[sacw] [ACT] sacw dispatch #1 (4 feb 00)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch
4 February 2000
____________________
#1. Press Statement Pakistan India Peoples Forum (India Chapter)
#2. Joint Statement issued by members of PPC, MIND and APA
#3. India-Pakistan: End of zero-sum game?
#4. The Grand Deobandi consensus
#5. Religious Fascism on the Rise in India
____________________

#1.

Pakistan India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy
(India Chapter)

PRESS STATEMENT (after the One-Day colloquium held at YMCA Auditorium, New
Delhi on the first of February, 2000)

1st February, 2000

A colloquium on "Peace Imperatives to Resume India-Pakistan Dialogue." was
organised by Pakistan-India Peoples' Forum for Peace and Democracy in Delhi
today. The colloquium was attended by Afrasiab Khattak (Chairperson of the
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan) and Ifteqar ul Haq (General Secretary,
Pakistan Chapter of the Forum) who traveled to Delhi especially for the
occasion. The colloquium was inaugurated by well known social activist Smt.
Nirmala Deshpande and the keynote address was delivered by Admiral A.L.
Ramdas.

The colloquium adopted the following resolution :

While the Forum remains committed to Democracy, it also recognises the
dangerous implications of the absence of a dialogue and the state of
hostility between our two neighbouring countries, on our domestic politics
and our civil societies. Growing tensions between the two states along with
a virtual suspension of the official dialogue has always encouraged forces
inimical to democracy and people's freedom. The arming of India and
Pakistan with nuclear weapons and the "limited war" in Kargil area of Jammu
& Kashmir lends further urgency to the need to defuse tension. Peace we
believe is a necessary condition of democracy and requires a degree of
normalcy in relation between the two countries. We also believe that the
continuing state of hostility exacerbates social tensions within each
country and retards economic and technological progress.

We, therefore, urge the governments of India and Pakistan to resume
dialogue at the earliest on all matters of concern including Kashmir to
ensure peace in the sub-continent. In parallel with the initiation of
talks, free exchange of people, goods and information must be allowed to
start immediately.

________

#2.
PRESS RELEASE February 4, 2000

Joint Statement issued by members of Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC),
Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) and Association of
Peoples of Asia (APA)

The recent announcement by the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes
unveiling a "limited wars" doctrine is alarming evidence of the
dangerous path along which those who govern India are moving towards.
Recent news from Pakistan also suggests a tussle among the ruling
generals with significant voices among them pushing for a "tougher"
stand vis a vis India. This, coupled with the continuing voices of
nuclear threat mongering and blackmail on both sides of the border
(especially exchanged during the Kargil conflict), pushes the
subcontinent into one of its gravest crises ever.

Several citizens=92 forums have called for the cessation of the present
climate of jingoism and chauvinism and stressed the need for sobriety
and peace. The visits to India last week of several senior retired army
officials from Pakistan and their recognition and commitment
(reciprocated by their counterparts in India) to taking bold steps to
foster peace in the region are an indication of the possibilities that
still exist to urgently initiate a process of mutual restraint and
dialogue.

We urge the peoples and governments of both countries to urgently forge
a bold plan of action to reverse the present process of sliding into a
political deadlock that may justify continuing "limited wars" at the
expense of greater amity and security for the peoples of South Asia.

Pakistan India

M.B.Naqvi Sumit Sarkar
Anis Haroon Imtiaz Ahmad
Karamat Ali Smitu Kothari
Abdul Khaliq Junejo Kumkum Sangari
Brig. (Retd) Abid Hameed Rao Praful Bidwai
Tahir Mohammad Khan Achin Vanaik
Sheema Kermani Seema Mustafa
B.M.Kutty Tanika Sarkar
A.H.Nayyar Kamal Mitra Chenoy
Beena Sarwar Utsa Patnaik
Jennifer Bennet Anuradha Chenoy
I. A. Rehman M. H. Qureshi
Ely Ercelawn
Prof. Mohd Nauman

M.B.Naqvi
President PPC "
________

#3.

The Friday Times
4 February 2000

India-Pakistan: End of zero-sum game?

Ejaz Haider asks whether Pakistan's pro-active Kashmir
policy based on the forces of jihad is compatible with other
more compelling interests

Washington has sent a stream of high ranking people to Islamabad in recent
weeks to convey one central message to the military government: given
certain aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy, the opportunity costs
incurred by Pakistan's national security policy have reached unsustainable
proportions.

