[sacw] [ACT] SAANP 21 Jan 00

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asian Against Nukes Post
21 January 2000
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#1. India's red phone: crossed wires
#2. Pakistan's Religious Right is wrong on CTBT
#3. India Pak Arms Race & Militarisation Watch No.8
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#1.
Christian Science Monitor
=46RIDAY, JANUARY 21, 2000
WORLD

INDIA'S RED PHONE: CROSSED WIRES
The US is talking nuclear management this week with both India and Pakistan.

Robert Marquand
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

NEW DELHI
When five masked hijackers took over Indian Airlines flight IC-814 last
month - throwing India and Pakistan into new heights of tension - an hour
went by before anyone told India's prime minister.

Atal Behari Vajpayee was traveling. So in that crucial hour, no decisions
were made, even though the plane first landed on Indian soil. The official
crisis group took hours to meet, and the Indian defense minister was not
called on the scene for three days.

While the story of delay and disunity in crisis is familiar here, the
handling of the hijacking brought more than the usual self-recrimination
and outrage in the news media.

But looking ahead, South Asian experts say recent miscues ought to be a
wake-up call to a greater concern - crisis management between two newly
nuclear neighbors that share great enmity, but which have not yet
fully realized the complexities of a nuclear weapons enterprise.

Indeed, one of the chief nuclear subjects in London this week in the 10th
round of talks between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and
Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh is "command and control" in a
nuclear crisis. US officials still hold out hope in talks that India and
Pakistan will not arm themselves with nuclear weapons. Even if India sticks
to its intent of developing a "minimum credible deterrent" - thought at
first to be a capacity for missile-and-airplane delivered weapons of mass
destruction - the Indian program is still an estimated five to 10 years
from serious deployment.

Still, both states have battlefield-useable nuclear weapons - and in recent
years both states have gone regularly on high alert, as in July when Indian
jets shot down a Pakistani surveillance plane.

"Let's say we are talking a couple years from now ... and suddenly Indian
radar picks up an unidentified plane that is traveling from Lahore,
[Pakistan]," says Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution. "What do you
do? Or what if a hostile plane is not picked up by radar?"

The question, raised by the Dec. 24 hijacking, is not theoretical. In that
case, the hijacked plane traveled from Indian airspace across the border to
Lahore, was denied a landing, and then was forced to turn around and land
just across the border, due to fuel shortages.

Problems beyond hijacking

In the wake of the hijacking, the need for a greater overall competence in
matters of security is articulated by such figures as K. Subrahmanyam, a
key architect of India's nuclear policy. The hijacking "showed signs of
tremendous incompetence," Mr. Subrahmanyam argues. "If you are incompetent
for 364 and a half days a year, how can you expect people to act with
remarkable efficiency for the one hour when it matters?"

In case after case, Subrahmanyam's question applies. When a 150 m.p.h.
cyclone devastated Orissa state last fall, India was going on holiday.
Three days of mayhem elapsed before ministers in New Delhi were seized by
the magnitude of the crisis.

Likewise, weeks passed last spring before the Indian military discovered
that Pakistan-based troops crossed their lines in northern Kashmir. The
resulting fracas, the "Kargil war," became the first serious shooting
conflict between two nuclear powers.

One bottleneck singled out for criticism by former military officials is
the office of Mr. Vajpayee's chief secretary - a position that presently
combines in one job what in the US context would be the White House chief
of staff and the National Security adviser.

Diplomats say that "there is no set group that monitors the news or
potential crises," as a European military attache put it. While the offices
of senior officials often have a computer tuned to news wires, those wires
are often unattended. "When they [officials] go home at night, they are
usually out of touch," the attache says.

The Oct. 13 Pakistani coup, for example, took place in the early evening,
but it was 10:30 p.m. before Indian officials were informed. An off-duty
staffer who was surfing the Internet saw the alert well after the coup was
over. Several foreign embassies in Pakistan whose officers learned of the
coup earlier did not report it to Indian colleagues - thinking Delhi would
already know.

By training and instinct, Indian bureaucrats and civil servants work in an
extremely hierarchical manner - and are famously cautious about taking
action that could later leave them open to scapegoating. In the hijacking
case, when the plane landed in Amritsar there was no official senior enough
to order the plane to be blocked from taking off. "No one wanted to later
be blamed for a fiasco, if things turned out badly," the European official
says.

