[sacw] SACW Dispatch | 21 Aug. 00

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch
21 August 2000
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

#1. Pakistan: A lesson from History [...publication of Hamood. report]
#2. India: Too many people have died in Kashmir
#3. Nation State, Education and Textbooks (comment by Mubarak Ali)
#4. Express Solidarity with Sugar Mills Workers in Sind, Pakistan

#5. Bangladesh: Anatomy of a Coup: A Journey of a Quarter Century

_____________________

#1.

DAWN
20 August 2000
Op-Ed.

A LESSON FROM HISTORY

By Mohammad Waseem

THE supplement to the main report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission is
an important source of information about the peculiar circumstances
which led the armed forces of Pakistan to defeat at the hands of India
in 1971. It provides not only a comprehensive analysis of the
politico-military situation obtaining in East Pakistan at that time but
also a crucial lesson for our state managers both present and future.
During the week after publication of this report, no allegations of
distortion or malrepresentation of facts and views were made by either
the government or the persons mentioned in the report. For one, Rao
Farman Ali has testified to authenticity of the part of the report
concerning his role in East Pakistan. Those who are accused of various
acts of omission and commission are understandably less than forthcoming
about the correctness of events recorded in this report. However, by and
large this document enjoys credibility among the people at home and
abroad inasmuch as no serious and forceful denial of its authenticity
has appeared in the media.

The nation deserved to know about, and learn from, the tragic events and
policy decisions which led to the break-up of Pakistan. However,
successive governments kept a tight lid over the Hamoodur Rehman
Commission Report. Most ironically, ex-COAS General Aslam Beg has
confessed that even he did not read the report. It is unimaginable that
the chief of the army never studied a report which sought to analyze the
causes of surrender of the armed forces in East Pakistan, the
imprisonment of 93,000 troops and civilian personnel and the killing of
a million-odd Bengalis and non-Bengalis during the crisis. This is
certainly no compliment to the professional competence of the army
leadership.

The report covers, among other things, a wide spectrum of issues
relating to the constitution, political parties, military strategy,
foreign policy as well as personal behaviour of certain military
officers. The following paragraphs seek to outline the pattern of
leadership behaviour in a crisis situation. It is pertinent to note that
the report drew extensively on the interviews of many military officers
after their release and repatriation to Pakistan from India in 1974, in
addition to talking to civil and military personnel in both wings of the
country after the cessation of hostilities. We can dwell on ten major
points for discussion in our analysis of the report.

1. Military in politics: The report claims that prolonged involvement of
the Pakistan army in "civil administration had a disastrous effect on
its professional and moral standards". It quotes Admiral Sharif as
saying that "the foundation of this defeat was laid back in 1958". He
chided the armed forces for abandoning "the art of soldiering" and
"amassing wealth and usurping status for themselves". Similarly, the
report decided that General Yahya "did not take over the country in
order merely to ... re-introduce the democratic process. He did so with
a view to obtaining personal power". The Commission recommended that
Generals Yahya, Hamid, Pirzada, Umar and Mitha should be "publicly tried
for being a party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power".

2. Political manoeuvring: The report claims that these officers indulged
in petty politics and tried "to influence political parties by threats,
inducements and even bribes ... for bringing about a particular kind of
result during the elections of 1970". In other words, these elections
were relatively fair and free despite the military junta and not because
of it.

3. Need for a political solution: The report reminds us that a conflict
which has political causes "must end with a political solution". In
1971, the "military action could not have been a substitute for a
political settlement". Thus, the report doubts the seriousness of the
"negotiations which General Yahya Khan was pretending to hold". A
military perspective on a political crisis is least suitable for a
country facing a similar situation.

4. Insularity of vision: The Hamoodur Rehman Commission warns against
"international isolation" which can have "fatal consequences". It noted
that friendly countries advised Yahya to go for a political settlement
but he did not listen. Iran, China, the US and other friends made their
inability to help Pakistan in an armed conflict with India known in very
clear terms. Still, the Yahya government continued to assure the Eastern
Command that China had reactivated the NEFA front against India and that
the US Seventh Fleet was bringing succour. The report notes that "the
GHQ held out vague or even fraudulent promises of foreign help". The
world view of the military establishment was characterized by a simple
dichotomy between friends and foes.