The US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth's January 21
meeting with General Pervez Musharraf had a clear agenda: The US considers
the activities of Islamists groups operating from Pakistani soil a "clear
and present danger" to its interests and wants Islamabad to take
appropriate measures to put these groups down, beginning with declaring
them "terrorist" groups. Appropriate to the occasion, Inderfurth was
accompanied by Michael Sheehan, the US Department of State's chief
co-ordinator on counter-terrorism and David Kamp, US National Security
advisor.

While the issue of terrorism formed the main plank of the visit,
other US concerns included Pakistan's return to democracy, the pace of
economic reform in the country, nonproliferation, including signing of the
CTBT and regional stability, especially a dialogue with India. Earlier, a
similar, five-point message was delivered to Islamabad by a team of four
senators led by Senator Tom Daschle, the minority leader in the US Senate.

What does this bode for Pakistan?

Consider some of the facts. The focal point of Pakistan's national
security policy is its rivalry with India. That rivalry itself is sustained
by the conflict on Kashmir. However, since the end of the Afghan war that
conflict has undergone an essential change. With the introduction of
non-state actors and the acquisition by Pakistan of its nuclear capability
since the late eighties, the Pakistani state has evinced much greater
confidence in its ability to take on India. Additionally, the Kashmir
conflict now informs the very nationalism of Pakistan in a manner that it
never did previously. This is not only owed to the state's greater
confidence in its capability to hurt India but also because the Kashmir
conflict has gathered unprecedented violent momentum in the last decade,
especially the last year or so.

But the situation has also bred its own contradictions. The
non-state actors that operate in Kashmir are the same Islamist groups, or
the continuation of those groups, that were thrown up by the Afghan war.
They operate in Kashmir in the same manner and for the same reason as they
do in other parts of the world. The state has tacitly allowed them to
operate in Kashmir because they provide Pakistan with a perceivably low
cost option against the Indian security forces in Kashmir. Tactically, this
appears a sound strategy because it allows Pakistan to hurt India
militarily and keep a large chunk of the Indian army tied up in Kashmir.
But the opportunity costs have multiplied over the years. In fact, some of
these groups make no bones about arming, training and sending their cadres
to fight inside Kashmir. The state has clearly done nothing to put these
groups down even though the Constitution of Pakistan lays down very clearly
in article 256 that private armies are forbidden.

The provisions of this article are specific and do not provide any
exception. However, the dynamics of the competition with India have not
only allowed such organisations to develop and spawn but have compelled the
state to look the other way while these armed militias go about their
business.

Clearly, however, the problem is not merely related to
constitutional subtleties. The real issue is that these groups are not
beholden to any state. They are only beholden to an ideology underpinned by
a certain political exegesis in Islam. Paradoxically, therefore, while
Islamabad might have allowed them to operate with a degree of freedom it is
a misconception to think that it can dictate its own terms to these groups.
It is this inability of Islamabad to control these groups that now
threatens to circumscribe its freedom of action in terms of tailoring the
India policy to bring it in conformity with the changes taking place
regionally and globally.

The dilemma

Pakistan wants to sustain the Kashmir conflict. This is considered
important because it not only keeps the conflict alive internationally, it
also keeps a large chunk of Indian army tied up in Kashmir. Keeping the
conflict alive is significant because of Pakistan's emphasis on the
original UN Security Council texts, which have declared Kashmir a dispute
to be resolved through a plebiscite. While the present resistance started
in Kashmir as an indigenous uprising, the momentum for some years has been
sustained by Islamist militias. This is not because the Kashmiris have
become reconciled to Indian rule but because they could not have sustained
their struggle against the Indian military might without external support.
The resistance is therefore now a mix of Kashmiris and Islamist groups that
train and arm in Afghanistan.

Since Washington's 1997 about-face on Afghanistan's Taliban militia
because of Osama bin Ladin and the linkage of groups fighting in Kashmir
with the Taliban, Pakistan's Kashmir policy has steadily fallen foul of
Washington. India has shrewdly capitalised on this development and since
Kargil has played up the theme of Islamist "terrorism". In this, India has
in fact been helped by these Islamist groups' rhetoric against the United
States. Pakistan has reacted slothfully to this development and because of
the state's inability to control these groups now finds itself in a bind.
If it bans these groups, it is likely to hurt its present Kashmir policy,
besides running the risk of angering these groups, which could create
internal security problems for it. If it does not ban these groups, it runs
the risk of totally discrediting its Kashmir policy and allowing India to
isolate it further by convincing Washington to declare Pakistan a terrorist
state.

