[sacw] SACW Dispatch | 14 Sept. 00

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch=20
14 September 2000
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

#1. Pakistan: Military Reshuffle
#2. Peasantry in Pakistan, Preparing to fight back
#3. Pakistan's clerics balk at school reforms=20
#4. Sri Lanka: The Political Logic of Violence
#5. India: The BJP and Muslims
#6. India: Implement Srikrishna Report - Press Conference 14 sept.
#7. India: Sambhavna Clinic, Bhopal Needs a socially committed gynaecologis=
t.
=20
--------------------------------------------

#1.

Far Eastern Economic Review
14 September 2000

PAKISTAN=20
MILITARY FACELIFT
ARMY LEADERS SHUFFLE JOBS IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO WOO THE WEST AT A UN SUM=
MIT
=20
By Ahmed Rashid/LAHORE
=20
Issue cover-dated September 14, 2000
=20
FOR MONTHS, PAKISTAN'S ruler, Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf, has laboured under a
growing public perception that he is not his own man, instead beholden to a
powerful junta of hardline generals whose foreign and economic policies
have increased the international isolation and the fiscal crisis of the
regime. As a result, the modernizing, liberal agenda that Musharraf
articulated when he seized power last October has steadily become more
Islamicist and conservative. But in a dramatic reshuffle of senior generals
on September 1, Musharraf appeared to be reasserting himself, with his
colleagues' approval.
=20
The reshuffle was predetermined by the anticipated retirement of two
lieutenant-generals, and was made no doubt by consensus within the junta.
But the timing of the move was significant: The announcement was made just
four days before Musharraf headed to New York to meet world leaders at the
United Nations, a public test of the army's ability to participate in the
world community and an opportunity to lobby for vital loans from the
International Monetary Fund.
=20
The most significant change is the replacement of Chief of General Staff
Lt.-Gen. Aziz Khan--a former officer of the Interservices Intelligence,
who, as the army's No. 2, gave critical support to Musharraf during the cou=
p.
=20
Aziz dominated decision-making in the regime's domestic and foreign
policies. He is revered by Pakistani and Kashmiri Islamic fundamentalist
parties, and was considered to be the architect of last year's seizure by
Kashmiri guerrillas of the Kargil heights in Indian Kashmir, which led to
six weeks of bitter fighting between India and Pakistan. He was also
credited with Pakistan's sustained support of the Taliban in Afghanistan
despite growing international condemnation. His replacement, Lt.-Gen.
Yousuf Khan, is not known for strong ideological leanings.
=20
The United States and other Western countries remain highly critical of the
army's reluctance to moderate its foreign policy toward India and cut ties
with the Taliban, and its refusal to sign the anti-nuclear Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. In this context, says a senior Western diplomat in
Islamabad, "Aziz's removal from day-to-day policy-making is a very
important signal, especially to the Americans."
=20
Aziz has been sent to Lahore as corps commander. A retired army officer
hints that Aziz cooperated in the job change: "Aziz had become too
controversial and both he and Musharraf knew it."
=20
Musharraf also made an attempt to restore crumbling business and investor
confidence by removing Lt.-Gen. Mohammed Amjad as chairman of the National
Accountability Bureau. Over the past 10 months, the NAB has generated fear
and capital flight by arresting, in secretive midnight raids, top
politicians and businessmen suspected of tax evasion and corruption.
Amjad's replacement, Lt.-Gen. Khalid Maqbool, who was corps commander in
Lahore, is expected to tone down the NAB's methods.
=20
Three other lieutenant-generals were reposted and two major-generals
promoted, giving Musharraf greater scope in bringing his own men into top
army slots.
=20
But while Pakistanis and foreign diplomats alike speculate that Musharraf
may now move more quickly to restore democracy and moderate the country's
foreign policy, that may be overly optimistic. Unlike any past military
ruler, Musharraf depends heavily on officers who have served in the
powerful Interservices Intelligence, which runs Kashmir and Afghan policy.
Four of his most senior advisers are ex-ISI officers, and of them only Aziz
has been distanced. The present head of the ISI, Lt.-Gen. Mehmood Ahmed, is
one of Musharraf's closest advisers.
=20
Meanwhile, the participation of Aziz and others in the reshuffle speaks
volumes for the army's monolithic unity. This unity, along with the army's
consensus system of policy-making at the top means that Musharraf cannot
bring changes quickly even if he wants to.
=20
Musharraf also has to watch his back. The Islamic parties, who pose the
strongest challenge to the regime and have become power-hungry in the
vacuum created by the discrediting of mainstream secular parties, are
perturbed by the reshuffle. "It's been done to win support from the
Americans," says a senior leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the country's
largest fundamentalist party. "But neither the army nor we will allow any
change in Kashmir policy," he adds.
=20
Musharraf desperately needs an IMF loan before December 31, when the
moratorium on interest payments on Pakistan's $38 billion in foreign debt
expires. Without an IMF loan in place, negotiating another moratorium will
be impossible, leaving Islamabad to begin repaying $4.5 billion in interest
due next year.
=20
Pakistan can't afford repayment. According to the State Bank of Pakistan,
the country has foreign-exchange reserves of $1.2 billion, down from $1.5
billion just after the coup. However, as $452 million of the reserves are
represented by deposits placed with the central bank by private commercial
banks, and other commitments, available reserves are $600 million--enough
for just three weeks of imports. An IMF loan would also release several
billion dollars from other lending agencies, including the World Bank.
=20
Even though the army has met some of the IMF's conditions for a
loan--including starting to document the black economy, imposing a 15%
sales tax on retail trade and services, and allowing the rupee to float
against the U.S. dollar--other measures remain to be taken. These include a
larger devaluation of the rupee, energy-price increases, a more broad-based
agricultural income tax and a resolution of the long-running stand-off with
private power company Hubco.
=20
During his New York visit, Musharraf was due to meet UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and representatives
from the IMF. He was certainly hoping that the reshuffle, though perhaps
little more than a facelift, would win him support for loans.
=20
IMF TEAM TO ASSESS ECONOMIC PROGRESS
=20
The IMF is in no hurry. After a three-month delay, it has agreed to send an
assessment mission to Pakistan this month. "It's a little too early to be
talking about a loan. As and when sufficient progress is made, there could
be talks,"Fund spokesman Tom Dawson told journalists in Washington.
=20
The IMF is unlikely to consider giving a loan until figures for the first
quarter of the financial year, July to September, are available early next
month. Even then, say Western diplomats, the Fund is unlikely to accept
Pakistan's request for a $2.5 billion "Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility" and is more likely to grant a much smaller, emergency loan to
stave off a default in December and allow Pakistan to negotiate another
moratorium with lenders.
=20
For their part, the fundamentalists want no IMF deal. "We should not pay
the debts taken by our corrupt politicians," says Maulana Fazlur Rehman,
leader of the Jamiat Ullema Islam, an influential, hardline Islamic party.
=20
Whereas after the coup Musharraf had promised a revival of the economy, he
is now grappling with economic survival. One way out for the army--strongly
urged by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori on a late-August visit to
Islamabad--is for Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which
would do much to mollify Western lenders. But Musharraf has ruled that out
until India does so also.
=20
For many, the key question is how long the army can maintain its hard line
when the money has gone. Reshuffle or not, the army will find it
increasingly difficult to promote any kind of policy when its well has run
dry.
=20=20=20=20
Copyright =A92000 Review Publishing Company Limited, Hong Kong. All rights
reserved.=20
______