5. Corruption: The Commission has catalogued many examples of corruption
of General Niazi and his colleagues. General Niazi had made money when
handling martial law cases in Sialkot and Lahore. He was involved in
smuggling of betel leaf from East Pakistan. General Jehanzeb had tried
to extract a bribe worth Rs.100,000 from a PCS officer in Multan. Other
martial law officers abused power to get land, house-building loans on
generous terms and other financial benefits. The report noted several
cases of "large-scale looting, including the theft of Rs. 1,35,00,000
from the National Bank" in East Pakistan during the army action. Many
officers looted television sets, refrigerators, airconditioners, cars
and other items, and even managed to send them to West Pakistan.

6. Moral lapses: Military officers in East Pakistan, from General Niazi
downwards, indulged in wine, women and violence during the nine-month
crisis. The report spoke of cases of rape, heavy drinking and
woman-in-bunker. Also, it noted that officers committed excessive
violence against Bengalis. They blasted residential student halls in
revenge and inflicted "death without trial, without detailed
investigation and without any written order by any authorized
authority". It was observed that the discipline of the Pakistan army had
broken down under these circumstances.

7. Hate crimes. The report noted that army officers displayed hatred
against Bengalis in general and Hindus among them in particular. Both
oral and written orders were given to kill Hindus.

8. Strategic lapses: The Commission report has brought out serious
weaknesses in military planning and professional competence of officers.
Several well-defended fortresses were surrendered without a fight,
brigades and battalions disintegrated in the face of the all-out Indian
offensive and the wounded were abandoned. General Niazi was accused of
culpable negligence in various aspects of his strategy relating to the
defence of Dhaka, spreading alarm and, once he landed back in (W)
Pakistan after release from Indian prisons, he tried to influence his
colleagues to give a certain version of what had happened during the
war. Many others shared the blame for these lapses, including those
concerning arbitrarily distributing the government money, "shameful
cowardice", "abrupt changes in command" and "abandoning valuable signal
equipment".

General M. Rahim Khan has been especially accused of abandoning his
division leading to its disintegration, "dereliction of duty", spreading
despondency and concealing the facts after being evacuated to (W)
Pakistan on December 16, 1971. The Commission reported that GHQ failed
"to guide, direct and influence the conduct of war". It blamed the "long
and inherited tradition of unquestioned obedience" for keeping officers
from challenging "the soundness of critical decisions".

9. The Commission called for deterrent action by conducting court
martial of senior army commanders for bringing disgrace to Pakistan, for
"subversion of the Constitution", for professional incompetence and for
"moral cowardice". Sadly, no such trials were conducted during the last
three decades. Similarly, the recommendation for instituting a
high-powered Commission of Inquiry "to investigate into persistent
allegations of atrocities" was ignored. Successive governments adopted a
policy of non-accountability of senior army leaders.

10. The report recommended that the National Security Council should be
eliminated. Obviously, the military leadership never accepted the idea
wholeheartedly. Under the present government, this council has been
revived, ostensibly to provide for representation of armed forces in the
decision-making process at the top level.

The Hamoodur Rehman Commission report should have been available to the
top echelons of the government as well as the army set-up during the
last quarter of a century in order to help them set their priorities
right, broaden their world view and eliminate the lapses in strategic
planning in the light of the 1971 political and military debacle in East
Pakistan. The question is why no accountability process was started when
serious charges of corruption, moral bankruptcy and lack of professional
competence were made against certain leading figures of the Eastern
Command. Finally, there is a dire need for examining as to how the
Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report can help bring about changes in the
structural and operational aspects of the national defence system in
Pakistan.

______

#2.

