[sacw] IPARMW No.17 (9 June 00)

[Harsh Kapoor]

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INDIA PAKISTAN ARMS RACE
&
MILITARISATION WATCH #16
(9 June 2000)
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[information & news for peace activists on Arms sales to the region,
defence budget figures, acquisitions & updgrades of weapons systems,
development and deployment of new weapons, implications of militarisation;
the developments on the Nuclearisation front and the doings of the
'intelligence' agencies. Bringing this information to wide public knowledge
is our goal here. No to secretive & exclusive control of this information
by technocrats, planners who plot national security hidden from public
scrutiny.
Please help us in the information gathering work for wide public
dissemination in South Asia.
Send Information via e-mail for IPARMW series to: aiindex@m... for
inclusion in the Emailings]

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I INDIA

[1.]

http://www.the-week.com/20jun11/cover.htm

The Week
June 11, 2000
Cover story

DOUBTFUL DEALS

Virtually every arms-selling company is wooing India, whose defence
establishment has suddenly become cash-rich

by R. Prasannan

Tourism watchers say that France is the world's most visited country. Soon
it may be for India's defence brass. Ever since Sofma lost the field gun
contract to Sweden's Bofors, the otherwise flamboyant French had been lying
low. But they are back now, with a lot of bang for Indian big bucks.
Several French commercial delegations are landing in Delhi with lists of
lethal ware. Following the big bang budget of this year, they first sent
their chief of joint staff Gen. Jean-Pierre Kelche and then Defence
Minister Alain Richard. The Vajpayee government, too, is responding with
equal warmth. Defence Minister George Fernandes visited Paris twice in the
last few months, followed by army chief Gen. V.P. Malik, air chief Air
Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis and Supreme Commander K.R. Narayanan. The
aggressive French diplomacy had its effect when Dassault's Alphajet was
back in the reckoning as a possible advanced jet trainer (AJT) choice after
being rejected on price grounds. Two months ago, the ministry had told the
parliamentary standing committee on defence that only British Aerospace's
Hawk was being considered and price negotiations were going on with the
manufacturers.

THE SUITORS

- Dassault. Its advanced jet trainer Alphajet was rejected on price
grounds earlier.
- British Aerospace. Its Hawk (above left) is the defence
ministry's hot choice despite its high price.
- MiG-MAPO for MiG-AT. Russians offered joint development and
licence production but was rejected.

- Uralvagonzavod. The Russians have reduced the price of T-90 tanks
from $2.65 million to $2.2 million.

- Iskra. Price negotiations with the Ukrainians for the radar
system are on.

Senior officials are wondering how the Russian MiG-AT, which was offered
at 40 per cent of the price quoted by British Aerospace for its Hawk, got
out of the race. The air force had been asking for an AJT for nearly two
decades. Successive governments have been postponing a decision, finding
that the Anglo-French cartel was refusing to reduce the price. The scene
changed in the early 90s after Russian President Boris Yeltsin asked Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao to consider MiG-MAPO's MiG-AT which was under
development. The 1995-96 budget even made a Rs 300 crore allocation;
technical negotiations were held and a detailed project report prepared for
commercial negotiations. The Russian plane was unproved, but the low
price coupled with the offer for joint development and licence production
appeared to beat competition. But price negotiations were conducted only
with the British and the French early this year, after which the ministry
told the parliamentary standing committee that it preferred the Hawk.

Sources in the defence ministry say that the French price was found too
high. Incidentally, some of the members of the present government had
alleged in the mid-90s that India had overpaid 4.7 million francs to
Dassault for the 40 Mirages and associated equipment bought for
4,597,915,000 francs. However, technically, the Alphajet went out of
reckoning because Dassault did not respond to a fresh request for proposal
last September. The French then came up with some aggressive "strategic
diplomacy", following which a revised request was made and the ministry
told the negotiators to consider the Alphajet offer afresh.

The special committee on flight safety, which had stressed on the need for
an AJT, had recommended that whichever aircraft was being bought should be
viable for 20 to 25 years. Computed from the day the committee gave its
report, this viability period would end in 2002-2007. Alphajet is
essentially 1960s technology and Hawk is of 1970s vintage, though both are
powered by newer engines. Now the situation is that India has to buy either
Hawk or Alphajet, which were shortlisted in 1986, at current prices.

