[sacw] [ACT] sacw dispatch (12 Feb 00)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web - Dispatch
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex
12 Feb 2000
[Note to all recipients of SACW dispatch: Between the period 13 Feb - 17
March 2000 the dispatches will be discontinued, except for urgent &
important announcements & news etc. !]
________________________
#1. Taking issue with General Hamid Gul
#2. Pakistan: LPP seminar report
#3. 'Jehadi' outfits against Pak. supervision [says Indian News report]
#4. The BJP and its roots in Gujarat
________________________

#1.

The Friday Times
11 February 2000

TAKING ISSUE WITH GENERAL HAMID GUL

Ejaz Haider says General Gul should look at the complete picture rather
than chiseling truth to suit his own purpose

In an article on the costs of signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
Lt-General (Retd) Hamid Gul has attempted to puncture the arguments
given by Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar when the latter recently spoke at
the Institute of Policy Studies in Islamabad. The general notes that:

1.Pakistan's nuclear capability cannot be improved without further and
continuous testing.

The general is presumably referring to improvements in weapons design.
Improvements entail both miniaturising the warhead and effecting other
changes that might be necessary in terms of modernising. The general
therefore argues that signing the CTBT would put constraints on
Pakistan's ability to keep improving the weapon design, which requires
testing.

The general is right in that the CTBT aims to (a) constrain
modernisation of nuclear weapons; (b) makes it extremely difficult to
develop new nuclear weapons; (c) ensures nonproliferation and (d) moves
the world towards disarmament. The opponents of the CTBT in the US argue
that modernisation is important, development of new weapons is
necessary, the treaty may not end nonproliferation because the ban is
not verifiable and disarmament is neither possible nor feasible.

The issue is clear: if the world wants to move towards disarmament, CTBT
is an essential step in that direction. This is clear even from the
opponents' arguments. The argument that the CTBT will not end
proliferation does not jibe with the argument that disarmament is not
feasible, because the latter implies the fear that at some point it may
be possible. Moreover, weapon systems age, and that is why they need to
be upgraded. If testing were banned, and if the argument that without
hot tests weapons systems cannot be upgraded, then it is logical to
argue that over time many categories of weapon systems would have to be
condemned. That would itself be an important step towards disarmament.

However, in the case of Pakistan, the decision to sign or not sign the
CTBT would depend upon (a) whether politically Pakistan is indeed in a
position to test any further, unless India again breaks the norm; (b)
whether its uranium-based capability can indeed lead to thermonuclear
capability for which hot tests are so important; (c) whether further
improvements in weapon design are an operational requirement, and
finally (d) whether Pakistan can bear the direct and indirect costs of
further tests.
The answers are fairly simple. Without India testing, Pakistan cannot
test without attracting prohibitive censure. Thermonuclear tests can be
done with a uranium atom bomb as a trigger but it is much harder.
According to a nuclear physicist, "The key feature is that the exploding
atom bomb produces X-rays which are used to squeeze and heat the
hydrogen in the hydrogen bomb part to such high pressures and
temperatures that it starts fusion and releases enormous energy.
However, the bigger weight and size of the uranium bomb absorbs more of
the X-rays that are produced, leaving fewer to ignite the H-bomb. The
atom bomb needs to be as light as possible for an H-bomb trigger. That
is easier with plutonium."

Because of the bigger weight and size of uranium, there are limitations
on how much the weapon can be miniaturised and its design improved; and
finally, Pakistan cannot sustain the direct and indirect costs if it
were to go in for further tests on its own. If it could do so, it would
not have waited for India to conduct the second round of tests to grab
the opportunity. It is foolhardy to think it can, at this stage, test on
its own and give India a triumph that would make India's present
diplomatic advantage look like a teddy bear's picnic. However, were
India to test again, that would put a whole different spin on the
situation. In that case, even if Pakistan were a signatory to the treaty
it could, and would, invoke the withdrawal clause in the treaty and test
afresh if it wanted to.