Rediff on the Net
16 August 2000
Dilip D'Souza Column

TOO MANY PEOPLE HAVE DIED

[by Dilip D'Souza]

The way I see the mess in Kashmir, there are various interested parties.
Each comes with its particular motivations. As an Indian who wants to
understand what's going on in that state, I cannot avoid trying to
understand these parties, these motivations. So for a 53rd birthday,
here's an attempt to explain how that goes.

First, there's the ruling establishment in Pakistan, a clique that seems
to exist and prosper regardless of who is actually in office in that
country. For decades now, this ruling establishment has made out that
Kashmir is the centrepiece of Pakistan's very existence, that that
country's soul and identity is inextricably linked to Kashmir. A mere
dilution of that concept, let alone a solution to the tragedy of
Kashmir, spells catastrophe to this establishment. For such dilution
will also expose the shameful way it has betrayed Pakistan and kept it a
poor, struggling country.

Second, there's the Indian state. Regardless of who is actually in
office, two things never change: a consensus about Kashmir and the
steady effort to persuade the rest of the country of its truth. These
are the elements in this consensus: that Kashmir is irreversibly,
undeniably, forever, and by the way also legally, Indian. That even so,
we must keep hundreds of thousands of our best soldiers and policemen
stationed there at an enormous cost in money, material and lives. That
Indian nationhood is so fragile that a mere dilution of this view of
Kashmir will dismember India.

Third, there are the assorted terrorists or militants or freedom
fighters, depending on who's referring to them. I'm aware that they form
a whole spectrum of loyalty and opinion, besides quarreling frequently
and viciously with each other. I'm also aware that for those reasons,
they probably cannot be lumped together. But in at least one thing they
seem to agree, and that is their basic motivation: a general
disaffection with India.

Fourth, there are the Kashmiri Pandits, driven cruelly from their homes.
As a broad and general aim, they would like to return to a homeland of
their own in Kashmir. But while they understandably find Pakistan
distasteful, they are increasingly disillusioned with an India that
seems indifferent to their situation. They are coming to understand a
sad reality: whichever the political party, it sees the Pandits only as
a pawn in its own wriggles towards capturing power. As a cause to score
points with, not people to care about.

Fifth, there are the Kashmiris in the Valley. As far as I can tell, they
are largely sick of three things: one, the endless years of conflict,
two, India and three, Pakistan. The years have told them very clearly
that neither country will actually let them decide freely what their
future will be; that the land they live on, rather than the people they
are, is the bone that India and Pakistan wrestle over. And today, the
stakes are grown too high for either country to let go. They have
understood as well that the militants are largely mercenaries and thugs;
hopes of an end to the suffering certainly do not lie in that direction,
if ever they did. They would like just to be left alone, but that seems
less likely every day.

Sixth, there are those in India who believe the only solution in Kashmir
is to -- and I quote from one such who once wrote to me -- "wipe
Pakistan off the face of the earth!" These are also the people who say
-- and I quote from another such who once screamed at me -- "Kashmir
will remain part of India regardless of what the Kashmiris want!" To me,
these guys seem wrapped in a consuming hatred of Pakistan. Hatred
produces obduracy, and I cannot see that that is a viable basis for
solutions. I know these Indians have their mirror-images across the
border. I am confident that acting in concert and unchecked, they will
ensure we all end up as nuclear French fries.

Finally, there are some others in India: those who are appalled by the
escalating carnage in Kashmir, the frustrations and hatreds it has
spurred in the rest of the country, the horrifying prospect of war. They
keep urging the need for radical new thinking for the tangle in Kashmir,
some major departure from the path we have followed there for half a
century. They also urge that Kashmiris -- Pandits too -- have the chance
to speak for themselves, and that it is time the rest of us listened.
Again, I am confident these Indians have their counterparts across the
border.

The indifferent and ignorant apart, I think everyone who is interested
in Kashmir falls in one or another of the seven categories above. Send
me a note if you're an eighth or ninth or tenth.

