[sacw] Pakistan -India / CTBT: the "should" vs "can" dilemma

[Harsh Kapoor]

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South Asians Against Nukes Post
29 September 2000
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CTBT: the "should" vs "can" dilemma

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The Friday Times
29 September 2000

CTBT: THE "SHOULD" VS "CAN" DILEMMA 

Ejaz Haider points at the increasing relevance of the CTBT for South Asia
and says the treaty must be used to prevent Pakistan and India from moving
up the nuclear ladder

Pakistan and India, who had tentatively agreed to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the 51st United Nations General
Assembly session in September 1998, have since been dithering. The
government's belated attempt to build consensus on the issue seems to
have failed for various reasons, not least because the exercise was
wrongly premised and sloppily executed. What is to be done next? More
appropriately, is the issue still relevant, especially in light of the
rejection of the treaty by the US Senate? 

The answer to that question cannot but be in the affirmative. Here is
why. 

First, while the US Senate may have refused to ratify the treaty, the
treaty is not dead. This is clear from the fact that state parties have
continued to come into the treaty fold. To date, 160 states have signed
the treaty, with five entering the treaty this year, and 63 have ratified
it, with Belarus being the latest, which deposited the instrument of
ratification on September 13, 2000. This clearly shows the consensus on
the issue has not waned. 

Secondly, and this is most significant, the CTBT is the only option left
with India and Pakistan in the area of nuclear arms control to (a) engage
the international community; (b) use the treaty to arrest the likely
movement up the nuclear ladder and (c) use the space thus got to
develop confidence- and security-building measures. This CSBMs
exercise, first at the military level and involving both conventional and
nuclear spheres, could then be used to develop a parallel dialogue on
contentious, political issues. Moreover, the exercise could be made more
meaningful through verification procedures and guarantees that could
be either bilateral or multilateral. 

Such a course is important for more reasons than one. Maximalists on
both sides seem already to have given the CTBT a burial. Not only that,
they are now talking of weaponising (converting weaponisable
configurations into weapons), more tests, overt deployment and the rest
of it. Since most believe the credible minimum deterrent to be a
flexible concept, there is talk of augmenting the arsenals. The
proponents of such a course in Pakistan, while realising that an arms
race may not be economically feasible, hide the reality by talking about
ratios. There is also fanfare over the setting up of the National
Command Authority, which is supposed to have resolved the problems of
command and control for Pakistan. 

All this is a red herring. This is not the place to go into the intricacies
of command and control problems, the inevitability of accidents, the
organisation theory and its impact on deterrence, various technological
constraints within the South Asian context and the other factors
associated with the issue but suffice to say the NCA is no answer to
these problems. These problems have only one answer: a clear refusal to
go down the nuclear lane. 

This is where the CTBT can play its part; this is also how the
governments in India and Pakistan must assess the treaty. There is
nothing inevitable about the technology-pull argument, as some experts
are wont to suggest. 

There is no gainsaying that the issue for Pakistan poses a dilemma.
Certain international developments have had a negative fallout on
nuclear arms control efforts and the international norm they sought to
develop and sustain. By emphasising "nationalisms" they have shifted the
discourse back to the idea of the survival of the fittest. India, which
has always looked at its nuclear capability in expansive terms, desiring
to play a larger role commensurate with its size and potential, has not
missed out on the signals. 

The opponents in that country seem to think stalling the process has
become possible because of India's rising stock in the international
market and its increasing economic potential. Additionally, they suggest
the present CTBT is dead and should be taken back to the CD to be
revived as a new treaty purged of its present loopholes. While this
stance may correspond with India's earlier rejection of the treaty it
seems to overlook certain other factors, not least the international
consensus against proliferation of nuclear arms. This view may also tend
to underestimate the U.S. commitment to nuclear arms control in light of
domestic debate in that country on the issue of the NMD and the
Senate's refusal to ratify the CTBT. 

Other Delhi strategists who advocate engaging the international
community on the issue seem to be looking for a value added for India's
nuclear status. This, for them, could translate into a more meaningful
strategic dialogue between India and the US, covering a wide range of
issues, lifting of export controls on dual-technologies and other
sanctions, and accepting India as a State with Nuclear Weapons if not a
Nuclear-Weapon State. The idea here seems to be to drive a hard
bargain and if that requires signing the CTBT, the treaty should be
signed. 

