[sacw] SACW Dispatch #2. | 8 Aug. 00

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch #2
8 August 2000
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

#1. Making a peace process work Part- I
#2. The cost of peace
#3. States of Determination
#4. Kashmiris pray and hope
#5. RSS gets a public face
#6. Ali Sardar Jafri

_____________________

#1.

The Hindu
8 August 2000
Op-Ed.

MAKING A PEACE PROCESS WORK - I

By Radha Kumar

THE PAST weeks have seen dramatic events. One of the largest of the
Kashmir militant groups, the Hizbul Mujaheddin, declared a ceasefire on
July 24. The ceasefire was unilateral only in so far as it was not
backed by other militant groups: in other ways it was conditional. It
called for unconditional talks, inclusion of Pakistan in the peace
process, and an end to reprisals and human rights violations, and it
gave the Indian Government three months to begin implementing measures.
The Government welcomed the ceasefire and the Army was put on strict
orders to curtail its hot war against the Hizbul - which would have, in
practice, also entailed a curb on Army-militant encounters. Meanwhile,
the Government established contact with the Hizbul to work on details of
the ceasefire. The first step has been taken with discussions on how to
curb violence and prevent human rights violations in Kashmir.

It was just such a set of cease-fires by Republican and Unionist
militias which allowed the peace process to begin in Northern Ireland in
1994. These too could have been seen as unilateral: that is, they were
not reached mutually, either with each other or with the British
Government, but one by one. To have seen them as unilateral, however,
would have been to miss the point. The ceasefire by the IRA led the
Unionist paramilitaries to follow suit. For the first time in Kashmir's
decade of insurgency, it looked as if something similar could happen
here. From press reports, it appeared that the Hizbul's ceasefire had
the tacit blessing of the Pakistani Government. It was not unreasonable
to expect that pressure on the other militant groups might follow.
Indeed, the ceasefire offered a golden opportunity to Pakistan to show
support for a Kashmiri peace process. Instead, the Pakistani Foreign
Office's mixed messages, the Lashkar's attack on an Army camp in the
Valley and ensuing press conference in Karachi, the barbaric attack in a
marketplace crowded with pilgrims, and the upsurge of militant violence
which left 100 dead in two days are grim reminders of how thorny the
Kashmir issue is. But this is still the immediate aftermath of the
ceasefire announcement, when attempts to derail it are inevitable, as is
also the controversy in Pakistan. The question is, will the Hizbul be
able to hold its ceasefire through this upsurge and what can be done to
make it die down?

Similar attempts to derail the ceasefires in Northern Ireland were
regularly made, but the major paramilitary groups were persuaded to
maintain, and on occasion return to, a ceasefire, largely because their
political wings proved their commitment to peaceful negotiations through
pressure on the paramilitary groups. In this, they were supported by the
British and Irish Governments, and the large and influential
Irish-American diaspora. The cease-fires paved the way for British-Sinn
Fein and Republican-Unionist talks, though these were delayed for over
three years by British Army and Unionist opposition. Sinn Fein, which
had been proscribed, became a recognised party. It is now in Government
with Mr. John Hume's Social Democratic and Labour Party, and Mr. David T
rimble's Ulster Unionist Party.

By comparison, the All-Party Hurriyat Conference is not exactly
proscribed, nor do Parliament or the Army oppose its recognition, but it
is yet to be instituted as a negotiating party. Given this position, it
is surprising that the Hurriyat coalition has been so critical of the
Hizbul's initiative - one of whose chief purposes was to push for the
Hurriyat to be recognised as a leading party - but fortunately that
hurdle appears to have now been partially crossed. But only partially.

The Hurriyat needs to take the further step of calling on other militant
groups to support the Hizbul's initiative, and it needs consistent, if
private, Pakistani Government support to do so. As several Pakistani
commentators have pointed out, Pakistan's ``now I support it now I
don't'' ``policies not only hurt Kashmiris but Pakistanis too. For its
part, whatever reservations it might have, the Indian Government needs
to substantively reassure the Hizbul of its commitment to inclusive and
open- ended talks.''

The question now is, can any forward movement be taken on talks, who
will be in them, and what will be their scope? Fortunately, the Indian
Government is currently taking the view that the militant upsurge must
not derail a peace process. It has, at the same time, been silent on
whether it will revise its position of ``no talks with Pakistan''.
Formally, the Hizbul has called for tripartite talks, but its leaders
have also shown that they are prepared for a step-by-step process. While
urging tripartite talks, the Pakistan Government has also indicated it
might be flexible. And the Hurriyat has said, at various times, that it
supports all-party talks which would include leaders from Jammu and
Ladakh and minority representatives. Judging by press responses, infor
med public opinion in India - and to a slightly lesser extent, in
Pakistan - also favours an inclusive and open- ended peace process,
which could begin on several tracks.

Unlike the situation in Northern Ireland, however, where much of the
groundwork for talks had already been done long before they commenced,
including draft agreements on its future constitutional and political
shape, groundwork towards a possible Kashmir solution remains to be
done. In this sense, whatever talks there are now can only be
preliminary ones which will prepare for substantive talks to follow.
Given this context, debate over whether or not the talks will be within
the purview of the Indian Constitution is a red herring, especially
given that the Constitution is itself under review, has been many times
amended, and there are in any case a range of views on what Kashmir's
constitutional relationship to India is, as the Kashmir Government's
autonomy report makes clear. The call for tripartite talks is similarly
premature, but it continues to be important to open a channel with
Pakistan, even if initially only at an informal level. Ultimately,
Kashmir will find lasting peace only if there is peace between India and
Pakistan. In fact, the Northern Ireland cease-fires were prefigured by a
joint declaration by the British and Irish Prime Ministers in December
1993 that: the people of Northern and Southern Ireland were entitled to
self-determination, and Sinn Fein and other militant parties would be
accepted in all-party talks only if they made a commitment to ``a
permanent end to terrorist activities''. Ireland renounced its claim to
the partitioned region in return for an open border and mutual
Catholic-Protestant self- determination. The Framework Agreements which
followed included an all-Ireland Council for trade and development, a
British-Irish inter-governmental conference, demilitarisation,
paramilitary decommissioning and police reform, power-sharing within the
region, and devolution within Britain through the creation of Assemblies
in Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland with which most powers
would reside. Where once there were giant concrete blocks known as
``Dragon's Teeth'', today the border between southern and northern
Ireland is hard to find.

Can one imagine a similar kind of joint declaration by the Governments
of India and Pakistan, or a similar set of agreements for Kashmir?
Clearly it is far too early to say. Nevertheless, there are some small
signs of promise. There is a growing nationwide discussion of devolution
which the Indian governing coalition is well-placed to develop. The
British Prime Minister, Mr. Tony Blair, in fact devolved to Scotland,
Wales, England and Northern Ireland before starting all-party talks
within Northern Ireland. Though systematic groundwork on the elements
which would have to go into a Kashmir solution is yet to be undertaken,
there are already several proposals in circulation. The next step is to
begin evaluating these proposals in comparison with other peace agree
ments, in preparation for substantive talks. Currently, the Indian
Government is displaying remarkable maturity in its commitment to a
Kashmir peace process. If the Pakistani Government could bring itself to
be similarly unequivocal, a major hurdle to talks would be overcome.

(The writer is Senior Fellow in Peace and Conflict Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations, New York.)

______

#2.

The Hindustan Times
8 August 2000
Op-Ed.

THE COST OF PEACE

by Sonia Jabbar

A hundred people have been brutally murdered in a series of
well-planned, coordinated strikes by unidentified militants in Jammu and
Kashmir. Of the victims, only two were armed security personnel. Most
were non-Kashmiri civilians, pilgrims to Amarnath and a sizeable number
being the poorest, weakest people of India: daily wage labourers from
Chattisgarh, Bihar, UP and Orissa working for a few months for slightly
higher wages in Kashmir.

Unlike an operation against security forces which requires skill,
planning, personnel and considerable fire-power, soft targets can be
attacked at will with a small group of armed men and with an alarmingly
high casualty rate in spite of the best planned security arrangements by
the Indian state. A few days ago, a 13-year old boy lobbed a grenade at
a tourist vehicle in Gulmarg, killing one and injuring five. In each of
the killing sites on August 1, whether Pahalgam, Mir Bazaar or Sandoo,
the survivors reported the presence of only two or three militants.

Although the Muttahida Jehad Council (MJC), an umbrella organisation of
16 militant groups based in Pakistan, has denied involvement and there
have been separate statements by the Lashkar-e-Toiba and
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen disowning responsibility, the killings are
obviously the work of groups inimical to the Hizbul Mujahideen's (HM)
call for a temporary cease-fire and talks with the Centre. In all these
years, no militant group has ever owned responsibility for an attack on
civilians, be it at Wandhama or Chattisinghpora.

Regardless of the killers' identity, the carnage was meant to dispel the
popular notion that the HM rules roost in the Valley and underscores the
fact that the Indian Government cannot negotiate with the HM while
ignoring other militant groups. Syed Salahuddin, the chief of the HM,
also headed the MJC right upto the day Abdul Majid Dar, chief of HM
operations in Kashmir, announced the unilateral cease-fire in Srinagar.
Even the chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami (the political and ideological
wing of the HM) of Pakistan was unaware of the HM's plans. A sudden and
radical shift in policy on the part of the HM which excluded the other
groups was bound to have an adverse effect. And to add fuel to fire, the
HM has been publicly claiming credit for single-handedly challenging the
Indian state in the last ten years.

Even though the Centre's decision not to abandon the peace process and
the Prime Minister's invitation to the HM for talks 'within the
parameters of human decency' are reasons to be optimistic about the
future of Kashmir, it is crucial to proceed with extreme caution. First,
no militant group which has the upper hand in an insurgency would
suddenly fold up operations to start negotiations with its sworn enemy.
Every insurgency in the world has had what is called 'tactical pauses'
which serves as a breather in a prolonged war and suits both sides as it
gives them time to rest, regroup, recruit fresh troops, regenerate
depleted resources and rethink strategy.

What is disturbing is that even as there are concrete moves towards a
peace process, there are intelligence reports of large numbers of
militants waiting to infiltrate from across the border, especially near
Gulmarg and in Kupwara.

But assuming that the HM is sincere and there are certain factors which
leave no other option but to negotiate with the Government, what
precisely will they negotiate about? Since azadi has never been an
option for the HM, and carving out a piece of Kashmir for Pakistan is
hardly something they are in a position to do, the only road seems to be
the one most militants opt for these days: political power within
mainstream politics.

This may seem surprising considering the HM's reputation as a
disciplined and effective group. But it should be remembered that Syed
Salahuddin's avatar of an armed 'revolutionary' materialised only after
Syed Salahuddin - the politician - failed to win during the 1987
election as a Muslim United Front candidate. There are reports as well
that the HM has reshuffled its organisation, placing moderate faces in
key and middle level positions which indicates a desire to be publicly
not only acceptable but appealing.

Even as this seems to be an attractive proposition for the Indian
Government, it should not be forgotten that something similar had been
tried in 1995, a year after the JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front, the first in 1989 to pick up arms) had declared a cease-fire. The
Home Ministry, with much fanfare, had brought the leaders of several
militant groups, including Babar Badr of the Muslim Janbaaz Force, to
the negotiating table. Badr gave up the gun and opted for a nomination
in Kashmir's Legislative Council. Within no time he stood a discredited
man, groups like the HM gained ascendancy and power, and lethal groups
like the Lashkar-e-Toiba emerged.

If the Centre is serious about the peace process in Kashmir, it has to
develop a multi-pronged strategy engaging with the entire spectrum of
players in Kashmiri politics, from

the National Conference, the HM, the Hurriyat and the Pandits, to groups
like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. It may even consider
it worth its while engaging with Pakistan. As it is, pitting one group
against another or the old divide and rule trick may pay dividends in
the short term, but it will also mean that the peace process in Kashmir
will be short-lived.

______

#3.

The Telegraph
8 August 2000
Op-Ed.

STATES OF DETERMINATION

BY ACHIN VANAIK
=20
Recent developments in both Kashmir and Sri Lanka have thrown up once
again the confusions, uncertainties and hypocrisies that inevitably
surround the issue of self-determination. Among Sri Lankan Tamils and
Kashmiris strong sentiments favouring complete independence can be
found. But otherwise the limits of "respectable" and "legitimate" debate
are supposed to be set by the inviolable character of the existing
territorial boundaries of both Sri Lanka and India. In short, secession
of either Jaffna from Sri Lanka or of Kashmir (in part or whole) from
the Indian Union is axiomatically deemed out of the question.
What is extraordinary, however, is that the exclusion of a secessionist
option is invariably justified in the name of respecting the sovereignty
of the country in question. For India, the rejection of Tamil eelam is
often justified in the name of "national interest". This usually
suffices to silence potential critics, but it is not as effective as the
claim that Sri Lankan sovereignty must be respected. After all, there
can be those irritating voices in India who will say that the interests,
aspirations and wishes of Sri Lankan Tamils cannot be held hostage to
Indian "national interests" as defined by its dominant elite.

For all those who are seriously concerned about the pursuit of justice
in politics (and not just national aggrandizement and self-importance),
the issue of self-determination, upto and including independence, must
be treated with the respect that it deserves. It does not follow that
one should advocate independence for either Jaffna or Kashmir.
Self-determination is an appropriately general term which can mean a
state of affairs short of full independence, provided this is acceptable
to the people concerned, namely the principal victims of discrimination
or repression, whose justified sense of grievance has helped create the
resistance movement in the first place. But it does mean that the option
of full independence cannot be ruled out by arbitrary fiat. If such
independence is opposed it must be done so through arguments based on
principles of political justice.

Cynics will no doubt say that it is the relationship of forces on the
ground, not principles of justice, that finally determines outcomes.
This common perception fails to understand that popular grievances
(deriving from a sense of injustice) fuel resistance struggles and
therefore help shape provisional and ultimate outcomes. Moreover, the
desire to establish the most just solution should be the normative ideal
that helps guide our political endeavours even if in practice we fall
short of achieving that ideal. Keeping this in mind, the first thing we
must recognise is that "sovereignty" does not reside in a territory or
in a government but in people. Notions like maintaining the "unity and
integrity" of a country at all costs is simply absurd. Sovereignty is n
ot something fixed but something that has to be earned from the people
who are governed. Precisely because sovereignty is revocable and
changeable, it has to be constantly earned if the boundaries within
which political rule is exercised are to remain unchanged.

The point is simple. The guiding principle in assessing the legitimacy
of a demand for independence, provided it is voiced by a large section
of people in a given area, is whether or not it advances the cause of
democracy. The legitimacy of the demand is not to be determined or
defined by any other condition, such as whether it is compatible with
the preservation of existing territorial unity or whether it is in the
"national interest" of that state (or neighbouring states) or whether it
"weakens" the country in question. This does not reduce the complexity
of the issue or explain how to arrive at the best (because most just)
solution or ideal. But it does mean that the terrain of serious debate
is wider than what is generally "allowed" in the name of a false sense
of patriotism.

In India, this means not only that this government has no business
ruling out even the discussion of Kashmiri autonomy, but also that there
is no sacrosanct principle (no matter what the left or other parties
think) that rules out discussion of pre-1953 autonomy status or even
independence. To respect Kashmiri sensitivities today is to rule out
nothing from discussion nor to take umbrage at a regional force taking
an extreme position as its initial negotiating stance. One must make out
a reasoned case why independence or too "lose" a union would be
antithetical to the interests of democracy. Such stands cannot simply be
declared unacceptable and irresponsible but must be shown to be
undesirable and unnecessary. The same applies to the issue of Tamil
Eelam.

Here, the argument must balance between a number of conflicting but
democratic claims. Self-determination is a democratic right of the
people concerned and therefore the voices of people must be heard even
if not necessarily assented to. But who are the people in question and
what is the collective unit to which the right of self-determination is
to be ascribed? Is it the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, the valley only,
or also Pakistan occupied Kashmir along with the valley? One thing
though is certain - it is not just the voices of the Indian and
Pakistani governments and their supporters that must be heard. It
follows that we do need to set up structures and forums of discussion to
include more than the representatives of New Delhi and Islamabad,
unpalatable as this may be to the arch-patriots of both countries.

Again, the leading forces demanding secession in Kashmir and in Jaffna
are such that by their very nature they make it difficult to justify
independence in the name of democracy. This is because the Islamic
fundamentalist groups which dominate the resistance movement in Kashmir
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Jaffna are themselves
strongly militarist, exclusivist and authoritarian forces and therefore
the new states formed would themselves be deeply undemocratic. Had there
been genuinely secular and democratic parties leading the resistance
movements, their demands for azadi and eelam would have been more
powerful and convincing.

As things stand, therefore, the search for some form of
institutionalized autonomous status for Jaffna and Kashmir, acceptable
to both the peoples in question and to the two governments respectively,
would clearly appear to be the most democratic framework in which to
strive for some kind of political resolution. But it should be noted
that the justification given here for limiting the search for solutions
to some form of autonomy rather than advocating independence is
authorized by considerations of democracy and not by considerations of
unity, national interest or even of fear of the supposedly knock-on
effects of secession.

In any case, the domino theory of nationalism - that secession in one
part of the country promotes secession elsewhere (in the same country or
in other countries) - represents a bad conceptual understanding of the
nature of nationalism, a poor grasp of history (which provides no
succour to such a domino theory) and leads to a political posture that
would deny respect for the right of full self-determination of an
oppressed group of people when this principle always deserves respect,
even if not always an automatic or uncritical or unqualified
endorsement.

It also means that freedom of debate is total. People should not be
pilloried for discussing or advocating independence or strong autonomy.
Here, the global lesson of the last 50 years is that
political-territorial union is strongest when it is voluntary. This is
especially so for large multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual
countries like India. Genuine federalism and decentralization of power
is increasingly recognized as providing the most democratic and
therefore the most stable foundation for preserving that voluntary
unity.

But given the different histories of different regions and the different
ways (and even times) in which regions have come together to form a
single union, the principle of asymmetric federalism (devolution of
unequal powers to provincial administrative units) has come to play an
increasingly important role for countries from Spain to Canada to the
United Kingdom. Both common sense and democratic instincts suggest that
this is the way forward for India and Sri Lanka.

The author has recently co-authored the book, South Asia on a Short
Fuse: Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament=20=20=20

______

#4.

BBC News Online: World: South Asia
Monday, 7 August, 2000, 16:11 GMT 17:11 UK

KASHMIRIS PRAY AND HOPE

By Jill McGivering in Srinagar

Indian-administered Kashmir has spent a tense weekend waiting and
wondering.

The historic meetings between government representatives and the leaders
of one of the main pro-separatist militant groups, the Hizbul
Mujahadeen, raised hopes here.

But while some people are optimistic that dialogue will restart, others
say the ceasefire negotiations are unlikely to lead to lasting progress.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
[They have seen] their parents killed in front of them, so they feel
very threatened
Abdul Rashiel Hanjoora

------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a charity hostel in Srinagar, young Kashmiri boys pray together.
All of them are orphans, their parents killed in the political violence
of the last decade.

They are just a handful of an estimated 100,000 children orphaned by the
crisis - many of them forced to fend for themselves as child labourers.

Abdul Rashiel Hanjoora, the general secretary of the Jammu and Kashmir
Yateem trust which runs this hostel, says the children are deeply
traumatised.

"It is true that the children, due to this turmoil, are really
frightened and have some psychological problems also.

"They have seen their parents killed in front of them, so they feel very
threatened," he says.

Living in fear

They are not the only ones scarred by the violence.

Dr Girija Dhar chairs the recently formed state commission for women.

She says many women who have spent a decade living with constant anxiety
are now clinically depressed.

"When any family member leaves the house, the whole family is worried.
Is he going to come back, will he be killed in crossfiring? Will he be
kidnapped... or taken away by the security forces or the police?"

"The anxiety preys on the mind and causes a lot of emotional turmoil,"
she says.

Her husband, Dr Naseer Ahmad Shah, is a well known doctor here who sees
patients from all walks of life.

