[sacw] saanp (19 April 00)

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Wed, 19 Apr 2000 16:06:26 +0200


South Asians Against Nukes Post
19 April 2000
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#1.

The Hindu
Sunday, April 02, 2000
Features

THERE WILL BE NO SECOND TIME

Being nuclear capable does not end with sabre rattling. It also means
being able to understand the perils of command and the control of atomic
weapons. But if the track record of the leading nations is anything to go
by, the capacity for human and mechanical failure is limitless. It reveals
that the world is always on the brink of disaster. There is much the newest
nuclear powers - India and Pakistan - have to learn, says ZIA MIAN.

SOUTH ASIA'S nuclear hawks have a pretty dismal record. First, they
claimed that simply having a "nuclear option" would be a convincing
deterrent. This belief, that being able to build the bomb would be enough and
there would never be any need to actually test it, was exploded in May 1998.
Having tested their bombs, they claimed that there would be peace between
India and Pakistan - cold, bitter and squalid, but still recognisably peace.
Kargil put paid to that. Now the same set of do-it yourself nuclear
strategists
are thinking out loud about how to manage and to use these weapons. Failure
here will make their past mistakes seem small.

To understand the perils of command and control of nuclear weapons, there
are few better people to ask than General Lee Butler, who, until 1994, was the
Commander in Chief of United States Strategic Command and had daily
charge of thousands of nuclear weapons. In January this year, he wrote about
what he had seen in a lifetime of dealing with nuclear weapons; "The capacity
for human and mechanical failure, and for human misunderstandings, was
limitless. I have seen bombers crash during exercises designed to replicate,
but which were inevitably far less stressful than, the actual conditions of
nuclear war. I have seen human error lead to missiles exploding in their
silos.
I have read the circumstances of submarines going to the bottom of the sea
laden with nuclear missiles and warheads because of mechanical flaws and
human errors".

If they deploy nuclear weapons, Pakistan and India will risk accidents caused
by "human and mechanical failure" and "human misunderstandings". There
are instances enough in both countries, of accidents involving the very
institutions that may have responsibility for these weapons. One need look no
further than the accident record of the Indian and Pakistani air force,
which as
the most hi-tech of the armed services, are the most familiar with having to
handle complex systems. Moreover, given how few tests there have been of
ballistic missiles by both countries, planes are still the most likely way
they
would try to use their nuclear weapons.

The record is fateful. India's Defence Minister George Fernandes informed
Parliament in December 1998 that 79 fighter planes had been lost in accidents
since April 1994. And in December 1999 Mr. Fernandes informed Parliament
that from 1997-98 to early December 1999, 46 fighter aircraft had been lost
and 16 pilots were killed. Most of these were because of technical defects or
human error. About Pakistan, Air Marshal (retired) Ayaz Ahmad Khan writing
in the Defence Journal in August 1998, describes in stark terms that "in spite
of the best efforts of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) technicians and engineers,
fighter aircraft have started falling out of the sky". The cause of his
concern
were the 11 major PAF accidents between January 1997 and August 1998.
The latest data from the Pakistan Institute for Air Defense says that 11 PAF
aircraft were lost due to accidents in 1998 and in 1999 (upto October) 10 such
accidents took place.

There are no reports (yet) of accidents involving ballistic missiles in South
Asia. The missile builders would try to keep them secret anyway. But
experience elsewhere suggests accidents are certainly possible. For instance,
in 1960, the U.S. BOMARC missile was in "ready storage condition", which
meant it was able to be launched at short notice. There was an explosion and a
fire involving the missle's fuel tanks. The nuclear warhead was destroyed in
the fire, but fortunately did not explode. The safety devices built into the
nuclear warhead worked. This was not an untested missile. It had received
eight years of development and testing before it was deployed. The accident
happened in the first year of deployment. The missile was liquid fuelled, like
Pakistan's Ghauri and India's Prithvi.

This was by no means the only accident involving missiles. The U.S. Air
Force has revealed that in a period of four years, between 1975 and 1979,
there were 125 accidents at its missiles sites. There were a further 10 from
March 1979 to September 1980. There were other accidents. There always
are.

The writer is with the Centre for Environmental Engineering, Princeton
University, U.S..
____________

#2.

