[sacw] [ACT] saanp (25 March 00)

Fri, 24 Mar 2000 17:36:24 +0100

South Asians Against Nukes Post
25 March 2000
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#1. Nuclear stalemate in South Asia
#2. Guardian Editorial on US Nuclear Policy & S. Asia
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#1.
Boston Globe
23 March 2000
Op-Ed.

Nuclear stalemate in South Asia

By Todd Sechser, 3/23/2000

fter South Asia's 1998 nuclear tests, the Clinton administration
established five ''benchmarks'' by which to gauge nuclear stability in
South Asia. But Washington's relationships with India and Pakistan have
suffered, and progress on these objectives has been disappointing.

Export controls. The most positive news from South Asia is that neither
India nor Pakistan appears to be directly aiding the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles beyond their borders. Although
neither has joined international conventions that would codify this
commitment (such as the Missile Technology Control Regime), both have in
place strict regulations that limit the sale of sensitive technology.
Pakistan's fragile economy and shortage of hard currency could undermine
this restraint.

Fissile material. Washington has urged India and Pakistan to cease
production of nuclear-weapons usable material and to enter into
international negotiations for a formal cutoff treaty, but both countries'
stocks continue to grow. Experts estimate that India possesses enough
plutonium for up to 90 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan holds enough
enriched uranium for up to 43 weapons. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh says a moratorium on fissile material production is something India
''cannot accept.''

Dialogue. Clinton's last-minute decision to include Pakistan on his
itinerary (dismissed by India as a ''brief stop-over'') reflects his
determination to bring India and Pakistan to the negotiating table to
resolve South Asia's linchpin issue: Kashmir. Discussions in Lahore one
year ago yielded a joint declaration of confidence-building measures
''aimed at the avoidance of conflict.'' But last summer's clashes in
Kashmir, in addition to the killings this week, demonstrated that the
divided territory remains a dangerous - and potentially nuclear -
flashpoint. Indian officials wince at the very suggestion of international
mediation, and Clinton explicitly refuses to pressure New Delhi otherwise.

Nuclear test ban. Until October 1999, India and Pakistan were on track to
sign the Compehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The US Senate derailed this
momentum by refusing to ratify the treaty. Nonetheless, both countries have
declared a voluntary moratorium on further testing. India's Atomic Energy
Commission believes that India gained enough scientific data from its 1998
tests to be confident about its deterrent, while Pakistan is unlikely to
risk further international sanctions by testing unilaterally.

Even if Clinton persuades India - and, by consequence, Pakistan - to sign
the test ban treaty during his visit, the US failure to ratify it will
likely preclude ratification by India and Pakistan as well.

Strategic restraint. These failures are worrisome developments, but none
is so disturbing as India's plan to deploy operational nuclear warheads.
India and Pakistan currently retain a latent or ''nonweaponized'' nuclear
capability. But if the draft nuclear doctrine released by India last August
becomes official policy, then nuclear deployment is, as Indian Defense
Minister George Fernandes has declared, ''inevitable.'' Pakistani Foreign
Minister S. A. Khan assures us that ''if India operationalizes its nuclear
weapons, Pakistan will be obliged to follow suit.''

Nuclear deployment would significantly accelerate the slow-motion arms race
that has been taking place in South Asia for over two decades and would
threaten the region's fragile stability. Nuclear weapons kept in safe
storage cannot be accidentally launched, nor do they terrify neighbors with
the possibility of a ''bolt from the blue'' surprise attack. Keeping South
Asia's nuclear weapons safely off the tips of ballistic missiles is of
grave importance.

In short, the US report card in South Asia is dismal. Moreover, Clinton's
visit has not achieved major breakthroughs on any of the five ''benchmark''
issues. Nevertheless, these shortcomings should not obscure the value of
rebuilding political and military ties with India and Pakistan.