Was this inevitable? The answer is yes. These groups do not operate
as part of any grand strategy worked out by Pakistan. They owe allegiance
only to their own ideology and their own networks. These networks operate
on the basis of the concept of civilisational conflict between Islam and a
supposedly anti-Islamic consensus symbolised by the United States. It is,
therefore, no coincidence that Pakistan finds itself in a bind today
because of developments external to its Kashmir policy. If these groups
were beholden to the state of Pakistan and worked in tandem with Islamabad,
they would have avoided a confrontation with Washington while continuing to
hurt India. However, that could not happen because such a strategy would
presuppose a complete control by Pakistan of these groups.

Pakistan has faced a similar dilemma with the Taliban. While
Islamabad has had to take the full brunt of the Taliban's policies, it has
acquired no strategic gains from its support of the Taliban. Those analysts
who hailed Pakistan's Afghan policy as a great success are today at a loss
to find a way out of the present dilemma vis-=E0-vis Kashmir. Should Pakista=
n
declare these groups "terrorist" groups? The question is evidently being
skirted. It must be clearly conceded that Pakistan's present dilemma over
Kashmir is a necessary corollary of its Afghan policy.

The Islamist worldview

The Islamist worldview is simple. India is the enemy closer to home but it
is not the only enemy. India's significance lies in that it has come to
symbolise the struggle that also defines Pakistani nationalism. But the
Islamists' nationalism has no secular roots. It is a nationalism that looks
at the state not in terms of a nation-state but as a citadel of Islam.
Consequently, the state is sacralised and nationalism defined in terms of
faith. It is only through this paradigm that one can understand the
Islamists' confrontation with the United States. This worldview does not
take into account such diplomatic nuances as President Clinton's visit to
South Asia, or indeed the issue of why must Pakistan sign the CTBT.

This consensus is symbolised by Qazi Hussain Ahmed's opposition to
the CTBT. That opposition is not linked to the legal or other
technicalities of the treaty or its text. It is also not related to whether
Pakistan needs further tests, or can indeed exercise the option of any
further tests. Neither does this view consider Pakistan's nuclear
capability as India-specific, which has traditionally been Pakistan's
policy. Qazi's opposition, and he is supported in this across-the-board by
the right-wing, is pegged to the civilisational construct: the conflictual
paradigm Samuel Huntington expounded in his controversial book on the clash
of civilisations.

For the Islamists, therefore, the factors of economy and diplomacy
are not important. They maintain, for instance, that Sudan has a thriving
economy but Sudan is also a "rogue state" for Washington; that Pakistan,
with its nuclear potential, stands a better chance because the nuclear
potential gives it a greater nuisance value; that therefore, it must keep
up its struggle against both India and the United States; and that the
strength of faith will not only help people tide over the initial problems,
but will also win in the end.

The nationalist state

The "nationalist" state is caught in a bind. It considers competition with
India essential just as India considers competition with Pakistan essential
since Pakistan would not accept its managerial role in the region. At the
secular level there is even a degree of legitimacy to a competition that is
fuelled, among other things, by the circumstances of history. Furthermore,
nuclearisation has taken away any incentive the two states might have had
in resolving their conflicts. There can be no total war between India and
Pakistan in the sense that Edward Luttwak advocates, and which allows one
party to put the weaker party down completely for a longer lasting peace.
There is no weaker party now in the military sense. But weakness, like
strength, is a multi-dimensional concept. India might not take Pakistan on
and win militarily, but it could adopt a strategy that could bring to fore
the inner contradictions of Pakistan. Being the status quo power, time is
on India's side. It can hold itself together and let the competition weaken
Pakistan.

Economic travails, diplomatic isolation, political uncertainty and
pangs of identity are all areas where Pakistan is likely to hurt more than
India. The present dilemma is just one manifestation of where the present
strategy might be leading Pakistan. Nothing manifests the nationalist
state's dilemma better than the Islamist consensus on the CTBT. This state
needs the militias in Kashmir, but it also wants them to accept its pitch
on the CTBT. But the Islamists will not bite. Such is the reliance of the
nationalist state on these militias that the convergence of Washington and
New Delhi on the issue of terrorism and these groups actually threatens to
unravel Pakistan's entire Kashmir policy.

