[sacw] sacw dispatch | 11 July 00

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South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch
11 July 2000

________________

Breaking Indo-Pak Impasse

Open talks with Musharraf

By Praful Bidwai

One doesn't have to be either a Pervez Musharraf admirer or a na=EFve
believer in the inevitability of amicable relations between India and
Pakistan to note the significance of the overtures Pakistan's chief
executive (CE) has been making to New Delhi. Both his three-part
interview to The Hindustan Times and his conversations with the 50-plus
Indian participants in the News group's South Asian media conference
(including, notably, the sangh parivar's Tarun Vijay and K.R. Malkani)
were meant to convey the message that he is not a rabid war-monger; he
desires peace with India. Gen Musharraf has been emphatic that he wants a
dialogue without preconditions.

It is possible that this is a shrewd public relations exercise to deflect
attention from the mess in which Islamabad finds itself in Kashmir,
Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is also not ruled out that the architect
of Pakistan's Kargil misadventure is atoning for his grave blunder--a
year later. But however questionable his motives, they do not constitute
a reason for not talking to him, even less for continuing with New
Delhi's policy of cornering, confronting and berating Pakistan in every
possible forum as an unbalanced, irresponsible power out to spread jehad,
with whom there can be no dialogue.

This column argues that New Delhi must open a dialogue with the Musharraf
government without preconditions. The Indian government's--and
people's--best bet lies in peace and reconciliation with Pakistan.
Indeed, Indian diplomacy today faces its greatest test--not in
Washington, Moscow and Beijing, or at the UN, but right next door. India
cannot enhance its global image unless it proves that it is mature enough
to overcome the =ABPakistan syndrome=BB which has plagued its
foreign policy for half a century. To say this is neither to deny
Pakistan's support to secessionists in Kashmir, nor to play down India's
many disputes with Islamabad.

Many people who advocate reconciliation with Pakistan advance two very
persuasive arguments. The first is culturalist. It holds that in some
sense, Partition created an =ABartificial=BB divide within a
seamless, relatively unified culture. This has made it impossible for
people to do what should come =ABnaturally=BB to them: e.g. cross
the border at Lahore or Amritsar, have a hearty meal, see an
Indian/Pakistani film, listen to music which they share, interact with
their =ABown kind=BB of people, and come back. Urvashi Butalia's
The Other Side of Silence (Kali) is a powerful plea for transcending
Partition's trauma and bridging the divide. Salman Rushdie describes it
as =ABmagnificent and necessary book, rigorous and compassionate,
thought-provoking and moving=BB.

There is much to be said for this, although the argument only applies to
a part of undivided India--Punjab, Sindh and some segments of Uttar
Pradesh. Although India and Pakistan have evolved within divergent
socio-political frameworks, the problems that confront them are not
dissimilar. There is much to be gained through interaction and
cooperation, whether social, literary or political, and a lot to be lost
through mutual exclusion. To recognise this, one need not contend, as
some well-meaning advocates of a sub-continental confederation do, that
geography will eventually prevail over history (of strife and separation).

No less powerful is the economic argument that India and Pakistan will
gain greatly from cooperation in trade, industry and energy. They can
only lose by not forming the core of a regional trading bloc. Such blocs
have effectively promoted rapid growth, e.g. as in the European Union,
ASEAN, and North America. The complementarities of the Indian and
Pakistani economies too offer rich possibilities. Just bringing their $2
billion-plus underground trade to the surface would immensely benefit
both economies. The saving from liberalised trade alone will exceed all
foreign direct investment into the region, to attract which its
governments exert themselves so much.

A shining example of such cooperation is the proposed Iran-India natural
gas pipeline via Pakistan. This would provide fuel at a fraction of the
cost of shipped natural gas. India's gas requirements are expected to
rise four-fold by 2010 (and Pakistan's to double). Pakistan would stand
to earn $600 million annually through transit fees alone. That apart, the
pipeline will enable India and Pakistan to join, perhaps dominate, the
Great Game (played since the 19th century between Britain and Russia)
over Central Asia, with its vast natural resources.

While one need not be an ardent supporter of an energy--intensive
gas--based economic growth model, the pipeline scores commendably over
the present sea-based import strategy. The fear that Pakistan will use it
as a military target or blackmail instrument is exaggerated. Strong
international guarantees can prevent this. Besides, Pakistan has its own
self-interest in the $1.1 billion pipeline-based refinery Iran is helping
it build. Gen Musharraf's pipeline offer is likely to spur interest among
Indian businessmen, especially those with a stake in hydrocarbons.