#2.

PEASANTRY IN PAKISTAN, PREPARING TO FIGHT BACK

By

Farooq Tariq
General Secretary
Labour Party Pakistan

Peasantry in Pakistan has been subjected to all sort of exploitation in the
past years. But last few years have seen more of this. Every year, one or
another part of peasantry is been looted of its income by permanent declini=
ng
of the prices of the crops. Last year in 1999, it was cotton-producing sect=
ion
of the peasantry who were not able to make what they had invested, let alon=
e
to pay their labor of few months. This year, in 2000, it is the rice produc=
ing
peasantry.=20

Cotton and rice are the two main exports of Pakistan. Cotton amount to over
70% of its export and rice is 17%. Pakistan produces 10% of the total world
cotton production, but it share of the world market in cotton export is les=
s
than 1%. So is the case of rice. Pakistan produces one of the best rice bra=
nd
Basmati.=20

Last year, in 1999, the peasantry got over 230 Rupees ($ 4) for a 40 Kilogr=
ams
of rice in the fields. This year, the price for such weight is less than
rupees 130 ($2.20). That means a drastic loss in the price of the rice and =
a
net loss to peasantry in this field. When I asked the Director of Rice
Research Form at Kala Shah Kakoo, Lahore today on 12th September the reason=
s
for the falling prices of rice. He wasted no time in blaming the internatio=
nal
falling prices of the rice. The seasoned bureaucrat told me that even India
has to reduce the prices of rice by $200 a ton to remain in the world marke=
t
as a competitive seller.