2.Technology cannot be capped without hurtful effects.

The general here refers to the fact that an idea cannot be disinvented.
However, it takes the Orwellian line that technology has its own
dynamics and there is nothing humans can do to stop its march. To a
large extent he is right. It is difficult to cap technology. But that
cannot be made the basis for not trying to curb proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction which threaten the entire world. In this regard
horizontal proliferation is the first concern and Pakistan, having
become a nuclear power itself, now has a vested interest in making
efforts towards that end. As for vertical proliferation, bilateral
efforts between the US and the Russian Federation continue. The
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme successfully managed
the problem of nuclear weapons and fissile material in some of the CIS
republics after the Soviet Union came apart. The two countries have also
dismantled different categories of weapons systems and the US has
observed a moratorium on testing since 1992. Similarly, France and the
UK have unilaterally cut down on some of thheir arsenal. The vertical
proliferation problem has still a long way to go but the norm is in
place, nevertheless, though complete disarmament is a fool's dream at
the moment.

3.No country can act inconsistently with the provisions of a treaty of
clear objectives it has signed unless it decides to withdraw from it.
After Pakistan has signed the CTBT it will not be able to conduct any
more tests, unless it withdraws from the treaty.

This point presumably refers to the Vienna Convention on Interpretation
of Treaties which says, among other things, that once a country has
signed an international treaty it cannot act inconsistent with the main
obligations of that treaty. Interestingly, technically speaking the
provisions of this Convention are not binding on Pakistan since Pakistan
is not a party to these Conventions. It is, therefore, the political
aspect of becoming a party to an international treaty that forces a
country to act consistently to the clear objectives and provisions of
that treaty. This is so because international law is a 'soft law' and
its application quite often is subservient to the global power
configuration. Compliance or noncompliance to the provisions of a treaty
is therefore governed not so much on the basis of legal technicalities
but on the basis of the relative strength and weakness of a country.
Consequently, any convention which is backed by the power of the US and
other G-8 countries has more chances of compliance than one which is
not.

4.The foreign minister did not reply to the general's query on whether
the rules of business dictate that an international treaty signed by
Pakistan also stands ratified.

Here the general seems to imply that signing also means automatic
ratification. This means that after Pakistan has signed it, the CTBT
will also automatically be ratified under the rules of business. This is
calumnious, to say the least. Signing and ratifying are two different
processes. There are many treaties that Pakistan has signed but either
ratified much later or has still not ratified. For instance, it signed
the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 but ratified it only in 1996.
Similarly, it signed the Protocols to Geneva Conventions in 1977 but has
still to ratify them. Yet another case is that of the 1958 New York
Convention on Arbitration Awards. Pakistan has yet to ratify the treaty.

5.Minister Sattar has conceded the government is under pressure on the
issue of CTBT. Pakistan must not therefore sign the treaty under
pressure.

The general does not explain either the nature of that pressure or how
he envisages Pakistan being able to withstand it. His silence on the
matter is also meaningful since he does not mention that pressure on
signing the CTBT has to be seen in the larger context of (a) the global
nonproliferation norm and (b) regional developments where Pakistan is
under a diplomatic offensive from India and has to be more creative than
before to head it off.

The general also eschews the fact that while the US might be at the
cutting edge of the global nonproliferation norm because of its position
as the biggest power in the world, the norm itself has much greater and
broader sanction than that it is backed by the US.

In fact, when the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated
during 1965-68, it principally targeted advanced non-nuclear weapon
states with nuclear research and production capabilities. These
countries included, among others, Japan, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands
and Sweden. At the time, given the discriminatory nature of the treaty,
these countries would not agree to a nonproliferation instrument of
indefinite duration. Their opposition resulted in the inclusion of
Article X2, which provided for an initial period of 25 years following
which the state parties would convene a special conference to decide the
future continuation in force of the treaty.

