[sacw] (no subject)

[Harsh Kapoor]

FYI
South Asians Against Nukes
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The Hindu
1st Sept 2000
Op-Ed.

South Asian nuclear dialogue

By V. R. Raghavan

NATIONS WHICH seek security through nuclear weapons place themselves in
the control of a relentless logic. A nation possessing nuclear weapons
finds it cannot give them up. It also does not wish the colossal dangers
from nuclear weapons to increase. The realisation that nuclear weapons
in larger numbers do not provide additional security leads to the
inevitable need to negotiate with the adversary about ways to limit the
possibilities of a nuclear exchange. The inexorable logic of nuclear
weapons rests on the juxtaposition of two contradictory needs. One has
to have strong capability to be credible as a nuclear weapons state. One
also needs to be seen as a credible, rational and predictable state by
the nuclear adversary. That provides stability to nuclear deterrence. It
ensures security without the dangers of a calamitous nuclear exchange
through fear and misperceptions. Deterrence stability comes not through
fears and anxieties but through reassurance. Reassurance is obtained
through direct and honest talks with the adversary. It is sustained
through mutually-agreed measures which not only reduce fears but also
build confidence, about the presence of nuclear weapons with the
adversary.

The South Asian nuclear weapons scene, in the two years since the tests
of 1998, shows two disturbing trends. The first is linked to the
understandable imperative of India and Pakistan to be recognised as
nuclear weapon states. The denial of that reality by the major powers
has generated pressures in the two countries to go further up on the
nuclear ladder. There are demands for further nuclear tests, for
thermonuclear and neutron bomb capabilities, and for not joining the
CTBT. There is an urge to seek nuclear doctrines which are predicated on
punitive second strike capabilities requiring large arsenals. There is a
desire for a full spectrum of nuclear infrastructure, without regard to
strategic needs or economic capacity. There is ill-informed talk and
worse still irresponsible political rhetoric, in both India and
Pakistan, about the use of nuclear weapons as instruments of influencing
political disputes. This route to nuclear weapons based security is more
likely to create a mutually- reinforcing negative spiral of competitive
capability acquisition. There is in it the serious likelihood of a
nuclear exchange through misunderstanding or a nuclear accident.

The second disturbing trend in South Asia is of an unwillingness to
engage in official talks on nuclear matters. This inflexible attitude in
India is part of the larger issue of the undoing of the Lahore
initiative by Pakistan and its direct role in the violence let loose in
Jammu and Kashmir. In Pakistan, inflexibility is rooted in its
insistence on the prior resolution of the J&K issue. A stage is reached
where Pakistan seems fixated in its belief that the Kashmir issue is
vital for its ideological survival. In both India and Pakistan, the
ruling establishments appear unconcerned about the dangers of nuclear
uncertainties remaining unresolved. The risks of nuclear uncertainties,
fears and misperceptions being considered unimportant is a serious
danger. The two trends of increased demand for nuclear weapons
capability and of inflexibility on a nuclear dialogue are potentially
hazardous. These dangers can translate into calamities over which
neither Government can have complete control. It is not without reason t
hat some analysts in the west give India and Pakistan no more than a
decade before a nuclear conflict takes place between them.

There is an urgent need for a South Asian nuclear dialogue. If the two
Governments are unable to find a way out of the impasse, experts on the
subject can be encouraged to begin the dialogue. The purpose of the
dialogue is more to understand each other's anxieties, compulsions,
technical and operational needs, and political dilemmas on the nuclear
weapons issues. The requirement is to use the time before official
dialogue commences - as it must before long - to create a higher
threshold of clarity on each side's position and its ability to
accommodate the other's concerns. Informal and candid dialogue outside
the Government channels can assist the two establishments in preparing
better for a fruitful outcome from the formal talks. A slow but sure
beginning is taking place on the dialogue process at informal and
non-official levels. Recently, a very useful dialogue on nuclear risk
reduction in South Asia was organised by the Center for International
Security and Cooperation (CISAC) of Stanford University at Bangkok. This
was attended by some members of the National Security Advisory Board and
other experts in India and Pakistan. Another such meeting is being held
in early September in Honolulu by the Asia Pacific Center for Security
Studies.

An important non-governmental dialogue on ``Nuclear Risk Reduction in
South Asia'' was held in New Delhi on September 24. This was organised
by the Delhi Policy Group and the Islamabad Policy Research Institute,
which facilitated an interaction between two sets of experts comprising
former Foreign Secretaries, defence services officers, nuclear strategy
analysts and academicians. It was the first such meeting on the
subcontinent after the nuclear tests of 1998 without any of the major
nuclear powers' experts providing a stimulus. The frank and forthright
exchange at the meeting allowed a wider but select audience to get a
first- and feel of each other's perceptions. There was surprise at the
differing interpretations placed on commonly-used nuclear phraseology.
It was also a revelation to note how adversely, immature political
rhetoric in one country affects the mood in the other. A special attempt
was made at this meeting to keep away from the polemics of core issues
and ideological divides, even as some amongst the participants found it
difficult to shed habits cultivated over the years. This approach led to
the real possibility of identifying the specific issues which need to be
addressed on the question of nuclear weapons, dangers, and ways of
reducing the risks of a deliberate or accidental nuclear exchange.

An insightful presentation was made at the meeting by a young analyst on
the lessons from the Cold War nuclear experience and how it can or
cannot apply in the South Asian context. There was an interesting
session on the nuclear command and control arrangements. It became clear
that there is wide disparity and opacity on the subject in both
countries. There was tacit agreement that without transparency on the
nuclear decision making processes adopted by both sides, the chances of
misunderstanding will remain high. Neither side was fully able to
convince the other about the reliability of its command and control
arrangements. There was a reference to how far the political leadership
can be immune to populist public pressures when a nuclear countdown
starts. The question of nuclear deterrence led to issue of who gets
deterred. This brought about a better understanding of how the deterrent
might really operate in South Asia, which was not a small gain. There
was the inevitable reference to China and its relevance in the South
Asian nuclear dynamic. There was general agreement that the
China-India-Pakistan triangle needs to be squared.

The Delhi dialogue came to some specific conclusions on the measures
India and Pakistan can unilaterally take to reduce the risks of a
nuclear weapons exchange and of accidents. An experienced diplomat
rightly pointed out that this need had been agreed upon by the two
countries in the Memorandum of Understanding which was part of the
Lahore Declaration. The real question is whether the urgency of the need
for nuclear risk reduction should wait until other issues between the
two countries are resolved. There was unanimity at the meeting on the
urgent need for a South Asian nuclear risk reduction regime. The two
Governments should use the informal dialogue process to assess each
other's commitment to risk reduction. They should better understand the
distance each wishes to travel in search of nuclear stability. While the
two Governments would have some difficulty coming down from their
positions of high principles, much ground work can be done for them
through informal and candid meetings between think-tanks and expert
groups. It is, therefore, to be hoped that having got themselves nuclear
weapons, neither Government will remain complacent, about living in a
condition of dangerous deterrence instability.