[sacw] SACW Dispatch #3 | 5-6 Nov. 00

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Sun, 5 Nov 2000 20:43:49 +0100


South Asia Communalism Watch #3

5-6 November 2000
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

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#1. Statement to USCIRF re religious freedom in Pakistan
#2. Bangladesh: Fundamentalists Parody on national anthem slammed
#3. India: The two faces of the Sangh Parivar

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#1.

United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom

Hearing on Religious Freedom in India and Pakistan

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Dirkson Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Monday, September 18, 2000

Statement by
Dr. Mumtaz Ahmad
Professor of Political Science
Hampton University
Hampton, VA 23668

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Commission:

I am thankful for the opportunity to appear before this august commission to share my views on the question of religious freedom in Pakistan. I will confine my remarks to a) describing the socio-religious and political context, so as to better understand the state of religious freedom and the status of minorities in Pakistan; b) delineating the prospects for religious freedom under the new regime of General Pervez Musharraf; and c) making some general observations with regard to the U.S. policy toward Pakistan in order to improve the state of religious freedom. 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, with a population of about 140 million, is the second largest Muslim nation in the world. With about 97 percent Muslim population, its non-Muslim minorities include Christians, Hindus, Parsis and Ahmadis. Among the Muslims, between 12 to 15 percent belong to the Shia sect.
Pakistan, which came into being as a result of the partition of British India in 1947, is unique among the Muslim countries with regard to its relationship with Islam. It was the only Muslim country which was established in the name of Islam and, hence, its subsequent political experience is integrally related to its Islamic identity. However, the question of the new nationís ideological character has been a subject of continuous debates among Pakistani intellectuals and policy makers. Two distinct schools of thought have emerged on this issue: one contending that Pakistan was demanded and created in the name of Islam and, therefore, has to justify its raison díetre only as an Islamic state; the other emphasizing that the country was created to safeguard the political, economic and cultural interests of South Asian Muslims and was, in no way, intended to be a religiously based, ideological state. There is ample evidence to show, however, that Pakistanís founding fathers s!
aw Pakistan as a progressive Muslim nation with democracy and pluralism as its foundational principles. Their vision of Pakistan as an Islamic state was constitutive more of Islamic ideals of justice, equality and brotherhood rather than the specifics of Shariah. Building an Islamic state for them, as well as for the Muslim masses, was thus synonymous with building a just and moral society. Hence, we see little, if any, reference to the introduction of specific Islamic laws, such as Hudud (Islamic penal laws) in the speeches and statements of the founders of Pakistan. Majority of the leaders of the Pakistan movement were Western educated, liberal-minded Muslim nationalists whose commitment to Islam was primarily defined by its spiritual and moral values, and the economic, political and cultural uplift of the Muslim community.
Although Pakistan, from the very beginning, faced certain critical problems of economic, political and ethno-regional origins which shaped its subsequent political developments and engendered its chronic socio-political instability, one issue that has generated maximum political conflicts and social tensions is the role of Islam in politics and the state. The controversy on the nature of an Islamic political system and its concrete manifestation in the constitutional structure and socio-economic policies of the state often took the form of fierce confrontation, sometimes violent, between the state and the organized religious groups, and among the religious groups themselves. 
The Islam-Pakistan relationship was first articulated in the Objectives Resolution which was passed in the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1949 and which now forms a part of the 1973 Constitution. While the Objectives Resolution promised that the state shall enable the Muslims to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam, it also stated that the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, social justice and respect for minoritiesí rights shall be fully observed. Notwithstanding its liberal proclamations, however, the Objectives Resolution laid the foundation for an enduring relationship between Islam and the state in Pakistan and thus encouraged religio-political groups to press their demands and agitate for an increased role for Islam, and for themselves, in public affairs. 
As is well known, Pakistanís rulers also have made extensive use of Islam as a means of legitimizing their power. The fact that many of these rulers came to power through extra-constitutional means and lacked legal legitimacy, made them more dependent on Islam as a handy source of legitimacy. This instrumental use of Islam at the level of the state created an environment at the level of civil society in which the religious groups could claim an equal legitimacy to use Islam for their own particularistic, sectarian purposes. 