The case of weapon-locating radars, the need for which was highlighted
often during the Kargil conflict, is no different. Requests for proposal
were sent to five manufacturers, but only Hughes of the US offered its ware
for trial. The army found that the Hughes system did not meet the general
staff quality requirements (GSQR). The ministry put up the file before the
minister who wrote that the unrealistic GSQR parameters had reduced
competition. Then the nuclear tests of May 1998 came in the way. With
sanctions in place, there was no way the US could sell the system to India.

Iskra of Ukraine and Thomson CSF of France then came on the scene, but the
latter would not offer its system for trials. The negotiators were thus
compelled to recommend the Ukrainian radar when Daimler Chrysler arrived
with its Cobra radar. A delegation went to France and Germany to evaluate
the Cobra, but again was not allowed to witness a working demonstration.
Price negotiations with the Ukrainians are on. Though not as aggressive
as the French, virtually every arms-selling country is now looking at India
whose defence establishment has suddenly become cash-rich. The Russians are
willing to give aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov free, provided the
Nevskoye Project Design Bureau is given the $500 million contract for
upgrading it and India buys at least a squadron of either MiG-29K or Su-33
to be based on the carrier.

The T-90 tank deal shows how desperate the Russians are. Uralvagonzavod,
the tank's manufacturers, found that the Russian army does not have the
money to buy them in bulk and so are scouting the export market. An order
from India, the Russians believe, will go a long way in raising the market
status of the tank in the world. And so they reduced the price from the
original $2.65 million to $2.41 million, and now to $ 2.2 million. So
aggressive has been the Russian hardsell that at one stage India was
willing to buy the tank with eyes closed. Hardly had Russia offered to sell
T-90 tanks when a technical delegation flew to Moscow, evaluated the tank
and recommended its acquisition. Within weeks the cabinet committee on
security approved purchase of 125 tanks off the shelf and 186 in
knocked-down condition.

It was then that former prime minister Deve Gowda shot off letters to Prime
Minister Vajpayee questioning the unholy haste. Sniffing a scandal in the
air, the price negotiation committee recommended testing the tank in Indian
summer, which is yet to be completed. All the same, techno-commercial
negotiations have begun. There have also been allegations that the four
Kamov-31 early warning helicopters, each costing $13.95 million, were
bought from Russia last year without trying them in tropical climate. The
navy's argument is that it has been operating Kamov-25 and 28 and so there
was no need to test the new ones which have similar airframe as Kamov-28.

The tank deal became a controversy when the army was about to put on
backburner the T-72M1 upgrade programme in which a host of European and
Israeli firms were interested. PCO-Cenzin of Poland, Elop of Israel and
Thomson CSF of France had been shortlisted for supply of the vital
fire-control system; Kerametal of Poland for power plant; Taman of Israel,
Litef of Germany and RDI of South Africa for the navigation system
component; GEC Marconi of the UK and Tadiram of Israel for radios. Mirage
2000 There was an allegation in the mid-90s that India had overpaid 4.7
million francs to Dassault for 40 Mirages and associated equipment. All is
quiet on the tank front with the army deciding to go ahead with both the
T-90 deal and upgrade of around 200 T-72s. One can imagine the desperation
of the vendors, considering the fact that it costs Rs 1.3 crore to upgrade
one tank.

Ministry officials say that it is the service headquarters which insists on
hasty acquisition. Following the Kargil conflict, the army headquarters
insisted that at least one battery of Smerch multi-barrel rocket launchers
be inducted expeditiously, though they had earlier postponed it to the
tenth army plan. A technical team went to Russia in September 1999 and
recommended its acquisition without conducting field trials in India. The
ministry, however, insisted that the system be tested at Balasore. All the
same the file has been forwarded to the cabinet committee on security. As
seen in the tank case, lobbying is stronger in the upgrade market than in
purchase of new systems. "Visibility is less in smaller packages, but the
total money involved is bigger," explained an officer in the naval
headquarters.

As of today, India plans to spend Rs 5,000 crore on upgrading its old ware.
Two MiG-21s are being upgraded in Russia which will transfer the knowhow
and kits to Hindustan Aeronautics to upgrade the remaining 120-odd planes
at a total cost of $626 million. The current competition is to supply ware
for upgrading MiG-27 by HAL and Aeronautical Development Establishment at a
ceiling cost of Rs 430 crore. Often there are also diplomatic
compulsions, rather than techno-economic reasons, that work behind foreign
procurement. The South Africans are learnt to have been dissuaded from
selling artillery systems to Pakistan by the Indian counter-offer to buy
refurbished Casspir mine-protected vehicles.

