[sacw] South Asia: Nuclear restraint & risk reduction

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Wed, 18 Oct 2000 23:36:09 +0200


FYI
Harsh Kapoor

--------------------------

The Hindu
19 October 2000
Op-Ed.

Nuclear restraint & risk reduction

By P. R. Chari

IF THE raising of decibels in the numerous seminars being held is any
indication, nuclear restraint and nuclear risk reduction are definitely
the flavour of
the emerging conference season. The United States has taken the lead to
highlight
the dangers of nuclear war in South Asia. These risks are believed to
arise from
the continuing proxy war in Kashmir which, in the absence of any dialogue
between India and Pakistan, could provide the flashpoint for a conflict with
nuclear dimensions. Hence the need for nuclear restraint and risk reduction.

Are such fears irrational? Do they reflect an ingrained cultural
prejudice? Does the
U.S. truly believe that brown men cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons? The
emotional counter-argument has been made in India that Stalin and Mao and
Nixon had their fingers on the nuclear trigger, and had acted
irrationally, even
abnormally, on many occasions; yet no one thought they would launch a nuclear
war in a whimsical fashion. Moreover, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were
involved in recurrent crises during the nuclear era - the most serious
being the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 that brought the world to the edge of a nuclear
precipice. Nuclear weapons have not been used after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It
could, therefore, be reasonably surmised that India and Pakistan would muddle
along despite periodic alarms.

The contrary argument is, however, possible that if no nuclear conflict
occurred
during the Cold War, it owed less to rationality and everything to plain good
luck, which may not be available in the current impasse between India and
Pakistan. More seriously, their capacity for muddling through is
questionable on
several counts. First, the Indo-Pakistan leadership seems unable to comprehend
that nuclear arms comprise an entirely new genre of weaponry in terms of
destructiveness and their long-term effects on biological life and the
environment.
Only such incomprehension could explain the frequency with which the two
countries are hurling nuclear threats at each other. Pakistan's Foreign
Secretary,
Mr. Shamshad Ahmed, warned India during the Kargil War that Islamabad could
use ``any weapon'' to defend the country's territorial integrity. And,
following
the Pokhran tests, the Union Home Minister, Mr. L. K. Advani, had cautioned
that ``this decisive step to become a nuclear weapon state has brought a
qualitatively new stage in Indo-Pakistan relations, particularly in
finding a lasting
solution to the Kashmir problem''. Both statements reveal a certain casualness
which is not exactly reassuring.

Second, the Kargil war proved an exception to many a priori dicta regarding
nuclear confrontations that have long been accepted by the international
community, viz. that democracies do not fight with each other. Pakistan was a
democracy when the Kargil war erupted; the military coup was a later
event. The
other dictum that nuclear weapon states do not conflict directly with each
other
was also disproved by Kargil. The only other example of a clash between
nuclear
states took place in 1969 along the Ussuri river between the Soviet Union and
China.

Third, India and Pakistan are not talking to each other, which raises the
bogey of
a conflict between them arising, not out of deliberate choice but due to
accident or
misperception or inadvertence. Several on- going and new track-II dialogues
between concerned persons in India and Pakistan have begun with the hope that
their conclusions would encourage moderation by the two decision-making
elites.
The Indian Government is interested in these track-II efforts; they could
throw up
innovative ideas, and mitigate international pressures on India to resume
negotiations with Pakistan.

The case for exhibiting nuclear restraint and establishing risk reduction
measures
between India and Pakistan is, therefore, unassailable. What are the measures
possible by India in the absence of bilateral dialogue? The most obvious is
continuance of its moratorium on nuclear testing and refraining from
testing its
Agni-II and longer-range missiles. One of the ``benchmarks'' laid down by the
U.S. specifically requires India and Pakistan to ``refrain from deploying
nuclear
weapons or missile systems''. India would need to accept, however, that,
whilst
it might be possessing a deterrent against Pakistan, further missile and
nuclear
testing would be essential to deploy a deterrent against China; this is
unavoidable
for deploying the triad of nuclear forces envisaged in the draft nuclear
doctrine,
and especially to acquire thermonuclear capabilities that are of the
essence here.
Nuclear restraint, premised on a no-test regime, would also question the
logic of
the Pokhran tests.

In brief, a difficult judgment has now to be made by India whether to proceed
with the logic of the nuclear tests to weaponise and deploy its nuclear
capabilities
or exhibit nuclear restraint and adopt risk reduction measures. Not
weaponising
and deploying its nuclear capabilities would be the most credible means to
achieve these ends that could be taken unilaterally. Should a political
decision be
taken, nevertheless, to weaponise and deploy, a margin of restraint and risk
reduction would remain if the warheads are not mated with their delivery
systems
but verifiably kept apart in different locations.

What about Pakistan? It would be relieved of the pressure to respond. It
is well
aware of the political and economic costs involved in weaponising and
deploying
its nuclear capabilities, and entering a debilitating nuclear arms race
with India;
this will not relieve it of upgrading and modernising its conventional forces.
What about China? It is more sensitive now to the consequences of its
no-longer-surreptitious transfers of nuclear and missile technology to
Pakistan.
This has spurred India's nuclear and missile programmes which could affect
China's national security adversely; so it would be in China's own national
interests to broaden its rapprochement with India.

There are several nuclear risk reduction measures worth simultaneous
pursuit by
India and Pakistan at this stage itself when their nuclear capabilities
have not yet
been deployed. Some are included in the Memorandum of Understanding that
accompanied the Lahore Declaration. It contained several confidence-building
provisions.These suggestions could be negotiated into agreements.

Most significantly, the MoU envisaged that the two countries would consult
each
other on ``security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing
measures for confidence- building in the nuclear and conventional fields,
aimed at
avoidance of conflict'', which requires immediate attention. A very first
item on
the agenda for these consultations could be the need for deploying
tactical nuclear
weapons which are really meant for battlefield use; do India and Pakistan need
them to acquire war-fighting capabilities? The need for a common language to
understand each other's signals, such as the states of alert sounded in a
crisis, is
of supreme importance to defuse future crises and avoid conflict.

More visible measures could also be pursued such as establishing risk
reduction
centres manned by mixed groups of officials from both sides to defuse crises
before they erupt; according greater transparency to command and control
arrangements established, exchanging information on national steps taken to
ensure safety and security of nuclear stockpiles, establishment of hotlines
between the two Air Forces and the two nuclear establishments, and so on.
In the
absence of dialogue; however, it is not possible to proceed with these
salubrious
suggestions, this emphasises the imperative need for re-establishing the Indo-
Pakistan dialogue to grapple with the nuclear issues that have emerged
after the
Pokhran-Chagai tests. The absence of dialogue between the two self-styled
putative nuclear weapon powers causes major concern to the international
community.

(The writer is Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi).