[sacw] S A A N Post | 6 August 00

[Harsh Kapoor]

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South Asians Against Nukes Post
6 August 2000
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#1. India: Hiroshoma & Nagasaki Days in Bombay (August 6)
#2. Pakistan: Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) 898 of 1999, allowing export
of nuclear technology
#3. Pakistan: Pakistan's nuclear advert 'mistake'
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#1.

5 August 2000
[From Sukla Sen in Bombay]

Hiroshoma & Nagasaki Days in Bombay

Dear Friends,

On the Hiroshima Day, Sunday 6 August, a group discussion involving a
bunch of young Japanese visitors and local peace activists has been
arranged at 3.30 PM at the Mani Bhavan. Please try to rope in the
members of the media.

On Wednesday 9 August, Nagasaki Day -- which also happens to be the
August Kranti Day -- we'll gather at the Churchgate at 5.00 PM at the
mouth of the Asiatic subway displaying anti-war, anti-nuke placards
and obtaining signatures from the members of the public on khadi
cloth banners bearing messages of peace and the determination for
attaining nuclear weapon-free world.

Let us make the programme a grand success.

Sukla
________

#2.

The Friday Times
4 August 2000

SRO on export of nuclear technology disregards law

Ahmer Bilal Soofi argues that the recent SRO allowing export of nuclear
equipment and materials is a highly irresponsible act apart from being in
disregard of international law and Pakistan's past state practice

In a stunning move, the Government of Pakistan has issued a Statutory
Regulatory Order (SRO) 898 of 1999, allowing export of nuclear technology
from Pakistan. The SRO was announced through a public notice, which
appeared in leading newspapers on July 24.

The SRO not only allows export of nuclear equipment and substances from
Pakistan but it permits any individual to export such technology and
equipment subject to a negligible condition of obtaining NOC (No Objection
Certificate) from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. The NOC is to be
issued against an undertaking that the nuclear materials thus exported
shall be used for peaceful purposes.

The SRO, which is a form of formal but delegative legislation, has been
issued by the Federal Government under section 3 of the Import and Export
Control Act 1950. Para 17.2 of the SRO states that Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission's (PAEC) NOC shall be mandatory for the export of the nuclear
substances, radioactive material or any other equipment used for generation
of electricity.

The July 24 public notice informs that anyone from Pakistan can now export
more or less freely nuclear substances like natural uranium, enriched
uranium, plutonium, heavy water etc., and nuclear equipment like nuclear
power reactor, reactor control systems and [other] full systems.

The move is surprising because it not only violates the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency) rules but is also contrary to Pakistan's past
practice in this regard.

The SRO throws up an interesting question. Who might import nuclear
equipment and substances from Pakistan? Except for India, Pakistan, Israel
and Cuba, all other states are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Articles 1 & 2 of the NPT categorically prohibit the party states to
receive `any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons...'.
Therefore, except for the non-signatories, no other state can import
nuclear substances and equipment that the Government of Pakistan is now
prepared to export bilaterally.

The condition of "bilateralism" is essential in this regard since no
signatory state would like to be blamed for importing material without IAEA
safeguards, especially because that could become the basis of an allegation
that such imports are likely to be diverted to nuclear use. Therefore,
technically, the only three states that can possibly import such materials
and equipment outside the purview of the IAEA are India, Israel and Cuba.
The SRO, which has apparently been issued without any debate, is silent on
these questions.

The transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is generally done
between states under the auspices of the IAEA and seldom bilaterally (see
box 1).

The IAEA is a Vienna-based international organization established under a
multilateral Treaty called the 1956 IAEA Statute. The purpose of the
organization was to help countries develop nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes. Under article XI of the IAEA Statute, procedure for assistance to
member states is regulated and provided for. The members place the
equipment and substances at the disposal of the IAEA, which in turn gives
them to states seeking assistance. IAEA further enters into safeguard
agreements with the recipient state. The Safeguards Agreement ensures that
the nuclear technology is not being diverted to any non-peaceful use.

Pakistan is a member of the IAEA. In the past, Pakistan has mostly routed
assistance in the nuclear area through the IAEA. Therefore, the present SRO
is contrary to state practice. The procedure involves firstly a treaty of
broad cooperation from the recipient state, and in the second stage,
acceptance of the IAEA safeguards. Under this SRO, both requirements
followed by Pakistan in the past have been carelessly disregarded (see box
2).