When I read about outrages in Kashmir such as the recent massacre of
Amarnath pilgrims, or murderous bomb blasts in Srinagar, I despair that
there ever will be an end to it all. Opinions on every side are so
deeply entrenched, everyone is so convinced of the God-given truth of
his own take on the situation -- as am I, too -- that there is no longer
any dialogue. No exchange. No hope for peace. Sometimes I think even the
desire for peace is ebbing fast. And that, as I sit here in Bombay, is a
frightening thought indeed.

Still, you have to hold on to some optimism and hope. So for this 53rd
Independence Day, I'd like to suggest a few thoughts.

1. Enough blood shed in Kashmir. Just enough.

2. Entrenched opinions have never got us anywhere. So let's begin by
examining our own. To me, that means I must understand that if I think
my views are reasonable, that lady out there has her own views and they
sound reasonable to her. But since neither she nor I are about to
vanish, we have to find a way to exchange our views, find common ground.

3. Pakistan's leaders often say something like this: "There can be no
bettering of ties until India recognises that the core issue is
Kashmir." India replies: "Kashmir is not the core issue." India's
leaders often say something like this: "There can be no dialogue until
Pakistan stops sponsoring cross-border terrorism." Pakistan replies: "We
don't sponsor terrorism, we support freedom-fighters."

That is, each side has found itself a perfectly good reason to evade
dialogue, and yet blame the other for that evasion. I'm not talking here
about right and wrong on somebody's barometer. I'm talking about
stubborn evasion.

You will find similar intransigence across other fences between those
seven categories I listed above. Thus blame is everywhere, while
introspection is not to be found. And any common ground is a very long
trek away.

As long as we don't find common ground, the blood will flow. That takes
us back to #1. And as we trudge back there, as we lose pilgrims and
photographers and soldiers and policemen and just ordinary men and women
and children every day, I wonder with Bob Dylan:

How many deaths will it take till we know,
That too many people have died?

______

#3.

[20 August 2000]

NATION STATE, EDUCATION AND TEXTBOOKS

by Mubarak Ali

During the medieval period in the West as well as in the East education was
controlled and monopolised either by the religious institutions or
individuals. State played no role in its promotion . Both in the Christian
and Muslim societies, education was motivated to preach, defend and
strengthen faith. When Luther challenged the authority of the Catholic
Church, the church,in order to defend itself, heavily relied on systematic
programme of education to refute the charges of Protestant movement and to
inculcate the true spirit of their version of religion. The Society of
Jesuits, established in 1540, launched a very elaborate programme of
education and defended Catholicism by supplying learned preachers and
scholars. The monopoly of church on education was first challenged by the
French Revolution (1789) as a result of establishing a nation state in
France which deprived the church from its hold on education. The National
Convention (1792-95) set up educational institutions for promotion of
secular learning which was the need of the state such as engineering,
industry and art. The word 'national' was now attached to such
institutions indicating state control and support such as 'National
Conservatory of Arts and Industries' National Institute' or 'National
university' etc.

Realizing the importance of education, Napoleon, after coming into power in
1799, fully used state power to promote his own image and existing values
of the French society. All educational institutions, higher or lower, were
put under the control of central government. No one was allowed to open a
school or teach in public unless the university licensed him. The
University of France was given authority to maintain uniformity of
educational system. All the schools were required to take as the basis of
their teaching the ethical principles of Christianity and loyalty to the
head of the state. For example, when asked what were the duties of the
Christians to their rulers? The pupils were told to tell that as Christians
they owed to the princes who governed them love, respect, obedience,
fidelity, military service, and taxes levied for the preservation and
defence of the Empire and of the throne.

The example of France was followed by other European states. Under the
pressure of political, military and industrial competition they turned
their attention towards mass education in order to use human resources for
development of their countries. For example, in 19th century Britain was
apprehensive of Prussia and North America for their industrial development.
Fearing of any future challenge, she undertook education under her control
and established schools throughout the country for mass education.