I met with this gentleman with a delegation of the newly formed Peasants
Committee to present the charter of demands from the committee. One of this
was to ask what has happened to the peasant welfare fund, which has been
collected from 1926 and never was spend of the peasantry. The reply was
=93forget the past, we will not spend any money from this without the permi=
ssion
of the Peasant Committee=94.=20

The members of Labour Party Pakistan formed the Peasant Committee in May th=
is
year after the peasantry working on this government owned rice research for=
m
found no other way to address their problems apart to contact LPP and ask
their help. The decision to form the committee was taken in the first meeti=
ng
attended by most of the 200 families living on the form.=20

One elderly peasant Rehmat Baba told me at that meeting that we are here fr=
om
1926 when the British decided to set up this rice research form. He said ma=
ny
years later those who came to Pakistan from India in 1947, they became the
owners of the land they never cultivated before. But we are still waiting f=
or
the time when we could say that we own this land, which has been cultivated=
by
us for the last 74 years.=20

In the meeting today on 12th September, the director of the Rice Research F=
orm
offered us cold drinks and accepted most of the demands of the Peasant
Committee. It was an open acknowledgement of the power of the Peasant
Committee, which it has built during the last four months of its formation.=
=20

We later headed for another village to form a new Peasant Committee. Waitin=
g
for us, were most of the peasants of the village in the house of a member o=
f
LPP. The discussion was worth noting. One peasant said that we are fed up o=
f
the politicians and now the present government. They are all the same. Ther=
e
was no time when we would have seen the hours of happiness. This village is=
on
the bank of a rain water drainage. This drainage brings every year at the t=
ime
of moon soon bad news for the villagers. Every single politician who had co=
me
to the village have made promised to build this drainage before the electio=
ns
and forgot after the elections.=20=20

One peasant told the gathering that the only solution is that India should
drop a bomb and most of the rich should be killed. He could not complete hi=
s
sentence to be interrupted by another one who said, =93 We would pay the pr=
ice
of the bomb and not the rich. Let us organize=94.

12 members Peasant Committee was formed which decided to meet next week to
discuss in detail the strategy for future. They agreed to go to other villa=
ges
to help form such Peasant Committees.=20

This committee was formed after a very successful formation of another
district Peasant Committee on Sunday the 10th September in Qasur, a distric=
t
adjacent to Indian border. The Kissan Raaj Committee (Peasants to power
committee) was formed by the representatives of 11 villages of district Qas=
ur.
Although, the LPP members in the district has gone to 60 villages of the
district to inform about the committee. Several send messages of support an=
d
promised to come in the next meeting.=20

In this meeting, it was clear that the conditionalities of IMF and World Ba=
nk
is biting the peasantry in a speed never seen before. Peasants leaders at
the meeting told about the power rates increase effect on agro economy. The=
y
told about the growing prices of seeds and pesticides. They complained abou=
t
the ever-lowering prices of the crops. One told the audience, =93 If there=
are
three shopkeepers in a new market, they will form an association, we are th=
e
majority in the population and we must be organized like those small trader=
s=94=20

Malik Jaffer Hussain, a renowned peasant leader and senior vice chairman of
LPP in Punjab was elected as the head of the coordination committee formed =
at
the meeting. The coordination committee will go to most of the villages to
form the new KRC committees. Then to call a district convention of the
peasants till the end of the year.=20

I spoke of the effects of globalization on the peasantry and the workers. I
stressed the need for the close links of the workers trade unions and peasa=
nt
committees. I told the gathering that a day after, on 11th September, our
friends in Melbourne would be doing a =93Gheraio=94 (Picket) of the World E=
conomic
Forum of the rich. It is an international conspiracy against the poor
countries. The IMF and World Bank conditionality for the economies of the
third world countries are promoting privatization of public sector and cutt=
ing
down the subsidies to agriculture, I told the meeting. It is WTO, which is
promoting the unfair trade between the rich and poor countries in favor of =
the
rich. I spoke about TRIPPS and its effects.=20

The message was clear and sharp. There is no other way apart from organizat=
ion
of the peasantry. A very militant mood was channeled into formation of the =
new
organization.=20

The three meetings of the peasants, I attended during the last two days, is
the beginning of the new mood among the peasantry, which is now off the mar=
k
and has started to add runs in the cricket match between the rich and poor.=
=20=20

______

#3.

The Guardian
13 September 2000

PAKISTAN'S CLERICS BALK AT SCHOOL REFORMS=20
=20
Religious right says US is behind moves to modernise suspected academies of
holy war=20=20
=20
Rory McCarthy in Akora Khattak=20
Wednesday September 13, 2000=20
=20
In the oppressive heat of Pakistan's North West Frontier hundreds of young
boys huddle together on the floor around a handful of electric fans,
rocking backwards and forwards as they memorise verses from the Koran.=20

This is a normal school day for these children just as it was for their
fathers and their fathers' fathers for centuries before. Many of those
former pupils went on to fight with the mojahedin against the Soviet forces
in Afghanistan and are now fighting against Indian rule in Kashmir. Others
are among the top leaders of Afghanistan's repressive Taliban militia.=20

Pakistan's military regime, under pressure from the west to curb terror
groups, wants to modernise teaching in these Islamic schools. But the
military is risking a confrontation with the increasingly influential
religious right.=20

"The government can do nothing," said Sami-ul Haq, the hardline cleric who
runs this madrassah, the Darul Uloom Haqqani, one of the leading Islamic
seminaries in Asia.=20