There were many in the market, but all others were rejected "on
considerations of cost, mobility, protection level, carrying capacity and
delivery schedule". Only Casspir was tried in India and invited to six
rounds of negotiations. Finally 90 vehicles of 1981 vintage and 75 of 1988
vintage were ordered with support package. Anyway, the global tables have
been turned. Till five years ago, when Indian arms purchase budget was
paltry in real terms, India was accused by western arms-selling countries
of indulging in an arms race. In fact, organisations like the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute were even accusing India of
falsifying its purchase budget. Now India is really out shopping with a big
purse, and the old critics are on glib sales talk.

Rollback on dates The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) is probing all the
defence deals of the last 15 years. That is what the country and its
Parliament believe. But documents in possession of The Week give a
different picture. A defence ministry press note of February 5 said: "CVC
is being requested to probe the allegations of presence of agents in all
identified major procurement decisions that have been taken since 1985-86
(ie., after a decision was taken by the government banning the role of
middlemen)." In March, Minister George Fernandes told Parliament that "a
special group of officers headed by the chief vigilance officer of the
ministry of defence, who is in the rank of a joint secretary, has been
constituted to ensure prompt and effective follow-up action on all major
observations of the comptroller and auditor-general pertaining to
procurement of arms, ammunitions, spares, their storage, transfer of
technology, indigenisation and other related aspects. This group will
identify the important observations/findings of the C&AG in the last 15
years for necessary corrective action and to fix responsibility for
lapses/delays/corrupt practices, if any, for necessary administrative,
disciplinary/legal action." However, a note sent by Additional Secretary
S.K. Misra to the three service headquarters says: "Raksha Mantri has
decided that all major procurement cases which have been finalised after
government orders (April, 1989) banning agents, middlemen or middle
companies in defence procurement, should be referred to the Central
Vigilance Commission to investigate through the CBI or through any agency
as considered appropriate by them, whether in those cases there was
involvement of agents, middlemen or middle companies...." Who is to be
believed=D1the minister or the additional secretary? And why this difference
of four years during which India bought MiG-29 fighters, the EKM submarines
and the Tu-142 maritime reconnaissance aircraft? Ministry officials
explain that the change of date was on the advice of officials who
clarified to the minister that middlemen and agents were banned only in
1989. In that case who advised the minister in February? "This is typical
of the way the ministry of defence is functioning," said an officer at the
naval headquarters. "The babus who don't know a commodore from a commander
are taking the minister up the garden path." All the same, the ministry
has made no attempt to clarify the position to Parliament, even when the
matter was raised. On May 10, P. Prabhakar Reddy asked the minister in
Rajya Sabha, "Whether it is a fact that the Central Bureau of Investigation
has expressed its inability to investigate into the various defence
purchases made since 1985 referred to it by the defence ministry?" The
written reply was: "Ministry of defence has requested the Central Vigilance
Commission to get all defence procurement cases, since the time of presence
of agents in such cases was banned by the government, investigated through
the CBI or any other agency considered appropriate. The CBI has not
expressed its inability to investigate such cases." The next day Ram
Mohan Gadde and M.V.V.S. Murthy asked, "Whether the CBI has expressed its
inability to undertake the probe into defence deals since 1985, asked for
by the government this year unless specific cases are referred to it?"
The reply again did not mention the change of the cut-off date. It read:
"...A detailed presentation on defence procurement procedure was given to
the CVC by ministry of defence and the service headquarters. After
discussion with the CVC about the modalities in this regard, the first
batch of 63 case files on defence procurement has been submitted to them.
These include some cases mentioned by an Hon'ble MP in a short duration
discussion on defence procurement in Rajya Sabha on 23.12.1999 and in a
writ petition filed by a naval officer, in which allegations of presence of
agents and corruption were made. These case files are presently under
scrutiny in the CVC. Defence ministry is extending cooperation required in
the matter.... The CBI has not raised any point in this regard with
ministry of defence." On both occasions there was no attempt to clarify the
dates. Most of the case files handed over are learnt to be of the
1996-1999 period during which equipment and stores worth Rs 63,008.57 crore
were procured by the services. The names of indigenous and foreign
companies which supplied them have been submitted to both the C&AG and CVC.
According to the minister, "Su-30 contract is one of the many major defence
procurement contracts which have been referred to the CVC for investigation
to find out if there was presence of agents, middlemen, middle
companies...," following reports of hanky-panky in the media and
Parliament. Sources in the service headquarters are sceptical about the
exercise. "Very often the manufacturer who failed to get the contract would
later allege that there was some hanky-panky," said an officer, citing a
Romanian case. India had bought some aerial bombs from Romtechnica, which
had authorisation from the Romanian defence ministry. However, another
company, Ratmil complained that it was the only manufacturer with a licence
from Romanian defence ministry. Investigations revealed that Romtechnica
was a state-owned company and was the only authorised firm to conclude such
contracts. The only case that has been transferred to the CBI after
=46ernandes's blanket probe order is the Pitcare case. (Another case, of one
Ashok Chawla in the Ukranian tank deal is of older vintage.) Pitcare of
Hong Kong was contracted in 1993 to supply 10,000 rounds of 130 mm and
6,700 rounds of 122 mm illuminating ammunition for $6.12 million. The
10,000 rounds of 130 mm ammunition arrived in 1993 at the Pulgaon depot,
without literature and range tables. A check-proof could be done only in
August 1995 when the fuze-setting key and range tables arrived. Ten rounds
were fired and three recorded defects. A reproof of 23 rounds in December
1995 manifested 12 failures. The consignment was declared "not fit for use"
and a quality claim was raised. R. Prasannan