The qualitative change in Pakistanís politics came during the rule of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. His rise to power parallels with the rise of the political influence of the religio-political groups in Pakistan. His own contribution toward the religionization of political life took two forms: with his socialist rhetoric, he provoked a strong reaction among the religious groups and awakened them to the need to organize and fight back what they perceived as an anti-Islamic turn in state policies. But, more importantly, in substantive policies, he chose not to resist their pressures and gave in easily to almost all of their religious demands in order to appease them. The ultimate turnaround came when the secular Bhutto agreed to amend the constitution to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims, a demand which had been earlier rejected in 1953 by a devout Muslim Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin. 
Although the Islamic measures introduced by Bhutto were peripheral to the core of his socio-economic policies, their impact on subsequent Islamic developments was quite significant and far-reaching. By making Islam as the state religion, by incorporating extensive Islamic provisions in 1973 Constitution, and by declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslims, Bhutto helped raise the expectations of the religious parties and prepared the ground for a full-grown movement for Islamization during the Zia regime. 
Coming in the wake of worldwide Islamic resurgence, General Ziaís Islamization measures were much more substantive than the Islamic reforms introduced by earlier regimes. Working closely with the ulama and the organized religious groups, Zia created a network of state-sponsored legal and institutional structures to translate the Shariah rules into public policies. The most important among them were the penal laws with specific Islamic punishments, the law of evidence which discriminated against the minorities and women, and the laws targeting the Ahmadis. To declare a particular group in society as a religious minority is in itself a form of oppression, what to speak of adding insult to injury by making discriminatory laws and restricting its political and civil rights as well. What was even more perilous from the point of view of religious freedom was the general socio-political and religious climate that created a fertile ground for religious divide, sectarianism, into!
lerance of religious dissent, and hostility toward minorities. 
The introduction of Shariah laws brought to the surface the old doctrinal and juristic differences between the Shias and the Sunnis. Thus, the question as to which interpretation of the Islamic laws should form the basis of public policy became a major source of conflict between the Shia and Sunni ulama on the one hand, and also among different schools of Sunnis, on the other. These controversies have caused frequent violent incidents and assassination of dozens of prominent Shia and Sunni leaders. The sectarian politics as a legacy of the Zia period has also given rise to extremist religious groups, killing each otherís members even in places of worship, and also to the recruitment of the madrassa students as militant arms of these extremist groups. The mobilization of a broad spectrum of religious groups by the Zia regime during the Afghan war further strengthened the political power and the material resource base of the religious groups, with funds and weapons being sup!
plied to them from both domestic and external sources.
Coupled with this religious militancy and increasingly intolerant socio-religious climate, decades of military rule and misrule by the civilian governments have further aggravated the situation of political instability, economic mismanagement, rampant political and economic corruption, creating a crisis of governability, the near collapse of state institutions, and the breakdown of law and order. All these factors have made the already fragile political system more vulnerable to pressures from the extremist religious groups. 
Although, the extremist groups that tend to harass the religious minorities remain marginal, their capacity to coerce the local authorities to concede to their demands by creating an emotionally explosive religious situation remains considerable. Much of what happens to religious minoritiesófrom harassment to violenceóis initiated by the extremist elements who incite the illiterate Muslims to take law into their own hands in order to ìdefend Islamî against what they perceive as blasphemous or desecrating acts of non-Muslims. In most cases, the local enforcement agencies either willingly join the melee in support of the ìdefenders of Islam,î or find themselves helpless before a religiously-charged mob. In general, the state authorities at the level of central and provincial governments and the higher judiciary in Pakistan have been quite sensitive to the need of protecting the life, liberty and property of religious minorities. Thus, none of the punishments under the Blasph!
emy Law handed out by the lower courts has been upheld by the higher judiciary so far. 
As for the prospects for religious freedom under the new regime of General Pervez Musharraf, there are sufficient grounds to believe that the situation is likely improve considerably. In terms of his religious orientation, the General is probably the most liberal ruler since Ayub Khan. However, as was evident from his backtracking on some procedural changes in the Blasphemy Law, he is not likely to do anything that will provoke a strong negative reaction from the religious groups. He will tread cautiously on Islamic grounds and will not allow Islam to become a political issue while he is busy cleaning up the political and economic mess created by the previous regimes. On the contrary, he may have to solicit political support from the religious groups when faced with formidable challenge from the secular opposition. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine that General Musharraf, even if he wants to do so, will ever try to dismantle the legal-institutional structures seen a!
