kashmir or with Pakistan is bound to defeat
the very purpose of his peace offering.

Jammu and Kashmir is a divided entity. Even the Shimla Agreement
recognises that there is a 'dispute' between India and Pakistan over the
region. It is an established fact that almost all Kashmiris, militant and
non-militant nationalists belonging to all shades of politics and faith,
are agreed on its 'disputed status'. All Kashmiris, whether they belong to
Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir or the Pakistan-held portion, as well as the
Kashmiri world dias-pora, want to see their homeland united. Under these
circumstances, no Kashmiri militant or non-militant can be expected to
participate in a peace dialogue with the Government of India as 'Kashmiris
of Indian origin'. The August peace initiative of the Hizbul floundered
because of the confusion over the terms of dialogue. The Kashmiri groups
were unwilling to work within the framework of the Indian Constitution, and
Prime Minister Vajpayee=92s clever phrase, of meeting within the "frame-wor=
k
of humanism (Insaneeyat)" did nothing to resolve the issue. Ultimately,
however, the August initiative broke down because of India's refusal to
involve Pakistan in the dialogue.

This time around, and before the month of Ramzan ends, Vajpayee and his
advisers must try and transcend their "stabbed in the back" psyche. New
Delhi's response to the Hizbul ceasefire and its own current ceasefire
offer are based on the same attitude. Unless India is willing to reconsider
its position on dialogue with the Government of Pakistan and the
'non-Indian' Kashmiris, there can be no progress. In which case Vajpayee
will merely be continuing a "monologue on peace", hardly a dialogue.

A ceasefire is generally achieved through negotiations: even the Kargil
ceasefire was arrived at through behind-the-scene talks while the guns were
still booming along the LoC. For the Vajpayee government to insist that
Pakistan stop all cross-border infiltration before the resumption of talks
was untenable. But now that Gen. Musharraf has given the Vajpayee
government an opening of sorts, by asking Pakistani soldiers on the LoC to
exercise "maximum restraint" to "strengthen and stabilise" India's
unilateral ceasefire in the Valley, one hopes that New Delhi will grab the
opportunity that presents itself.

The Vajpayee government can turn this ceasefire into an opportunity for
peace-building by immediately initiating steps to restore the rule of law
in the Valley and ordering its forces to respect the human rights of the
people of Kashmir. It should simultaneously lift all restrictions on
peaceful public activities in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. This will
enable the people of the region to discuss their social and political
problems and their future in a democratic manner. As Kashmiri civil society
recaptures its lost space, the vexing question, 'Whom do we talk to in
Kashmir?' will lose its relevance. A vibrant Kashmiri civil society in will
provide the answers.

______

#5.

[A longer version of the below paper is likely to appear in the upcoming
issue of 'Communalism Combat', Bombay]

WHY DOES THE RSS HATE THE IDEA OF INDIA ?

By Purushottam Agrawal

Salman Rushdie described the idea of India as one of the greatest ideas of
the 20th century. He is both right and wrong. Right because he realizes the
greatness of the idea. Wrong because by confining the idea to the 20th
century he ignores its lineage. India as a nation-state is certainly a 19th
or 20th century concept, but the idea of India as a multi=1Evocal and
multi-religious polity is of older vintage. It is rooted in the search for
a political idiom appropriate to Indian pluralism. The national movement
had evolved a consensus on a constitutionally defined democratic polity as
the authentic political ideal for India. This consensus captured the
essence of Indian cultural experience. Till this day it constitutes
mainstream political space. The fact that the political member of the
Sangh-Parivar needed to discard its so=1Ecalled cultural nationalist agenda
in order to overcome its political isolation underscores the consensual
core of mainstream Indian politics. The idea informing this consensus is a
pagan idea, that celebrates cultural and religious plurality instead of
condescending to it.

This is the key to understanding the RSS' pathological aversion to the
pagan mindset informing the idea of India. The following quote from
Jawaharlal Nehru underscores what I mean. In an interview to Link
(August15, 1961), Nehru described himself as a pagan and clarified this as
follows, "Only in the sense that paganism is opposed to rigidity=8AI don't
mind a person having his own beliefs, but I don't like the other fellow
trying to impose his beliefs on me. I may accept those beliefs... of my own
free will, that is a different matter. The whole idea that others must
conform to our ways, that we are the only true believers - this is contrary
to my conception. It is this concept of having the whole truth, which is
fundamentally opposed to the pagan concept. The whole truth is too big for
any one people to grasp completely." (R.M. Bakaya, One more November, and
miles to go Mainstream November18, 2000). Nehru was talking about
non=1Ealignment here - and was contrasting the Judaeo=1EChristian lineage o=
f
communism to a pagan conception. I have omitted those references in order
to focus attention on the basic issue the epistemological ground of
mainstream Indian nationalism. Violently opposed to the pagan moorings of
this nationalism is the monolithic cultural nationalism of the RSS type.
Historically, while one section of the colonial intelligentsia tried to
find a modern idiom to articulate Indian plurality, the other tried to get
rid of it. The former naturally felt inclined towards democracy and liberal
values, while the latter felt easier with fascist conceptions of politics
and culture. With great insight, Nehru defined communalism of all hues as
the Indian variant of fascism. This essay is about the RSS, but I agree
with Nehru that Indian fascism has a competitive form, in which Muslim
communalism plays a crucial role in sustaining its Hinduttva variant.
.
The mainstream idea of India is exciting because it captures the pluralism
of Indian culture and incorporates a wise ideal for the future. A
democratic polity and a liberal mindset are natural corollaries to the
plural tradition. On the other hand, the so=1Ecalled cultural nationalism o=
f
the RSS is a violation of it. Democracy and its attendant institutions may
be a new and 'foreign' concept, but it sits comfortably with the social and
cultural attitudes of ordinary Indians. That is why even the most
illiterate and traditional of them took to democratic politics like ducks
to water. But consider this - having expended seventy-five years years
building the elusive 'Hindu Nation' the RSS even today has to put its basic
issues on the back=1Eburner. The majority of Indians still do not share the
fascist mentality of the RSS because the epistemology and politics of the
RSS is diametrically opposed to the 'paganism' that informs the dominant
idea of India. In such a situation it is natural for the RSS to hate this
idea and seek to replace it with its own laboured conception of Hindu
Rashtra.