The Hindu
Sunday, April 02, 2000
Features

SOME ACCIDENTS

HERE are a few of the many serious accidents involving United States,
Soviet and now Russian nuclear weapons or nuclear-armed ships and
submarines between 1950 and 1993.

All told as a result of all the known accidents, some 51 nuclear warheads
were lost into sea (44 Soviet and seven U.S.. However, at least one Soviet
warhead was recovered). Also, seven nuclear reactors (five Soviet and two
U.S.) from three Soviet and two U.S. nuclear-powered submarines have been
lost at sea due to accidents. Another 19 nuclear reactors from
nuclear-powered vessels have been deliberately dumped at sea (18 Soviet and
one U.S.).

The experience of the U.S. and the Soviet Union suggests that not only are
nuclear arsenals extraordinarily expensive but they also come with serious
safety, health, and environmental costs.

March 10, 1956: A U.S. Air-Force B-47, bomber carrying two capsules of
nuclear materials for nuclear bombs, en route from MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida, to Europe, failed to meet its aerial refuelling plane over the
Mediterranean Sea. An extensive search failed to locate any traces of the
missing aircraft or crew.

December 5, 1965: While the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga
(CVA-14) steamed en route from bombing operations off Vietnam to the U.S.
Navy base at Yokosuka, Japan, an A-4E attack yet loaded with B-43
thermonuclear bomb rolled off the Number 2 elevator, and sank in 16,000 feet
of water. The aircraft carrier was positioned about 70 miles from the Ryuku
Islands and about 200 miles east of Okinawa. The bomb, aircraft and pilot
were not recovered.

January 17, 1966: A collision occurred between a U.S. B-52 nuclear bomber
and a KC-135 tanker aircraft while over the village of Palomares in southern
Spain. The B-52 was on an airborne alert operation and carried four B-28
thermonuclear bombs. In the collision, the KC-135 exploded and caused the
B-52 to break up, scattering wreckage over a 100 square mile area. One of the
four nuclear bombs landed relatively intact, while the high explosives in two
other bombs detonated upon impact with the ground scattering radioactive
materials over the village and surrounding area. The fourth bomb fell into the
sea and was recovered intact three months later after an extensive underwater
search.

April 12, 1970: The K-8, a Soviet November class (Project 627A)
nuclear-powered attack submarine, sank in the Atlantic Ocean 300 miles
northwest of Spain. The submarine was powered by two nuclear reactors and
carried two nuclear torpedoes.

November 22, 1975: The U.S. aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67)
collided with the cruiser USS Belknap (CG-26) in rough seas at night during
air exercises in the Mediterranean Sea off Sicily. The collision caused major
fires and explosions, and the commander of Carrier Striking Force for the
Sixth Fleet issued a "Broken Arrow" message - a top secret communication
about a nuclear weapons accident - warning of a "high probability that nuclear
weapons on the USS Belknap were involved in fire and explosions".
Eventually, the nuclear weapon barely escaped destruction as the fire was
contained just feet from the forward weapon magazine.

September 8, 1977: The K-171, a Soviet Delta I (Project 667B)
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, accidentally jettisoned a nuclear
warhead near Kamchatka in the Pacific Ocean after a build-up of pressure in a
missile launch tube. After a search, the warhead was recovered.

March 21, 1984: The U.S. aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) collided
with a Soviet nuclear-powered Victor class (Project 671) attack submarine in
the Sea of Japan. At the time of the collision, the USS Kitty Hawk is
estimated to have carried several dozen nuclear weapons, and the submarine
probably carried two nuclear torpedoes.

April 7, 1989: The K-278 Komsomolets, the Soviet Mike class (Project 685)
nuclear-powered attack submarine, sank off northern Norway following on
board fires and explosions. The submarine was powered by one nuclear
reactor and carried two nuclear torpedoes.

March 20, 1993: A Russian Delta III class (Project 667BDR) nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines is struck by the U.S. nuclear-powered attack
submarine USS Grayling (SSN-646) while operating in the Barents Sea close
to the Kola Peninsula. The submarine suffered slight damage and was able to
return to base, but the collision could have sunk the Delta submarine
including
its 16 SS-N-18 nuclear armed missiles.

Source: http://www.greenpeace.org/-comms/nukes/ctbt/read3.html

The site contains a list of as many as 22 serious accidents between 1950 and
1993.