Pakistan's situation is more complex. Its stock in the international
market has plummeted for various reasons. The Kargil conflict has made
the world look askance at its nuclear capability and how it wants to use
it. Its Afghanistan policy has come under increasing pressure. The
linkage between Afghanistan and Kashmir continues to take a toll on its
stand on Kashmir where it has increasingly lost its credibility. The
military coup has added to its difficulties. In addition to domestic
political uncertainty, its economy is in a shambles and shows no signs of
immediate recovery. It is therefore much more dependent on the
international community for bailing it out and to that extent is more
amenable to external pressure. In a manner of speaking it cannot afford
a "relaxed" debate on the issue of CTBT. 

However, the discourse of power and considerations of security also
inform Pakistan's response, especially within the given regional situation
and on the basis of its present national security paradigm. This also
creates a paradox for it. Given its ebbing fortunes, Pakistan requires
doing something to enhance its salience, but it fears that its bargaining
chip used at this point may not serve any purpose higher than merely
bailing it out. It contrasts the situation with India and apprehends that
India is likely to get a more generous quid pro quo from the
international community. One of the biggest fears Pakistan has is that
the US is likely to share with India the advanced technologies to "carry
out laboratory sub-critical explosions with no measurable fission yields,
computer simulation of atomic explosions and fusion research". 

This is not a sustainable position because such sharing could take place
with or without Pakistan's signatures to the CTBT. In fact, one could
argue that if Pakistan were to sign after India worked out such a quid
pro quo with the U.S., there would be nothing left in the bargain for
Pakistan. However, a case can be made that if Pakistan had chosen to
sign the CTBT after it had tested, the reciprocal reward would likely
have been more substantial. But the problem with losing time is that
Pakistan could well be losing even more time and opportunity. 

Two other factors, doctrine and cost, stand out in regard to a decision.
Both are interrelated since the latter cannot be worked out without
defining the former. The factor of doctrine is also significant, among
other things, for reasons of taking a decision on whether Pakistan needs
more tests than it has already conducted. 

A third factor, as mentioned earlier, relates to the issue of deployment
and its attendant command and control problems. It is here that the real
problem arises for the international community. Even if it were to get
Pakistan to sign the treaty, it cannot allow India to keep moving up the
nuclear ladder. So far the factors of international pressure, the costs
involved in the venture, lack of infrastructure and technology and the
hope to get something meaningful out of the international community
have prevented India from moving ahead. But if India were to move any
further down the nuclear route, dragging Pakistan with it, the
development is most likely to destabilize the situation, especially in the
absence of any movement on the contentious, political issues. It is
therefore important that both countries be treated on the basis of
parity on the issue of the CTBT. 

Therefore, along with signing the CTBT, the present condition of
non-deployment can, and should be used as the basic framework for
developing confidence- and security-building measures. This would mean
an acceptance of the nuclear status quo and verifiable guarantees, which
could either be bilateral or multilateral, that the status quo will not be
disturbed. The two countries could then initiate a parallel process of
military CSBMs and political dialogue to improve the atmosphere
between them. 

CTBT affords a good test of what the international community one the
one hand, and Pakistan and India on the other hand, can do. It can easily
be contrasted with, for instance, the NPT. While Pakistan should de-link
from India and sign the treaty, the international community must
address its fear that India might ultimately get more out of its
signature. Therefore, the international community needs to (a) engage
the two countries on the issue of the CTBT on the basis of parity, and
(b) explore ways of finding a viable quid pro quo that is acceptable to
both countries. In fact, parity in this case can, and should, be used to
also allow Pakistan and India to use the opportunity to spurn maximalist
options. 

For this strategy to work, India and Pakistan must obviously refrain
from moving up the nuclear ladder and should in fact turn the factors
that presently prevent them from doing so to their mutual advantage.
There is no reason why they should build arsenals, big or small, and
deploy them before taking to developing CSBMs to address the problem
of stabilizing the deterrent a la the US and the Soviet Union. 

It is clear that deployment, even on a small scale, is likely to stretch
their meagre technological and other resources to the extreme. The
maximalists in both countries are trying to "manufacture consent" in
this direction. Like before, they hope to raise the stakes and give a fait
accompli to the world. The situation must be squarely met and that is
where the CTBT must play its part. 

This article is culled from a paper the author read at an arms control
conference in Berlin, September 24-26