[sacw] S A A N Post | 6 June 2000

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Tue, 6 Jun 2000 01:50:07 +0200


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South Asians Against Nukes Post
6 June 2000
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#1. India's Nuclear Blindness
#2. Downsize the Logic of "National" Security in India
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The Telegraph (Calcutta, India)
6 June 2000
Editorial
=20
NUCLEAR BLINDNESS

In theory, India is following international practice by removing its
nuclear weapons programme from the purview of the atomic energy
regulatory body, the agency responsible for nuclear safety. There will
now be two such bodies. The AERB [Atomic Energy Regulatory Board] will keep
an eye on the civilian
nuclear industry and a new safety panel, set up by the Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre, will do the same for nuclear weapons facilities. On
paper this looks reasonable. In reality it is likely to further
undermine the credibility of nuclear safety in India. Regulatory bodies
need a certain degree of institutional independence to serve as
effective watchdogs. The AERB never had such autonomy because it was
made subordinate to the department of atomic energy, the same body whose
activities it was supposed to monitor. There is evidence, including
statements by former AERB members, to believe India's nuclear industry
has been far more error prone than the government admits. And that the
AERB is disallowed from going public with findings and told to stay away
from certain facilities. The new move will mean replicating AERB in a
military setting. Again, it will be a case of a custodian controlled by
its ward. India's nuclear programme is already shrouded in oppressive
secrecy. It will now become even more opaque and less accountable.
Questions need to be asked as to why the nuclear establishment has felt
the need to further retreat into its shell and seclude itself from any
watchdog's prying eyes. The former AERB chairman, Mr A. Gopalakrishnan,
has provided a possible explanation. He believes New Delhi has ordered
the regulatory split because India is determined to build up its fissile
material stockpile. However, BARC's ageing reactors and facilities would
find it hard to pass AERB's muster if New Delhi insisted they be put to
round the clock use. Therefore, he argues, the government decided to
strip the regulatory body of its oversight authority in the case of
nuclear weapon facilities like BARC. This would fit other circumstantial
evidence that India is aggressively pushing ahead with plans to build a
minimum nuclear deterrent. Whatever the reason, there is no excuse for
diluting India's already weak nuclear safety regime. Nuclear accidents
are not in the same league as other industrial mishaps. An out of
control chain reaction can level cities, radioactive leaks can
contaminate and poison regions for years. Run like public sector
enterprises, accountable to almost nobody and equipped with dated and
unsafe technology, India's nuclear facilities are atomic powderkegs. The
suspicion exists that New Delhi's skewed definition of nuclear power
status puts a premium on nuclear explosions and downgrades safety and
security. If Pokhran II should be followed by an indigenous Chernobyl,
New Delhi would have none to blame but itself. =20

_________

#2.

Economic and Political Weekly May 13, 2000 1710

DOWNSIZING 'NATIONAL' SECURITY

[Increases in military expenditure are welcomed by the ruling elite
in the nme of national security. But the expenditure is already too high
for a poor country, is used wastefully and, worse, 'national security' is
misconcieved.

by GAUTAM NAVLAKHA

Glorification of the "limited" war over Kargil has helped lay the
foundation for a phenomenal mili-tary build-up by the Indian government.
This is compounded by intellectual failure to examine the doctrine of
"national" security under which territorial integrity and upholding
government=EDs authority takes the place of security of people's lives and
liberties.

This provides the justifica-tion for declaration of war against our own
people with all the consequences that wars entail. In such a climate there
is a palpable lack of scrutiny of allocations, and of interrogation of
premises and assumptions behind security perception which defines potential
and real threat, limits of military response, as well as comparative
analysis of the cost of instilling fear versus restor-ing confidence among
our people. During the budget presentation by the union finance minister,
the entire Lok Sabha burst into thumping ovation when he reached paragraph
9 dealing with military spending:

In this budget, I have made a provision of Rs 58,587 crore for defence,
which is nearly Rs 13,000 crore more than in BE for the current year
(1999-2000). This represents the largest ever increase in the defence
budget in any single year. More will be provided whenever needed. We shall
not shrink from making any sacrifice to guard and protect every inch of our
beloved motherland.