"The United States wants to be the supreme power in the world and it knows
that these madrassahs are the hurdles in its way so they put pressure on
the government," said Mr Haq.=20

"But the madrassah is not just the building. If a teacher stands under the
shade of a tree with his students that is a madrassah . If the United
States closes down one madrassah we will build thousands more under every
tree."=20

Mr Haq stroked his long, hennaed beard and reflected proudly on some of his
star students now leading the Afghan Taliban. They include the interior
minister, Khairula Khairkhwa, and the head of the feared religious police,
Qalam Uddin.=20

After 53 years of military rule and corrupt democracy Pakistan was now
ready to become an Islamic state like neighbouring Afghanistan, he said.=20

Few Pakistanis, however, voted for the religious parties when they had the
chance. The clerics' power has always lain in the fear that they might
bring students from the thousands of madrassahs out on to the streets.=20

It was the religious leaders' opposition that forced Pakistan's leader,
General Pervez Musharraf, to back down this year on his proposal to make a
slight procedural change to the country's blasphemy law. The law is often
misused to target religious minorities, particularly Christians.=20

Then the religious parties backed shopkeepers in their opposition to a new
income survey and the introduction of a new sales tax. Clerics want the
weekly holiday switched back from Sunday to Friday.=20

Now the government has provoked their anger again by trying to survey the
madrassahs and introduce new classes, like science and computing.=20

"Our main objective is that the ulema (clerics) should join the mainstream
and make some positive contribution to society," said Mehmood Amed Ghazi,
the member of Gen Musharraf's national security council who is in charge of
the madrassah issue.=20

Gen Musharraf has met several religious leaders in the past month,
including Mr Haq. He is reportedly planning to bring some of them, along
with some former politicians, into his government as advisers.=20

Mr Haq is at pains to point out that his madrassah is no threat. It has no
weapons and no military training. "You see, there is no terrorism in the
madrassahs ," he said. But the thoughts of war in Kashmir and Afghanistan
are not far from the minds of his young students.=20

"There is a vast difference between an Islamic war, which is a jihad, and
terrorism," said Arshad Yusuf, a 24-year-old in his sixth year at the
Haqqani school.=20

"Jihad is to fight for a very great cause, like Kashmir. If there are
people who restrict the Muslims, then the Muslims are allowed to fight
them. People in the west should understand the spirit of Islam."=20
=20
=A9 Guardian Newspapers Limited 2000

______

#4.

Neue Z=FCrcher Zeitung,=20
2/3 September 2000
NZZ Background on World Affairs, September 2000

SRI LANKA: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF VIOLENCE
TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE OVERSHADOW AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Markus Spillmann=20

Parliamentary elections are scheduled for 10 October in Sri Lanka. They are
being heavily influenced by the civil war in the northern and eastern
portions of the island. A further advance by the Tamil Tigers in the Jaffna
Peninsula would be politically fatal for the regime in Colombo, while a
defeat of the guerrillas could secure its election victory. So both parties
to the conflict will likely be tempted to break out of the present military
stalemate.=20

Travel brochures put out by the Ceylon Tourist Board lure tourists with the
slogan "Welcome to Paradise." But there isn't much to see of it in Colombo,
the capital of Sri Lanka. This metropolis of two million people seems like
an army camp. Rusty barbed wire and camouflage-painted oil barrels at the
countless roadblocks disfigure a cityscape that was never exactly notable
for its beauty. Wherever you go throughout the downtown area, your eye
falls on armed soldiers and police. Government buildings, train stations,
hotels, publishing houses and service stations are like miniature
fortresses. Whole thoroughfares are sealed off around "Temple Trees," the
current residence of President Chandrika Kumaratunga on Galle Road, which
runs along the Indian Ocean. The navy is on patrol off the coast.=20

Constant Fear of the "Black Tigers"

The rigorous security measures are designed to prevent attacks by fighters
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the so-called cyanide
killers. These "Black Tigers" generally escape capture by swallowing a
tablet of potassium cyanide which they wear around their necks. Now and
then the police manage to capture a suspect anyway. But generally what
happens during raids is what might be termed "ethnic profiling." According
to Amnesty International and statements by local human rights activists,
under the emergency laws which were tightened in early May Tamils whose
only violation is being unable to identify themselves correctly may be
thrown in jail for up to 60 days without formal charges.=20

Last April, under the leadership of their ruthless and charismatic leader
Vellupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE fighters captured the strategically important
land bridge at Elephant Pass in the northern part of the island and thus,
despite their crass numerical inferiority, succeeded in severely
threatening the 30,000 government troops stationed on the Jaffna Peninsula.
Since then, the ethnic conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese has become
more sharply palpable again in the southern part of the country as well.
The regime is worried that the campaign leading up to the parliamentary
elections scheduled for 10 October will provide a new occasion for
terrorist attacks by the Tigers. Rumors are circulating that several
suicide bombers are already in place in Colombo and Kandy, the Sinhalese
cultural heartland, ready to blow themselves up with explosives strapped to
their bodies. The weeks ahead, during which all parties will hold election
rallies involving leading politicians and large crowds, will offer ample
opportunities for such strikes.=20