Consequently, the NPTREC (NPT Review and Extension Conference) was
convened at the UN in April-May 1995. The treaty was given indefinite
extension by 174 state parties. It is a matter of record that only five
out of 174 states were nuclear weapons states. It is clear that the
nonproliferation norm has the sanction of non-nuclear weapons states
despite the discriminatory nature of the NPT. In fact, the coercive
consensus at the 1995 NPTREC was what undermined India's moral argument
that it would sign the NPT only if the five nuclear powers were to
disarm.

The 1995 "principles and objectives" specified a "programme of action
containing three specific mesures: an immediate objective, the
completion of negotiations on a CTBT by the end of 1996; a follow-on
objective, the "early conclusion of negotiation on a non-discriminatory
and universally appliable convention banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapon or other nuclear devices" (Fissile Material
Cut-Off Treaty, or FMCT); and the "determined pursuit by the
nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce
nuclear weapons globally."

This then forms the entire structure of the nonproliferation agenda.
India is as much susceptible to it as is Pakistan, and even the US, as
is clear from the debate in the US Senate which led to the Senate's
refusal to ratify the treaty. The Senate would not have refused
ratification if it thought the US could circumvent the test ban norm.
This is irrespective of the question of whether a ban would degrade the
US nuclear capability as is clear from the domestic debate in the US.

6.Minister Sattar said signing the treaty ahead of India will be a moral
plus for Pakistan. But the country cannot afford to sign off its
national security to merely gain moral high ground.

In competition with India where Pakistan is consistently been
marginalised, moral high ground can in fact lead to more security for
Pakistan than vice versa. For a start, it can keep the country engaged
with the rest of the world. And rest of the world does not just include
the US but many other important countries, including, for instance,
Japan, which is the biggest donor to Pakistan and separately from the US
has laid down a road map for both Pakistan and India on the issue of
signing the CTBT. It is hardly sensible for any country, much less
Pakistan, to allow itself to be isolated on an issue that can be handled
with greater insight and prudence.

7.India's nuclear doctrine and Indo-US defense collusion dictate that
Pakistan should refuse to sign the treaty. Therefore, even if India
signs the CTBT, it will keep getting vital technological information
from the US to upgrade its capability.

=46acts belie the general's thesis about an Indo-US defence collusion. The
general also weakens his argument about the imperative of testing for
continuous upgradation of capability. If India were to sign the treaty,
it would not be able to test any further. How could it then put to use
any information it might get from the US?

8.India will negotiate its way into becoming a permanent member of the
UN Security Council.

It is difficult to see how India's permanent membership of the UN
Security Council is related to Pakistan's signing or not signing the
CTBT. In fact, if India were to sign the CTBT and Pakistan opted to stay
out of it, the diplomatic isolation this would invite would make it even
more difficult for Pakistan to resist such a move. Moreover, if the US
were to even consider India's case for a permanent UNSC seat, this would
not only further jeopardise the nonproliferation regime, already
precariously balanced since South Asia's nuclearisation, but will be
opposed by countries such as Japan and Germany, long aspiring to that
status. India realises the political fallout of such a move. A leading
Indian strategist K Subrahmanyam wrote some time ago that India is not
looking for a UNSC seat because it would create more political problems
than India could solve.

9.Our economy cannot take precedence over our national security.

Evidently, the general looks at the concept of national security merely
in terms of military security and not as a triad. This is a dangerous
argument not least because it is impractical. No capability can be
sustained without the power of the purse. This is as true of running a
household as running a country. However, if the general has a gameplan
which could allow Pakistan not only to further enhance its capability
but also allows the country to improve its economic condition, then he
should spell it out in greater detail. This is too serious a business to
be glossed over in a couple of sentences. It would also be good if
Minister Aziz were to rise to the occasion and defend Minister Sattar on
this whole issue. Because if matters were to spin out of control, his
agenda would take the first hit.