Once education came under the control of state, it was used to promote its
interests. Nationalism, patriotism, images of heroes, and spirit of
sacrifice for nation were some elements which were inculcated in the mind
of pupil with the help of textbooks. The state prepared its own curriculum
and prescribed its textbooks. The victim of state textbook was specially
the subject of history which was blatantly used to create false pride by
distorting facts and manipulating historical narratives. David Lowenthal
correctly writes in The Past is Foreign Country: 'The virtue of bygone
heroes are likewise inflated. Admired forebears acquire qualities esteemed
today, however anachronistic, and there faults are concealed or palliated.
Popular modern depictions of Washington and Jefferson, for example, are
utterly at variance with their lives as eighteen-century slave-holding
planters=D6'

Though radical historians raised their voices again and again against the
state manipulated curriculum, but it was of no avail as the state had
proved to be more powerful than a bunch of scholars. In 1990s the History
Workshop Group in Britain remarked on the content of the British national
curriculum as "triumphalist, Whiggish, document-driven and a parochial
syllabus of British political and constitutional history, with an emphasis
on rote learning of dates and 'facts' and an aversion to the historical
imagination."

After decolonisation, the newly independent nation states of Asia and
Africa, following the model of European nation states, controlled
educational system and used it for their interest to promote the concept of
one nation, one language, and in some cases of one religion. Patriotism to
the country and loyalty to the "Founding Fathers" was the central theme of
the history textbooks. All emphasis was on glorifying national struggle,
sacrifices of freedom fighters, and their ultimate victory over colonial
powers. On the basis of this version of history, a particular class of
politicians made an attempt to perpetuate the rule of their 'families'.
History textbooks also used to create hostility against the neighbours to
keep the country in permanent sense of insecurity in order to relay on
defence forces to protect them. On this misuse of history, a historian
writes: 'It fills people with false memories, exaggerates their reactions,
exacerbates old grievances, and encourages either a delirium of grandeur or
delusion of persecution. It makes whole nation bitter, arrogant,
insufferable, and vainglorious.'

Patriotic and nationalistic version of history played crucial role in most
of the wars among the European and Asian countries. The monuments and sites
that were built in memory permanently remind of destruction and holocaust
of wars. But even developed countries do not like to abandon memorials of
their victories. Recently when the European Parliament asked the British
government to change the name of Waterloo station because it reminds the
Napoleanic wars, the British government refused saying it was "salutary for
the French to be constantly reminded of Wellington's great victory'. The
British nation is not ready to loose Nelson's Column, Trafalgar Square, and
Blenheim palace.

However, realizing the danger of nationalistic and chauvinistic history
textbooks, an attempt was made between the historians of Germany and Poland
to write joint history for school children. The project was successful
because both governments were interested in it. Whereby, there is no hope
to make such experiment in case of those countries who are at dagger drawn
against each other and regard their nationalist version of history raison
de `etre for their existence.

Keeping in view history textbooks of India and Pakistan which are poisoning
the mind of young generation, the question is raised many time to write
joint history textbooks as an alternative of official one. To accomplish
this project, there is need to bring together like-minded historians of
both countries and discuss the parameter of how to write and how to
interpret the past. No doubt, there is a deep desire in the enlightened
circles of both the countries that such history should be written because
it would help people of India and Pakistan to understand the political
complexities of the recent past and realize the ulterior motives of the
politicians and political parties and the ruling classes. This historical
consciousness would certainly bring people together.
If any such attempt is made, it will certainly be a thrilling experience
for both sides historian. Such a venture will remove the deep rooted
prejudices, cut down great heroes to their size, and bring to light shaded
facts to their true colour.

______

#4.

[20 August 2000]

700 SUGAR MILLS WORKERS LAID OFF IN SIND

Over 700 workers of the sugar mill factories in Sind province have been mad=
e
redundant during the July and August 2000. One glaring example is the Alnoo=
r
Sugar Mills and Shah Murad Sugar Mill. Mr. J Ismail owns both factories. 24=
0
workers have been kicked out from these two factories in the end of July. T=
he
reason given by the bosses is that the mills are running in losses. So they
have to lay off the workers. The Alnoor Sugar Mills Workers Union has
challenged this notion and has given figures that show that the factories a=
re
running in profits. The union refused to cooperate with the bosses in the p=
lan
to lay off the workers and has started an agitation against the decision to
kick out the workers.