He senses a general exhaustion - people emotionally worn out by years of
uncertainty and eager to move on.

"People definitely want change, they are tired of uncertainty, they want
peace," he said.

Scepticism

But talks or no talks, Mohammed Jaseem Butt is still digging graves,
ready for the next casualties.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
If they just talk quietly amongst themselves like this, I don't think
anything will come of it
Mohammed Jaseem Butt

------------------------------------------------------------------------
He is a volunteer worker at an Islamic cemetery exclusively for the
pro-separatist dead.
He has been digging two or three graves every day for the past few
years. He agrees that people want peace but does not expect to be out of
work soon.

"If they involved Pakistan and the other militant leaders, then
something positive might happen," Mr Mohammed says.

"But if they just talk quietly amongst themselves like this, I don't
think anything will come of it. The Hizbul Mujahadeen alone can't decide
the fate of the whole of Kashmir," he says.

The violence has taken its toll on people here - inflicting damage which
will take many years to repair.

For the children orphaned by the conflict, football is much more real
than peace - this conflict started long before they were born.

But however remote, the ceasefire has at least raised hope that a
solution might eventually be found.

______

#5.

The Times of India
8 August 2000

RSS GETS A PUBLIC FACE

By Rajesh Ramachandran

NEW DELHI: For the first time, the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) has
appointed an official spokesperson. It has picked M G Vaidya (Bapuraoji
Vaidya, to old-timers) for the post. His job definition: to represent
the RSS view correctly to media.

A former baudhik shiksha pramukh (intellectual training chief),
77-year-old Vaidya was chosen to head the publicity wing when the Sangh
opened its prachar vibhag.

Why does the the 75-year-old organisation of `many mysteries' now need a
public face? Vaidya answers: ``We are also changing. Earlier we thought
that Sangh activities need no publicity. But the stand was changed in
1994 and I was asked to set up the prachar wing. Now, the Sangh feels
there is a schism between reality and the image of the Sangh, which has
to be rectified.''

The announcement of the image-builder's appointment too was very
Sangh-like. On Monday, Vaidya addressed a poorly attended press
conference where he voiced the RSS demand for the Tripura government's
dismissal. No one had a clue that Vaidya was anointed the RSS' voice
until, almost at the end of the press conference, one of the Delhi RSS
leaders casually rose to announce that Vaidya would be available for
comments every day from four to five in the evening.

Vaidya says the decision to have a spokesperson was made at an all-India
meeting in Ahmedabad on July 1-2.

But, it still remains a mystery why the Sangh has decided to get out of
its shadowy trail after 75 years. In fact, Delhi's Pranth Sanghchalak,
Satyanarayan Bansal, calling the press conference to order, didn't
forget to remind that it was one of the RSS' rare public interaction
with the press.

So was the all-India protest on the day against some Tripura abductions
that took place a year ago. The RSS hardly ever launches an agitation
under its own banner. RSS leaders also reiterated that Muslims too were
present in the protests. Is the RSS finally plunging into mainstream
politics?

Copyright =A9 2000 Times Internet Limited.
______

#6.

Letters to the Editor
The Hindu
8 August 2000

ALI SARDAR JAFRI

Sir, - I have learnt the sad news about the passing away of the foremost
Urdu poet, Ali Sardar Jafri. With the late Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Jafri was an
epic poet. His long poem Asia Jag Utha, which he wrote in recent years
placed him alongside Faiz Ahmed Faiz, the Pakistani poet, who was
persecuted and who lived mostly in exile during his mature years.

As one of the first seven writers of the Progressive Writers' Movement,
which was initiated by us in Lucknow in the early Thirties, Ali Sardar
Jafri had from the beginning of his career the vision of renaissance
movement in literature and culture to lift our writings from triflings
to the expression of the vision of Asia awakening to universal
awareness. I take pride in the fact that I was privileged to write the
introduction to his long poem Asia Jag Utha. I know that his vision of
awakening Asia will be realised if the new young remember his poems as
we, in our generation, were inspired by the long poems of Muhammad
Iqbal.

Mulk Raj Anand,

Mumbai
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