Pakistan's options

The state has to take certain decisions. It has to see whether it wants to
lap up the Islamists' worldview of a civilisational conflict with the world
and accept international isolation or reject that worldview and reformulate
its policies in regard to the competition with India. As yet, however, it
is not prepared to take a clear line on the issue. It wants to exercise
both options: continuing to use the militias against India while denying
that it is doing so. This is the strategy it adopted in Afghanistan. But it
is also a strategy that has increasingly lost the element of plausible
deniability.

If the state wants to keep using these militias, it will need to
purge them of the civilisational paradigm. But that is impossible.
Therefore, the only option it has is to reformulate its India policy. Such
a reformulation would require a reassessment not only of the parameters but
also of the nature of its competition. It is a misconception to think that
anything short of a zero-sum competition would amount to surrendering to
India. Or, indeed, that any reformulation on Kashmir in view of a realistic
assessment of what can be achieved would be to give India an upper hand.
Such an appraisal is beholden to an all or nothing mindset. Diplomacy,
quite obviously, does not work on the basis of all or nothing but on the
basis of what is achievable. In fact, efforts to co-opt the international
community may well strengthen Pakistan's viewpoint, especially in the
context of South Asia's nuclearisation. The idea should then be to wrest
the initiative away from India rather than play into India's hands.
Unfortunately, however, the present policy has failed on that count.

________

#3.

The Friday Times
4 February 2000

The grand Deobandi consensus

by Khaled Ahmed

The civil war in Afghanistan and the jehad in Kashmir have gradually
veered to a Deobandi consensus. The dominant Hizbe Islami of Hekmatyar, a
flag-bearer of modernist-Islamist thinking of Maududi and Hasan al-Banna,
lost favour with the Pakistani establishment in the mid-1990s. In its
place, the Taliban of Mullah Umar, trained in the traditional Deobandi
jurisprudence, enjoy popularity in Pakistan. In Kashmir, Jamaat-e-Islami's
Hizbul Mujahideen has been eclipsed by Harkat-ul-Ansar (Mujahideen) of
Deobandi persuasion.

In a parallel development, the Wahabi or Ahle Hadith warriors have gained
strength. The most effective jehadi outfit based in Lahore is
Lashkar-e-Tayba, functioning as a subordinate branch of Dawat al-Irshad, an
organisation with contacts in the Arab world, collecting jehad funds among
the expatriate Muslim communities in the West. It has training camps in
Afghanistan and Azad Kashmir and is arguably the most resourceful militia
fighting in Kashmir. It has contacts in Central Asia through its training
camps in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden has strengthened the old Wahabi
connection with the Deobandi Taliban rulers. Some American sources claim
that the Taliban amirul momineen, Mullah Umar, has married Osama's
daughter.

The third strand of fundamentalist movement which seems attracted to the
Wahabi-Deobandi combine in Afghanistan, is the Naqshbandiya. Most of the
Muslim-populated North Caucasian region in Russia follows the
shrine-worshipping mystical order of the Naqshbandiya. The uprising in
Chechnya and its incursion into Dagestan is turning the Naqshbandi
followers to the more strict orthodoxy of the Saudi-based Wahabi order.
Russian onslaught in Chechnya is transforming the mystical faith into a
militant one.

Afghanistan has become the retreat of Central Asian Islamists fighting
against their ex-communist leaders. Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev have
staged a fundamentalist revolt against Uzbekistan's president Karimov and
have sought shelter with the Taliban government after being accused by
Karimov of trying to assassinate him in Tashkent. In 1999, Kyrgyzstan
experienced a commando assault from these radicals along its borders in
which some Japanese technicians were made hostage by them. Central Asian
Islam has been traditionally Hanafi sunni with strong mystical colouring
provided by the Naqshbandiya school of sufis.

In Afghanistan, the naqshbandi faith is represented by Sibghatullah
Mujadiddi, Afghanistan's first president chosen by the mujahideen in exile
in Peshawar in 1989. Mujaddidi is a descendant of Sheikh Ahmad of Sirhind
(d.1624), also called Mujaddid Alf-e-Sani, who led a mystical movement of
purification under Emperor Jehangir and was greatly admired by Islamic
revivalist movements in India. It is a measure of the greatness of Sheikh
Ahmad that the Naqshbandis of Afghanistan, Central Asia, North Caucusus and
Turkey are all Mujaddidi today.