Moreover, General Gul should in all honesty look at the complete picture
rather than chiseling the "truth" to suit his purpose. He has had a long
and illustrious military career and as a strategist should know the
difference between tactical and strategic withdrawal. He should also, as
a strategist, evince the capability to understand the dynamics of power
and advise policies that can turn to Pakistan's advantage rather than
acting as an angry young man and forcing the country into isolation.
_________

#2.

10 Feb 2000

Labour Party Pakistan organized a seminar on "Military Regime and its
effects on the working class" at Lahore Press Club on 9th February.
Over 250 activists of LPP, trade unions and NGOs attended this event.

Among the speakers were Hina Jilani, general secretary of Pakistan
Human Rights Commission, Salim Raza, general secretary Pakistan
national Trade Union Federation and Farooq Tariq, general secretary of
LPP. A representative of a committee against the demolition of Katchi
Abadies (slums) also spoke at the occasion. The seminar was chaired by
zafar Awan, general secretary LPP Punjab. The event was reported by
every single national newspaper of Lahore. Some news papers even
carried the colour pictures of the event. It was the first public
meeting of any political party to oppose openly the military regime in
the city.

Salim Raza, the general secretary of National Trade Unions
=46ederation, who especially flew from, Karachi to speak in this
seminar as chief guest told the audience that LPP must be
congratulated for organizing this important topic. It will prepare the
working class to fight the regime on a better footing. He was among
the 13 Labour leaders who met the Chief Executive General Musharaf
two days before this meeting. He told the seminar that he was really
ashamed by the comments of some of the other labour leaders who
praised the military ruler and told him of full co-operation.

While giving the details of the meeting he said that I told the
military ruler that they will not believe the good word of the regime
but they want to see the deeds. He also told him that there is a
growing hatred developing among the working class against the regime.
Salim Raza said that it was not coincident that LPP and PNTUF opposed
the regime from the very beginning. He said working class of pakistan
has been hit hard by the first four months of the regime. He said we
must prepare ourselves against the privatisation and other imperialist
policies of the regime.

Hina Jilani, general secretary of the powerful Human Rights
Commission Of Pakistan told the seminar that a bad democracy is no
justification for a military rule. She criticized the judges who
recently took oath under the new ordinance of the regime. She praised
those 6 judges who refused to take a new oath. Hina Jilani, who is
herself an advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan said that she
felt ashamed of saying "My Lords" to those judges who have bowed down
to the regime.

She said Labour Party has organized this seminar on a
right time as the regime has started a new class war against the
working class of Pakistan. She said military will never be able to
reform anything nor will solve any problem of the masses.

=46arooq Tariq, general Secretary LPP said that it is nearly four month
of the military regime and the real agenda of the regime has come in
the open already. Working class of Pakistan has been hit hard by the
different actions of the regime.

Citing the example of railways, he said that in the last four months,
the railway workers wages has been cut down by at least 30%. The
railway pensioners has lost their right of free pass to travel.
Railway workers now must pay 10% for every travel by railways. Most of
the \Kachi Abadies (Slums) which existed for already 50 years has been
demolished leaving hundreds in Lahore alone without any roof tops and
the small business ventures they were involved in. Few thousand
workers has already lost their jobs from different public sector
departments.

=46arooq Tariq said what has failed is the capitalist democracy and not
democracy. He said the capitalist system will not be able to revive
itself under the suppression of the military. He criticized those
political parties who openly supported the regime at the beginning and
now are trying to oppose it. He said only Labour Party can take the
pride from the very beginning to oppose the regime.

=46arooq Tariq said workers must get rid of the capitalist parties and
join their own party if they have to fight against the regime.

The seminar passed two resolutions. It demanded the uplifting of ban
on trade union activities from Railway, WAPDA (Water and Power
Development Authorities) and 13 other public sectors. It demanded that
no Katchi Abadi should be demolished without compensation.

Report by Farooq Sulehria
__________

#3.