"War for Peace"

Under the slogan "War for Peace," President Kumaratunga and her governing
People's Alliance coalition are promising voters that the Tigers will be
defeated militarily in order to secure political peace with the country's
Tamil minority. They pledge that negotiations with the Liberation Tigers
will take place only after they have laid down their weapons and given up
on secession. The main reason why the president has made that linkage is to
win the support of the Sinhalese majority for her moderate plans for a
federal system which would give greater autonomy to the northern and
eastern provinces. She presented that devolution plan to Parliament in
August, shortly before the legislature was dissolved, but then, finding
that the necessary two-thirds majority could not be achieved, she prudently
withdrew it until after the elections. Kumaratunga has indicated several
times that she regards the parliamentary elections in part as a kind of
referendum on her plans for constitutional reform. But should the
government have no successes to show for itself in its war against the
guerrillas or in combating LTTE terrorism, Colombo will have a very tough
time indeed persuading the majority Sinhalese of the need for a political
solution tailored to the Tamils.=20

For its part, the LTTE has rejected the proposed constitutional reform as
falling too far short of its secessionist demands. Behind that, along with
a goodly measure of arrogance on Prabhakaran's part, is the fear that if a
political restructuring brings more power to Sri Lanka's provinces, the
LTTE could lose some of its support among the war-weary Tamil population.
So the Tigers will make every effort to scuttle the constitutional
proposal. The assassination of politicians from both the Sinhalese and
Tamil camps who are prepared to enter into dialogue, is a standard
component of the LTTE's double strategy of terrorism and guerrilla warfare.
The assassinations serve the aim of deliberately destabilizing the country
through the physical elimination of its political leadership. This provokes
a hardening of the Sinhalese position vis-=E0-vis the Tamils, which in turn
indirectly strengthens Tamil support for the LTTE.=20

Stalemate on the Jaffna Peninsula

Some observers in Colombo are reckoning not only on renewed terrorist
attacks before election day, but also on a broad flare-up of fighting in
the northern and eastern provinces. As his first official act, Lionel
Balagalle, the newly appointed Sri Lankan general chief of staff who was
appointed on 25 August, declared the recapture of the land-bridge at
Elephant Pass to be a priority objective. At the same time, he announced
that the government will defend the Tamil stronghold of Jaffna against the
LTTE at any price. The chances are not bad. Thanks to new weapons systems
and the assistance of foreign military advisers, government troops have
already succeeded in stopping the Tigers' advance. Among other things, Sri
Lanka's military now has a number of Israeli Kfir combat jets and four
Mig-27s from the Ukraine, as well as Russian-made multiple-missile
launchers from Pakistan and Chechnya. Some new Mig-24 combat helicopters
have also been procured.=20

According to unconfirmed reports, Israeli military advisers are undertaking
to improve the sometimes catastrophic state of training of Sri Lankan
troops, which should have a positive impact on the very shaky morale and
discipline of government combat units. In addition to arms purchases from
South Africa, Ukraine, Pakistan, Thailand and Chechnya, Colombo has
reportedly received tens of millions of dollars' worth of American military
aid.=20

Regardless of the arms buildup, however, the army is having a difficult
time of it, especially on the Jaffna Peninsula. The overwhelmingly
Sinhalese-Buddhist soldiers and officers are fighting in an area that is
alien and unknown to them; only a few personnel even speak Tamil. Many
units are also suffering from supply shortages as a result of the almost
complete cutting off of the north. According to official figures, some
12,000 soldiers have already deserted (over an unspecified time period),
and some independent sources estimate an even higher number of deserters
from the 120,000-man army. Press reports state that the government's fourth
amnesty for deserters in the course of this year brought the return of
about 3,000 soldiers, while an additional 5,000 were allegedly captured in
June and July by civilian and military security forces. But according to
Balagalle, the army needs 20,000 new troops for the battle in the north.
Despite generous army pay and fringe benefits, calls for new recruits
seldom bring much results.=20

Well-Armed Guerrillas

For their part, the Tamil Tigers recruit their fighters from among the
inhabitants of the war zone, most of whom have been forced to flee their
homes several times, and also from refugee camps set up by the government.
At regular intervals, international organizations also accuse the LTTE of
using child soldiers. Among other things, the Tigers have introduced a kind
of compulsory service for all adults. Its fighters are operating on home
territory, they are highly motivated and carry out frequent, almost
classical hit-and-run actions, not hesitating to risk their own lives when
necessary. Despite tight censorship of media coverage of the war in the
north, reports repeatedly reach the public of "human bombs" who penetrate
army bases and blow themselves up there.=20