s discriminatory by the minorities. Not legislating Islamic laws is only being a negligent Muslim, but abrogating these laws once they are legislated is ìblasphemyî and will provoke the wrath of the religious groups, which a military regime, already faced with the crisis of legitimacy, can hardly afford. What we can expect from General Musharraf, however, is to ignore the implementation of discriminatory laws, or to slow-motion them, making them a moral equivalent of blue laws. After all, there is a blasphemy law on the statute books in the United Kingdom, but when was the last time the Queen was ìpleasedî to use it? The overall policy thrust of the military regime in Pakistan is liberal, progressive, non-discriminatory and non-sectarian. In a political culture beset with the legacies of fanaticism, intolerance and violence, General Musharrafís is a voice of reason and moderation. His appointment of Dr. Mahmud A. Ghazi, an Islamic scholar of great distinction and a longs!
tanding advocate of inter-religious harmony, as the Federal Minister for Religious and Minority Affairs, is also an encouraging sign for religious freedom in Pakistan. 
If we want to help General Musharraf fortify democratic practices and, at the same time, deal effectively with the extremist groups that indulge in violence against religious minorities, we must strengthen the Pakistani stateís economic base and its institutional capacity to maintain effective law and order. An economically weak and internationally isolated Pakistan will be a more fertile ground for Talibanization. A weak state with collapsing institutions, dysfunctional apparatus and mounting debts cannot ensure its own survival, what to speak of protecting minorities. 
Having said that, let me also point out some positive and encouraging trends at the level of civil society that promise a better future for religious freedom in Pakistan. First, the emergence in Pakistan during the past decade and a half of a host of human rights organizations and the NGOs, specifically concerned with the problems faced by the oppressed segments of society and with issues of civil liberties and rule of law, is a welcome development. These organizations are very active and alert and are trying to mobilize the enlightened public opinion against the injustices committed against the minorities. They are also becoming increasingly effective in putting pressures on state authorities to abide by the rule of law.
Second, the press in Pakistan has never been freer in its entire history than it is today. A free and vigilant press is likely to play an important role in promoting freedom and liberty and publicizing the instances of discrimination and injustices against minorities.
Third, the majority of Pakistanís citizens are becoming increasingly wary of Islam being used as an instrument of politics by the rulers and as a means to create divisions in society by the religious groups. 
Another promising development in recent years has been the emergence of a liberal Islamic discourse that seeks to reaffirm the Islamic principles of tolerance, democracy, pluralism, civil liberties and rule of law from within the Islamic tradition. A new generation of Islamic thinkers is challenging the monopoly of the extremists on Islamic discourse and is articulating a more liberal and pluralist vision of an Islamic society and state. In the same vein, the liberal Islamic thought of Muslim ÈmigrÈ intellectuals in the United States--Fazlur Rahman, Hossein Nasr, Abdulaziz Sachedina, Mohammad Ayub, Ali Mazrui, Sulayman Nyang, and Taha Jaber-- is also contributing significantly toward the development of a progressive religio-intellectual discourse.
In conclusion, let me, briefly, make a few general observations with regard to our policy thrust toward Pakistan in order to help improve the state of religious freedom.
First, the most effective way, in my view, is not public condemnation, censure, intimidation and sanctions, but dialogue, ìconstructive engagement,î and quiet diplomacy. We should engage not only the incumbent regime in a dialogue on the issue of religious freedom, but also the important religious groups in Pakistan in a spirit of working together to solve the problems faced by religious minorities. Our recent contacts with the Jamaat-I-Islami Pakistan leadership have demonstrated that a working relationship with moderate Islamic groups is not only possible but is also useful and necessary. 
Second, a narrowly focused search for religious freedom in isolation from other freedoms, may not be a very successful strategy in countries like Pakistan; it must, therefore, constitute an integral part of a larger agenda of promoting democracy, pluralism, rule of law, and civil liberties. Once these practices are institutionalized, religious freedom is a natural outcome. In the absence of democracy and civil liberties, even if there is freedom of religion, oppression and persecution will continue, albeit on other grounds and with other names. After all, the freest Christian minority in the Middle East, religiously speaking, is to be found in Iraq; but it is not difficult to imagine how much they celebrate their religious freedom in the context of an oppressive political system. 
Third, in order to ensure a greater credibility for its task and integrity of its mission to promote religious freedom in Pakistan and elsewhere, the Commission must disassociate itself from other, more mundane, goals of U.S. foreign policy. There seems to exist a widespread perception, both in India and Pakistan, that the recent U.S. interest in international religious freedom in not motivated by humanitarian concerns, but is driven by U.S. strategic objectives. I am sure the Commission is aware of these concerns and will try its best to remain focussed on its humanitarian mission. 
I thank you for your attention. 