There are 30 sugar mills in Sind province employing over 28000 workers. But
several has been closed by the bosses during the last one year including
Larkana Sugar Mills, Dadu Sugar Mills, Thatha Sugar Mills, Bawani Sugar Mil=
ls
and Al-Asif Sugar Mills without paying the dues to the workers. Many worke=
rs
have been on hunger strikes for weeks to demand without much success.

On 20th July 2000, from Shah Murad Sugar Mill, 171 permanent workers have b=
een
laid off. From Alnoor Sugar Mills, 70 permanent workers have lost jobs. At
present, there are 986 workers are employed by Alnoor Sugar Mills. Five yea=
rs
before, there were 1600. But these 986 workers are making more money than t=
he
1600. The balance sheet of the factory this year also shows a big profit. B=
ut
with ever lasting greed of more profits, the bosses have laid off 71 perman=
ent
workers. Most of these workers have worked over 25 years in these factories=
.

Union Response

The Alnoor Sugar Mills workers union has launched a protest campaign to dem=
and
for the reinstatement of the workers. In favor of the workers, The Save Cit=
y
Action Committee, an organization of the citizens of Moro and Shah Pur
Jehania, the two small cities around the factory brought out a rally in fav=
or
of the workers demand and blocked the national high way for over an hour. T=
he
workers have set up a permanent camp outside the factory and have sit down =
on
hunger strike. The Sind Sugar Mills Workers Federation has taken a serious
note of the situation. On 20 August, over a 1000 workers protested at
Hyderabad against the laying of the sugar mills workers. Makhdoom Rashid Ah=
med
and his union colleagues lead the campaign. Makhdoom Rashid is general
secretary of Alnoor Sugar Mills workers union and national senior vice
chairman of Labour Party Pakistan.

Labour Party Pakistan has taken a decision to have a protest Dharna (sit in=
)
in front of Alnoor Sugar Mills on 3rd of September. The decision was taken =
by
the national executive committee of LPP in its meeting on 19th August held =
in
Lahore.

The cement workers of Dada Bhai factory have also joined the protest of the
sugar mills workers. More and more unions and political parties are taking =
up
the issue.

The sugar mills workers needs the international solidarity. Please send you=
r
protest letters to the following Email number of the mill owner.

Mr. Z Ismail
za@c...

Please send the copies to

Chief Executive
General Pervaiz Musharaf
Email: ce@p...

Federal Minister of Labour
Umer Asghar Khan
Fax: 92 51 9224890

Mr. Zia Mahmood Mirza
Chairman National Industrial Relation Commission
Fax: 92 51 9205920

Copies to Labour Party Pakistan
Labour.Pakistan@u...

In Solidarity,

Farooq Tariq
General Secretary
Labour Party Pakistan

______

#5.

The Daily Star
20 August 2000

ANATOMY OF A COUP: A JOURNEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY

By Lawrence Lifschultz

Indeed, this source claims, killings were planned for August 15th. At
least four Awami League leaders were to be removed from their residences
and taken to a designated location where they would be executed. This
plan included the killing of Sheikh Mujib. However, this source claims
there was no premeditated plan among the officers organizing the coup to
fire weapons on the families. As in all such situations, the
unpredictable ruled and brutality took command.

Continued from yesterday

ACCORDING to my unusual source, the Majors hoped right up until the end
that Zia would take the lead in the coup. Their view was that the best
option would be not to bring in Mustaque with whom they were in
constant, yet discreet, contact. The best option from the Majors
perspective was to establish a Military Council as the commanding
authority after the coup. In fact, it was largely Rashid who was in
charge of defining the options for his group. It was their hope that Zia
would lead such a council. While the junior officers might have
preferred a senior officers' coup with Zia at the head, they secured the
next best option. With General Zia's neutrality or even tacit support
assured, the junior officers could move ahead without fear that Zia
would throw his forces against them at the crucial moment.