Civilian control over weapons

At present, relations between civilian and military control of nuclear
weapons is still nascent. India, unlike Pakistan, has a long history of
civilian control of the military, and nuclear weapons are said to be still
in civilian hands. Release of the weapons is strictly limited to orders
between the prime minister and the head of India's Atomic Energy
Commission, Rajagopal Chidambaram.

If the nuclear program spreads and becomes operational, the military will
have to become more involved. But the nuclear doctrine is unclear, says
Gen. V.R. Raghavan, former head of Army military operations. Will the Army,
Navy, and Air Force each control their own weapons? Or will orders be given
by a separate strategic command? India does not have a deputy prime
minister (equivalent to a vice president). And in an era of coalition
politics, (21 parties now form the government), authority for action is
still to be decided.

Moreover, the peacetime assumptions of nuclear policymakers, and the
realities of a crisis so extreme that they could be considered, are often
leagues apart, experts say. In one scenario, for example, India or Pakistan
have slowly escalated into a conventional battlefield war. One side has
taken a huge toll on the other. One way to stop the defeat would be
tactical nuclear weapons - something rationalized in the heat of battle as
logical, yet which could spiral out of control.

"In the past 50 years the West has spent an enormous amount of time working
through the complexities of a nuclear theology and practice," says Thomas
Simons, former US ambassador to Pakistan. "Now the subcontinent in the next
50 will have to face these same questions."

____________

#2.
The Friday Times
21 January 2000

QAZI HUSSAIN AHMAD IS WRONG ON CTBT

Ejaz Haider examines the arguments put forward by the Jama'at-i Islami
against signing the CTBT and argues that they do not stand up to the test
of a rigourous analysis

In response to recent efforts by Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar to create a
national consensus on signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
Qazi Hussain Ahmed Amir of the Jama'at-i Islami wrote an op-ed piece
January 15 in Jang, seeking to explain the Jama'at's opposition to signing
the treaty. One can list the arguments, both tangible and intangible, made
by Qazi Hussain Ahmed thus:

Tangible arguments

=B7CTBT is part of the broader nonproliferation agenda put in place by the
five nuclear weapons states through the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and
is supplemented by the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The agenda
is discriminatory and meant to keep the rest of the world non-nuclear.

=B7The argument that CTBT is a "dead" treaty and therefore signing it would
only bring dividends to Pakistan while not compromising its nuclear
potential is flawed and self-deceptive. Nuclear potential underpins our
nuisance; foregoing that potential will only reduce our status and our
ability to stand up to West's agenda, which seeks to lock the other nations
out of the international system.

=B7Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar argues that signing the CTBT will not affec=
t
our nuclear programme. This is factually incorrect since the CTBT clearly
says that it is the first step to signing the NPT and the FMCT.

=B7If CTBT is indeed "dead", why has the US Senate refused to ratify it? Why
can Pakistan not talk straight and tell the US and other western countries
that since this treaty is dead, there is no reason for Pakistan to sign it?

=B7Since Pakistan does not have the technology to conduct cold tests, and
since testing is necessary for improving weapons design, signing the CTBT
would hurt Pakistan's deterrent capability.

=B7India has a more credible deterrent capability than Pakistan. Moreover,
India does not need to invest in the capability because its security is not
endangered in the same way as Pakistan's.

Intangible arguments

=B7Western powers do not want other countries, especially Muslim countries,
to possess nuclear weapons capability.

=B7Western powers consider Muslim countries as terrorist, fundamentalist and
irresponsible.

=B7The US Administration has allocated US$12 bn for research on biological
weapons. They plan to annihilate all other races, except the European race.
=46or this purpose, US labs are trying to produce germs that can be spread
through missiles.

=B7India has not accepted the existence of Pakistan and still thinks in term=
s
of "Akhand Bharat" (undivided India).

=B7Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar is now trying to "sell" the CTBT despite th=
e
fact that until very recently he was opposed to it. Speaking at the May 21
conference called by the JI on the issue, he had argued against signing the
treaty.