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#2.

PARODY ON NATIONAL ANTHEM SLAMMED

by Ershadul Huq, India Abroad News Service

Dhaka, Nov 5 - A parody on the national anthem published by a
pro-fundamentalist daily here has angered many people from different walks
of life who have termed the act treacherous and called for a ban on the
paper.

The Bangla-language daily Inquilab had published the allegedly defamatory
parody on October 20.

Twenty-four members of the Dhaka University Senate comprising lawyers,
political leaders, journalists and teachers have urged the government to ban
the publication of the daily.

"The national anthem is an integral apart of our sovereignty and
independence and publication of a parody amounts to disloyalty to the
state," they said in a statement Sunday.

They expressed deep concern and anguish that the daily that emerged under
special patronage of the military junta continued its propaganda in favor of
the "Pakistani spirit" defying the sacred spirit of the War of Liberation of
1971. "The newspaper tried to destabilize the communal harmony in the
country and instigate conflict among different segments of society," the
statement stated.

Reacting to the controversy, Kamal Hossain, one of the framers of the
Constitution said, "It's a treachery. It amounts to a criminal offence."

During the war of 1971, the song "Amar Sonar Bangla Aami Tomai Bhalobashi"
(my beloved Bengal, I love you) penned by noble laureate Rabindranath Tagore
was declared the national anthem of the country.

The daily Janakantha in a commentary said Inquilab has attacked the national
anthem and shown disregard for the national anthem. The daily expressed
anguish over the silence of the government on the issue.

Wahidul Hoque, a researcher on songs by Tagore, condemning the publication
of the parody said it was tantamount to "treason." He demanded immediate
legal action against the newspaper.

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#3.

Deccan Chronicle
5th November

THE TWO FACES OF THE SANGH PARIVAR

By Kancha Ilaiah

The socio-spiritual agendas and the related discourse that the BJP and the 
RSS are thrusting on Indian civil society will have very serious 
implications for the Indian nation-State. In the socio-political realm, such 
agendas and discourses would spread socio-spiritual fascism in multi-pronged 
forms which are bound to sprout equally socio-spiritual fascist associations 
and organisations by the social forces that expect to face the attacks by 
the Sangh Parivar. The Sangh Parivar leadership is doing this in the name of 
majoritarianism. This trend will have at least two implications as the 
BJP-RSS are doing this from a position of power.

One, the hegemonic partner of the ruling coalition - the BJP - is making its 
ideological position absolutely unpredictable. The coalition partners will 
be forced to take a stand on such issues.

Second, diabolical messages from its associated platforms threaten the 
insecure minority religious forces further. Bangaru Laxman's statement that 
Muslims form part of "blood of our (Hindutva forces) blood and flesh of our 
flesh" is a reflection of its masked face. Read in the historical background 
of animosity among Hindutva forces and Muslims and now the one deliberately 
getting built between Christians and Hindutva forces, the BJP is putting its 
masked face in front in a subtle form.

Since the statement is made by a Dalit leader, it was expected to be 
perceived by the minorities and the Dalits with a different mindset. This 
statement is that of the Vajpayee camp within the party. This camp wants to 
be like the early Indira Gandhi phase of the Congress which ruled India with 
a vote bank of upper castes, SCs and minorities.

It does not believe in allowing autonomous space for Other Backward Castes 
in the socio-cultural terrain. Hence, the OBC agenda of Kalyan Singh, 
Govindacharya and Uma Bharati is completely sidelined by this camp. In terms 
of implications, the Vajpayee-Laxman strategy is quite Kautilyan because it 
is a mode of war that destroys by driving poisoned nails into the enemy's 
body after inviting him/her for a ball.

The strategy of the Sudarshan-Advani camp is the open "eye-for-eye" kind. 
This strategy needs the support of the OBCs as it can be used as a "force of 
muscle" as they did at the time of pulling the Babri Masjid down. This camp 
seems to think that a unity of the four varnas - Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya 
and Sudra - and formation of a stable vote bank out of these four varnas 
will be long lasting. For them, the SCs are untrustworthy in terms of both 
religion and politics.

