[sacw] S A A N Post 28 September 2000

[Harsh Kapoor]

////////////////////////////////
South Asians Against Nukes Post
28 September 2000
////////////////////////////////

#1. Pakistan: The other side of nuclear policy
#2. Mori, Clinton's visits to Pakistan, India: Japan and US send wrong
signals 
#3. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission takes over Chashma nuclear power plant 
#4. India: The Koodankulam jillypuff 
#5. India: Kudankulam n-plant work to start in January 

--------------------------------

#1.

The News International
27 September 2000

The other side of nuclear policy

Some questions on moratorium and the CTBT have not been answered

If a message could be found in the official verbiage on nuclear testing and
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it is that Pakistan is keeping its
options open. Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar in his New York visit round-up
press conference in Islamabad conveyed this much by saying, "...we will
maintain moratorium and refrain from further tests unless our supreme
national interest is threatened." The 'unless' rider Mr Sattar added to his
assurance of no more tests should be read to mean the likelihood of Delhi
carrying out more nuclear tests, in which case Pakistan will no longer
abide by self-restraint and can actually respond in kind.

This stance means two things: one, Pakistan's perceived nuclear needs are
still defined by Indian nuclear behaviour; and two, which is a corollary of
the first, Islamabad is as far away from making up its mind about the CTBT
as it was two years ago when Delhi forced it to bring its bomb out of the
basement. A strong argument can be made in support of linking our policy on
moratorium and the CTBT with that of India's. If the threat from Delhi is
the centre of most of our defence thinking, then it is only logical that
our responses should be alive to Delhi's actions.

But the argument also has a hole in the middle, which many chose not to
see. Ending self-restraint, or moratorium, in reaction to Delhi's
resumption of nuclear tests sounds just right, but what it means in reality
has not been debated enough to be put forward as a workable policy option.
Would Pakistan match India test-for-test? Would it match India's quest for
a better, deadlier, thermo-nuclear bomb? Would it be willing to spend more
from its rather limited fissile material stocks on a futile display of
nuclear masochism? Would it be willing to bear another round of crippling
sanctions? Would its economy bear the impact of these sanctions? How would
the square peg of ending moratorium if India tests again fit into the
oft-repeated promise of not entering in an arms race with Delhi?

Similar unanswered questions hang over the CTBT policy, which has zig
zagged between so many different formulations that it is dizzying to look
at. Islamabad is still frozen between taking the leap of faith and stealing
the Treaty march on Delhi and waiting for India to set the pace of the
long-lingering decision to sign or not to sign. It is doubtless that the
policy course Pakistan has taken on these two important issues is secure
and cosy; it is easy to sell to domestic lobbies, to the extent these
matter to the final decision on anything. But just as true is the fact that
this policy course, and the range of options it offers, is held hostage by
India, which, funnily, can have the final say on what Pakistan can and
cannot do in the nuclear field.

_____

#2.

Asia Times
27 September 2000

Mori, Clinton's visits to Pakistan, India: Japan and US send wrong signals 

By Ralph A. Cossa

TOKYO: Like President Bill Clinton before him, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori
has just completed a trip to South Asia that has been high on hope and
symbolism but disappointingly low on results. Both leaders argued that it
was important to engage India and Pakistan to revive the momentum of global
nuclear nonproliferation.

But neither Mr Mori nor Mr Clinton achieved much progress in this direction
- despite the considerable leverage that both possess given India and
Pakistan's desperate need of economic assistance and investment, not to
mention renewed international respectability.

The best that could be extracted by the US and Japanese leaders were
pledges by India and Pakistan to refrain from new nuclear tests; something
both states had promised before. What was needed, at a minimum, was their
commitment to join the CTBT and their agreement not to deploy nuclear
weapons. Once such weapons are put in the field under local commanders, the
risk of inadvertent (or purposeful) use rises considerably.

It is too late to undo these visits. But the US and Japan must take note of
some of their consequences to prevent further damage being done. Shortly
after India's nuclear tests in May 1998, Indian officials predicted that
international protests would be short-lived and that the West would soon
come around to accepting India's de facto entry into the nuclear club. The
Mori and Clinton visits have proved them right.

This could send a dangerous signal to would-be nuclear powers that going
nuclear may be a low-cost method of gaining greater international
attention, if not respect.

The presence of Mr Mori and Mr Clinton in Pakistan also sent the message
that two of the world's most economically powerful democracies were willing
to turn a blind eye toward the use of military coups as a means of removing
inefficient or corrupt governments, even if those governments have been
democratically elected.

What kind of signal does that send to the armed forces in countries like
Indonesia and the Philippines, where democratically elected governments are
struggling? True, Mr Clinton was openly critical during his visits in March
of the coup that brought General Pervez Musharraf to power in Pakistan, and
of Indian and Pakistani nuclear aspirations. Mr Mori, for his part, linked
the resumption of Japanese aid to a continued freeze on nuclear testing.
But, the visits did not result in significant concessions on nuclear issues
or a firm date for resumption of civilian rule in Pakistan.