These points give the gist of Qazi Hussain Ahmed's argument. Qazi Sahib
would have been more impressive intellectually if he had not woven the warp
of tangible arguments in the woof of intangible arguments. Consider the
following, beginning with the intangible:

Qazi Sahib's "intangible" is linked to the idea of a grand western
conspiracy against Islam. He looks at the West as a single, monolithic
entity, which is planning to annihilate the other races. Facts point to the
contrary. Just as the Muslim world has never been a monolith, the modern
and complex western world is even less of a monolith. In fact, in terms of
diplomacy and foreign relations, the nation-state still holds on and the
diplomatic interface is still linked to the idea of national interest and
security rather than any civilisational abstraction.

While Qazi Sahib pegs his argument largely on Strobe Talbott's Foreign
Affairs article - an open source - he still considers the issue in
cloak-and-dagger terms. Similarly, he shifts his argument from the West's
discrimination to India's enmity with Pakistan to Israel's collusion with
the US. Moreover, if discrimination is indeed the rule of the game, Qazi
Sahib need not speak of it as if the West has sought to hide it. There are
innumerable open sources, which point to this fact and all of them emanate
from the West itself.

Qazi Sahib says the US Administration has allocated US$12 bn to wage
biological war on the non-European races. This is factually untrue, not
least because the US is a signatory and ratifier of the BWC (Biological
Weapons Convention), the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and the Geneva
Protocol. What is true is that the Administration has allocated money for
further research and development in the sphere of defense, an act that has
been criticised by many within the US.

=46oreign Minister Abdus Sattar cannot be faulted for now supporting a treat=
y
he had earlier opposed. He has already explained his position in regard to
both positions and the matter should rest there. The manner in which it is
being highlighted seems to cast aspersions on his person, which is an
uncalled for exercise. Signing or not signing the treaty is an issue and
should not involve personalities.

Now, to the tangible arguments:

It is wrong to sell the CTBT as a nondiscriminatory treaty. While it is
all-pervasive - unlike the NPT - and does not distinguish between the
nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states, it remains
discriminatory (a) because it freezes the capability at the existing levels
(Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea); (b) serves to further throw a
net around the NNWSs to keep them out of the exclusive club; and (c) still
allows the advanced NWSs to conduct cold tests to continue improving the
weapon design and create and test new weapons.

However, Qazi Sahib's objection to the treaty on that count is woven around
his expansive pan-Islamic vision and the idea of civilisational conflicts.
Realistically speaking, Pakistan, like other countries, has to operate not
on the basis of abstractions but realpolitik. In that sense, diplomacy is
the art of the "negotiable" and does not follow a clear-cut linear course.
The issue has to be therefore treated on the basis of what is good at the
given time and under the given circumstances rather than on the basis of
some universal morality or grand idea. That is where double standards and
compromises come in. For instance, for India and Pakistan, after having
become nuclear powers, there is now a vested interest in preventing
horizontal proliferation. That is an area of convergence rather than
conflict between Pakistan and the US.

Quite clearly, it will not be in the interest of Pakistan to have another
nuclear-armed Muslim country unless such a development were to fulfill
Pakistan's strategic objectives. Even if Qazi Sahib's pan-Islamic
(civilisational) thesis were to be accepted, the Muslim civilisation would
need a "core state" (history proves that) to guide its destiny. Would he
not look at Pakistan as that core state? If that is true, would he not
desire, quite objectively, for Pakistan to have the capability to play that
role? Evidently, such a role would mean that Pakistan must not just be
primus inter pares but have a superior capability. That would automatically
bring in the concept of discrimination. Even if all Muslim countries were
to be considered equal in a mythical Islamic bloc, then too policy
formulation and implementation would require unity. Such unity could only
be maintained if one country was more unequal than others.

One has also to assess whether (a) further testing is indeed an option
available to Pakistan (or India), given the fact that nonproliferation is
an agenda pursued not just by the Club of Five but also all the NNWSs that
are signatories to the NPT. France drew severe criticism when it tested in
1996 just prior to the CTBT. The US Senate might have refused to ratify the
CTBT but the US already has a moratorium on testing.