The Advani group always believed in fighting militant battles with 
minorities. Sudarshan's statement, therefore, was offensive. He said at the 
RSS meet of Agra that Muslims and Christians must accept that they have 
inherited the blood of Rama and Krishna. Leave alone the Muslims and 
Christians, if the Dalits are said to have inherited the blood of Rama and 
Krishna it is much more offensive than constructing them as 
"Harijan" (the children of God).

For both Muslims and Christians, such a construction has a deeper spiritual 
implication. The language of Sudarshan implies that the Muslims and 
Christians should accept the spiritual fatherhood of Rama and Krishna. For 
Muslims it is a destructive construction. For them, except Allah nobody - 
not even Mohammad the Prophet - can be assigned the position of fatherhood. 
Not just the Indian Muslims, in fact Muslims the world over get offended by 
the statement of Sudarshan.

For Christians, the status of fatherhood is given only to Jesus Christ. The 
cardinal principles of religion do not change with the boundaries of the 
nation. For all denominations of Christians, only Jesus is the Lord and 
Father. Assigning that position to anybody else is offensive and 
blasphemous. This sentiment is very deep among those who believe in 
religions of the book than idol-worshippers. Sudarshan
has deliberately decided to injure that belief and the sentiments of Muslims 
and Christians.

In a Dalit Christian seminar, when a non-Christian-Dalit leader suggested 
that Ambed-kar's statue must be installed in all Dalit Christian churches 
the Dalit Christians rejected the proposal in one voice. They were of the 
opinion that the statues of only Christ and Mary could exist in churches.

They said though they were all devoted Ambedkarites they could not accept 
this proposal. For Christians, the statement that they should accept Rama 
and Krishna as their fatherly Gods is unimaginable. This is an affront to 
their belief and sentiments.

Thus, for Muslims and Christians, the statement of Sudarshan is absolutely 
offensive. And such a statement was made in the presence of Advani so that 
an unmasked message should go out. We can see the difference between the 
masked statement of Laxman and the stark statement of Sudarshan.

Indian Christians or Muslims do share Indian civilisation in all its 
dimensions. They have their share in constructing the agrarian instruments, 
tanks, canals and so on. They have contributed their share of labour and 
knowledge in shaping our pot and wheel and the gamut of technology that we 
are proud of. Many historical monuments that these two religious forces 
constructed are proud places of the
Indian culture and civilisation.

Leave alone decorative monuments like the Taj Mahal and the Charminar, 
useful structures like the Andhra Pradesh High Court building, Osmania 
Hospital and the Arts College building of Osmania University, built by 
Muslim rulers, stand as highwater marks of our civilisation. All these are 
common heritage of Muslims and non-Muslims.

The contribution of Christian institutions in terms of spreading Indian 
English education made all of us - particularly the upper castes and Dalits 
(not the OBCs so much) - globally enterprising people. Even the Indian food 
culture from biryani, (no non-Brahmin marriage takes place without it) to 
cake (that has become part of the birthday celebrations of all middle-class 
Indians), everything is
constructed in a typical Indian mode by both Muslims and Christians.

The Parivar is making perverted demands on absolutely assimilated 
communities. The ignorance of the Parivar leaders is amazing. Nobody who 
understands the ethics and principles of religions of the world would do 
such a thing.

The two faces of the Sangh Parivar, though they have the common objective of 
power, see the basis for their power differently. The forces that operate 
very close to Vajpayee-Laxman, Jaswant Singh and so on, appeared to be 
indifferent to the agenda of pulling down the mosque but benefited from the 
expanded vote-bank because of that.

The Vajpayee's camp got power for its non-performance during its militant 
phase. The militant OBCs like Uma Bharati and Narendra of Andhra Pradesh see 
Bangaru Laxman as non-performing Dalit who is propped up to tame the 
militant OBCs. For the Vajpayee group, Laxman plays his role within limits 
and any attack against him can be dubbed as an anti-SC attack which will 
prove harmful when Christian missionaries are active among the SCs.

Of these two faces of the Sangh Parivar, the Advani-Sudarshan camp wants to 
set agendas that could lead them to power on their own. Since the large 
section of OBCs are operating as nuts and bolts of the Hindutva ratha, 
militancy can take any form and they want to use that force once again.

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SOUTH ASIA COMMUNALISM WATCH (SACW) is an
informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service
run by South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex)
since 1996. Dispatch archive from 1998 can be accessed
at http://www.egroups.com/messages/act/
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