The LTTE, however, are also now probably among the best-armed guerrilla
armies in the world. The Tigers not only have long-range artillery, but
also multiple-missile launchers, tanks, a naval force, apparently one or
two aircraft, and most likely also Russian- and American-made portable
anti-aircraft missiles. These weapons systems were either captured in
battles against government forces or procured on the international arms
market with "donations" from Tamils living in exile in the West. The LTTE
are also suspected of acquiring a portion of their substantial financial
means through the drug trade.=20

Even Sinhalese admit that 46-years-old Tiger leader Prabhakaran, who comes
from a lower caste of fishermen and lives somewhere in the jungles of
Vanni, is almost frighteningly clever in his conduct of the war. Coupled
with the iron discipline and high level of loyalty among his fighters, who
include many young women, this explains the LTTE's astonishing successes in
the field. The Tigers are also abetted by the fact that Colombo often
enough conducts the war in the north more in accord with election-campaign
politics than military considerations and has not shown a particularly
skillful hand in its past appointments to command positions.=20

Finally, the numerical inferiority of the estimated 10,000 Tigers is also
compensated by the fact that, in the north and northeast, the government's
army is perceived as an occupation force and an instrument of Colombo's
repression. The LTTE, on the other hand, enjoy the status of a defense
force. Sympathy for the Tigers' aims - though not necessarily for their
methods - is mixed for many Tamils with fears of LTTE vengeance, since
Prabhakaran has never shown any scruples about moving brutally against
"traitors" in his own ranks.=20

Gloomy Prospects

Prabhakaran has declared that his forces will retake Jaffna before 27
November, which the Tamil Tigers celebrate as "Heroes Day." Strategically,
that would not be terribly important. But the symbolic significance of a
renewed "liberation" of the Tamil stronghold from Sinhalese hands would be
of great political consequence for the Colombo regime. Even worse would be
the loss of other key military positions, such as the airfield at Palali,
or a spread of the fighting in the northeast.=20

If, despite arms purchases financed by new consumer taxes and foreign aid,
Colombo's forces fail to stop the LTTE, the governing coalition will likely
not only lose the elections, but Kumaratunga's goal of resolving the
problem by way of a constitutional reform will have little chance of
mustering a majority in Parliament. This scenario would suit Prabhakaran's
purposes perfectly, since then the odds would increase that the LTTE would
one day have to be summoned to the negotiating table again by Colombo - but
this time without any preconditions, undefeated, and with a real claim to
power in the Tamil-inhabited north and east of the island.=20

6 September 2000 / Neue Z=FCrcher Zeitung, 2/3 September 2000=20
=20=20
=A9 AG f=FCr die Neue Z=FCrcher Zeitung NZZ 2000

______

#5.

[12 september 2000]

THE BJP AND MUSLIMS

by Imtiaz Ahmad

On assuming the leadership of the BJP, Mr. Bangaru Laxman chose to engage
in a soul-searching exercise for his party. Among the points he made, two
were particularly prominent. One was that despite having been at the centre
of the political stage during the last decade, the BJP has yet not been
able to emerge as the preferred party of governance. The second was that
the BJP had remained isolated from the Muslims and other minority
communities who continue to look upon the party with suspicion, fear and
apprehension.=20

These two aspects are closely related. When the party emerged on the
centre of the political stage after the advent of what has been described
as the mandalisation of Indian politics, it chose the strategy of creating
a consolidated Hindu vote bank. For it achieve some degree of success in
this direction, it was imperative for it to adopt an anti-Muslim,
anti-minority stance and advocate the ideology of hindutva. Only by
creating a strong Hindu sentiment the party could expect to consolidate a
Hindu vote bank otherwise quite internally divided by considerations of
sectarian differences, caste and other socio-economic cleavages. One
consequence of this political strategy was the party managed to emerge as
the single largest party in parliament but failed to muster adequate
support to form a government on its own. It ended up leaning on the
clutches of a motley crowd of political formations with diverse ideological
leanings.=20

This situation was built into the logic of political arithmetic of
governance in the country. As is all too well known, this is a highly
diverse country with sizeable strength of the Muslims and other minorities.
No political formation can hope to come to power on its own in this country
until its support base cuts across all these groups. By the terms of the
same logic, the BJP could well hope to emerge as a leading political party
on the strength of a consolidated Hindu vote bank, but its capacity to
emerge as a preferred party of governance was bound to remain limited. This
dilemma for the BJP has been becoming quite prominent as some of the Hindu
castes and communities, particularly the Other Backward Classes and the
Dalits, whose support it had succeeded in garnering in the name of hindutva
are slowly getting weaned away from the party. This is already well
illustrated by the current political developments in states like Uttar
Pradesh where the BJP=92s strategy of consolidating a Hindu vote bank was
initially most successful.=20

