[sacw] S A A N Post | 30 Nov. 00

Wed, 29 Nov 2000 21:05:53 +0100

South Asians Against Nukes Post
30 November 2000
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#1. India: A platform for peace
#2. India: IAF suggests nuclear air command
#3. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Chief for selling Nuclear Technology
#4. India: Right to Conduct More N-Tests Not Closed: Jaswant
#5. India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch #27
( 29 Nov 2000)

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#1.

Frontline
Volume 17 - Issue 24,
Nov. 25 - Dec. 08, 2000

NUCLEAR ISSUES

A PLATFORM FOR PEACE

The new idiom of security that has come into existence after Pokhran-II
compels a coalescence of forces around the ideas of nuclear disarmament and
peace.

SUKUMAR MURALIDHARAN
in New Delhi

A THREE-DAY convention in New Delhi held between November 11 and 13 laid
the groundwork for the formation of a Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and
Peace, bringing together on one platform the diverse range of protest
groups that emerged following the I ndian nuclear tests of May 1998. Though
the new body will focus its endeavours primarily within India, a degree of
coordination with peace movements in the neighbourhood and elsewhere is
indicated by the participation of no fewer than 50 delegates from P
akistan, 15 from other parts of South Asia and 20 from the global
anti-nuclear movement.

SANDEEP SAXENA
A street play against nuclear weapons, at the venue of the convention.

The nuclear domain is one where diverse shades of opinion can often
coexist. India witnessed that phenomenon in 1996, when ardent champions of
disarmament, nuclear strategists and national security hawks made common
cause in rejecting the Comprehensive T est Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a decidedly
dubious pact, which would contribute little to the goal of a nuclear-free
world.

That tenuous coexistence of opposites fell apart after the Pokhran nuclear
tests of May 1998 and the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government's decision
to deploy what it euphemistically titled a "minimum credible deterrent".
The new realities compelled a c oalescence of forces around the ideas of
nuclear disarmament and peace. After some years when peripheral differences
tended to enjoy undue prominence, the new idiom of national security
succeeded once again in focussing minds on the fundamentals.

The charter adopted at the convention provides the essential elements of
the Coalition's programme for the years ahead. Nuclear weapons, the
Coalition believes, should be resolutely opposed whether it is in India,
South Asia or globally. Apart from drain ing scarce resources, nuclear
weapons were inherently genocidal and only promoted a generalised sense of
insecurity. India's attempt to blast its way into the nuclear club in 1998
was a betrayal of its own ethical positions in the past. The damage could
be partly undone only by an unequivocal commitment to reverse the
preparations under way to assemble and induct nuclear weapons into the
Indian arsenal.

A number of other agreements are structured around this basic compact. For
instance, the Convention witnessed a range of opinions on the utility and
legitimacy of the nuclear energy programme worldwide. But the final
consensus was to avoid any specific f indings on the links between nuclear
energy and weapons. There was little dissent, though, over the assertion
that civilian nuclear programmes in India needed to institutionalise a
greater degree of transparency and accountability through all stages of t
he fuel cycle - from uranium mining to spent fuel management and waste
disposal.

The ethics and practical utility of various nuclear restraint measures came
in for minute scrutiny. Here again, a range of views was witnessed. A
section within the Convention argued that initiatives such as the CTBT had
an inherent value as part of a gl obal disarmament movement. The optimal
strategy for the peace movement would be to take each measure as part of a
connected whole, as steps towards an ultimate goal of a nuclear-free world.

Another viewpoint emphasised that the Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) were
responsible for fostering a climate of impunity in which there were no
rewards for the principled renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.
Rather, the prevalent climate seemed to provide overt incentives for
clandestine weapons proliferation. To retrieve their fast diminishing
credibility, the NWSs needed, at the minimum, to provide iron-clad
"negative security assurances" to the non-nuclear states.