All three movements, the Deobandi, the Ahle Hadith-Wahabi, and
Naqshbandi-Mudaddidi (in India), are against bidaa (innovation) in Islamic
rituals. They oppose the eclecticism that developed among Muslims under the
Mughals and wished to separate local accretion from the pure Islamic faith.
The founder of the Naqshbandi order, Shaikh Ahmad, compelled the Mughal
king Jehangir to persecute the Muslim mystical orders that had developed a
spiritual consensus with Hindus and Sikhs.

The other preoccupation of the Naqshbandis in India was opposition to the
Shiite faith developing in the South of India and in the northern province
of Oudh. Shaikh Ahmad had decreed that the Shiites were apostates and had
to be put to the sword. Central Asia has been historically Hanafi and
anti-Shiite, particularly because the rulers of Iran were mostly conquering
Turks from Central Asia and did not favour its conversion to Shiism which
they thought heretical.

Deoband is in district Saharanpur in the Uttar Pradesh province of India.
The Darul Uloom seminary established here in 1879 by Maulan Abul Qasim
Nanotvi concentrated on the instruction of the Quran, realigning the
mystically inclined Muslim population with the basic teachings of Islam.
Deobandi scholars adopted Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) as their spiritual
patron. Shah Waliullah is probably the most revered Islamic thinker among
the Muslims of South Asia and Afghanistan. His ability to interpret the
Quran and adjudicate among the various strands of Islamic jurisprudence was
such that he declared himself a qayem al-zaman, a semi-divine personality
given the mission by Prophet Muhammad PBUH himself to reform the faith. He
travelled to Hejaz (Saudi Arabia) to learn the jurisprudence of Imam Malik
and the other great jurists of Islam.

A renowned Deobandi scholar Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi in his book Shah
Waliullah aur unka falsafa quotes Shah Waliullah as writing that Prophet
Muhammad PBUH ordered him in person that he should 'bind' all the schools
of sunni fiqh together and not reject hadith. The great reformer then set
out to combine the teachings of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei and Hanbali Islam
without denigrating any one of the schools. He was averse to accepting
hadith, but in obedience to the Prophet PBUH, he selectively permitted the
validity of hadith.

In Mughal India, this was tantamount to a revolution. S.M. Ikram in
Mauj-e-Kausar explains how, from the progeny of Shah Waliullah, a new
movement against bidaa (innovation) sprang up in early 19th century and was
mistaken for Wahabism by the generality of Muslims of India. Shah
Waliullah's grandson Shah Ismail (1781-1831 AD) was attracted to Ibn
Taimiyya (1263-1328 AD) whose teachings were also to inspire Abdul Wahab
(1703-1792 AD), the spiritual guide of the House of Saud. This 'confluence'
gave rise to a new strict fundamentalism in India.

Annemarie Schimmel in Islam in the Indian Subcontinent tells us that Shah
Waliullah in his youth was greatly inspired by the anti-innovation,
anti-Shiite thought of Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi. It seems that the antecedents
of Shah Waliullah were derived from a Naqshbandi inspiration while his
followers were inclined by his teachings to Wahabism. This sowed the seeds
of a tripartite deobandi-wahabi-naqshbandi alliance that has now come into
being.

In Pakistan, only one armed religious outfit called Tanzeem al-Ikhwan is
active under the aggressive leadership of Maulana Akram Awan. Based on the
mystical teachings of Shaikh Ahmad, the madrassa run by him in Chakwal is
said to have close links with the army. In the investigations that followed
the 1995 unsuccessful military coup in Pakistan, led by Islamist officers,
his name is said to have cropped up in the list of the accused, but was
allegedly removed from the findings because of his close army connections.

Asta Olsen in her book Islam and Politics in Afghanistan explains the
historical Afghan connection with Darul Uloom of Deoband. The Afghan cleric
was discouraged by the Khanate of Bukhara's oppression to seek religious
training in Central Asia. He sporadically sought training in Saudi Arabia
and Egypt, but the most convenient source of learning for him became
Deoband with its doctrinal closeness to the strict Islamic observance of
the Arabs. Many Afghan rulers invaded India and headquartered themselves in
the region now included in Peshawar and the Tribal Areas in Pakistan - the
region claimed by Afghanistan as Pakhtunistan in 1947 after challenging the
1893 Durand Line.

