[sacw] SAAN Post (15 May 00)

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Mon, 15 May 2000 14:09:29 +0200


South Asians Against Nukes Post
15 May 2000
________________________________
#1. Pakistan: On the nuclear roller-coaster
#2. US: SF Bay area events with Praful Bidwai & Achin Vanaik
________________________________

#1.

DAWN
15 May 2000
Op-Ed.

ON THE NUCLEAR ROLLER-COASTER By M.B. Naqvi THE origins of Pakistan's
quest for a nuclear capability lie in the military defeat inflicted by
India in 1971. It was, in many ways, a convincing defeat. Pakistan's
traditional power establishment finally realized that India was a much
larger country with a far bigger resource base in men, money and
technology. In the expensive military confrontation of a conventional kind,
India could always outspend and overwhelm it. Conventional armaments will
not therefore do. Z.A. Bhutto, acting for the establishment, made a choice
in favour of the nuclear option. There were then, as now, siren songs
extolling the virtues of atomic weaponry: its possession supposedly alters
fundamental facts of strategy, resources, and even geography. Besides,
these weapons are relatively cheap and there is no real defence against
them. A nuclear Pakistan will thus become invincible for India; all its
deficiencies in conventional armed strength can be overcome by a minimal -
and therefore affordable - nuclear deterrent. In the context of the
intractable Kashmir dispute, it would be even more useful. Behind the
nuclear shield, Pakistan could make India's occupation of Kashmir so costly
as to make it squeal and squirm. It is this sort of reasoning and thinking
that dictated Pakistan's Kashmir-centred national security policy
throughout the 1980s, especially after 1984 when it first acquired the
theoretical or notional nuclear capability in the shape of having mastered
the more recent technology of enriching uranium through the centrifuge
method. It was also the time of the Afghan jihad which had made Pakistan
and the US close allies. This and the non-weaponized nuclear capability
enabled Gen. Ziaul Haq to adopt an audacious policy vis-a-vis India. On
the one hand, he kept badgering India with a torrent of proposals of peace,
no-war pact, cooperation over Afghanistan and an Indo-Pakistan rather than
a comprehensive detente over nuclear weapons and, on the other, tactfully
promoted Sikh secessionism in India. The Sikh militancy made India
extremely angry. It seemed poised at one stage to invade at least Sindh
under cover of exercise Brasstacks. Let us pause at this point to take note
of certain facts. Although men like Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg continued to
claim well into the 1990s that the notional or non-weaponized nuclear
deterrent was already doing its job of deterring, the precise means of
deterring India from invading Pakistan in 1986-87 was a frank admission by
Dr A.Q. Khan that Pakistan possessed the actual bomb and would use it if
India made a military move against it. The same threat, plus a US
intervention, stopped India in its tracks in 1990. The point being made
here is that a nuclear escalation was not only inherent and inescapable in
the given situation but was in fact taking place quietly on both sides in
spite of disclaimers. The other point is that developments on a broader
front show that nuclear weapons have a baleful effect on politics, economy
and even culture. Events since 1990 show just this. Both India and Pakistan
after 1986, if not 1984, have stayed on the nuclear escalatory ladder
building weapons in secret. Even as the insurgency in Kashmir intensified,
so did India's efforts to suppress it by strong-arm methods (in gross
violation of Kashmiris' human rights). The level of civility in the
residual Indo-Pakistan ties continued to deteriorate. On the Indian side,
it was the worsening situation in Kashmir and the BJP's desperate drive for
power that made India test five nuclear devices at Pokhran on May 11 and
13. the story ever since has been one of non-stop escalation and a
corresponding deterioration in the South Asian security situation -
contrary to the deceptive theories of (minimal) sufficiency of deterrence
and nuclear weapons being a guarantee for peace. Pakistan felt compelled
not only to equal India's nuclear score but to better it. it exploded six
devices on May 28 and 30 in Chaghi. Just as L.K. Advani seemed to have gone
over the top in euphoria after the May 11 Pokhran tests and was in a
threatening mood, Mian Nawaz Sharif and his government also went wild with
enthusiasm. Pakistan was pronounced the seventh nuclear power of the world:
it could now do anything it willed; it was even called a veritable
superpower by some official publicists. What did the PML government do
after Chaghi tests? In short order, it sacked its army chief, Gen.
Jehangir Karamat, for advocating a National Security Council that caused
much resentment among army officers and perhaps laid the foundation of the
October 12, 1999, takeover. However, Mr Nawaz Sharif warmly responded to
the Indian prime minister's proposal of doing a detente on nuclear weapons
- which was the real purpose of Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee's Lahore visit. At
this stage, all that can be said is that no one now remembers the
reassuring noises made by hardliners like K. Subrahmaniam in India and the
all too familiar galaxy of retired bureaucracy on the Pakistan side to the
effect that should India and Pakistan become open nuclear powers by
conducting test explosions, peace through mutual deterrence and negotiated
detente will become guaranteed. India-Pakistan relations too will be
stable, if also minimal and distant. Escalation in intent and action on
both sides of not only the LoC in Kashmir but also of the common
international border is the only cognizable reality since 1998. However,
the Indians sprang a surprise by propounding the new Indian position:
deterrence by nuclear weapons does not necessarily prevent a 'limited war'
by conventional weapons; India is quite ready for it. Should a conventional
war now break out - a real possibility - it will be for Pakistan to decide
how to respond to such a contingency and to what effect. In the meantime,
let us look at the politics of nuclear weapons: who actually benefits
politically? We are not concerned with the quantum of advantage that the
BJP derived from Pokhran II. In so far as Pakistan is concerned, the
idolization of the bomb has benefited both the ideologues of the religious
and other right-wing parties, including to an extent the PML and the PPP.
Needless to say, the various jihadist organizations, not to say the
Taliban, are so much the stronger because of the policy orientation that
has given birth to Pakistan's necessarily effective, survivable, credible
and deliverable minimum nuclear deterrent. If Pakistan's national horizon
is overcast by clouds of intolerance, extremism and violence, its
Kashmir-centred national security thinking is responsible for it. And if
the army has inherited the debris of a failed constitutional order and
democracy, it is natural because it has been the leading actor in the
security field. As for the economy, it has been teetering on the brink of
debt default for half a dozen years at least. IMF and World Bank experts
have been ringing the alarm bells. In 1998, it did default but was not so
declared because the leading creditors and BWIs (Bretton Woods
Institutions) did not find it expedient. Instead, a bail-out was given for
two and a half years that is being finalized even as its relief is coming
to an end. Pakistan's economic managers are back in Washington, hat in
hand, at the doors of BWIs and the US Department of Treasury, asking for
yet another bail-out from 2001 onward. Why? Because Pakistan is unable to
meet its external debt obligations for the year 2001 onward that are sure
to be well over $5 billion and may be even $6 billion. Economic sanctions
remain in force with no aid flowing in. Few foreign investments are coming
in for lack of confidence. The wonder of wonders is that no one in
authority either finds a new economy-reviving formula, consistent with the
nuclear capability, or considers recasting the national security paradigm,
despite realizing that things cannot go on like this. The question is: has
the nuclear capability proved to be the panacea for many of our security
and other problems that it was meant to be?
_________