In the current context, the greatest hazard facing the nuclear disarmament
campaign is the imminent U.S. decision on the deployment of a National
Missile Defence. Recognising this, the Convention adopted a resolution
"condemning" the NMD proposal and urg ing the Indian government to shed its
equivocation on this issue.

The Convention also adopted an action plan that places emphasis on the
formation of linkages among various movements that have so far been
proceeding in a rather uncoordinated fashion. It includes the formation of
a "clearing house" of ideas, literature and campaign material on
disarmament and the illegitimacy of nuclear deterrence as a strategic
doctrine.

A 40-member coordination committee was set up by the convention to
formulate the next steps in the Coalition's practical agenda. The apex body
includes figures such as Admiral L. Ramdas, former Chief of the Naval
Staff, and Achin Vanaik, writer and peace activist. Distinguished
scientists and researchers from the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,
the Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, and the National Institute
of Immunology, Delhi, are also involved with the committee.

Copyrights © 2000, Frontline & indiaserver.com, Inc.

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#2.

Yahoo! India News - Top Stories
http://in.news.yahoo.com

Tuesday November 28, 9:35 AM

IAF SUGGESTS NUCLEAR AIR COMMAND

November 27: THE INDIAN Air Force has suggested the formation of a nuclear
air command even as it seeks two-front capability and enhanced force levels
in the years to come.

Government sources said the IAF in a presentation entitled 'Vision 2020'
last month, had recommended that India move to a position of deterrence
against Pakistan and China not only in the nuclear arena but also on the
conventional front. This future defence strategy is a step ahead from the
present stance of deterrence for Pakistan and dissuasion for China.

The presentation made before the Arun Singh Task Force on Higher Defence
Management, was path-breaking since it advocated that the country's
strategic resources be placed under the nuclear air command because only
the IAF had the required delivery platforms (strategic reach aircraft).
According to the IAF, the Army did not need and in fact might not need a
nuclear role because of the incongruity of tactical nuclear weapons in
India's draft nuclear doctrine. The third leg of the triad _ nuclear
submarine _ was still beyond the Indian Navy's reach.

The IAF recommended that as soon as the Agni intermediate range ballistic
missile became operational, it should be given to the nuclear air command
as the range of the Prithvi missile was too short to qualify as a nuclear
weapon delivery platform. The paper urged the Government to have its
nuclear systems in place, given New Delhi's no-first-use policy. It said
that the armed forces should go beyond the creation of the strategic
element "under a three-star officer".

The nuclear air command, according to the Air Force, should have even the
strategic surveillance resources _ both in space and elsewhere _ under its
control so that they provide intelligence inputs on a continuous basis.In
the presentation, the IAF saw itself grow from the present authorised
strength of 39-and-a-half combat squadrons to 55 combat squadrons in the
coming two decades. This will be in addition to the urgently needed force
multipliers such as airborne early warning systems (AWACS) aircraft,
air-to-air refuelling aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.

The vision document argued that the Government should think in terms of
giving more teeth to the IAF as the land forces are locked in a "status
quo" on the northern and western fronts and sea forces expected to protect
the coastline and commercial sea-lanes. It said the true exploitation of
air power is that enemy air and surface forces are stopped from coming
anywhere close to Indian forces.

The paper discussed future war scena

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#3.

DAWN
22 November 2000

PAEC CHIEF FOR SELLING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

Chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, Ashfaq Ahmed, said
that Pakistan should sell nuclear technology "which was not sensitive
and used in agriculture, health and other sectors" in order to help the
national economy.

http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/22/top10.htm

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#4.

The Times of India
25 November 2000
http://www.timesofindia.com/251100/25indi16.htm

RIGHT TO CONDUCT MORE N-TESTS NOT CLOSED: JASWANT

Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh stated that India will
not block enforcement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but views
nuclear testing as an "inherent right." Singh also reiterated statements
that CTBT enforcement will not be possible with the existence of nuclear
weapons all over the world.

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#5.

India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch #27
( 29 Nov 2000) is now available at:
http://www.egroups.com/group/IPARMW