Many Afghan princes fled civil war at home and sought refuge in British
India, thus renewing contacts with the followers of Shah Waliullah.
Peshawar and Nowshehra just outside Peshawar gradually became home to the
most famous Deobandi seminaries after Deoband, training clerics for
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind, the Congress ally that helped form a pro-Congress
government in the NWFP in 1947, challenging the Muslim League of the
Quaid-e-Azam.

The clerics trained in these institutions are now powerful leaders of the
two factions of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman
and Maulana Samiul Haq, claiming strong links with the Taliban government
in Afghanistan. In his book Unholy wars: Afghanistan, America and
international terrorism, John K. Cooley reveals that Mullah Umar and Osama
bin Laden first met in 1989 in a Deobandi mosque, Banuri Masjid, in
Karachi, and presumably formed an alliance based spiritually on the
traditional closeness of the Deobandis, who follow the Hanafi school, with
the Wahabis, who accept only hadith under Imam Hanbal and Abdul Wahab. Thus
the protection offered to Osama by the Taliban, and the threats delivered
by Pakistan's JUI leaders to American citizens in support of Osama bin
Laden, seem to spring from a historical interface between the two schools
of Islamic fiqh.

The non-Pakhtun population of Pakistan is predominantly Barelvi, following
the Hanafi fiqh of Ahmad Raza Khan (1876-1931 AD) who led a successful
revolt in India against the stringent teachings of Deobandi-Wahabi school
of thought. The stronghold of Barelvism remains Punjab, the largest
province of Pakistan in terms of population, but increasingly the
state-controlled mosques are being given to Deobandi khateebs. Because of
the rise of the Deobandi militias, and their funding by the Arabs for their
anti-Shiite doctrine, the province is rapidly losing its Barelvi
temperament. The Tablighi Jamaat which holds its annual congregation in
Lahore has become a powerful influence favouring a Deobandi point of view.
It gathers 2 million people in its congregation but it is important to note
that over 90 percent of its attendants are Pakhtun from Peshawar and the
Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan. The President of Pakistan, Muhammad
Rafiq Tarar, is a Punjabi Deobandi. The High Court of Lahore, influenced by
the Deobandi-Wahabi school, followed the Maliki doctrine in one of its
verdicts in 1997 to deny the Hanafi practice of allowing girls to marry
without the consent of their fathers.

The Afghan war pushed over 3 million Afghan refugees into Pakistan, which
accommodated them in the Pakhtun-dominated areas of the NWFP and
Balochistan. The Afghan youth trained in the Deobandi seminaries in these
two provinces for over ten years later became the Taliban warriors of
Mullah Umar. In their war with the Northern Alliance, the Taliban armies
are constantly 'replenished' by fresh Taliban from Pakistan, many of them
now Punjabi. According to Ahmed Rashid in Foreign Affairs, over 80,000
Taliban have gone to Afghanistan to fight the Deobandi war against the
Northern Alliance of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Recognition of the Taliban
government by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan can be seen also in light of the
'confluence' of historically anti-Shiite Deobandi-Wahabi spiritual
coalition. This has pitted a Shiite Iran against them. After the Naqshbandi
addition to this equation, the Central Asian governments too have joined
the anti-Taliban reaction, with Russia at their back, and America inclining
in favour of this formation because of Osama bin Laden.
________

#6.