Let us not be misled into believing that the RSS disapproves of plurality
only in the context of present day politics. Let us also not fool ourselves
that its self-designated task of setting right the wrongs of history is
directed solely at minorities and mosques. Its world-view was constructed
by a section of the colonial intelligentsia that suffered from a guilt
complex about its pagan past (and present), and who pathetically tried to
copy their masters. Obsessed as it was with inferiority, it disguised its
fascination for 'victorious' Western culture in the garb of 'uniqueness';
and its disdain for India's cultural personality in the garb of love for
'Bharat Mata'. Such manipulations were necessary in order to make its
exotic alien ideology appear plausible. The RSS has always contested the
mainstream idea of India in the name of Indianness itself. Its attitude
towards Hindu plurality is as intolerant as its abhorrence of anything that
stands in its way. Thus, the RSS locates contemporary political events
within a framework of revenge, for which task it assumes the self=1Eimage o=
f
a high priest supervising great sacrifices complete with bloody rituals. A
statement made by Golwalkar in November 1948 makes this clear. According to
him, "unfortunately the great latitude allowed to all individuals and
groups resulted in the creation of many faiths and sects. The vastness of
our motherland fostered many dialects which in time became so many sister
languages, and gradually the grand unity in all the diversities of life
began to crumble away".

Of special interest is the misuse of the phrase 'unity in diversity' which
in the fascist fantasies of Golwalkar seems to mean little more than
benevolent permission granted by a master! Note his discomfort with
dialects becoming full-fledged languages. In the RSS' pseudo=1Elinguistics
all Indian languages are daughters of Sanskrit and if not they ought to be!
Such statements reveal its intellectual strategy. Instead of articulating
its own crude theories, it borrows (steals?) respectable phrases like unity
in diversity, tolerance, purity in public life etc. What happens in
practice is a different matter. The RSS calls itself a cultural
organization. Indeed it is! However, its 'culture' refers neither to
individual creativity nor to social reality energized by common
experiences; creative interventions and conflicts of power. 'Culture' in
the Sangh's lexicon means a system of concealing conflicts and oppression
through the deployment of the rhetoric of hatred and violence. Deception
and deceit define the culture of the RSS. Such 'qualities' may represent
evil in an individual's life, but are a 'must' for the life of the nation!
- thus goes the Kautilya-style logic of the RSS. That is why Govindacharya
can compare the hoodlums destroying Deeepa Mehta's film sets with French
revolutionaries, why Uma Bharti can claim that she was in Ayodhya to save
the mosque; and why (to top it all), the Sarsanghchalak can speak the
untruth of the millennium without blinking an eyelid. The mosque was not
demolished - it was blown up by a secret bomb!

The idea of "selfless deceit" is central to the RSS conception of public
life and raises fundamental questions about politics and its relation with
the notion of truth. These questions must be examined separately. But it
explains the RSS' flair for conspiratorial politics and its hatred of
democracy, both as organizational principle and political philosophy.
Deception in the RSS style of politics is neither incidental nor
contextual. It is integral to its worldview. This worldview motivates the
RSS to maintain a balance between formal and informal communication;
official and authentic pronouncements of intent and policy. Because of this
deception, many commentators find nothing objectionable in its 'official'
pronouncements. If they compared such pronouncements with what transpires
in informal communication they would be in for a rude shock. The RSS was
forced to describe itself as a cultural organization and adopt a written
constitution as part of a deal with the government after the assassination
of Gandhiji. It has never discarded its political designs. 'Cultural'
status is a matter of convenience. It is cultural when it wants to control
its political outfits from behind the scenes, and it is not cultural when
it has to fulfill the legal and social obligations required of a cultural
body. A.G. Noorani has given an instance of its manoeuvres. In 1978, when
the joint charity commissioner held the RSS liable to register under Bombay
Public Trust Act, 1950 (since it claimed to be a cultural organization),
Rajendra Singh and Bhaurao Deoras filed a legal document stating that
although the RSS did not participate in day=1Eto=1Eday politics it had a
political philosophy within its sweep of cultural work. It was possible for
the Sangh to change its policy and participate in politics.(The RSS and the
BJP: A Division of Labour Leftword, New Delhi). However, the RSS does not
need to participate in mundane politics since, apart from its offspring the
BJP, it has enthusiastic adopted children such as George Fernandes and
Maneka Gandhi.

