[sacw] South Asians Against Nukes Post | 24 July 00

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Mon, 24 Jul 2000 00:25:18 +0200


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South Asians Against Nukes Post
24 July 2000
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#1. Some Cold War Lessons
#2. Nuclear Weaponisation and YOU

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#1.

Outlook
31 July 2000
OPINION

Michael Krepon
Some Cold War Lessons

Nuclear risk reduction during the Cold War was far from easy. The US and
the Soviet Union worked hard to put in place nine key elements to
prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Despite sustained efforts to prevent
a nuclear exchange, US and Soviet leaders barely avoided potentially
catastrophic accidents.
The Cold War nuclear risk management still holds water vis-a-vis South
Asia.

In vastly different circumstances, India, China, and Pakistan are now in
the early stages of developing nuclear weapons. While recognising the
obvious differences between the US-Soviet experience and the
India-China-Pakistan relationship, it's still useful to consider whether
these key elements of nuclear risk reduction also apply to South Asia.

One key element in the US-Soviet case was a formal agreement not to
change the status quo in sensitive areas militarily. This accord, signed
at Helsinki in 1975, was the product of detente, not a battlefield
victory. Weight was added to its guiding principles as 35 heads of state
with a stake in avoiding another war in Europe endorsed them.

A second key element of nuclear risk reduction was tacit agreements
between the US and Soviet leaders to avoid brinkmanship in each other's
backyard or along particularly sensitive Cold War faultlines - divided
Germany and Korea. Tacit pacts to avoid brinkmanship over the status of
Berlin came after harrowing crises in 1948-1949 and 1961. The status quo
in Korea was restored only after a war in which the use of -weapons was
proposed but rejected by President Truman.

The most worrisome example of Cold War nuclear brinkmanship - the Cuban
missile crisis - came 12 years after the Soviet Union joined the US as a
-weapon state. This crisis prompted the removal of nuclear-capable
missiles from Cuba and Turkey. After this brush with disaster, US and
Soviet leaders continued to jockey for geopolitical advantage - but with
an understanding not to play for such high stakes so close home.

A third key element of risk reduction was an agreement to minimise
dangerous military practices. During the Cold War, US and Soviet forces
engaged in activities with a potential for escalation or accidents.
Surface naval vessels and submarines jostled for position in tight
spaces; combat aircraft carried out exercises near national borders; and
provocative intelligence-gathering operations were conducted. The first
guidelines for avoiding incidents at sea were negotiated in 1972. A pact
to prevent dangerous military practices on land and in the air was
negotiated in 1989.

Special reassurance measures for ballistic missiles and nuclear weapon
systems were a fourth key element. Reassurance was provided by prior
notifications of missile launches and other arrangements, requiring
transparency for the deployment and dismantlement of nuclear forces.

A fifth key element in risk reduction was trust in the faithful
implementation of treaty obligations and confidence-building measures.
On occasion, such trust was generated through unilateral or reciprocal
actions: removal from operational status of the least safe and secure
nuclear weapons in 1989 by presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.
More often, trust was built on verification. Therefore the sixth key
element was reliance on one's own monitoring capabilities, known
euphemistically as "national technical means."

The seventh key element was the establishment of reliable lines of
communication across borders, both for political and military leaders.
The first communication channel, the "Hotline", was established after
the Cuban missile crisis.

Eighth, risk reduction required reliable and redundant command and
control over nuclear forces, as well as exceptional intelligence
regarding the disposition of opposing nuclear capabilities. The expense
of these arrangements was considerable, but well worth it, considering
the many things that could go badly wrong.

Ninth, the US and the Soviet Union worked constantly to upgrade and
strengthen existing nuclear risk reduction measures in quiet times. The
original Hotline has been improved considerably. Reassurance measures
were recently extended to include shared early warning arrangements.
Gradually, treaty arrangements led to intrusive on-site inspections to
build trust.

What conclusions might be drawn from Cold War experience? Clearly, even
with all of the measures described above, the US and Soviet leaders
still found themselves "eyeball-to-eyeball" on several occasions.
Somehow, they managed to escape nuclear disaster, which suggests that a
tenth key element is divine intervention, or at least plain dumb luck.
US-Soviet risk reduction measures took many years to put in place. But
even after the safety net was presumably in place - during the first
Reagan administration - there was severe miscommunication.

It would be extremely unwise to dismiss this record as being irrelevant
to South Asia. Thankfully, the hyperactive nuclear rivalrly between the
US and the Soviet Union is not being replicated in this region. But
redundant nuclear capabilities were supposed to reduce risk during the
Cold War. Great nuclear risks can also arise from smaller arsenals.
Indeed, these risks are greater in the early phases of arsenal-building,
when perceived vulnerabilities are felt, verification is weak and
command and control untested.

As bad as Cold War nuclear dangers were, bipolarity provided a measure
of simplification. In Central Europe, boundaries were fixed, but South
Asia has lines of control, not borders. And nothing replicates the J&K
situation.

The introduction of overt, offsetting nuclear capabilities and ballistic
missiles has not reduced nuclear risks in South Asia. Seeking safety in
more powerful weapons is likely to make matters worse. How many of the
key elements of nuclear risk reduction are now in place? Can India
afford to wait 10 to 15 years to put them in place? Even in the darkest
periods of the Cold War, US and Soviet officials maintained active lines
of communication to reduce nuclear risks. At present, India refuses to
talk to Pakistan and China is not ready to engage India on these
matters. Deafening silence is not a key element for nuclear risk
reduction.

(The writer is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center)

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#2.

[23 July 2000]
Dear Friends,

Bangalore Platform Against Nuclear Weaponisation
Announces
"Nuclear Weaponisation and YOU" by Vishwambar Pati
This thirty-page booklet covers the major issues around nuclear
weaponisation in a succinct and readable manner
Suggested Contribution Rs5 per copy.
Contact
pati@i...
or
admin@i...
Contents:
1. Are they really weapons?
2. Brief History of Nuclear Arms
3. Disarmament Efforts, India's Role
4. Threat perception:The Cuban Missile Crisis
5. Sub-Continental Security
6. Jai Vigyan?
7. Socio-economic Costs
8. Risks
9. What you can do

Regards,
shubha