#2.

*******PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENT********

Should India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons? As we observe the
second anniversay of these tests, is the Indian subcontinent more secure
than ever before, or on the brink of a nuclear disaster? Will unilateral
disarmament bring peace, or is it sheer lunacy?

Come, let's discuss.

PRAFUL BIDWAI and ACHIN VANAIK, two prominent Indian journalists, nuclear
policy experts and authors of 'New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global
Nuclear Disarmament,' will be in the San Francisco Bay Area from May 16th
to 18th. The following events provide an opportunity to meet with them
and discuss the nuclear politics of the subcontinent and its global
impact.

* * *

TWO YEARS AFTER THE BOMB: Regional and Global Impact of South Asian
Nukes. A discussion

When: Tuesday May 16th, 7 p.m. to 9 p.m.

Where: ICSC, 3065 Democracy Way, Santa Clara CA 95054 Ph: 408-748-1771.

Directions: From 237, exit on Great America Pkwy going South. Turn right
on Tasman Dr, left on Old Ironsides Dr and right on Democracy Way)

=46ree and open to the public

* * *

SOUTH ASIA ON A SHORT FUSE: Nuclear politics in the Indian Subcontinent.
A discussion featuring Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik. Stanford Faculty
response by Scott Sagan, Co-director, Center for International Security
and Cooperation and Rafiq Dossani, Consulting Professor, Asia/ Pacific
Research Center.

When: Wednesday May 17th, 4p.m. to 5:30 p.m.

Where: Stanford University At History Corner, Room 2 (Bldg 200, Main
Quad).

=46or more details go to
http://www.stanford.edu/group/sia/event.html

=46ree and open to the Public

* * *

PENINSULA PEACE AND JUSTICE CENTER'S FORUM. PPJC will host a free public
forum with Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik on the issue of global nuclear
disarmament. The forum will be held in the studios of cable TV Channel 6
and broadcast live to the local area including Stanford, Palo Alto, East
Palo Alto, Atherton and Menlo Park.

When: Wednesday May 17th, 7:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

Where: Channel 6 Studios, 3210 Park Blvd, Palo Alto. Ph: 650-326-8837

=46ree and open to the Public
http://www.peacecenter.com/events/index.html#newnukes
* * *

Dinner | Presentation | Discussion

Sponsored by Western States Legal Foundation (510) 839-5877

When: Thursday, May 18th, 7 p.m.

Where: Sabina Indian Cuisine, Upstairs Banquet Room, 1628 Webster,
Downtown Oakland (near the 12th St BART Station)

$10 per person, includes a delicious Indian Buffet with vegetarian and
meat entrees. (Beer and wine extra.)

Pleas RSVP to Ann Beier at WSLF, 510-839-5877

* * *
Radio Call-in Show

Pacifica radio KPFA 94.1 (KFCF fresno)

When: Wednesday, May 17th, 12 noon

LIVING ROOM-- A local talk and call-in show with Kris Welch, featuring
Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik.

__________________________________________
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