My unusual source made a rather interesting comment when he noted that
he had been present during two different meetings- one with Zia and a
separate one on a different day with Mustaque-in which Major Rashid
independently raised a question concerning what the attitude of the
United States would be to the planned coup. "Both Zia and Mustaque
independently told us that they had checked with the Americans," said
this military officer. "Their answers were the Americans. I then
realized that Zia and Mustaque had their separate channels to the
Americans. After that the subject didn't come up again."

The Majors hoped until the last that Zia would take command of a new
military Council that would be set-up in the immediate aftermath of the
coup. Even on August 15th they believed this was still a possibility.
But, according to this source3, Zia stepped back into the shadows once
it emerged that a massacre had occurred at Mujib's house and the houses
of other relatives in which women and children were mercilessly killed
alongside their menfolk.

According to this source, Rashid himself was shocked at the killings and
believed in the years that followed that there had been a "hidden plan"
submerged within the coup that he neither knew about nor controlled.
Nevertheless, neither Rashid nor Farooq, the two military principals of
August 15th, did not publicly disown the killing of the families.
Walking on thin ice they were not about to disown the action of the
small contingent of soldiers which were solidly behind them and now
deeply implicated in an action that Rashid and Farooq had led them into.

Indeed, this source claims, killings were planned for August 15th. At
least four Awami League leaders were to be removed from their residences
and taken to a designated location where they would be executed. This
plan included the killing of Sheikh Mujib. However, this source claims
there was no premeditated plan among the officers organizing the coup to
fire weapons on the families. As in all such situations, the
unpredictable ruled and brutality took command.

After the coup there was very little analysis of the contradictory
phenomena which existed. Ignored was the stark juxtaposition that, in
the two years prior to the coup, it was the country's organized left
wing parties such as the JSD, the National Awami Party Bhashani), and
the underground organizations like the Sharbohara Party, which had
developed and mobilized public sentiment against Mujib's regime; yet,
when the critical moment of collapse came for Mujib, it was not from a
leftist mass uprising-"The Revolution"- as had been feared, but from a
narrowly-based conspiracy of the right.

The challenge being developed and prepared by radical nationalist forces
was preempted by the August events. The coup itself was an inside job by
right wing elements within Mujib's own party, his own cabinet, his own
secretariat, and his own national intelligence service, who viewed
Mujib's leadership as no longer capable of holding out against a left
wing challenge to their interests.

Whether or not the United States had prior knowledge of these
plans-given the assertions of State Department sources and the counter
assertions of CIA officials-could never be conclusively settled without
the power of Congressional subpoena. (See accompanying article: "The
Solarz Correspondence: A Congressional Investigation Deliberately
Derailed?" But, one thing is clear beyond a doubt that the United States
had important prior relationships with the political and intelligence
leadership of the coup.

In my interview with Phil Cherry, the CIA Station Chief, he insisted
throughout that he had been completely under the supervision of the US
Ambassador. "We knew that Mujib was in trouble. We also knew that no
matter what happened there, no matter who overthew Mujib, or what
overthrew Mujib, we also knew we would be blamed for it.... So we were
extra extra careful to be super clean. To make sure all of us were
directed by Ambassador Boster. To cut any contact which would possibly
give credence to the theory we knew was going to come about. We indeed
followed Ambassador Boster's instructions."

The difficulty with Cherry's statement is that in 1980 the State
Department admitted to US Congressman Stephen Solarz that meeting had
taken place in the period between November 1974 and January 1975,
precisely as our key Embassy source had reported to US. The State
Department's admission to Solarz flatly contradicted Cherry's statement
that "we had no Bangladeshi come into the office and tell us anything
about any plans for coups or anything like that."

The writer is presently working as a Research Associate at the Yale
Centre for International and Area Studies, Yale University. He was
recently named a Fulbright Scholar for South Asia. The sixth and the
last instalment appears tomorrow.

______________________________
South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch (SACW) is an
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Opinions carried in the dispatches are not representative
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