Reversing the chill in US relations with South Asia will help secure Indian
support on economic and strategic issues as well as Pakistan's cooperation
to combat terrorism and restore democracy. At the same time, Clinton's
visit will help give the US leverage to manage crises on the subcontinent.
The Pentagon learned this lesson first-hand during last July's flare-up in
Kashmir, when an absence of military-to-military ties inhibited efforts to
send the commander-in-chief of the US Central Command to Pakistan to defuse
the crisis.

During the 1990s, the United States made demands of India and Pakistan
without first gaining their confidence. As a result, US nonproliferation
goals have been rebuked. Clinton's visit is a badly needed step toward
building the cooperation and trust necessary to harness the region's
nuclear dangers. This task is a decade overdue.

Todd Sechser is a junior fellow in the Non-Proliferation Project at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

This story ran on page A23 of the Boston Globe on 3/23/2000.
=A9 <globe/search/copyright.htm>Copyright 2000 Globe Newspaper Company.

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#2.

The Guardian
=46riday March 24, 2000

Alarmingly incoherent US nuclear policies fail to add up
The India-Pakistan conflict: special report

President Bill Clinton flunked a rare opportunity in India this week to
advance efforts to curb global proliferation of nuclear weapons. His mild
strictures about the dangers inherent in India's military nuclear programme
were politely but firmly rejected. Pakistan's leaders are likely to give him
similarly short shrift when he visits Islamabad tomorrow. Even though he
calls Kashmir, where India, Pakistan and their proxies are locked in
confrontation, the world's most dangerous place, and even though his
secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, considers the two countries' nuclear
rivalry a "number one security concern" for the US, Mr Clinton was overly
anxious not to upset his prickly hosts with unwelcome mediation offers or
some serious arms control arm-twisting. India and Pakistan learned this week
that nuclear capability ensures a kind of respect from the big kid on the
block. That is a seriously destabilising global signal.

Mr Clinton's diffidence reflects a broader problem: America's deepening
confusion about its overall nuclear strategy. The president could not
convincingly preach the virtues of self-denial to Delhi while the US refuses
to ratify the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Although it observes a
voluntary moratorium, it is free to resume testing at any time. And despite
the scrapping of more than half of its cold war weapons stockpile, it
retains at least 10,000 nuclear warheads and state-of-the-art offensive
delivery systems. Ms Albright piously reaffirmed recently America's
"ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons". But even if a Start III arms
reduction accord is eventually agreed with Russia, for instance, the US will
keep as many as 2,500 "city-buster" warheads.

The problem of US double standards has worldwide impact. In the Middle East,
for example, Washington tolerates Israel's nuclear capability which Arab
states consider a major threat to their security. But it continues to press
all sides for a "final" peace settlement as if this fundamental imbalance
did not exist. Its fears that Iran or Iraq may acquire the bomb meanwhile
lead it to adopt policies, particularly economic sanctions, which undermine
the chances of long-term regional peace and prosperity.

Mr Clinton's weak south Asian performance also provides an unpropitious
backdrop for next month's nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference
in New York. Here, another basic confusion in US policy will come under
scrutiny. The foreign office minister Peter Hain voiced hopes this week that
the US intention to build a national missile defence (NMD) "will be
compatible with the preservation of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
treaty". But he acknowledged a possible "conflict of interests". This is
very diplomatic of him. NMD has the potential to destroy ABM, the 1972
keystone of non-proliferation efforts, wreck the review conference, and
provoke a post-cold war global strategic arms race. For the obvious response
of a country like China is to build more and bigger nukes.

The NMD presents particular problems for Britain. Under the Pentagon's
madcap scheme, interceptors would (if they work, and that is a big "if") be
alerted by forward stations such as Fylingdales to meet incoming nuclear
missiles fired by "rogue states". This affords Yorkshire a proud place in
the national defence. Of America, that is. For NMD is not intended,
initially at least, to protect European Nato allies. Because it threatens
Nato's cohesion, because it encourages nuclear proliferation, and because it
is just plain dangerous, Britain must actively and urgently oppose it.
Meanwhile, the US needs to sort out its nuclear ideas.