Asian Age
4 February 2000

Religious fascism is on the rise

By Ashim Chatterjee

That Uttar Pradesh has become the happy hunting ground for the Sangh
Parivar became apparent once again with the unprovoked violence at
Varanasi on the sets of Water, filmmaker Deepa Mehta's latest endeavour.
The film, an Indo-Canadian venture, is the last part of the trilogy
following Fire and Earth and reportedly is based on the lives of Hindu
widows living at Kashi. As per the demand by the law of the land for
foreign-funded films, the necessary clearance for the script of the film
had been obtained along with the assurances from both the Central and
state governments of full co-operation.
Deepa Mehta possibly was not acquainted with the strange and bizarre
ways of the ruling hindutva psychosis. With the formalities over
smoothly, little did she apprehend any mishap when she went on with the
shooting scheduled at Varanasi. But, to her utter surprise, Ms Mehta
found the local BJP leaders along with other Sangh Parivar organisations
under the banner of newly formed Kashi Sanskriti Raksha Sangharsh Samiti
up in arms against her. She had barely completed the mohurat shot of
Water, when the protesters descended on the venue and vandalised the
whole place under the plea that the film would hurt the sentiments of
the Hindus and tarnish the image of Varanasi. Ms Mehta and her crew
somehow managed to escape unhurt. The fact that the film had been
cleared by their central leadership did not cut much ice with the
protesters, most of whom are not even acquainted with the content of the
film. Strange are the ways of the hindutvawallahs these days, especially
in the states ruled by them.
Stranger still, is the behaviour of the state administration. Instead of
punishing the guilty in order to protect and guarantee the democratic
rights of free speech and expression as enshrined in the Constitution,
the administration has asked Ms Mehta to discontinue shooting on the
pretext that the shooting may lead to major law and order problems in
the city! The ugly incident has rightly been condemned by all
right-thinking people all over the country.
One may be tempted to depict, as has been attempted by some BJP leaders,
this vandalism as a spontaneous reaction of local people instead of
being an organised effort by the Sangh Parivar. But facts tell a
different story. As is well known, Ms Mehta does not enjoy any
popularity among the members of the Parivar. Her earlier efforts,
especially Fire, had earned the ire of the hindutva lobby. The decision
to make a film on the Hindu widows had not been welcomed by them. Acts
of vandalism, even when the content of a film is not known, smack of
premeditated action. Moreover, the deafening silence of the central
leadership on the issue is quite eloquent. The demand of a separate
clearance of the script of the film from the state administration is not
compatible with the film policy enunciated by the UP government. All
these point out a prior decision to attack which exposes the intolerance
as well as the real face of the BJP.
That this ugly incident has been condemned squarely is, no doubt, a
welcome development. But is mere condemnation sufficient? Had it been a
stray incident, condemnation would have been proper and sufficient to
prevent its recurrence. But when the Varanasi incident, instead of being
an isolated, stray one, becomes a part of the chain of events taking
place all over the country, the dimension as well as the significance of
the whole incident changes. It, then, points unmistakably to a more
menacing, more ominous writing on the wall. One should not indulge in
the luxury of missing the forest while looking at the trees. It often
becomes suicidal.
In view of the recent developments taking place all over the country,
the Varanasi incident cannot be judged in isolation simply because it is
no isolated phenomenon. It is, in fact, part of a bigger game plan that
is unfolding before our very eyes gradually through a series of events.
Leaving aside, for the present the Pokhran programme and the Kargil
conflict that successfully spread national chauvinism and jingoism
throughout the country, one may try to understand the real significance
of certain utterings made and recent steps taken by the BJP leaders.
=46irst, the chief minister of UP, a prot=E9g=E9 of the central leadership o=
f
the BJP enjoying its unequivocal support and patronage, declared
unabashedly that the UP government, in keeping with the tradition of pe
aceful dismantling of the Babri Masjid would welcome the peaceful
building of the Ram temple at the Babri site. Of course, a hasty denial
came as a routine exercise, but it convinced none.
Second, the Gujarat government has permitted government employees to get
involved in RSS activities. Faced with criticism throughout the country,
the Gujarat government has come out with an adamant declaration that it
would not bow down before any pressure.
Third, the rare perseverance shown by the BJP leadership on the question
of revision of the Constitution by which the reliance on the experts
rather than the elected representatives of the people is a clear pointer
towards the intended dilution of the political process.
=46ourth is the uncalled for enthusiasm to enact stringent methods to
prevent conversion. The Varanasi violence came in the wake of all these
developments, and, as such, cannot be judged isolated from them.
Confronted with these developments, when I raised the question of the
rise of religious fascism in our country, or to be more precise
metamorphosis of communalism into religious fascism, most of my eminent
friends scoffed at me in disbelief. But the uncanny similarity between
the present situation in the country and that of pre-war Germany cannot
be whisked away. Undoubtedly, fascism, a product of developed
capitalism, would take the form of authoritarianism in this land of
limited and perverted capitalist growth. But the identity of political
content cannot be ignored. In fact, prevailing national chauvinism,
jingoism, war against plurality of our society along with the witch-hunt
for the artists etc. are nothing new. It invariably reminds one of
pre-war Germany.
Thus, the Varanasi violence can neither be treated as a mere law and
order problem nor as a failure of the local administration. It, rather,
is a clear pointer to the shape of things to come. An unmistakable
danger signal in the political horizon is emanating from Varanasi.
Ashim Chatterjee is the general-secretary of the Communist Revolutionary
League of India, and a former leader of the Naxalite movement

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SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB DISPATCH (SACW) is an informal, independent &
non-profit citizens wire service run by South Asia Citizens Web
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