The Hindu
12 February 2000

'JEHADI' OUTFITS AGAINST PAK. SUPERVISION

ISLAMABAD, FEB. 11 The `Jehadi groups' operating against India and the
U.S. both inside and from Pakistani territory are beginning to show that
they can act independently of Pakistani intelligence agencies, which
have promoted and fostered their development.

This is not to argue that these groups can operate in Kashmir without
the support, training and logistical back-up of their Pakistani
handlers. However, the `Jehadi' outfits like the Lashkar-i-Taiba and the
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, which are almost 100 per cent Pakistani, have
shown that they can act independently of their Pakistani masters as far
as certain domestic issues are concerned.

In a sense, Pakistan has to deal with several Bhindranwale-type [*] groups
at the same time. Given the fact that these groups appreciate their
growing muscle and power, they are not averse to warning even a military
Government publicly that `no ban' on their activities will be tolerated.

A product of the `Bleed India Policy' of the Pakistan Army, these groups
today feel they are strong enough to resist the diktat of the Pakistani
Government. The Lashkar, for instance, has warned the Chief Executive,
Gen. Pervez Musharraf, from any kind of proposed supervision of `Deeni
Madrassas' or religious seminaries.

Of course, if the Musharraf Government wants it can crack down hard on
these groups, follow the footsteps of the Egyptian Government. However,
these `Jehadi' outfits serve important strategic interests of Pakistan,
keeping the pot of violence boiling in Kashmir. And Kashmir, needless to
say, is the centre of Pakistani domestic and foreign policy.

However, whatever be the pressures on the Government before a possible
visit or stop-over by the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton, these groups
are unlikely to feel the heat from the Musharraf Government.

Many analysts argue that persons and groups who are prepared to die for
`Jehad' will not appreciate any interference in their principal activity
- that is fighting in Kashmir. In any case, there has been little
evidence to show that Gen. Musharraf is keen on reducing the role of
these groups.

In fact, the General has become the first Pakistani leader to proclaim
that `Jehad is not terrorism' and that the theatre of `Jehad' has now
shifted from Afghanistan to Kashmir. There is no real fetter on the
military any more; it no longer has to fear any civilian check from
saying what it wants.

However, what should concern the military Government is that these
religious fundamentalists have their own agenda. With all political
activity suspended in Pakistan, it is these groups, along with the
Jamaat-i-Islami, who are filling the growing political vacuum. All the
noise against the CTBT is being made by these sections.

Also, a group like the Harkat is closely associated with the
Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a known Sunni hardline outfit and its
militant wing, the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. In fact, some believe that these
three groups are actually `one' and making a distinction between them is
a cosmetic exercise. There is considerable `exchange' of cadres between
these three outfits.

Interestingly, while the Harkat seems to have toned down its harsh
anti-American stance for the moment, the SSP Chief, Azam Tariq, has
warned Mr. Clinton against visiting Pakistan because the Americans were,
in his view, the real killers of Muslims.

Azam Tariq has promised to supply cadres for the new militant outfit,
Jaish-i-Muhammadi, floated by Masood Azhar, the erstwhile
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen leader freed by India recently. This `sectarian'
aspect to `jehad' is `disturbing' to some in Pakistan.

There is also a belief here that Masood Azhar has been picked up by
Pakistani intelligence agencies not because of his anti- American
statements, but because he is close to the SSP and the danger of
introducing this `sectarian element' into the Kashmir `Jehad.'

The first real challenge to the symbiotic relationship between the
`Jehadi groups' and the military Government can come if Gen. Musharraf
moves to sign the CTBT, which is seen by them as an American conspiracy.

Given their strong anti-CTBT position, it would be interesting to see
what these groups will do if the Musharraf Government does adhere to the
CTBT, a step even the civilian Nawaz Sharif Government could not take
despite support from the Opposition in Parliament.

In the long-term, these fundamentalist groups will seek to impose their
version of Islam in Pakistan as well. It would appear that they are, at
present, engaged in the task of strengthening themselves in collusion
with fundamentalist sections of the establishment.