Qazi Sahib must realise that the 1995 quinquennial NPT review conference
extended that treaty indefinitely, rejecting India's "moral" objections to
the nonproliferation agenda. This was done primarily by the non-nuclear
weapons states. It was that surprise experience and the 1996 CTBT, which
forced India's hand into testing. Even today, while the US has accepted the
reality of South Asia's nuclearisation, it is the non-nuclear weapons
states' bloc that is still opposed to the nuclearisation of South Asia.

Pakistan never objected to the NPT or the CTBT on any "moral" grounds. Its
traditional stand was, and remains, that while it adheres to the
nonproliferation norm, it cannot go out on a limb and sign these treaties
unilaterally because of security considerations. When Qazi Sahib objects to
the Western agenda, he fails to take into account the universal consensus
on nonproliferation. The cutting edge of that consensus, in moral terms,
are not the NWSs but the NNWSs. That is why Indian strategists are more
afraid of the NNWSs at the March 2000 NPT review conference than they are
of the NWSs.

As mentioned, far from not accepting the reality of Pakistan's nuclear
capability, the US has in fact accepted the nuclearisation of South Asia.
To the extent that Washington now wants to control damage, it is as much
concerned about India's nuclear programme as it is about Pakistan's - not
in terms of reversing it but in terms of preventing a nuclear arms race
between the two countries. Moreover, Washington realises that it cannot
deal with India and Pakistan on the basis of a single-point agenda. The
goalposts have constantly shifted since Talbott wrote his Foreign Affairs
article. Even then, while talking of the NPT, he had conceded that it was a
long-term objective and it would be unrealistic for the US to expect India
or Pakistan to sign the NPT. That view has undergone further change and
efforts are now on to create a special niche for India (and perhaps
Pakistan if it plays its cards well) which can allow it the benefits of an
NWS without fulfilling the de jure needs under the NPT.

Qazi Sahib's reference to the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty) is
also preemptive. Pakistan has stated its position on the FMCT negotiations
clearly. It would prefer to negotiate an FMT (Fissile Material Treaty)
rather than a cut-off treaty, which puts it at a disadvantage vis-=E0-vis
India. There is no reason why facts should be fudged in this regard.

The linkage of Pakistan's nuclear potential with Kashmir and calling upon
the US to act morally on that issue also puts an idealistic construct on
the reality of state craft. Not only does it overlook the concept of
national interest as the determinant of state policies, it also implies
that while Pakistan's nuclear potential can make other people listen to,
and heed its demands, India's nuclear potential would not allow it to do
the same; even more, that despite being a nuclear power New Delhi would
find itself weak enough to let go of Kashmir after having clung to it for
52 years. If nuclear capability allows Pakistan a deterrent, it provides
the same benefit to India. It has been argued - in favour of retaining the
nuclear capability - that if Pakistan possessed the capability in 1971, it
would not have lost East Pakistan to India. That logic could equally be
applied to India vis-=E0-vis Kashmir. It can be argued - indeed has been -
that nuclearisation of South Asia has served to freeze the national
frontiers. That essentially means neither India nor Pakistan can try to do
with each other what India could, and did, to Pakistan in 1971.

Evidently, then, Qazi Sahib has to realise Pakistan's limitations. He must
also understand that at least for now the nonproliferation norm holds
despite its discrimination. And what makes it work "morally" is the
acceptance of this discrimination by the NNWS. They do not want
proliferation and they continue with their efforts to convince the NWSs to
disarm. To that extent, India and Pakistan are not just pitted against the
US.

However, one wonders if Qazi Sahib really wants to debate the issue within
the framework in which nation-states traditionally work, bargain, and make
compromises. One hopes this is not the case because he heads a party that
comprises intelligent and patriotic cadres. As head of the Jama'at, he
introduced young blood in the party and has sought to institute changes
that have sometimes not gone down well with the JI old guard. Since there
is no doubt that he has Pakistan's best interest at heart, one hopes he
would appreciate the necessity to look at these things with greater
sophistication than has been evinced so far. The Jama'at has not been
averse to making compromises in domestic politics without necessarily
undermining its basic principles. Why should it treat diplomacy any
differently and force Pakistan into international isolation? That would
only give further ammunition to India.
____________

#3.