Exporting and importing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is a
state-level activity and an individual supplier or exporter cannot take it
upon itself. Pakistan's own state practice demonstrates this. It is very
casual on the part of Pakistan Government to withdraw the requirement of
safeguards from the potential importer of nuclear materials and equipment
and eliminate the IAEA engagement in the entire process of export.

It is a worldwide state practice that purchases made from suppliers in
other states have to be done under the umbrella of the treaty of
cooperation between the two contracting states. In other words, the states
should agree to cooperate and then the individual importer and exporter
engage each other in the negotiations for the deal.

However, under the present SRO, no treaty of cooperation with the state
where the prospective importer resides, is necessary. This is a very
loose-ended arrangement.

Although the SRO and its amendment provides for an NOC and an undertaking
that the nuclear substances and materials exported from Pakistan shall not
be used for non-peaceful purposes, it is not clear how the Pakistan
government would ensure that the buyer is complying with the undertaking.

Realistically speaking, it cannot, because Pakistan's law will have no
extraterritorial application in the state to which nuclear material has
been exported. Thus the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission or any other
Pakistani authority shall have no administrative jurisdiction or control
over the buyer if the material is diverted to the preparation of a nuclear
device. In that sense the condition of giving an undertaking is rather
useless and a mere formality.

It is paradoxical that while the Government of Pakistan is fighting hard to
dispel the impression that it supports "terrorism" of any kind, it should
make laws and effect procedures that could effectively facilitate the
acquisition of nuclear materials by undesirable elements.

Pakistan should be mindful of several international conventions that are in
place and others that are being negotiated for sanctions against state
actors who, directly or indirectly, might be found to assist terrorism. The
legal developments show a trend to arrest all aspects of terrorism. This
SRO can be very damaging for Pakistan since it could provide an ideal
option to a non-state actor to arrange export from Pakistan of nuclear
wherewithal under the garb of fake companies.

Interestingly, there is some indication that the Foreign Office and the
PAEC might not be involved in the decision to amend and publish the SRO. If
this is indeed true, then the obvious question is, who did this and why? It
is dangerous to bypass the authority of the PAEC and to keep the FO out of
the loop. If Pakistan is ready for the transfer of nuclear technology it
must do so through the IAEA so that the technology is put to its correct
use without being detrimental to the interests of Pakistan.

Experts agree that a matter so important should not have been brought on
the statute book in a manner so visibly irresponsible. No hint was received
from any quarter that the government was planning to make such a move. This
could merely provide another opportunity to anti-Pakistan elements to
tarnish the country's image.
________

#3.

BBC News Online: World: South Asia
Friday, 4 August, 2000, 17:56 GMT 18:56 UK

Pakistan's nuclear advert 'mistake'

By Zafar Abbas in Pakistan

Pakistan has criticised an article in the British newspaper The
Guardian, which claimed Islamabad would allow the export of sensitive
nuclear material.

The commerce ministry's full page advertisement of 24 July - on which
the Guardian's story is based - does seem to suggest Pakistan was all
set to export its nuclear material.

The advertisement invited applications for the export of 11 radioactive
substances, including depleted uranium, enriched uranium, plutonium and
tritium, as well as equipment like nuclear research reactors

Would-be exporters were asked to declare that the nuclear substance sold
would only be used for peaceful purposes, and that it would not be
re-exported.

But now the foreign ministry says the publication of the advertisement
was a mistake, and the Guardian should not have written its article
without further clarification.

A spokesman described the article as tendentious, and said Pakistan was
not violating any international guidelines.

Clarification

It is still not clear who authorised the publication of the advert, but
top government officials say they realised a mistake had been made
fairly quickly.

Within 48 hours the commerce ministry issued a clarification and the
export offer was withdrawn.

The foreign ministry spokesman said Pakistan remains committed to its
decision not to export any sensitive nuclear material or equipment to
any other country.

Almost all nuclear material in the country is held by the government,
and this incident is likely to cause some embarrassment to the
authorities.

They'll now be expected to conduct a full investigation into how the
advertisement came to be published.
________

#3.