Leading astray Much of what is happening in the Purohit case is behind the
back of the naval chief and often the defence minister

Officers at the naval headquarters say the confusion about the cut-off date
for the vigilance probe is just one instance of how certain officials have
been misleading the minister. The Purohit case is another. T-90S tanks
Hardly had Russia offered to sell T-90 tanks when a technical delegation
flew to Moscow, evaluated the tank and recommended its acquisition.

Rear Admiral Suhas Purohit's promotion case is now before the Delhi High
Court while the ministry has referred the allegations he raised to the
Central Vigilance Commissioner. But Purohit suspects that the ministry's
attempt is to drag its feet till he retires next year. Purohit, the
senior-most rear admiral in the logistic cadre, was hopeful of getting
promoted as vice-admiral when Vice-Admiral Varghese Koithara retired in
January 1998. Purohit's name had been cleared by the promotion board in
late 1997, but he is yet to get his promotion. If arms dealers who lost
their profits by his actions in the early 90s tried to get him posted out
of logistics once, now he suspects the hand of ministry officials in
scuttling his promotion. Purohit was to retire in July 1998, but his
promotion would have got him four more years, thanks partly to extension of
retirement age by two years.

The controversy started on the eve of the promotion board meeting when
naval headquarters received an anonymous complaint that Purohit had been
favouring one Super Trade, Makalu Engineers and others and had received
favours from them. Ironically, some of the firms listed had been losers
from the actions of Purohit in the early 90s. Rules prohibit inquiry over
anonymous complaints, yet as a matter of abundant caution, the then chief,
Admiral Bhagwat, asked Vice-Admiral Sushil Kumar to get the matter probed
so that the matter was settled before the board met. The departmental probe
cleared him and the promotion board, consisting of both Bhagwat and Sushil
Kumar apart from three others, recommended promotion. The file was
forwarded to the ministry and the then defence minister Mulayam Singh Yadav
okayed it. It was then that another anonymous complaint was sent to the
Prime Minister's Office. Koithara retired in January 1998 and Purohit was
asked to officiate as chief of logistics. Faced with retirement in July
1998, he made a statutory representation which was not replied to, though
rules stipulate the reply should be given within 30 days.

Meanwhile the government changed, and the ministry ordered a fresh look
into the explanations given by Purohit to the charges raised in the
anonymous letter. This committee found the allegations "baseless".
Meanwhile, members of the committee, some of whom were naval officers,
personally assured him that he would be promoted soon. But as months
dragged on, Purohit started sending statutory complaints and reminders, but
never got a reply. Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat was sacked in December 1998 and
soon there was an attempt to portray Purohit as Bhagwat's man. Alarmed,
Purohit claims to have met Sushil Kumar who told him "to continue to work
and persevere in the direction in which he was leading the logistics
function." Purohit's writ petition also claims that he was told by Sushil
Kumar that he was satisfied with his performance earlier too.