Mr Clinton's four-day visit to India (as opposed to his five-hour stopover
in Pakistan) was also heralded by many in New Delhi, and even some in
Washington, as the beginning of a strategic shift toward India and away
from America's long- standing ally Pakistan. Any shift in basic relations
is bound to make other, longtime allies nervous, especially if Washington
does not better define the nature of its South Asia ties.

Beijing clearly suspects that US overtures toward India are aimed at
further containing China. Mr Mori's visit reinforced this view among those
in China who see the US-Japan alliance in equally sinister terms.

None of this argues against the wisdom of better US or Japanese relations
with either India or Pakistan. But the possible downsides of these South
Asia initiatives need to be recognized, in order to prevent or limit
negative consequences elsewhere in the world.

Any new overtures from Washington or Tokyo should await unequivocal
statements of support from the leaders of India and Pakistan for the
nuclear test ban treaty and against the operational deployment of nuclear
weapons. Without such commitments, US and Japanese aid to both South Asian
states will send the wrong signals, not only to New Delhi and Islamabad but
worldwide. -

Dawn/International Herald Tribune News Service. 

-----

#3.

DAWN - the Internet Edition 
27 September 2000 Wednesday 

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission takes over Chashma nuclear power plant 

By Our Correspondent 

ISLAMABAD, Sept 26: The Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (CHASNUPP) crossed
another landmark when the plant was handed over to Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in a simple
ceremony held here on Monday. 

The agreement of provisional acceptance of the plant was signed by Mr Zhao
Hong, Senior Advisor, CNNC and Mr Parvez Butt, Member (Power) PAEC. 

Speaking on this occasion, Dr Ashfaq Ahmad, Chairman PAEC congratulated the
Chinese and the Pakistani engineers and appreciated their painstaking
efforts to make the project a success. 

Dr Ishfaq said CHASNUPP is a symbol of successful South-South cooperation
in high technology and another landmark of everlasting Pakistan-China
friendship. 

He hoped that in future Pakistan and China would have much greater
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Member (Power) also
praised the efforts of the Chinese and Pakistani engineers who made it
possible to complete the project. 

He further said that PAEC engineers have gained valuable expertise by
participating in various stages of plant construction and commissioning and
are ready to take the responsibility of operation and maintenance of the
plant. 

Earlier, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Board (PNRB) held a meeting to review
the Performance and Reliability Demonstration Tests (PRDT) of CHASNUPP.
After a detailed scrutiny of the performance of the plant, the Board
authorized CHASNUPP Project director to take over the plant from CNNC and
its subsidiary CZEC, and assume full operational responsibilities. 

CHASNUPP is Pakistan's second nuclear power plant, the first being KANUPP.
CHASNUPP has been built under a turn-key contract with China National
Nuclear Corporation signed on 31st December 1991. 

PAEC undertook a significant part of the construction work beside
manufacturing some mechanical equipment for the plant. A number of
Pakistani companies were also involved in this project. The construction of
the plant has significantly contributed towards improvement of
infrastructure in the area and acquiring of technical know-how by the
Pakistani engineers and technical staff. 

-------

#4.

THE HINDU 
September 12, 2000 

The Koodankulam jillypuff 

IT IS certainly interesting to read about the upbeat mood of Dr. R.
Chidambaram's personal view "that the apprehensions relating to the safety
of the nuclear power plants were on the wane, though not completely
disappeared and people had started realising the importance of the nuclear
power." It is as pleasurably relaxing to listen to him as munching some
tasty jillypuff. According to Dr. Chidambaram the cyber-sizzling Andhra
Pradesh and embattled West Bengal are asking for nuclear reactors. Apart
from the insinuation that if the Tamilians oppose the Koodankulam unit, the
merchandise will be shifted to these States, the statement also makes it
appear as if there has been a widespread public discourse and people have
waved the green signal for the nuclear reactors to be installed in the
Tirunelveli area.

In fact, there has been no public discourse on the subject. There may have
been a couple of seminars held in the air-conditioned comfort of high-tech
institutes. But the general public has not been educated in any significant
manner. As is the wont of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
while occupying the august chair, Dr. Chidambaram once again assured the
public on May 10 at Tuticorin that the nuclear installations in India are
working without mishaps. Good copy for the immediate audience but not for
the watchers of the nuclear sky in India.

Accident-free? How about the Narora fire? The Kalpakkam water leak? The
Kaiga collapse? The Kakrapar flooding? The actual list of revealed mishaps
is quite long. Because of the "secrecy" clause in the Atomic Energy Act of
1962, however, there could be an equally bizarre list of unrevealed mishaps
as well. Besides, waxing eloquent about environmental safety and orating
temptingly about raising the living standards of the locals is not enough.
Such speeches do not touch upon the core problem regarding nuclear power
plants: how is the nuclear waste to be disposed of? Safety of n-plants