Forced by this situation, the BJP had realised that its chances of success
at the hustings as well as in terms of the legitimacy that it enjoys in the
eyes of the electorate at present is seriously in jeopardy until it can
broaden its political base. Mr. Laxman=92s plea that the BJP must make
overtures and win the support of the Muslims and other minority communities
along with the sections of the Hindus represented by the Other Backward
Classes and Dalits if it anticipates to eventually emerging as the
preferred party of governance in the foreseeable future clearly reflects
that concern.=20=20=20=20=20=20

Whether the BJP can improve upon its records in this respect has to be
assessed in the light of two factors. One, whether the party can launch
upon a policy of appeasement to win over the Muslims to its side without
risking whatever is left of its Hindu support base. Two, whether the
tenuous balance in which the party is placed by the dependence on a
congeries of diverse political formations, most of whom enjoy some support
among the Muslims and other minority communities, would be seriously
disturbed if the party starts cutting into the very support base of those
parties. What would be the prospects then of the BJP sustaining itself in
the significant role that it occupies under the current political
dispensation?

On both counts the situation does not look too good for the BJP. If the
party starts making overtures to Muslims all too suddenly, it will not only
open itself up to the charge of appeasement of minorities which it was
until the other day hurling at its political opponents. One consequence of
this shift would then be that the party=92s already eroded support base wou=
ld
be further depleted by hardcore sections of the Hindus, including the RSS
leadership and cadres, being pushed away to a yet extreme right position in
the political process. If the BJP leadership genuinely purses a programme
of mobilisation of Muslims and other minorities on its side, the chances
are that the party would either split or its traditional linkage with the
RSS, which has hitherto controlled its ideology and policies would be put
to severe strain. One can only speculate whether the party is in a position
to risk its traditional relationship with the RSS and whether the RSS can
go so far as to shed off its anti-Muslim, anti-minority stance in order to
allow the BJP to broaden its political base. In that case the very reason
de atr for the organisation=92s existence would stand lost.=20

On the other hand, assuming that the BJP is able to purse meaningfully a
strategy of winning over the Muslims and other minority communities to its
side, this will definitely put the relationship between the BJP and its
alliance partners to severe strain which may eventually result in the
collapse of the government itself. As already indicated, the alliance
partners enjoy some support among the Muslims and other minorities besides
the Other Backward Castes and Dalits and they are not likely to remain
passive onlookers if the BJP starts eating into the very support base that
they command. They will be alarmed and would surely react against the BJP.
Under the circumstances the survival of the coalition would be seriously
jeopardised. In the event of the collapse of the government, the allies
would again taken on an anti-BJP stance and the BJP would be hard put to
reverting to its old agenda with its strong anti-Muslim, anti-minority
sting. The BJP=92s aspiration to build support base among Muslims and other
minorities would then be a thing of the past.=20

Even if we ignore all these complications, which are real in their own
right, one question still remains. How are the Muslims and other minorities
likely to respond to the call given by Mr. Laxman that the BJP build
bridges with them? Going by the current sensibilities of the minority
communities, it is clear that they are likely to reject Mr. Laxman=92s call
as another political slogan to confuse the people. On the one hand, the
sense of hurt over the demolition of the Babri Masjid, about which Muslims
do not like to talk but their sense of hurt is nevertheless quite live, and
what has been happening to Muslims and other minorities since the BJP has
been in the centre of governance, is going to caution them against any
enthusiastic response to the call. It is true that Muslims always had a
sense of insecurity. Even during the high point of the Nehru era, when they
had the assurance of being protected, this sense of insecurity was a part
of their political sensibility. This sensibility has been deeply
strengthened during the period the BJP has been at the centre of power so
much so that the average Muslim is beginning to ask whether it is a good
thing to be a Muslim in India. At best, they would like to wait and watch
on how the BJP washes its past sins of hostility and targeting of Muslims
before they commit themselves in any meaningful way to the party. Of
course, this would not preclude a handful of self-seeking Muslims from
jumping on to the BJP bandwagon.=20=20
=20=20=20=20=20=20
______

#6.

Ram Puniyani
Secretary-EKTA (Committee for Communal Amity)
B-64, I.I T. Qutrs,Powai Mumbai 400076
Ph- (R)-5723522, 5725045 ,5768763,(O) 5767763, 5767769

PRESS CONFERENCE

The recent affidavit filed by the Government of Maharashtra is a=20
total betrayal of the promises this Government has been making to the=20
public and various delegations of the citizens regarding=20
implementation of Shrikrishna Commission Report.

