[sacw] TIME Asia: 'More Nuclear Tests Make Sense' says Indian Hawk

[Harsh Kapoor]

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South Asians Against Nukes Post
22 September 2000
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TIME Asia story=20=20=20=20

WEB-ONLY EXCLUSIVE=20

Conversations: 'More Nuclear Tests Make Sense'
Interview with retired Indian Navy rear admiral Raja Menon=20

By MASEEH RAHMAN
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September 19, 2000=20
Web posted at 2:00 p.m. Hong Kong time, 2:00 a.m. EDT
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Rear Admiral Raja Menon was responsible for formulating strategy for the
Indian Navy before retiring from service in 1994. Ever since he has been
writing and lecturing on strategic affairs, and is the author of the
recently published book 'A Nuclear Strategy for India', a pioneering effort
in its field. Menon is a strong proponent of arms control talks between
India and Pakistan to stop the looming nuclear arms race in the
subcontinent. But he also believes India should conduct further tests in
order to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons. He spoke to TIME
contributor Maseeh Rahman in New Delhi recently. Edited excerpts:=20
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TIME: Does the total absence of a dialogue on nuclear arms control between
India and Pakistan worry you?
Menon: Ever since India and Pakistan began weaponizing following the
nuclear tests in 1998, there has been this fear of a spiraling nuclear arms
race in the subcontinent. That's why I've been arguing for a start to arms
limitation negotiations with Pakistan. But apparently any talk with
Pakistan at the moment is not in India's national interest. My feeling is
that all other negotiations can be postponed, but the nuclear dialogue has
got to begin. What in some ways is more frightening [than the absence of
talks] is that some people have been saying that, 'No, there can never be
an arms race on the subcontinent, because we're culturally different from
the West.' This is a dangerous idea. Nuclear weaponization has a dynamic of
its own, and if it is to be controlled, some positive efforts have to be
made. Culture doesn't come into it. Neither India nor Pakistan is
economically well-off, so it makes a lot of sense for both countries to
limit their nuclear arsenals.=20
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TIME: Pakistan appears willing to talk about arms control, independent of
the Kashmir issue.
Menon: Definitely. They are very much in favor of a dialogue.=20
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TIME: What sort of risks do we face in the absence of a dialogue on arms
control?
Menon: The risk is that the arsenals of both sides grow and grow. If
neither side has an idea of what the other side is planning, both would
plan for the worst.=20
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TIME: You're involved in informal discussions between retired Indian and
Pakistani military officers on the nuclear arms issue. How is that
progressing?=20
Menon: People have not been very clear about what they're addressing--are
they addressing risk reduction between countries, which is really a
political-diplomatic effort? Or are they talking about risk reduction of
arsenals, which is a highly complicated technical subject? For instance, in
the 1999 Lahore agreement, there is a clause that says, 'Both sides will
attempt to strengthen command and control systems.' The objective is to
ensure strong control over the nuclear arsenals so that accidental
releases, or deliberate release by rogue elements, do not take place.
Politicians and diplomats can state this in an agreement, but nothing
happens on the ground until technical people from both sides get together
and list how this can be achieved. And that is not happening.=20
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TIME: Has there been any visible progress in creating command and control
structures?
Menon: Pakistan has defined its command and control apparatus in a more
lucid manner than anything New Delhi has done. Pakistan has also named the
individuals on its national command authority, which consists of a
strategic planning group and committees for nuclear use and nuclear
development. India could be a little more transparent on this. Deterrence
requires a great deal of transparency. These are weapons that are not meant
to be used, therefore their capability should be fully advertised. The
strength of the command and control over those weapons should also be
advertised.=20
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TIME: What kind of nuclear stockpiles do both sides have today?
Menon: Neither side has signed the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty [a
proposed ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and
other nuclear explosive devices], so fissile material is still being
produced. Pakistan already has around 500kg of fissile material, indicating
it probably has around 60 warheads. Estimates on India vary greatly, but a
good guess would be around 150 warheads.=20
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TIME: What type of minimum nuclear deterrence should India be aiming for?
Menon: Minimum deterrence today would mean the capability to launch a
second strike [after being targeted by a nuclear attack]. For this you've
got to have a submarine-based arsenal. All non-submarine based arsenals can
be detected through satellite surveillance in about seven to eight years.
If the arsenals have been discovered, you have to assume they're targeted.
Therefore, to retain a second strike capability, you need sea-based
arsenals. Unfortunately, India's nuclear submarine project has produced
nothing so far, even though it was first announced by Indira Gandhi in 1968=
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TIME: What other factors are preventing the nuclear arms scenario from
stabilizing in South Asia?
Menon: The extreme pressures that the armies exert on both sides of the
border in another factor clouding the issue. To put it bluntly, armies have
no role in nuclear deterrence, since this involves strategic weapons that
have never been given to the army. Land-based nuclear weapons are
invariably in the hands of the air force, and sea-based ones are with the
navy. But in the subcontinent, it is going to be difficult to keep the army
out of the nuclear arsenal loop on both sides of the border. In Pakistan,
the weapons are already with the army. In India, if the civilian hierarchy
decides that the army should have no role, it can be kept out. But the
Indian Army's size and the pressure it can exert would make that touch and
go.=20
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TIME: In the book 'Dragon Fire,' Humphrey Hawksley's fictional account of
nuclear war in South Asia in 2007, it is China that launches a successful
nuclear attack on India.=20
Menon: Unless India develops long-range missile capability and a
submarine-based strike force, it does not stand a chance against China in
the event of a nuclear conflict.=20
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TIME: So despite going nuclear, the picture is gloomy for India as far as
China is concerned.
Menon: We've lost too much time on the nuclear submarine project. But the
project can certainly be given impetus. The technological capability is
there--the problem has been poor management. Given the will, we can catch
up in 10 to 15 years. Until then, we could manage with a mobile land-based
system.=20
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TIME: Should India sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) now?
Memon: Definitely not. I don't think we have the ability to make
sufficiently small yield-to-weight warheads that could be carried by Indian
rockets--even with the technology that the 1998 tests provided.=20
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TIME: So you're saying India needs to conduct more tests?
Menon: More tests make sense because then the nuclear arsenal that India
produces would be stable, and we won't have to fiddle with it for 30 to 40
years. An arsenal produced now would be cheap, fragile and subject to chang=
e.=20
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TIME: Does a poor country like India have the resources to conduct more
tests and develop more sophisticated weapons?
Menon: If you create one arsenal that lasts 40 years, it would be cheaper
than creating a poor arsenal that has to be changed after 15 years.=20
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