Noorani's essay contrasts Europe's resentment at Herder's [read Haider's]
neo-Nazis sharing power in Austria with the absence of similar concern when
the RSS rose to the centre of power in India. This is indeed noteworthy,
but Noorani fails to analyse the role of the left and secular parties in
according respectability to the RSS. All of them, for decades, refused to
confront the fascist essence of communal politics. The struggle for
secularism, instead of preventing the fascist takeover of the polity has
been reduced to a balancing act between Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and
Christians. That is why the ideologues of anti=1Econgressism tried to
'reform' fascists of all hues by co=1Eoperating with them. Even the
communists used United Front tactics not against the fascists but in
collaboration with them! With this background, how may we expect
wide=1Espread resentment at the RSS ascension to the centre of power?
Particularly when it has responded positively to the clarion calls of
reformers like George, Mamta and Chandrababu and permitted the BJP to put
its core issues on the back=1Eburner? Sooner rather than later the reformer
brigade will be shocked beyond their wildest apprehensions and will have
all the time in the world to record their historical blunders for
posterity. Where giants like JP failed, worthies like George cannot
succeed. The reason is very simple. The RSS is not just another
organization seeking legitimate space in a democratic polity and plural
culture. Its agenda is fundamentally hostile to the very idea of India
which gave birth to that polity. The RSS is 'cultural' in the sense that it
seeks to replace the cultural mode itself. It has its own monolithic idea
of the nation and is bound to hate India as we know it. Its paranoid
campaign of hatred and deceit has converted the RSS into the very "internal
enemy" that it has been conjuring up over the decades. Whether India will
survive this onslaught from within is upto us.

_____

#6.

Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2000 16:27:11 +0530 (IST)
From: Dr. Ram Puniyani
(B-64, IIT Qutrs, Powai Mumbai.400076 [India])
---

The call given by Shiv Sena Chief Mr. Bal Thackeray to disenfranchise
Muslims, to deprive them of their citizens rights on the ground of their
religion, coming in the wake of Mr. Vajpayee's statement that construction
of Ram Janm Bhoomi temple is a reflection of nationalist sentiment which is
yet to be realized, contains dangerous portents for Indian democracy. The
citizens at large had believed that all the fanatic pronouncements of Sangh
Parivar (SP) are mere statements of some fringe zealots of SP as the BJP is
lead by Mr. Vajpayee who is a secular, liberal democrat. Now his real
intentions and face are there for all to see. Both these statements signal
the further unrolling of the agenda of the S P. What is most pathetic at
the moment is that it is so reminiscent of the analogy of the trajectory of
imposition of Fascism in Germany. In Germany, the democrats allied with
Hitler with the illusion that it is another democratic party. In due course
Hitler crushed the same allies, butchered the minorities in the name of
Great German race and ultimately destroyed Germany itself. The present
stance of PM and the call given by its ideological and political ally (Bal
Thackeray) is no laughing matter. It is the final wake up call for the
secular parties in alliance with BJP-Shiv Sena to call it a day. It is a
historic moment for them to save the democracy from the advancing TRISHULS
of Indian fascism, marching with full vehemence. We urge upon the likes of
Mamata, Samata, Naidu's and the Karunandhis to overcome their power greed
and break the alliance, which is becoming the vehicle of agenda of Sangh
Parivar, the agenda of Hindu Rashtra.

Sincerely

Anand Patwardhan Film Maker,( EKTA)
Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer (CSSS)
Ashim Roy, Trade Unionist
Fr. Cedric Prakash (Gujarat United Christians Forum for Human Rights)
C.K.Leeks (St. Blaise Action Committee)
Darryl D' Monte, Journalist
Dolphy D' Souza, (AICU and VOTE)
Francis Parmar S.J.
Dr. Hanif Lakadawala, PUHR
Dr. I.K.Shukla, Asha Shahed and others for Coalition for Egalitarian
Pluralist India, L.A. (USA)
Jai Sen ,Researcher
Dr.Jawaid Quddus, Uni Michigan
M.H.Lakdawala, Journalist, Social Activist
Maria Doss, CAHR
Dr. Peter Ronaldo de Souza, Goa Uni.
Ram Puniyani, EKTA
Ruby Naushad, Writer
Sonal Mehta, Movement for Secular Demoocracy
Sonal Thakker, SAMVAD
Stanny, Legal Aid Center
Suma Jossan, Film Maker
Swatija Manorama, FAOW
Wilfred D'Costa, INSAF

______________________________________________
SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run by South Asia Citizens Web
(http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996.
Dispatch archive from 1998 can be accessed
at http://www.egroups.com/messages/act/
////////////////////////////////////
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necessarily correspond to views of SACW compilers.