Different social concerned groups have drafted an open letter to the=20
Chief Minister which will be released at the press conference=20
tomorrow, Thursday 14 September at 4.00 p.m. at Mumbai Marathi=20
Patrkar Sangh. Flavia Agnes, Shakeel Ahmad, A. D. Golandaz, K.L.Bajaj=20
and many other social activists will be addressing the conference.=20
J.B. D'Souza, subject to his health permitting may also be present

Ram Puniyani
For Citizen's Collective

______

#6.

Wanted: Socially committed gynaecologist

The Background.

Sambhavna Clinic, Bhopal Needs a socially committed gynaecologist. The
Sambhavna Clinic provides free medical care [through modern medicine,
auyrveda and yoga to the survivors of the December 1984 Union Carbide gas
leak in Bhopal.

Since September 1996 we have offered care to over 9,000 chronically ill
survivors from the severely affected communities. The clinic is run by the
Sambhavna Trust with Dr P M Bhargava, Chandana Chakrabarti, Madhu Kishwar,
Padma Prakash, Mira Sadgopal, Satinath Sarangi and Dr. H H Trivedi, as
trustees.=20

We run on small donations from a large number of individuals all over the
world. The clinic is committed to working for the improvement of the health
and health care condition of the survivors, carrying out research and
documentation activities to monitor the long term health consequences of
the disaster and campaigning on issues concerning the health and well being
of the survivors.=20

In view of the exposure induced injuries to women's health and the official
neglect towards health and health care of women survivors, the Sambhavna
Trust has decided to pay special attention to women's health.In late 1997 /
early 1998, much because of the initiative taken byvolunteer doctor
Jayshree Chander from San Francisco, we started carrying out Pap's smear
examinations in view of the unusually large proportion of persons with
problem of excessive vaginal secretions.

We soon came upagainst problems in getting biopsies done for women with
suspect smears. At the time we did not hav eour own facility to do biopsies
and so had to send women to government hospitals. We found that cervical
biopsy facilities are unavailable at the hospitals meant for survivors,
including the 150-bed Indira Gandhi Hospital built specially for women
survivors.=20

It is not just the problems of diagnosis; facilities for treatment of
cervical cancer, particularly among women from poor families, are also near
absent in Bhopal. Where such facilities exist they consist of hysterectomy,
which is known to be an overkill in majority of cases. Given such a
situation we decided to start Colposcopy and LLETZ [Large Loop Excision of
Transformation Zone] or LEEP [Loop Electro-surgical Excision Procedure)
facilities at the clinic.=20

LLETZ/LEEP is one of the state of the art surgical procedures that allows,
with the aid of a colposcope, excision [through electro-surgery] of
abnormal tissue [thus sparing the rest of the reproductive organs. Mr.
Dominique Lapierre, author of City of Joy has agreed to donate about Rs. 25
lakhs from the royalty of his books towards our proposal for a
gynaecological clinic with special attention to screening, diagnosis and
treatment of cervical cancer. Half of his contribution is already deposited
in our special bank account. We have very recently purchased a colposcope
[Takagi CS5] , L & T electro-surgical unit with a set of reusable
electrodes and other accessories required for this procedure. A room has
been specially renovated to accommodate this work.=20

Our health workers have started on health education campaigns focused on
gynaecological health problems.=20

The gynaecologist would be expected to

* see at least 25 patients [new registered + follow up] in a day=20
* Document detailed case histories=20
* Develop (where required) and standardize treatment protocols for
specific syndromes / symptom complexes.=20
* Keep herself updated on the latest research in relevant areas=20=20
* Keep herself informed of possibilities of treatment of specific problems
through Ayurveda and Yoga=20
* Perform procedures for Pap's smear slides=20
* Take biopsy specimens for confirmation of Pap's smear positive findings =
=20
* Carry out colposcopy and LLETZ where required=20=20
* Carry out focused studies (such as on anemia ) related to the project =
=20
* Prepare fortnightly, quarterly and yearly reports=20=20
* Do quarterly internal evaluation of the project=20=20
* Provide assistance in the production of community health education
material.=20

Specifically we are looking for a woman with the following qualifications.

* A post-MBBS degree or diploma in gynaecology=20=20
* At least two years experience of seeing patients independently=20=20
* At least one year of independent experience with investigative and
surgical procedures=20
* Knowledge of spoken Hindi Additionally the following would be desirable=
=20
* Experience and/or demonstrated interest in epidemiological/clinical
research=20=20
* Involvement with or exposure to community situations particularly
socially and economically disadvantaged communities.=20
* Computer literacy and familiarity with statistical packages.=20

The offer.=20

* Salary Rs. 10,000 per month=20
* Leave up to 38 days leave in a year=20
* Excellent laboratory facilities=20
* A team of committed and competent medical and other workers=20
* Encouragement and support to research activities=20=20
* A participatory and non-hierarchical work environment=20=20

Replies should be emailed to the Managing Trustee, Satinath Sarangi at
sambavna@b...

_____________________________________________
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