All the same, a white paper brought out by the ministry in the wake of the
Bhagwat controversy publicised the allegations against Purohit and omitted
the fact that he had been held "blameless". The white paper also alleged
that the CBI was probing the allegations and that the NHQ, under Bhagwat,
had not been cooperating. Sources in the service headquarters suspect
that much of what is happening in the Purohit case is behind the back of
the naval chief (as in the case of a fresh CBI inquiry) and often the
minister. Purohit's petition also alleges that the "promotion board
recommendations... were as such dealt with at the MOD at unknown levels".
=46or, there is no indication on the files as to when the decision was taken
by the minister to refer the case to the CBI, to transfer him to the post
of officer on special duty with the chief of personnel and keep his
promotion in abeyance till the CBI inquiry is completed. Incidentally, the
Supreme Court has observed in another case that an inquiry can be
considered 'pending' only after chargesheet or charge memo has been issued.

Alphajet The French came up with some aggressive "strategic diplomacy",
following which the defence ministry told negotiators to consider Alphajet
offer afresh. (above right, Minister George Fernandes.) There was still no
action from the CBI's part, which made many wonder whether the agency was
investigating the matter. It did not interrogate Purohit; not even sought
information from him. But Purohit was served a show-cause notice from NHQ
which referred to certain allegations raised by a company that had lost a
tender to supply compressors. Incidentally, the company had gone up to the
Supreme Court and lost the case, and both the naval headquarters and the
ministry had defended Purohit's action in court. More interestingly, the
CBI probe was also into allegations over some of Purohit's actions which
had earned him a Visisht Seva Medal!

Soon, chief of personnel Vice-Admiral Arun Prakash wrote to Purohit that
"it has been learnt telephonically from MOD that the secret verification
undertaken by the CBI in the matter of anonymous complaints against you has
been completed. However, no information on this file in this context has so
far been forwarded to NHQ by MOD."

Why the MOD has taken no action is the mystery in the naval headquarters.
The chief of personnel has also written to Purohit that he himself had
"personally brought to the notice of the raksha mantri and defence
secretary the long delay that has occurred in the CBI secret verification
as well as on the question of your promotion to the rank of vice-admiral.
It is for your information that no written response has been received from
the MOD till date." Naval officers also believe that the minister himself
had approved the findings of the ministerial committee and recommended
Purohit's promotion in June 1998. But the ministry's stand-off with Bhagwat
started soon after and the anti-Purohit group got the whole affair linked
to the Bhagwat episode, on the ground that it was a board headed by Bhagwat
that had recommended his promotion.

A promotion board was constituted recently, and as Purohit approached the
court again stating that the only vacancy was that of chief of logistics,
the ministry assured the court that the post would be kept vacant till the
court decides on the matter. But Purohit's friends now suspect that the
idea is to drag the issue till he retires in April 2001. Though the NHQ
has been made a respondent in Purohit's petition, it is clear from the
documents attached to it that the NHQ's sympathies lay with Purohit. The
tug of war, as in the case of Bhagwat, is essentially between the service
headquarters and the ministry which has been resisting all attempts to
bestow more powers on the service headquarters. For instance, Fernandes had
promised in the wake of the Bhagwat controversy that he would get the
ministry-services relationship restructured within a month. Nothing has
been heard of it till date. On the contrary, the attempts of the service
headquarters to get a greater say in security matters have been stiffly
resisted by the ministry. The service chiefs were peeved that they were not
initially even consulted when the Indian Airlines plane was hijacked to
Kandahar. There was also a move to bring in the services within the purview
of the vigilance commission. The chiefs wrote a stern letter pointing out
that they have a quicker and smarter way of dealing with corruption within
the service acts. The ministry had its revenge when the chiefs once
requested that they be made part of the cabinet committee on security
affairs. The ministry replied with a prompt 'no'. R. Prasannan

------

[2.]

//www.rediff.com/news/2000/jun/07reuters.htm
June 7, 2000

Bombay-bound Mug-21 parts seized in Sofia:

Reuters

Bulgarian customs have confiscated two Mig-21 jet fighter canopies, which
were about to be exported to India by a company in Sofia, without a
permit, a customs spokesman said on Tuesday. "The shipment was seized by
customs at Sofia airport. It was packed in two large wooden boxes marked
as exhibition items and was bound for Bombay," spokesman Ivan Kutevski
said.
A Bulgarian trader who lacked a government permit to deal in military
products forwarded the shipment and there were no documents from the trade
ministry approving the deal, said Kutevski.
An investigation has been launched to trace the origin of the shipment.
The canopies were valued at $17,300 each, said the defence ministry. India
is a traditional destination of Bulgaria's legal military exports.
The Balkan country has frequently been accused of violating international
arms trade embargoes and maintaining lax arms trade regulations. The
government has denied wrongdoing.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

II PAKISTAN:

[1.]