Western media reports paint a scary picture of the Pakistani Army as
well, pointing to an alarming fundamentalist trend. Notwithstanding
these reports, the fact remains that the Pakistan Army is united in its
Kashmir policy of `Jehad' against India.

There can be little doubt that by fostering and promoting these groups,
the Pakistani establishment is allowing them tremendous clout and
influence. The fact that armed cadres strut around openly in principal
cities of Pakistan is a sign of official acquiescence and support.

Pakistan is laying itself open to grave domestic challenges by promoting
these `Jehadi' groups, whose anti-India agenda is blind and total.
Creating Bhindranwales is relatively easy, controlling them is not.

[ * Sikh religious extremist leader]
__________

#4.

The Hindu
12 February 2000
Op-Ed.

THE BJP AND ITS ROOTS IN GUJARAT
By Asghar Ali Engineer

THOUGH THE BJP's growth has been quite phenomenal all over India thanks
to the Ram Janmabhoomi issue it took up in the late Eighties, its growth
in Gujarat has been much faster and deeper. It is the only State where
the BJP is in power on its own. Again it is the only State where the BJP
and other members of the sangh parivar, such as the VHP, the RSS and the
Bajrang Dal, are not only sticking to their ideology but also behaving
in an aggressive manner. While in Uttar Pradesh the BJP lost a number of
seats in the last Lok Sabha election and fears it may lose more, the
party has no such apprehensions in Gujarat. The attitude of the
Keshubhai Patel Government shows how confident the BJP is of its
strength in the State. The BJP also captured 30 of the 48 municipalities
in the State in early January maintaining its supremacy in urban and
semi-urban areas.

The way the BJP is behaving in Gujarat clearly brings to the fore what
remains its hidden agenda at the Centre and in other States. The BJP has
been maintaining that it has given up its Hindutva agenda and that it
has nothing but the NDA's common agenda for governance. The BJP
maintains that it neither intends to strive for construction of the Ram
temple in Ayodhya nor desires to enforce a common civil code or delete
Article 370 from the Constitution. In its Chennai declaration too it
made this clear. ``The BJP has no agenda'', the Chennai declaration
said, ``other than the common agenda of the NDA.'' Obviously the
statement was calculated to allay the suspicions of allies such as the
DMK, the MDMK, the Janata Dal(U) and the Trinamul Congress.

Mr. L. K. Advani also had to mollify the hardcore elements in Chennai by
saying that the BJP was not diluting its ideology. He advised the BJP
leaders and cadre not to ``get imprisoned by dogma'' but denied that the
BJP was diluting its ideology for the sake of power. The thrust of Mr.
Advani's address was that the party was ``evolving'' as the
circumstances in the country changed. The BJP had gone through many
changes and this was one such phase. While responding to the
``challenges of the times'', the BJP's constants were ``nationalism''
and ``character'', which were derived from ideology and idealism.

Is the BJP really responding to the challenges of the times or is it
adopting certain strategies to survive in power? There is a great deal
of difference between the two. Judging by what the BJP Government is
doing in Gujarat, it is hard to be convinced by Mr. Advani's assertion
that it is responding to the challenges of the times. Rather, the BJP is
adapting to the given circumstances without compromising its core
ideology. The BJP has a more moderate face where it has to rule in an
alliance and a hardened face where it is in power by itself, as in
Gujarat. It is for the allies of the BJP to reflect on this. How can the
BJP, if it is honest in its assertion that it has no separate agenda of
governance, behave radically differently in States where it is in power
on its own? Does it mean the BJP has two separate agendas of governance,
one of the NDA and one its own? It certainly seems so.

Just look at what the BJP Government has been doing in Gujarat. The
VHP's attacks on Christians began in the Dangs since December 25, 1998.
The law and order machinery was a silent spectator throughout the
period. The Gujarat Government also, going back on its word, allowed the
VHP and the Hindu Ekta Manch to lay the foundation for a Ram temple in a
Christian area, near the Dangs, in Surat district.