India Pak Arms Race & Militarisation Watch No.8
21 January 2000
----------------------------
[1.]
Jane's Defence Weekly
http://jdw.janes.com
Vol 33 No 3
19 January 2000

- India and Myanmar look to bury years of distrust
A landmark exchange of military visits earlier this month indicates a
warming of relations between India and Myanmar, following years of
distrust that have verged on open hostility.

- India drops plan to upgrade its Sea Harrier fleet
The Indian Navy has abandoned plans to upgrade its fleet of around 23
Sea Harrier fighters and will use the money allocated for the project
to buy Russian MiG-29Ks for its aviation wing.

------
[2.]
Rediff On The NeT
January 19, 2000

Viraat to be armed with 'Baraak' anti-missile system

George Iype in Kochi

India's only aircraft carrier, INS Viraat will be fitted with the
Israeli-made Barak anti-missile systems, one of the best and highly
sophisticated self-defence missile systems in the world.

INS Viraat is now undergoing major refit works at the Cochin Shipyard
Limited to extend its serviceability and seaworthiness to at least the year
2010. It has left the Indian Navy without a serviceable aircraft carrier.

But the first phase of the renovations on INS Viraat is almost complete at
the Shipyard and the vessel will soon move to the Bombay Naval Dockyard for
the installation of the Barak anti-missile system, Indian Navy officials
disclosed.

Viraat was originally commissioned in the Royal Navy as the HMS Hermes in
1959. The Indian Navy purchased the vessel in 1986 and commissioned it into
the Navy in 1987. Currently Viraat is defenceless against any missile
attacks and thus has to solely rely on the air defence missiles of its
escort ships. Therefore, Navy sources said, a decision has been taken to
install in Viraat the Barak modular missile along with a new sensor package
and early warning radar for long range surveillance.

The development of the Barak missile by the Israeli industry and the Navy
began 12 years ago. It can destroy attacking missiles and can target and
attack airborne targets such as aircraft, unmanned aircraft and various
bombs. It can also damage enemy ships.

The vertically launched Barak is an anti-missile system that can lock on
to and destroy incoming sea-skimming missiles up to a range of 15 km.

After the second phase of refitting in Bombay, Viraat will be seaworthy
almost for the next ten years. But officials point out that the rapidly
depleting submarine fleet and the absence of a major warship has made the
Indian Navy "a vulnerable force."

The current power of India's naval aviation rests solely on the aged
Viraat. In the last one decade, the Navy has not been able to place a
single order for a major warship due to budgetary constraints and
bureaucratic delays. The Navy at present possesses only 16 operational
vessels and its destroyer and frigate fleet is just 13 ships strong.

The Navy has been actively pursuing a few options to replace Viraat. They
included buying and refitting the Gorshkov from Russia, building of a new
vessel similar to either the French Charles de Gaulle or the Italian
Garibaldi.

Last year, negotiation between the defence ministry and Russia to buy
Gorshkov, the 44,000-tonne Russian aircraft carrier succeeded as India
agreed to pay an unspecified amount for its three-year refit and induction.

But Navy officials say buying Gorshkov for a little over its scrap value
does not equip the Indian Navy the way it wants. Moreover, the Russian
aircraft carrier will be ready for use only in three years.

While the Navy has been demanding that it needs at least 25 destroyer and
frigate ships to guard the country's 7516-kilometre long coastline,
successive governments have either kept quite or have prolonged crucial
decisions.

But to offset its rapidly depleting fleet, last year the Atal Bihari
Vajpayee government sanctioned an off-the-shelf purchase of ships and
submarines. As per this plan, the defence ministry has already placed an
order with a Russian shipyard for three Project 1135.6 modified Krivak III
frigates.

India has also recently bought two 'Kilo' class submarines and three
frigates from Russia. "But these purchases are too little to maintain
adequate force levels in the sea," a senior Navy officer stationed in the
Southern Naval Command told rediff.com.

He said the Navy is now facing new threats, referring to Pakistan's
acquisition of three Harpoon missile armed P3C Orion maritime patrol cum
strike aircraft last year. "We need to immediately purchase a long-range
maritime strike aircraft," the officer pointed out.

[3.]
Chinese Firm Licensed to operate Pak nukeplant
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/subcont.htm#story15

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