However, there is an even more powerful argument for breaking the
India-Pakistan impasse. This political case arises from three
considerations: the need to break the vicious spiral of strategic
hostility which poses a unique danger in South Asia; the need to
unshackle New Delhi's (and Islamabad's) global perspectives and regional
agendas from the Kashmir crisis; and decommunalising both countries'
domestic politics. Mutual strategic hostility is one of the greatest
obstacles to democracy and development in both countries, driving and
reinforcing social prejudice, religious bigotry and militaristic
nationalism.

The painful truth is that the Indian sub-continent is the world's only
region which has witnessed a continuous hot-cold war for half a century,
which shows no signs of abating. East-West rivalry ended a decade ago,
with mixed results. The hot-cold war between Israel and the Arabs too has
ended-again for better and for worse (witness Palestine's plight). Even
the two Koreas have reached a level of reconciliation that seemed
inconceivable only months ago. India and Pakistan are the sole exception
to this trend. Their potential for mutual destruction has escalated
frightfully after their nuclearisation. A war between them now is
essentially unwinnable. Today, millions of their civilians have become
vulnerable to a nuclear catastrophe against which there is no defence.
Such hostility will only worsen-unless the impasse is broken.

This itself constitutes a pressing reason for a Lahore-II, with serious
arms reduction and strategic restraint, not just confidence-building
measures. But no less pressing is domestic politics in both countries
into which their strategic rivalry ineluctably feeds. Mutual hostility
validates communal politics in both societies. If the image of an
=ABoverbearing=BB, hostile neighbour did not exist, the
Jamaat-i-Islami would have to invent India. A Pakistan at peace with
India, and not helping the Kashmir militancy, would blunt the edge of
Hindutva's appeal. With India-Pakistan reconciliation, two of the three
prongs of the communal-Hindu Trishul- (mandir, Uniform Civil Code
and Article 370) would lose their potency. The forces of prejudice,
distrust and rivalry would lose their vicious edge.

That's why the reconciliation process must begin. For a dialogue to
start, New Delhi must stop stipulating unachievable preconditions, and
give up the pretence that its opposition to the Musharraf regime is based
upon =ABdemocratic=BB high principle rather than the mundane
calculation of courting Washington at Islamabad's expense through
US-style democracy rhetoric. Like Washington, New Delhi has done brisk
business with a range of military dictators, from Sukarno to the Shah, Ne
Win to Pinochet, =ABPapa Doc=BB Duvalier to Zia-ul-Haq; and Marcos
to Zia-ur-Rahman. It maintains close ties with the Burmese junta and the
King of Bhutan. It would be embarrassing for Mr Vajpayee to be reminded
that he was among the world's few foreign ministers who failed to condemn
Bhutto's judicial hanging under Zia-ul-Haq!

To talk to Gen Musharraf is not to dignify him: it is merely to accept
the reality of his being Pakistan's CE. Even the progressive community in
Pakistan is divided in its attitude to Gen Musharraf. While the bulk of
it believes that that the main issue before it is democracy vs military
rule, a significant section thinks it is the revival of the institutions
which Mr Nawaz Sharif systematically destroyed. The division shows the
issue is complex. New Delhi should not meddle with it as if it were a
participant in Pakistan's domestic politics.

A dialogue with Gen Musharraf does not mean conceding that Islamabad has
radically changed its Kashmir policy. But did Pakistan execute a dramatic
change before Mr Vajpayee rode the bus to Lahore? Nor will it do to argue
that the Kargil =ABbetrayal=BB makes a dialogue impossible. Kargil
did vitiate the India-Pakistan security equation. But an even greater
blow came from nuclearisation. Here, India, not Pakistan, was the
initiator. Past mistakes, misperceptions and misunderstandings must not
be papered over. But they do not negate the need for a dialogue; rather,
they underscore it. Beginning that process in no way narrows New Delhi's
options. On the contrary, it might produce results--if not a
breakthrough, then at least greater mutual trust and a revival of the
SAARC process which India wantonly torpedoed last year. A dialogue offers
a win-win opportunity which only an extraordinarily foolhardy government
will squander.---end---

______________________________________________
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