The Gujarat Government has also now permitted its employees to join the
RSS. What will happen to objectivity and impartiality in the Gujarat
administration? As it is, the administration is generally found to be
subservient to the political bosses. Now if police officers join the
RSS, will they show even a semblance of impartiality in controlling
communal violence?

Naturally the RSS leaders are so pleased by this act of the Gujarat
Government that they want the Centre to follow suit. The RSS at its
``Sankalp Shibir'' in Ahmedabad demanded that the Centre adopt the
Gujarat Government pattern and allow its employees to participate in
activities of the Sangh. Had the BJP- led Government not been dependent
on an alliance at the Centre would it not have obliged the RSS leaders?
After all, the ban has been lifted in Gujarat with the permission of the
Union Home Ministry. What is surprising is that the BJP's allies which
swear by secularism have not raised even a little finger against the
lifting of the ban. Now VHP leaders have demanded that Government
employees be permitted to join the Parishad.

The important question is why has there been an unrestricted growth of
the BJP in Gujarat, one of the highly industrialised States in India?
Does industrialisation not result in secularisation of the civil
society? Also, Gujarat had produced Gandhi, the greatest champion of
communal harmony. Yet today it is a stronghold of communal forces.
Nothing moves in a straight line as far as social phenomena are
concerned. The pattern is often convoluted. Thus one has to seek
explanations for the BJP's phenomenal growth in Gujarat in various
developments which have taken place there since Independece.

The growth of the BJP in Gujarat is not a sudden phenomenon. The Jan
Sangh (the pre-1980 version of the BJP) had been steadily making headway
in the State since its formation in 1952 and had succeeded in
establishing its hold by the late Sixties when the decline of the
Congress began with Indira Gandhi splitting the party. It was the
Congress(O) under Morarji Desai's leadership which captured Gujarat.
When the 1969 riots took place, Hitendra Desai, political protege of
Morarji Desai, was the Chief Minister. The party lost much of its elan
with the split. Though in the early Seventies the Indira Congress
captured power, it soon came under a cloud. Jayaprakash Narayan launched
his anti- corruption movement from Gujarat. Chimanbhai Patel was alleged
to be most corrupt and he had to resign. The RSS and the Jan Sangh
played an important role in this movement and got credit.

Later, Madhavsinh Solanki won the Assembly elections for the Congress
with a two-thirds majority with the help of what was known as the KHAM
formula in February 1985. He announced reservation for Kshatriyas,
Harijans, Adivasis and Muslims (KHAM) and won their overwhelming
support. But Patels, politically and economically the most dominant
caste in Gujarat, brought down the Solanki Government within one and a
half years. The 1985 communal riot in Ahmedabad was the most major one
after 1969. The fall of the Solanki Government broke the back of the
Congress in Gujarat for good. The party lost the support of the backward
and minority sections as, faced with the anti-reservation agitation by
the Patels, the Solanki Government suspended reservation for them. The
BJP consolidated its position further by helping to bring down the
Solanki Government.

The BJP projected itself as a ``party with a difference'' and filled the
vacuum. There was another reason for the BJP establishing itself: the
Janata Dal which had claimed to represent the interests of the weaker
sections, Dalits, and minorities unfortunately came into existence under
the leadership of Chimanbhai Patel who had been thrown out as ``most
corrupt''. Hence, the Janata Dal could never take off. Also, unlike
Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat did not throw up any Dalit or backward class
leaders like Mr. Kanshi Ram or Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav. So, the BJP,
which succeeded in attracting these sections to its fold, continues to
retain their support. Mr. Shankarsinh Waghela, who belongs to a backward
class, broke off from the BJP and floated his own outfit and subseq
uently joined the Congress. He too failed to attract the backwards and
Dalits to his fold, probably because he himself was associated with the
BJP for long and was seen as breaking away to grab power.

These are some of the reasons why the BJP continues to rule unchallenged
in Gujarat. The Congress will have to work very hard to replace the BJP
in the State.
__________

#5.

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