The ongoing discourse on the safety of nuclear plants in the West has
seriously considered this problem and has found no solution yet. For
instance, Physics Today (May, 1997) has a report that should make us think
twice before we set up the Koodankulam plant. It appears that the Atomic
Energy Commission of the United States took over Camp Upton in rural Long
Island to build the Brookhaven National Laboratory. This was in 1947. The
people around complained against setting up the nuclear reactor but were
not heeded. After it was set up there were complaints of sickness. The
scientists laughed. (As the "in-people" laugh at the "out-people" who
complain about Koodankulam today.) Soon the laughter petered off and " the
Laboratory adopted the Department of Energy's stance of being above
compliance". twenty homes east and southeast of the lab showed traces of
tritium. Fishermen had begun reporting the death of fish in the coastal
waters due to radiation leak. Of course, the Director, Nicholas Samios,
promptly issued a denial. But a test by the National Research Council of
the National Academy of Sciences found a problem with the HFBR (High Flux
Beam Reactor), a small research reactor that was in operation since 1965.
It was proved that there had been leakage and so court cases took over. It
was in January 1996 that the county health department detected a 200- foot
wide tritium plume in the groundwater flowing toward the southern boundary
of the 5,300-acre labsite. The source of the tritium was the 260,000-litre
spent fuel pool beneath the HFBR. Even more damaging was the report that
the strontium from the tank had seeped into groundwater through concrete
walls.

An intractable problem

In the following month, Physics Today came out with a special issue on
radioactive waste and made it clear that disposal of hazardous nuclear
waste is still an intractable problem. Managing a nuclear waste storage
tank is not the same as putting old newspaper bundles away from sight into
a loft. Apart from so many short-term and long-term hazards for those who
handle it, one cannot overlook the possibilities of "a sudden, energetic
hydrogen gas combustion in a waste tank", say W.E. Kastenberg and Luca J.
Gratton.

In any case, one cannot feel self-complacent because India has had no
Chernobyls so far. As M. V. Ramana rightly says: "What starts as a 'minor'
accident could quickly spin out of control leading to a huge calamity. At
Chernobyl less than 90 seconds elapsed between a computer warning to shut
down the reactor and the total destruction of the reactor. Thus, each and
every accident, small or large, should be treated as a close encounter with
disaster."

Besides, in the name of appropriate technology and tight finance (since
Russia is in financial trouble), there could be a dangerous relaxation of
safety systems. This might lead to unforeseen effects. Recently we had the
Bharathpur ammunition inferno. It was a day's affair. Of course we lost
much and a few priceless lives also. But the destruction stopped there in
the moment of time as it was but conventional weaponry.

In the event of such unexpected accidents to the radioactive wastage tanks,
the destruction would not stop in that moment of time. It will go on and
on, gathering further destruction, asking for more victims down the
generations. In the United States the discourse on nuclear installations
has taken many forms including Fun Books, full of dark, educative laughter.
If there are problems in our site, can we just stand in the contaminated
area and clap hands, munch a macaroni special called Koodankulam jillypuff
and recite a nursery rhyme on how the crow snatched away the old woman's
ulundhu vadai?

The simple truth is that man is not capable of handling this power with
care and grace. And another installation, whether in Koodankulam or
Calcutta, is but further temptation of increasing the nuclear arsenal.
Certainly, India cannot afford the gamble. Let us forget it and turn to
more creative, useful, people- friendly ways of improving the life-style of
the people of Tirunelveli.

PREMA NANDAKUMAR 

----------------

#5.

THE HINDU 
August 29, 2000 

India: Kudankulam n-plant work to start in January 

NAGERCOIL, AUG. 28. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) has
drawn up Rs. 100 cr. estimates for establishing infrastructural facilities
at Kudankulam where the Department of Atomic Energy has proposed to
establish water cooled and water resistant (VVER) nuclear reactors with
Russian assistance.

Mr. V. K. Chaturvedi, chairman and managing director of NPCIL told
reporters at the site near here on Sunday that the estimates had been
submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission for approval and funds would be
released soon.Maintaining that funds could never be a constraint in
establishing the atomic power plant, the CMD said the construction work
would commence from January, 2001 following the receipt of the Detailed
Project Report (DPR) being prepared by the Russian agency, Atomen Ergo
Export (AEE), in December this year.

The DPR would be implemented after scrutiny by the Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board. The actual construction of the reactors would begin from 2002
onwards, he said, adding that the first reactor would be commissioned by
2007 and the second in 2008.

The Kudankulam project had been included in the Vision 2020 and it would
help in generating extra power. The site acquired by the Corporation was
sufficient for establishing six nuclear reactors and it had been planned to
set up four reactors of 1000 mw capacity each. The reactors would be
commissioned in a phased manner to ensure that the power generation
capacity doubled once in seven years. About 50 Russian scientists initially
and totally 700 in addition to 1,500 Indian scientists would be involved in
constructing the reactors.

Asked if a jetty would be constructed at Kudankulam for importing the
required material from Russia, Mr. Chaturvedi said the proposal had been
shelved and instead they were concentrating on developing the port at
Tuticorin. To another query on the dependence of potable water for cooling
the reactors, Mr. Chaturvedi said though about 3.5 cusecs of water was
likely to be drawn from the Pechiparai reservoir, the authorities would
make alternative arrangements such as sinking bore wells and installing
desalination plants.