India Abroad
7 June 2000

http://www.indiaabroad.com/news/2000/06/07/china.html

SINO-PAKISTANI VENTURE DEVELOPS NEW JET

June 07, 2000 15:00 Hrs (IST)
Beijing: The K-8e, a new jet trainer developed by China under a
Sino-Pak venture, has successfully made its maiden flight, the official
"China Daily" newspaper reported on Wednesday, the Press Trust of India
reported.
The test flights carried out indicate that the aircraft is an excellent
basic trainer with good flight quality and performance, satisfactory
training efficiency at low operation and maintenance costs, Zhang Yanzhong,
General Manager of China Aviation Industry Corporation II (CAIC II), said.
This puts China in an excellent position to fulfill a $
47.4-million-dollar deal to export the jets to Egypt, The 'China Daily'
said, quoting officials.
The deal for the 80 K-8e training aircraft and its production line,
made by the Hongdu Aviation Industry Group was reached on Dec. 23 last year
between the China National Aero-technology Import and Export Corporation
and the Egyptian Defence department, he said.
Pakistan is a 25 percent partner in the K-8 project and is expected to
purchase up to 100 K-8s, sources said. However, there was no mention in the
report about Pakistan's involvement in the venture.
It is also the largest deal China's aviation industry has concluded in
terms of the number of aircraft and sum of money involved, the report said.
Several Middle Eastern countries have shown interest in the new jet, as
well as some Southeast Asian and South American nations, a company
spokesperson said, adding more sale contracts are also expected to be
signed in the coming months.
The K-8e is an upgraded version of the K-8 that is designed not only for
training programs for pilots but also for armament operation training.
The K-8 is a two-seater aircraft designed for training programs such
as takeoffs, landing, acrobatics, night and spin flights and armament
training. It has been exported to several countries, including Pakistan,
Myanmar and Zambia.
Pakistan and China are also planning to manufacture the Super-7 fighter
aircraft, under another deal signed during deposed Pakistani Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif visit here last year. The progress on this front, however,
remains unclear in the face of reluctance on the part of Russia to impart
technology for it, they added.
---------

[2.]

NBC NEWS: Pakistan nukes outstrip India's
http://www.msnbc.com/news/417106.asp

An April 1999 test of India's Agni missile, described by the Pentagon as
ten years away from operational status. Pakistan nukes outstrip India's,
officials say U.S. reverses assessment of South Asia nuclear balance

By Robert Windrem
and Tammy Kupperman

NBC NEWS WASHINGTON, June 6 Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is vastly
superior to that of rival India, with up to five times the nuclear
warheads, say U.S. military and intelligence officials now reassessing the
South Asian balance of power. Senior U.S. officials have told NBC News in
the past week that Pakistan not only has more warheads than its long-time
adversary, but has far more capability to actually use them.

Don't assume that the Pakistani nuclear capability is inferior to the
Indians.=92
GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI
Commander, U.S. Central Command

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS by India and Pakistan in May 1998 caught American
intelligence off guard. While U.S. agencies long had known about
weapons-development research in both countries, the decision by both to go
public with their capabilities shocked policymakers.
Since then, U.S. intelligence and diplomacy has focused on South
Asia with a new intensity. Until recently, for instance, Pakistan was
considered to have somewhere between 10 and 15 nuclear weapons and India
between 25 and 100.
But after two years of intelligence gathering, officials now
believe those figures overstate the capabilities of India=92s home-grown
arsenal and understate those of Pakistan, whose program has relied on
generous Chinese assistance. One official said the Pakistanis "are more
likely to have those numbers [25 to 100 weapons] than the Indians."
Perhaps most important, the official said, is that Pakistan appears
far more capable than India of delivering nuclear payloads. "I don't think
their [the Indian] program is as advanced as the Paks," the official said,
speaking particularly of ballistic missiles.
Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni, commander of the U.S. Central
Command, said long-time assumptions that India had an edge in the South
Asian strategic balance of power were questionable, at best.
"Don't assume that the Pakistani nuclear capability is inferior to
the Indians," said Zinni, the senior U.S. officer responsible for the
Middle East and South Asia.