Hyperbole apart there is much that is untrue in this statement. For one,
the figure cited by the finance minister understates the diversion of
resources for the military. For another, the governing class does not make
any "sacrifice", it is extracted from the salariat and the working people;
often to enjoy the privilege of being oppressed by the very same military.

Admittedly, the worldover military spending occupies a grey area and most
governments fudge the volume 2 includes defence pension and civil
expenditure of ministry of defence. (4) Standing Committee of Parliament on
Defence says that requirements of coast guard and Border Roads Organisation
are provided for by department of revenue and ministry of surface transport
respec-tively. (5) Following nuclear weapons tests and the declared
intention to acquire =EBminimum nuclear deterrence=ED half of the allocation=
s
made for departments of atomic energy and space merit inclusion. Let us
turn to budgetary allocation for military in 2000-01.

Military Expenditure

Increases in the allocation for military are a recurring annual phenomenon.
Apart from the increase shown at the time of presentation of the budget,
there is the usual upward revision in defence expen-diture in the course of
the financial year. Allocations listed under defence for 2000- 01 in the
expenditure budget volume 2 is Rs 70,948 cr. This represents 3.25 per cent
of GDP and 21 per cent of the government=EDs total expenditure. But from thi=
s
amount, beginning 1984-85, finance ministry has begun to exclude the item
defence pen-sion. One reason for excluding it may have to do with the
decision taken in the late 1970s to increase the length of service for
jawans from seven years to 17 years. This increased the pension burden of
the GoI [Govt. of India] . For instance at present there are four
pensioners for every serving jawan [soldier]. The Subrahmaniam Committee
report on Kargil has recommended reversion to seven years with absorption
of jawans into paramili-tary force thus released from the army.

Significantly, Indian military is a man-power based force precisely because
bulk of the troops are deployed in internal wars which are manpower
intensive: 50 soldiers are required to neutralise one militant. Anyway, in
an itemwise com-parison between the expenditure budgets the increase
between BE of 1999-2000 and 2000-01 is Rs 16,500 cr.

=46rom the two supplementary demands for grant (December 1999 and March 2000=
)
between BE and the RE for 1999-2000 military expenditure increased by Rs
6,920 cr. In this sense between RE of 1999-2000 and BE of 2000-2001, the
increase comes to Rs 9,380 cr. However, given during-the-year increase, a
routine feature, the RE for 2000-01 is sure to repeat the quantum leap in
military allo-cations.

But even this figure does not provide the full extent of allocations.
figures related to it in order to understate their military budgets. Also
most govern-ments use the euphemism of =EBdefence=ED to disguise military
preparations and discour-age investigation of actual expenditure that may
occur under different heads of account. In this sense the Indian
govern-ment's efforts are no exception.

However, in the context of insecurity of life of bulk of our people by
processes located in the country=EDs political economy, it acquires a
different hue. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the size of
resources consumed by the military and towards this end to define what
constitutes military expenditure.

What constitutes military spending is defined by SIPRI as "all current and
capital expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, including peace-keeping
forces; (b) de-fence ministries and other government agencies engaged in
defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces when judged to be trained and
equipped for military opera-tions; and (d) military space activities." It
goes on to say that such expenditure should include "military and civil
personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social
services for person-nel".

This definition gains in credibility because: (1) Indian Constitution under
the Seventh Schedule, Union List, speaks of "naval, military and air force;
any other armed force of the union". The State List speaks of =EBpolice=ED=
as a
subject matter of provinces. (2) There is now an overlap between external
and internal security and the combined use of military and para-military in
internal wars as well as border clashes is now routine. For instance Jammu
and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAKLI) fig-ures under MHA and was engaged both
in counter-insurgency operations in J and K as well as in the "limited war"
in Kargil sector of the LoC. The same is true for XV and XVI Corps of the
army engaged both in counter-insurgency as well as border clashes. (3)
Expenditure budget