Unfinished business
>From the origins of the India-Pakistan rivalry to its modern nuclear realit=
y.
Other military and intelligence officials, as well as an
intelligence analysis of South Asia=92s nuclear balance obtained by NBC News=
,
shed more light on the revised view.
"They both have a capability," said one senior military official.
"Pakistan's may be better than India=92s, with more weapons and more
capability.
"You can't underestimate the Pakistani program," said the official.
Like most of the officials NBC News contacted, this one would speak only on
condition of anonymity.

DOCUMENTS SUPPORT REVISED

These officials believe India understands that it is behind. A
recent Defense Department analysis of the Indian program obtained by NBC
News states that India is moving to address its shortcomings.
Quoting India's recently publicized draft nuclear doctrine, the
Defense Department report said that "India announced its plans to develop a
minimum nuclear deterrent force comprised of a triad of nuclear delivery
systems =97 air, mobile land-based launches and sea-based platforms. The air
component of its triad is the only one that may be in place already."
The U.S. report also states that =93India probably has a handful of
>nuclear bombs," meaning roughly five. With regard to delivery systems =97 t=
he
missiles and bombers needed to launch a nuclear strike =97 U.S. officials no=
w
believe Indian capabilities to be seriously lagging.
According to the Defense Department document, which is
unclassified, India has no nuclear-capable missiles and fewer aircraft
capable of delivering a nuclear payload than Pakistan does. India has twice
tested a new intermediate-ranged missile, the Agni, which may eventually
provide the basis of an nuclear missile force. However, current U.S.
analysis suggests the Agni will not be fielded with nuclear warheads for
another 10 years. Additionally, India appears to only have begun work on
missile warhead design and on the miniaturization of weapons =97 two critica=
l
hurdles to the actual use of weapons.

The U.S. assessment of Pakistan, on the other hand, has been
greatly upgraded.
A U.S. official stated that Pakistani air and missile delivery
systems are now believed to be =93fully capable of a nuclear exchange if
>something happens.=94 Other officials noted that Pakistan=92s air force, wi=
th
its U.S. F-16=92s and its French Mirage fighter-bombers, are superior at
penetrating enemy airspace than India=92s Soviet-designed MiGs and Sukhois.
Most importantly, Pakistan is now thought to possess about 30
nuclear-capable missiles: the Chinese M-11 short range missile and its
Pakistani variant, the Tarmuk, as well as the North Korean Nodong
intermediate-range missile (known locally as the Ghauri).

HAIR-TRIGGER CONCERN
The mystery that shrouds both of these growing nuclear arsenals has
become a major cause for concern among U.S. policymakers, who even before
the 1998 tests had deemed South Asia the most likely site of a nuclear war.

According to one analysis done by the U.S. Air Force, more than 150
million Indians and Pakistanis could perish in an all-out nuclear exchange
=97 three times the total number of people who died in World War II.
One frequently cited fear among U.S. intelligence officials is an
accidental nuclear war in which Pakistan mistakes the firing of an Indian
missile bearing a conventional warhead as a nuclear strike.
Despite what appears to be a healthy fear of the other on both
sides, the United States still fears there could be a series of crises that
lead to something worse. Last year=92s Pakistani incursion in the Kargil are=
a
of Kashmir, the disputed Muslim territory controlled by India, is a good
example of the region=92s unpredictability.
"Kargil scared both sides," Zinni said. "There is usually a
gentleman=92s agreement to keep conflict around the Line of Control," he
said, referring to the U.N. cease-fire line set after the two nations=92 194=
7
war over the region. "It escalated with mobilizations on different fronts =
=97
tit for tat. Both sides are now very concerned about how escalation works
and how it could happen very quickly."
Zinni said the United States intervened in the "nick of time" with
Kargil. The United States doesn=92t exert much influence on the daily level
of fighting, but a senior military official official does believe that
Washington has some sway in terms of escalation because neither side really
wants an all-out war, despite some hard-liners on both side who publicly
claim they want to bring the issue to a head.

NBC News=92 Tammy Kupperman is based at the Pentagon. Robert Windrem
is an NBC News investigative producer based in New York.